The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century

by Michael N Forster

  34.2 THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: HERDER AND KANT AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR A DYNAMIZATION OF THE WORLDVIEW

  Before the term evolution in Germany gains its mainly biological connotations it is used together with the German word Entwicklung to express the two abstract denotations of the Latin ‘evolvere’2 or ‘explicare’. The German word Entwicklung and the German rendering of evolution3 as ‘Explikation’ can therefore from the seventeenth century on connote either the ontological neo-Platonic idea of an ‘unfolding’ of the ‘One’ or the Absolute Being into different manifestations or the epistemological unfolding of the implications and deductions derived from a given thought or concept.4 The word Evolution acquires its mainly biological meaning at the end of the seventeenth century in Germany in the context of embryology, referring to the development of an egg-cell into a full-grown organism. The word is used as a technical term in the debates over embryology in the mid-eighteenth century to refer to the idea of an unfolding ‘predetermined’ mode of development (preformationism), in opposition to the doctrine of epigenesis, which argues for the creation of unpredetermined novelty.5

  The early philosophical concepts of Evolution and Entwicklung in the eighteenth century, however, are closely linked to the organic model of a more or less fixed harmonic or teleological development following the paradigm of preordained germination in biology. The purposiveness of organisms does not, it seems, allow for a random or chaotic development or radical novelty. Accordingly, in relation to cultural development the idea of a preordained development according to a divine providence is prevalent in German thinking from the eighteenth until the mid-nineteenth century, following the paradigmatic ideas of a guided cultural development explored in Lessing’s The Education of the Human Race, 1777–80.

  To evaluate the debate about evolution and Entwicklung in Germany in the nineteenth century Herder’s and Kant’s prominent ideas on development and evolution in nature and culture should be recalled as the two most influential starting points. Herder discusses the origin of human language (Treatise on the Origin of Language, 1772) and speculates in his This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity (1774) about the origin of all human races from one single couple, sketching a vision of cultural development that attacks the overemphasis on the rationalism of his times. Neither enlightenment, nor science, nor reason, are the driving forces of cultural development, but fate, nature, passion, and drives. Herder stresses that the plurality of cultures should not be measured by one standard and dismisses the idea of a linear cultural progress towards one civilization as the ultimate aim of development. Nevertheless, Herder’s vision of cultural evolution is still traditional in at least one sense: he repeatedly hints at a divine providence behind the seemingly blind and chaotic development (Herder uses the word ‘Entwicklung’ and biological metaphors of germination throughout the book). His later work Outlines of the Philosophy of the History of Man (1784–91) stresses in a similar fashion the common more universal patterns of the individual development of nature and culture and emphasizes the importance of the laws of cultural development. Herder thus popularizes the idea of a dynamic development of culture in Germany.

  The importance of Kant lies, firstly, in the hypothesis of a dynamic evolution of the universe that he proposes in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens in 1755. Kant suggests that the origin of the stellar systems might itself be explained by an evolutionary development of cosmic nebulae. Thereby Kant strengthens the conviction that even the laws ordering the planetary system are not eternal, but a product in time of an overall development of the cosmos. This at least implicitly prefigures the view that any seemingly ‘eternal’ stability is a result of a dynamic and somewhat chaotic process. It is now possible to conceive—within the limits of an overall stability according to first laws—of a much more dynamic development in nature than was previously thought of by natural philosophers. Kant thereby takes an important first step towards a dynamization of the model of (mechanical) nature.

  Secondly, Kant is influential in his later separation of the realm of nature and the realm of freedom: a separation he draws in order to reconcile the deterministic causal view of Newtonian science and the ethical self-interpretation of man. From the Critique of Pure Reason onwards Kant emphasizes the necessity of interpreting empirical nature in terms of causality, making it a constitutive principle of empirical reasoning. Thus Kant extends the realm of ‘mechanical natural science’, following his early trust in Newtonian physics, and rejects the idea of evoking God or supernatural causes as an explanation for natural events. In the Critique of Judgment Kant argues that a mere theoretical perspective on organic nature can acknowledge the internal purposiveness (in modern words, teleonomy) of organisms, but it cannot give empirical reasons why organisms or even man should be considered a (final) purpose of nature. Kant hereby, long before Darwin, destroys the naive teleological thinking that prevailed, for example, in the English tradition following Paley’s ideas.6 Far from being a proof of God’s design, much of this external teleology in the organic realm (to assume, for example, that plants are created as food for herbivores etc.) are random or even silly reflections.7 But most importantly, even assuming that some events or objects are in fact extrinsically purposive (for the existence of man or other ‘aims’ one might ascribe to nature) or intrinsically purposive (i.e. they show a functional design), the question of its causal genesis as a phenomenon of nature must still be answered.

  In regard to the development of organisms, Kant claims that a natural origin of biological ‘organization’ cannot be conceived of by human reason: there will never be a ‘Newton of the blade of grass’.8 Kant, however, also hints at the ‘daring adventure’ of a naturalist perspective which envisions an evolutionary origin and transmutation of all organisms as a conceptual possibility, but rejects it due to the lack of evidence.9

  Kant influentially states that all functional biological ‘organization’ must be explained as stemming from prior organisms: structure is given via inheritance to the next generation. Kant is even willing to admit that advocating a mere Evolution (understood in the embryology of his time as a predetermined unfolding of given structures) is not enough. Kant opts in favour of Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb10 (nisus formativus) and of epigenesis: a more active and creative mode of development. However, the problem of the initial origin of this power of organic development and self-formation remains (Critique of Judgment, A 128).

  The separation of the theoretical and practical perspectives with all their aforementioned implications, together with Herder’s dynamic ideas about cultural evolution, are the starting point for the debate about nature and culture in the philosophies of the nineteenth century.

  34.3 FICHTE

  The nineteenth century sees a broadening in the meaning of the term evolution. The stricter usage to denote preformationism in embryology that was still prevalent in Kant’s writing gets left behind: it is widened to denote the overall transformation of organisms and species and is used in this way at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Christian Gottfried Daniel Nees von Esenbeck, Julien Joseph Virey, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Charles Lyell.11

  In Fichte, a genuine philosophy of nature—and therefore systematic speculations about natural evolution—are virtually absent because Fichte’s philosophical focus lies on the primacy of the perspective of practical reason over theoretical reason. Because of this, even if the Naturlehre (Science of Nature) forms a part of his Wissenschaftslehre (Science of Knowing), this part was never elaborated further. Strongly prioritizing the theoretical perspective might lead to an overall determinism that contradicts the experience of freedom. Determinism, Fichte states, might satisfy the intellect but it cannot satisfy ‘the heart’ (Fichte, The Vocation of Man, 1800). Fichte follows Kant in proclaiming that we must understand the development of human culture from the perspective of freedom and acknowledge that humans are in essence not m
erely a part of the Sinneswelt (empirical realm), that is, they have a purpose which reaches beyond nature12. Fichte argues that it would be self-contradictory to deny our ability to free ourselves from natural predispositions in order to make reasonable judgments. The vocation of man is to develop his autonomous self-knowledge, something that cannot be conceived of as a merely external natural process, but can only be man’s own task: ‘[D]‌ie eigentliche Bestimmung des Menschengeschlechts auf der Erde ist, daß es mit Freiheit sich zu dem mache, was es eigentlich ursprünglich ist’13 (‘The genuine vocation of mankind on earth is to transform itself with freedom to that what it genuinely originally is’).

  Fichte elaborates in his Characteristics of the Present Age (1806) a philosophy of cultural history where history as a philosophical concept unfolds between the opposites of pure culture (‘reine Kultur’) and untamed wildness, that is, it should be reconstructed as the progress of a ‘Kulturvolk’ (civilized nation) standing in opposition to uncivilized ‘wild’ man. The development of mankind moves over several stages from heteronomy to freedom, from a mere ‘Vernunftinstinkt’ (instinct of reason) via ages ‘of sinfulness’ towards a future age of the rule of reason (‘Vernunftherrschaft’). Already earlier works, such as the Vocation of Man 1800 and similar The Closed Commercial State 1800, proclaim a society based on reason (‘Vernunftstaat’), perpetual peace, and the realization of the intelligible realm in the form of morality (‘Sittlichkeit’) as the goal of human culture. In 1806 Fichte stresses Christianity as one decisive factor in the cultural development. Christianity is interpreted as a religion that fosters belief in individual freedom and universal equality. Fichte therefore in his theory of cultural development follows the Kantian motif of a winding road of cultural progress towards freedom. Fichte thus connects the philosophy of history with metaphysics and the philosophy of religion: Herder’s earlier interplay of cultural development and God’s Providence is deepened in Fichte’s philosophy of history in a way that foreshadows Hegel’s and Schelling’s approach to cultural history. Fichte, as mentioned, never elaborated a philosophy of nature, but in his posthumous Diary on Animal Magnetism (1835) he struggles with the idea of a ‘physicalization’ of his idealism (‘Physicierung des Idealismus’).14 He notes, in accordance with Schelling’s philosophy of nature, that any idealistic approach would necessarily lead to a dynamic picture of nature: ‘Dies eben ist der Unterschied eines idealistischen Natursystems, daß es dynamisch sei’15 (‘The difference of an idealistic system of nature is, in fact, that it is dynamic’).

  34.4 SCHELLING AND ROMANTICISM

  Schelling and Hegel both advocate the programme of a genuine Naturphilosophie as a crucial element of their ‘absolute’ or ‘objective Idealism’. The common goal is to achieve a unity between the two separated Kantian perspectives: the practical focus on freedom and the theoretical perspective on nature. Their common answer to this task leads to three major implications: a dynamic concept of ‘the Absolute’, a dynamic picture of nature and cultural development, and most importantly a reintegration of their own philosophical stance in the process of the history of thought and philosophy: thus the philosophical reflection on nature, culture, and development itself must be understood as a part of the evolution of human thought. This evolution, culminating in philosophy, constitutes for Hegel and Schelling a part of the ‘unfolding’ of the ‘absolute spirit’, and the manifestation of God or the Absolute in the world becomes a dynamic process encompassing nature and mind.

  Schelling’s philosophy of nature is dynamic insofar as he interprets the whole of nature as a system of polar opposites and their reconciliation (Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 1797/18032, On the World-Soul, 1798, 18062, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, 1799: here Schelling explicitly aims at achieving a ‘dynamic philosophy’). These paired oppositions aiming at balance appear again on each level of natural organization. Nature, for Schelling, possesses an original productivity: an infinite tendency towards idealization and organization that at the same time is counterbalanced by a force of inhibition, thus leading to an ascending chain of different realms of natural organization. Schelling delineates the movement from inorganic to organic nature culminating in human spirit. With human thinking a new cultural evolution starts that aims at absolute self-knowledge: spirit recognizes itself as the basic principle of all reality, first in the mode of intuitive knowledge in myths and in religion, and later in the conceptual knowledge of philosophy (System of Transcendental Idealism, 1800; Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, 1856–8).

  The overall evolution of nature is thus integrated in an overall unfolding of the Absolute, already in Schelling’s earlier writings, but quite explicitly so in his later ‘positive philosophy’. Development within nature, however, is due to natural causes and should be understood from the polar principles of nature. But these principles themselves are an expression of an absolute structure (labelled ‘Weltseele’, world-soul, in 1798) unfolding in nature. Thus the two opposing perspectives, Transzendentalphilosophie and Naturphilosophie, are unified (see also Bruno, 1802). The perspective of natural science—looking for natural laws and causes—and the philosophical stance of freedom that Schelling inherits from Kant and Fichte are brought into a unity. Looking at nature, Schelling proclaims early on that the abstract mechanical views of nature have to be complemented by views that employ the higher concepts of natural ‘organization’. From here, mechanical nature can be reintegrated in a holistic organic schema of nature, whereas starting from mere mechanical principles alone cannot explain organic nature (On the World Soul, 1798). The opposition of mechanism and organicism can therefore be overcome, once we understand that the same polar principles can be found throughout nature as a whole.

  From this starting point, Schelling can focus on the continuities in nature, which he does in relation to the question of the origin of life from inorganic or chemical processes. Schelling also alludes to Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb, but he clearly rejects versions of it that would reduce it to a mere ‘occult quality’. He points out the circularity of postulating an autonomous life force that would have to bring life into existence, but that is also already dependent on the existence of life forms. Furthermore, he embraces the idea of an overall continuous development of organic species, using the German word Evolution for his views:16 the chain of different organic beings might have been brought forth by the gradual dynamic unfolding (Entwicklung) of one and the same type of organization. Even if we never observe such a transmutation of species, this might only be due to the fact that we can only observe natural development in very limited amounts of time.17 Even if Schelling later (in his First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature18) rejects the idea of an overall alteration of species, in On the World Soul we clearly find a view of a productive and evolving nature.19 Similar to Fichte and Kant, for Schelling the goal of self-organization in nature is freedom: a form of causality that connects autonomy and necessity and which is the hallmark of spirit. Schelling’s conception of a dynamic process of nature therefore conforms to the idea of unfolding (Entwicklung): ‘Die erscheinende Natur (…) gebiert nur sukzessiv und in endlosen Entwicklungen (…), was in der wahren zumal und auf ewige Weise ist’20 (‘The appearing nature only gives birth successively and in an infinite development to that which exists in the true nature in an eternal way’). Schelling explicitly states in The Ages of the World that Entwicklung (unfolding) always presupposes Einwicklung (infolding).21

  Schelling’s approach to nature, together with Goethe’s influential ideas about an idealistic unity of nature, strongly influenced the Romanticism of Schelling’s Jenaer friends and colleagues, especially August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, and Ludwig Tieck. Schelling and Goethe’s aesthetic view of nature and Goethe’s biological writings also had an impact on the idealism of German zoology and botany. The Romantic philosophy of nature searches for a unity of forms and principles in nature. It conceives of the plurality in nature and the organic realm
as variations of ideas or archetypes. These variations in natural phenomena could be understood as nature’s playful alterations from their archetypes, or as a real ongoing and dynamic process of transformation. Goethe, looking for intermediate forms in nature, discovered the inter-maxillary bone in humans and searched for the Urpflanze, the archetypal plant from which all other plants could be derived, further suggesting that within the development of a plant all stages are a variation from one structure, the leaf. Goethe, together with Schelling, thus popularizes the idea of a ‘Metamorphose’ as a basic principle in nature (see Goethe’s The Metamorphosis of Plants [Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären, 1790]).

  Some scholars, especially Robert Richards22 and Philipp Sloan,23 link this overall dynamic view of nature and the search for common archetypes of Romanticism to Darwin’s views. Richards24 argues that Schelling and Goethe actually contemplated a transmutation of species. Richards and Sloan25 suggest that Darwin himself was in fact influenced by German Romanticism. Darwin studied Alexander von Humboldt’s Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent (1852) and was aware of the work of German physiologist and painter Carl Gustav Carus, a disciple of Goethe. Richards further links Richard Owen’s morphological studies (On the Nature of Limbs, 1849)26 via Carus to German biology.27