by James Jinks
The second phase of the operation involved following the Soviet exercise when it was under way. Air surveillance was scaled back considerably and concentrated mainly on detecting the position of the Soviet submarine barriers. Royal Navy surface forces, including frigates, were ordered to shadow Soviet surface forces, while Royal Navy submarines were tasked with shadowing Soviet submarines. Royal Navy forces were instructed to observe a number of general limitations while carrying out these activities, such as maintaining a distance of three miles by day, or five miles by night. Surface ships were also forbidden from passing between Soviet vessels or interfering with their Fleet exercises in any way. If the Soviets asked them to leave the exercise area, then they were to do so immediately. Submarines had significantly fewer restrictions placed on them. They were instructed not to approach closer than 2000 yards from a Soviet submarine. As the Defence Secretary, Peter Thorneycroft, told the Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, in June 1964:
The operation would, of course, take place entirely on the high seas and our forces would remain well clear of foreign and territorial seas. As our submarines would not go east of 24°E there would be no risk of their infringing Soviet territorial limits. However, they would at all times give overriding priority to avoiding detection and, if discovered, they would withdraw clear of the Soviet forces before resuming their task.29
Royal Navy submarines were also increasingly involved in counter-intelligence operations against Soviet surface vessels, designed to protect the British and Allied activities against intelligence-gathering by Soviet ships. In March 1964, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, told Douglas-Home that:
This new requirement arises from the fact that since 1958 more than 30 trawler-type vessels, laden with electronic equipment, catching no fish and unashamedly designed to pick up communications and electronic intelligence (COMINT/ELINT), have been identified. Some of the vessels may be capable of underwater – as well as radio – intelligence gathering. Their activities in the U.K. Communications Security Area and in the vicinity of U.K./NATO naval exercises have caused us growing concern during the past two years. If the security of important exercises and trials is to be properly protected, we must be in a position to know the whereabouts of any of these vessels and sometimes, e.g. when a COMINT/ELINT vessel is near the limit of the range of U.K./NATO emissions, to keep a regular and continuous watch on them.30
At the end of March 1964, the First Lord of the Admiralty informed the Prime Minister that ‘we have mounted a considerable number of counter-intelligence operations with special ad hoc approval, to protect selected naval exercises and trials during the past 12–18 months’.31
In October 1964, three Soviet submarines, a submarine rescue tug, a destroyer and a minesweeper all left the Baltic and headed around the north of Scotland towards the Londonderry exercise area, where a Joint Maritime Exercise was due to take place, with UK, US and Canadian forces, including a series of trials involving HMS Dreadnought, a US Navy nuclear submarine, four conventional submarines and nine surface escorts. Five Soviet electronic intelligence-gathering trawlers (ELINT trawlers) were also in the southwest approaches to the UK, waiting for the exercise to begin.32 The Soviets would even intrude on the Perisher course, as Sam Fry, a future Teacher, recalled:
One of the periods when exercising the submarine v submarine attack, a Soviet ‘Whisky’ class submarine was spotted by the Officer of the Watch in HMS Finwhale, then the submarine allocated to the COs’ course. As the Russian interloper snorted by we formed up with Finwhale close astern and our proper target, an A class submarine on the Russian’s quarter. Safety was not a problem as we could see the wake of our fellow trailer quite well. We kept this up for a few hours until we ran out of our allocated area and let the Russian blithely carry on!33
The Navy also continued to mount specific intelligence-gathering operations in northern waters. In September 1964, the Navy was preparing ‘a possible submarine operation in the Barents Sea to observe Soviet fleet movements’ codenamed Operation ‘Catgut’.34 This caused a problem in that the best period to mount submarine operations in the Barents Sea, during October and November, when the darkness/daylight conditions were optimal, coincided with the next general election in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, was well aware of the political repercussions should a submarine be discovered and trigger an embarrassing international incident which could affect the outcome of the election. He agreed that the ‘exercise should go on’ but urged that it should take place ‘in late October or November rather than earlier. We don’t want any complications at election time.’35
During the planning of Operation ‘Catgut’, a heated debate took place between the Navy and the Foreign Office about how close Royal Navy submarines could approach the Soviet coast. The Foreign Office had approved previous submarine intelligence operations on the proviso that the Submarine Service took ‘special care … to avoid giving any ground for an accusation that Soviet territorial waters had been infringed, or for any action based on such an excuse’.36 For Operation ‘Catgut’, the Navy wanted to allow the submarine carrying out the operation to patrol right up to the twelve-mile limit. However, the Foreign Office ‘thought this was too close’. The Ministry of Defence weighed in, suggesting a compromise of thirteen miles. It is not clear what the outcome was, but Royal Navy submariners almost certainly patrolled close to Soviet territorial waters during special intelligence-gathering operations. Commanding Officers differed in their approach to their orders. Some were cautious and remained well clear of Soviet territorial waters, while others were more daring and tended to patrol as close as they could get. One naval officer, John Coward, then an intelligence watch keeper on board HMS Oracle under the command of Robin Morris, recalled one particular patrol off Murmansk: ‘Morris didn’t have any respect at all for the Russians. He’d spent his life in intelligence and he just wanted to patrol as close to the coast as possible preferably with the radio aerial up so he could listen to the test match. That was quite hair raising … If the Russians detected you and they thought you were not one of theirs they fired. I’ve often seen rockets going over the periscope and things like that. But Morris didn’t care. He had the utmost contempt for them and that was that. He didn’t bother to pull the mast down.’37
Following Labour’s election victory in October 1964, the new Labour Government continued to authorize special submarine intelligence-gathering operations, in January 1965, approving ‘the special submarine operation Findon’. Like their Conservative predecessors, Labour ministers were always concerned about the political repercussions should anything go wrong during an operation. In January 1965, George Thomson, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, was particularly concerned about the timing of Operation ‘Findon’ as ‘it could coincide with visits here by Gromyko, and possibly Kosygin’, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. ‘We must do what we can to avoid the risk of incidents during these visits,’ noted Thomson.38
Harold Wilson’s Labour government continued to mount surveillance operations against Soviet naval exercises. In June 1965, Labour was given a stark reminder of how a submarine surveillance operation could go wrong. On 21 June, one of the Royal Navy’s ‘Oberon’ class diesel electric submarines, HMS Opportune, was on patrol in the Norwegian Sea when it received an Intelligence Summary from the Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland, giving the position of a Soviet force conducting exercises to the northeast. Opportune’s CO moved his submarine into range and at 0424 on 22 June came into contact with two Soviet ‘Skory’ class destroyers, transmitting on sonars. As Opportune’s CO began to collect intelligence, taking photographs through the periscope and recording noise and sonar characteristics of the Soviet vessels, the submarine was detected. The CO immediately took Opportune deep and moved away to the south at slow speed in an attempt to shake off the Soviet destroyers. As Opportune conducted evasive manoeuvres, the Skorys began to drop explosive c
harges – not depth charges – but the smaller explosives that were commonly used in ASW exercises to mark attacks and signal other submarines. For over thirty hours, the two destroyers hunted Opportune to exhaustion, until at 1130 on 23 June, when Opportune’s battery had almost lost all power, the CO was forced to surface the submarine. As Opportune broke through the waves and settled on the surface she was hemmed in by the two Skorys, at a distance of about 2000 yards on each quarter. One of the destroyers thanked Opportune for working with them, while the other closed in to read the submarine’s pendant number and exchange identities by light. The two Soviet destroyers then escorted Opportune out of the area for about forty-eight hours before parting company.
The Submarine Service and Naval Intelligence conducted a detailed analysis of the incident in order to determine how Opportune was detected; why she was unable to break contact; whether the Soviet destroyers possessed any new detection equipment; whether they used new tactics; and at what time, if at all, they appreciated that their contact was not one of their own submarines. The analysis concluded that Opportune was probably detected by either radar or sonar and that tactics employed by the Soviet destroyers combined with good sonar conditions and low sea state were adequate to hold Opportune, which during the initial stages of the hunt used only small alterations of course and speed and remained at a steady depth. The more violent evasive actions taken by Opportune later in the hunt might well have been effective had they been used in the beginning during the initial period of contact and classification.39 Because of these factors, the Deputy Director Service Intelligence (Navy) stressed ‘that this incident does not present a full picture of Soviet AS capability. It must therefore on no account be quoted or used in isolation – any attempt will result in a biased or distorted assessment.’40
The Submarine Service and Naval Intelligence were not unduly concerned about the incident. Aside from the dropping of small explosive charges, at no time did the destroyers make any aggressive manoeuvres. One MOD official also pointed out that:
The Russians also engage in this type of surveillance of course, and they do it on a much larger scale and less prudently than we do, using both surface vessels and submarines. We are repeatedly detecting their submarines in our habitual exercise areas; there were two cases last year when we forced them to the surface and escorted them away, for their own safety, from exercises or trials; while in June this year another submarine was escorted away submerged when we did not succeed in bringing her to the surface.41
However, at the time, the Navy decided not to inform the Government about the incident and when Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, eventually found out, he took it ‘very seriously’ and issued firm instructions that ‘the Prime Minister is to be informed at once if any similar incidents arise in the future’. When Harold Wilson eventually discovered what had happened he asked ‘why he was not told about it at the time’.42 Despite this, the Labour Government continued to authorize surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, but only, as George Thomson explained:
on the understanding that all possible steps will be taken to avoid a repetition of the incident when H.M. Submarine Opportune was detected by Soviet vessels, tracked under-water for 30 hours as she tried to withdraw, and finally obliged to surface, whereupon she was escorted from the area by two Soviet destroyers. Although there have been no political repercussions from this incident, so far as we know, I am anxious that it should not be repeated.43
By the mid-1960s, Soviet submarines were increasingly venturing into waters off the United Kingdom. In March 1964 and January 1965 Russian submarines were ‘hunted’ in the Londonderry area. The first Russian submarine was forced to the surface and escorted out of the area while the second, which was thought to be nuclear, was hunted for two days before it cleared the area. Until the beginning of 1966, Soviet submarine operations off Northern Ireland were described as ‘sporadic’, but a 1967 note on recent incidents with Soviet submarines prepared for Healey pointed out that ‘it is clear that since January last year the Russians have kept a virtually continuous patrol NW of the UK, supported by ‘W’ [Whisky] class boats from the Baltic’.44 Among the Soviets’ prime intelligence targets were the transiting US Polaris submarines based in Holy Loch. In November 1965, HMS Otus was diverted from a surveillance exercise to follow a Soviet ‘Okean’ class intelligence-gathering vessel, or AGI, called Zond, which was patrolling in Royal Navy exercise areas off Londonderry.45 Otus observed how Zond reacted when the USS Daniel Webster, a US Polaris submarine, made its way back into Holy Loch and then made four runs underneath the trawler, taking photographs of its hull fittings, and recordings of its machinery.46 The fact that Otus was able to remain undetected only reinforced the view that a Soviet submarine intruder could also remain undetected in waters off the United Kingdom for a considerable time, conducting its own intelligence-gathering and surveillance operation.
The Soviets also appeared to be unconcerned about the political repercussions of their own operations. They did not suspend their operations during high-level political visits. In February 1967, the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, visited the United Kingdom for another high-level visit. At the time, HMS Dreadnought, with the C-in-C Home Fleet on board, three frigates and two conventional submarines were exercising 100 nautical miles off Northern Ireland when intelligence indicated that a Soviet ‘Whisky’ class submarine which had left the Baltic on 22 January was operating in the area. Initially the Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland ordered the ships taking part in the exercise to close in and hunt the submarine and force it to the surface. However, when Healey was made aware of the presence of the Soviet intruder, he concluded that ‘during the period of Mr Kosygin’s visit, it would be best to avoid any action which might carry the risk of an awkward incident’.47 Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland was urgently telephoned and told ‘that all ships and submarines were to be withdrawn from the hunt and to carry on with the exercise, and that the RAF maritime aircraft only were to continue to follow up the contact.’48
By the end of the 1960s, the Submarine Service was devoting so much time to surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations that in June 1968 the Admiralty Board added an additional directive to the Submarine Service’s principal tasks in both peace and war: ‘to carry out intelligence procurement and surveillance’. FOSM ordered that it was ‘therefore desirable that Submarines exercise these tasks whenever opportunity permits and particularly against Soviet Forces when political approval for this can be given’.49 In 1969, two standard operational orders were issued for the locating, shadowing and reporting of Soviet forces. The first, Operation ‘Alfa’, involved the locating and shadowing of Soviet vessels by operational submarines.50 The second, Operation ‘Bravo’, was far more clandestine, covering operations involving submarines that were fitted with special equipment, specifically designed to collect intelligence.51
Royal Navy submarines were not only engaged in surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations against Soviet forces; in the mid-1960s they were also taking part in operations in the Far East.
INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION
Royal Navy submarines assigned to the 7th Submarine Division, operating out of Singapore, also played a crucial, yet largely unsung, role in the Far East during the 1963–6 conflict between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia, otherwise known as the Indonesian Confrontation. From 1963 onwards, Indonesia ‘confronted’ Malaysia by waging an undeclared war, conducting armed incursions across international borders with the aim of destabilizing Malaysia and dominating the region. The UK, Malaysia’s strongest ally, deployed significant numbers of land, sea and air forces to deter the Indonesians and stop the conflict from escalating into an all-out war. The Indonesians operated vast amounts of Soviet equipment, including a ‘Sverdlov’ class cruiser, several ‘Skory’ class destroyers and significant numbers of MIG-15s, -17s, -19s and -21s. The Indonesian Navy also possessed one of the most powerful s
ubmarine forces in the Asia–Pacific region, consisting of twelve Soviet-built ‘Whisky’ class submarines, two torpedo retrievers and one submarine tender.
Up until 1965, five submarines were assigned to the 7th Submarine Division, which were supported by the immobile, converted Maintenance and Repair Craft, HMS Medway. Prior to the confrontation in Indonesia, the Chiefs of Staff had recommended the deployment of seven operational submarines East of Suez, including two nuclear submarines by 1970. To meet this requirement plans were subsequently made to deploy eight conventional submarines to Singapore in 1968, followed by a nuclear submarine in 1969, as well as a new submarine depot ship, designed to support nuclear submarines, HMS Forth. HMS Forth arrived in 1966, three years early, due to the outbreak of the confrontation, to support the 7th Submarine Division, which at the time comprised the Royal Navy’s older ‘A’ class submarines: HMS Alliance, HMS Ambush, HMS Amphion, HMS Anchorite, HMS Andrew and HMS Auriga. The Captain of the Singapore Squadron, Commander John Moore, was a dynamic wartime submariner who was determined to make a submarine contribution to events. He ensured that the submarines of the 7th Submarine Division were employed on a variety of operations, including special intelligence-gathering patrols as well as operations that involved the insertion and extraction of Special Forces from 40 and 42 Commando (some of which were personally authorized by the Prime Minister).52