Decision Points

by George W. Bush

  Other leaders had a different outlook. Vladimir Putin didn’t consider Saddam a threat. It seemed to me that part of the reason was Putin didn’t want to jeopardize Russia’s lucrative oil contracts. France also had significant economic interests in Iraq. I was not surprised when Jacques Chirac told me he would support intrusive weapons inspections but cautioned against threatening military force. The problem with his logic was that without a credible threat of force, the diplomacy would be toothless once again.

  With Jacques Chirac (left) and Vladimir Putin. White House/Eric Draper

  One of the toughest leaders to figure out was Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany. I met with Gerhard five times in 2001. He was relaxed, affable, and interested in strengthening our bilateral relationship. I appreciated his leadership on Afghanistan, especially his willingness to host the loya jirga in Bonn.

  I discussed Iraq with Gerhard during his visit to the White House on January 31, 2002. In my State of the Union address two days earlier, I had outlined the threats posed by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world,” I said. The media seized on the phrase “axis of evil.” They took the line to mean that the three countries had formed an alliance. That missed the point. The axis I referred to was the link between the governments that pursued WMD and the terrorists who could use those weapons. There was a larger point in the speech that no one could miss: I was serious about dealing with Iraq.

  In a small Oval Office meeting, joined by Condi Rice and Andy Card, I told the German chancellor I was determined to make diplomacy work. I hoped he would help. I also assured him our words would not be empty. The military option was my last choice, but I would use it if necessary.

  “What is true of Afghanistan is true of Iraq,” he said. “Nations that sponsor terror must face consequences. If you make it fast and make it decisive, I will be with you.”

  I took that as a statement of support. But when the German elections arrived later that year, Schroeder had a different take. He denounced the possibility of using force against Iraq. His justice minister said, “Bush wants to divert attention from domestic political problems. … Hitler also did that.” I was shocked and furious. It was hard to think of anything more insulting than being compared to Hitler by a German official. I continued to work with Gerhard Schroeder on areas of mutual interest. But as someone who valued personal diplomacy, I put a high premium on trust. Once that trust was violated, it was hard to have a constructive relationship again.

  Two months after 9/11, I asked Don Rumsfeld to review the existing battle plans for Iraq. We needed to develop the coercive half of coercive diplomacy.

  Don tasked General Tommy Franks with updating the plans. Just after Christmas 2001, Tommy came to Crawford to brief me on Iraq. The plan on the shelf required a six-month buildup and four hundred thousand troops. The experience in Afghanistan was at the forefront of our minds. Thanks to new technology and innovative planning, we had destroyed the Taliban and closed the al Qaeda camps using far fewer troops. We were not viewed as occupiers by the Afghan people.

  Tommy told the national security team that he was working to apply the same concept of a light footprint to Iraq. He envisioned a fast invasion from Kuwait in the south, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the west, and Turkey in the north. “If we have multiple, highly skilled Special Operations Forces identifying targets for precision-guided munitions, we will need fewer conventional ground forces,” he said. “That’s an important lesson learned from Afghanistan.”

  I had a lot of concerns. I wanted to know how fast our troops could move and what kind of basing we would need. As in Afghanistan, I was concerned about starvation of the local population and asked what we could do to protect innocent life. I worried about Saddam sabotaging the oil fields or firing missiles at Israel. My biggest fear was that he would use biological or chemical weapons against our troops, our allies, or Iraqi civilians.

  I asked the team to keep working on the plan. “We should remain optimistic that diplomacy and international pressure will succeed in disarming the regime,” I said at the end of the meeting. “But we cannot allow weapons of mass destruction to fall into the hands of terrorists. I will not allow that to happen.”

  Between December 2001 and August 2002, I met or spoke with Tommy more than a dozen times. The plan was getting better, but I wasn’t satisfied. I wanted to make sure we had thought through as many contingencies as possible. I asked Don and Tommy a lot of questions that started with “What if Saddam decides to … ?” One scenario I brought up frequently was Saddam consolidating his forces in Baghdad and engaging our troops in bloody urban combat. I remembered the battle in Somalia in 1993 and did not want to see that repeated in Iraq. Tommy and his team didn’t have all the answers on the spot, and I didn’t expect them to. But they were working hard to refine the plan, and every iteration they brought me was an improvement on the previous version.

  The updated plan Tommy presented in the Situation Room on August 5, 2002, resolved several key concerns. We had lined up basing and overflight permission from leaders in the Gulf. Tommy had devised a plan for Special Operations to secure suspected WMD sites, Iraq’s southern oil fields, and Scud missile launchers. He had also designed a massive aerial bombardment that would make it costly for Saddam’s elite Republican Guard units to remain in the capital, reducing the chances of a Fortress Baghdad scenario. “Mr. President,” Tommy said in his Texas drawl, “this is going to be shock and awe.”

  There were plenty of issues left to resolve. We all worried about the possibility of Saddam launching a biological or chemical attack on our troops, so the military was in the process of procuring hazmat suits. We had gradually increased the level of troops and equipment in Kuwait under the guise of training and other routine exercises, which would make it possible to begin combat operations rapidly if I gave the order to launch. Joint Chiefs Chairman Dick Myers talked about the importance of persuading Turkey to open its territory so we could establish a northern front. George Tenet raised concern about a broader regional war in which Syria attacked Israel, or Iran directed its proxy terrorist group, Hezbollah, to foment instability. Don Rumsfeld pointed out that a war could destabilize Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that America could get stuck in a manhunt for Saddam, and that Iraq could fracture after liberation.

  Those potential scenarios were sobering. But so were the briefings we were receiving. A report in July read, “Iraq has managed to preserve and in some cases even enhance the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production.” Another briefing warned that Saddam’s regime was “almost certainly working to produce the causative agent for anthrax along with botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin.” It continued: “Unmanned aerial vehicles give Baghdad a more lethal means to deliver biological … weapons.” It went on, ominously, “Experience shows that Saddam produces weapons of mass destruction to use, not just to deter.”

  In the summer of 2002, I received a startling piece of news. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an al Qaeda–affiliated terrorist who had experimented with biological weapons in Afghanistan, was operating a lab in northeastern Iraq. “Suspect facility in this area may be producing poisons and toxins for terrorist use,” the briefing read. “Al-Zarqawi is an active terrorist planner who has targeted U.S. and Israeli interests: Sensitive reporting from a [classified] service indicates that al-Zarqawi has been directing efforts to smuggle an unspecified chemical material originating in northern Iraq into the United States.”

  We couldn’t say for sure whether Saddam knew Zarqawi was in Iraq. We did have intelligence indicating that Zarqawi had spent two months in Baghdad receiving medical treatment and that other al Qaeda operatives had moved to Iraq. The CIA had worked with a major Arab intelligence service to get Saddam to find and extradite Zarqawi. He refused.

  The question was whether to bomb the poisons lab in the summer of 2002. We held a series of NSC meetings on the topic. General
Dick Myers talked through the options: Tomahawk missiles, a B-2 bomber strike, or a covert ground raid. Dick Cheney and Don saw Zarqawi as a clear threat and argued that taking him out would reinforce the doctrine that America would not tolerate safe havens for terror.

  Colin and Condi felt a strike on the lab would create an international firestorm and disrupt our efforts to build a coalition to confront Saddam—especially our attempt to recruit Turkey, which was highly sensitive about any activity in northeastern Iraq. “This would be viewed as a unilateral start to the war in Iraq,” Colin said.

  I faced a dilemma. If America was hit with a biological attack from Iraq, I would be responsible for not having taken out the threat when we had the chance. On the other hand, bombing the camp could undermine diplomacy and trigger a military conflict.

  I told the intelligence community to keep a close eye on the facility. For the time being, I decided to continue on the diplomatic track. But one thing was clear to me: Iraq was a serious threat growing more dangerous by the day.

  I spent much of August 2002 in Crawford, a good place to reflect on the next decision I faced: how to move forward on the diplomatic track.

  One option was to seek a UN resolution calling on Saddam to readmit weapons inspectors. The other was to issue an ultimatum demanding that he disarm—and rally a coalition to remove him if he did not comply.

  From a legal standpoint, a resolution was unnecessary. Three years earlier, President Clinton and our NATO allies had removed the dictator Slobodan Milosevic from power in Serbia without an explicit UN resolution. Dick and Don argued we didn’t need one for Iraq, either. After all, we already had sixteen. They believed that going to the UN would trigger a long bureaucratic process that would leave Saddam even more dangerous.

  I shared that concern. On the other hand, almost every ally I consulted—even staunch advocates of confronting Saddam like Prime Minister John Howard of Australia—told me a UN resolution was essential to win public support in their countries.

  Colin agreed. The day before I left for Crawford, I asked him to meet with me privately in the Treaty Room. Colin was more passionate than I had seen him at any NSC meeting. He told me a UN resolution was the only way to get any support from the rest of the world. He went on to say that if we did take out Saddam, the military strike would be the easy part. Then, as Colin put it, America would “own” Iraq. We would be responsible for helping a fractured country rebuild. I listened carefully and shared Colin’s concern. It was another reason I hoped that diplomacy would work.

  That summer, the possibility of war had become an all-consuming news story in Washington. Reporters asked frequently whether I had a war plan on my desk.

  On August 15, I opened the Wall Street Journal to find a column by Brent Scowcroft, Dad’s national security adviser. It was headlined “Don’t Attack Saddam.” Brent argued that war with Iraq would distract from the war on terror and could unleash “an Armageddon in the Middle East.” His conclusion was that we should “be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq.”

  That was a fair recommendation. But I was angry that Brent had chosen to publish his advice in the newspaper instead of sharing it with me. I called Dad. “Son, Brent is a friend,” he assured me. That might be true. But I knew critics would later exploit Brent’s article if the diplomatic track failed.

  Some in Washington speculated that Brent’s op-ed was Dad’s way of sending me a message on Iraq. That was ridiculous. Of all people, Dad understood the stakes. If he thought I was handling Iraq wrong, he damn sure would have told me himself.

  On Saturday, September 7, 2002, I convened a meeting of the national security team at Camp David to finalize my decision on the resolution. Fifty-one weeks earlier, we had gathered in Laurel Lodge to plan the war in Afghanistan. Now we sat in the same room trying to find a way to remove the threat in Iraq without war.

  I gave everyone on the team a chance to make their arguments. Dick Cheney recommended that we restate the case against Saddam, give him thirty to sixty days to come clean, and then disarm him by force if he refused to comply. “It is time to act,” Dick said. “We can’t delay for another year. … An inspection regime does not solve our problem.”

  Colin pushed for the UN resolution. “If we take the case to the UN, we can get allies to join. If not, it will be hard to act unilaterally. We won’t have the international support we need to execute the military plan.”

  After listening to the options one last time, I made a decision: We would seek a resolution. “There’s ambiguity in the international community’s view of Saddam,” I said, “and we need to clear it up. Either he will come clean about his weapons, or there will be war.”

  I told the team I would deliver that message in a speech to the United Nations the following week. I would remind the UN that Saddam’s defiance was a threat to the credibility of the institution. Either the words of the Security Council would be enforced, or the UN would exist only as a useless international body like the League of Nations.

  Tony Blair came to dinner that night at Camp David. He was pleased when I told him I was planning to ask the UN for the resolution. “Many opponents wish we would just be unilateral—then they could complain,” he said. “But you are calling their bluff.”

  We both understood what the decision meant. Once we laid out our position at the UN, we had to be willing to follow through with the consequences. If diplomacy failed, there would be only one option left. “I don’t want to go to war,” I told Tony, “but I will do it.”

  Tony agreed. After the meeting, I told Alastair Campbell, one of Tony’s top aides, “Your man has got cojones.” I’m not sure how that translated to the refined ears of 10 Downing Street. But to anyone from Texas, its meaning was clear.

  “All the world now faces a test,” I told UN delegates on September 12, 2002, “and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”

  Delivering the speech was a surreal experience. The delegates sat silent, almost frozen in place. It was like speaking to a wax museum.

  Speaking before the UN on Iraq. White House/Paul Morse

  The response outside the chamber was encouraging. Allies thanked me for respecting the UN and accepting their advice to seek a resolution. Many at home appreciated that I had challenged the UN. An editorial in the Washington Post read: “If the United Nations remains passive in the face of this long-standing and flagrant violation of its authority in a matter involving weapons of mass destruction, it certainly will risk the irrelevance of which Mr. Bush warned.”

  While the UN debate unfolded, we went to work on another resolution, a congressional war authorization. As part of the debate, leaders on Capitol Hill asked the intelligence community to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate analyzing Saddam’s WMD programs. The CIA compiled the NIE using much of the same intelligence it had been showing to me for the past eighteen months. In a summary sentence later declassified, the NIE concluded, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.”

  The intelligence had an impact on members of Congress. Senator John Kerry said, “When I vote to give the president of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat.”

  Senator Jay Rockefeller, a respected Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, followed up: “Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow. … He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into
the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly.”

  Senator Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, supported the resolution. He said, “The risks of inaction are too high. We are elected to solve problems, not just debate them. The time has come to chart a new course in Iraq and in the Middle East.”

  On October 11, 2002, the Senate passed the resolution 77 to 23. The House passed it 296 to 133. Both margins were larger than those of the votes for the Gulf War. The resolution garnered votes from prominent Democrats, including House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, and Senators Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, John Kerry, John Edwards, and Harry Reid.

  Some members of Congress would later claim they were not voting to authorize war but only to continue diplomacy. They must not have read the resolution. Its language was unmistakable: “The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”

  The decisive vote at the UN came on November 8. Colin had been horse-trading on minor issues, but he stayed tough on the provisions holding Saddam to account. The question was whether the resolution would have the votes. We needed nine of the fifteen Security Council members, without a veto from France, Russia, or China. We had been burning up the phone lines, trying to get everyone on board. Shortly after the Security Council vote, the phone in the Oval Office rang. “Hey, Boss,” Colin said. “We got it done.”