by James Jinks
Many of the ‘A’ class submarines assigned to the 7th Submarine Division had their old Second World War 4-inch deck guns refitted to counter blockade-running junks, and although the class had been designed for operations in tropical waters, conditions on board were difficult and uncomfortable. They carried little water, which meant the crews rarely washed and many suffered from prickly heat because of the intense tropical temperatures. The extreme heat also influenced how COs operated their submarines. Dived sea time was governed by trying to keep battery temperatures below the ceiling of 124 degrees Fahrenheit, which meant that the batteries – which were located underneath the accommodation spaces and often pushed temperatures up to 110 degrees – were seldom used in full charge or discharge rates. When the submarines surfaced and the crew went on the bridge or the casing in inadequate clothing they were hit by a reduction in temperature of around 50 degrees. There were many cases of pneumonia. Operational conditions improved marginally with the arrival of the more modern HMS Oberon, which was equipped with battery cooling, and air conditioning in the accommodation spaces, resulting in more tolerable temperatures on board.53
In July 1965, intelligence indicated that the Indonesian Navy was planning to conduct a live firing of their Soviet-supplied Styx missile from a Soviet supplied Komar fast patrol boat somewhere in the Java Sea, and HMS Ambush was deployed to observe the firing. As Richard Channon, who was on board Ambush at the time, describes:
We cleared the Singapore Strait to the eastward and got out of sight of land, then turned right, dived, and started snorting south-eastward through the Karimata Strait between Borneo and Sumatra. It was an unusual passage, thundering along at 6 knots in a flat calm sea with never anything in sight, and the echo-sounder running continuously with the trace flickering up and down to show the bottom seldom more than 100 feet below the keel. Charted soundings were few and far between. Having turned south-west off Belitung we were on station off Djakarta a couple of days after sailing, and settled into our billet.54
HMS Ambush was fitted with special communication intercept equipment. ‘We used to creep about during the day, observing the movements of naval and merchant ships, and recording “interesting” buildings on the littoral. Some “sneaky beakies”, specialized secret communications ratings, were embarked with us and spent hours listening to and recording local VHF traffic,’ wrote Patrick Middleton, a young engineer on board at the time.55 ‘It was interesting to put it mildly,’ says Channon:
We had almost exactly 12 hours of daylight and 12 of darkness, and the sea remained glassy calm, which dictated that during the day we patrolled very slowly (one shaft, group down) up and down a line parallel to the coast keeping an eye on what was going on, and snort charged at night. By day the horizon was continually filled with the sails of trading and fishing praus, so that the Contact Evaluation Plot resembled a spider’s web and periscope drill with the attack periscope perforce became immaculate for all watch keepers. Preventing praus getting too close as they drifted past was often a considerable problem, and of course they were almost always noiseless, so being forced deep was another hazard to be avoided at all costs.56
At night, when Ambush was snorting to charge batteries, the poorly lit little boats, sometimes numbering as many as 300, erratic in course and speed, were almost impossible to keep track of. Only the man on periscope watch stood between the submarine and a collision. Channon, who was looking through the periscope, recalled:
As I swung round, I thought I fleetingly caught a light, almost at the top of the field of view. Continuing the swing right round, and elevating the lens a touch, there it was, a man swinging a lantern to illuminate his sail, so close that I could see the seams in the cloth. So close that he must have heard the engine bearing down on him, and been not a little scared by the fact that he could not see what was making the noise. By the Grace of God we were already turning, otherwise we might well have collided, with neither having sighted each other. Hearing the noise receding, he promptly dowsed his lantern and was no more seen. I have often wondered since what tall stories he told in the coffee shop in Tanjong Priok, and whether his unlikely tale caught the attention of the authorities. If it did, there was never any evidence of their following it up.57
The submarines of the 7th Division were also involved in inserting and extracting Special Forces undertaking reconnaissance missions in both Borneo and Sumatra.58 During the Second World War, the CO of the 7th Submarine Division, Commander John Moore, had experienced first hand the difficulty of landing men from submarines and the submariner’s dislike of entering shallow water. When he was posted to the Far East during the Confrontation, he took a special interest in the operations of the Special Boat Service and was determined to do something about the problems. The ‘A’ class, with its flat-topped tanks and low casing, was ideal for the role. By 1965, Moore had led the development of ‘Goldfish’, an underwater method of leaving and re-entering submarines. The technique, which was based on the Second World War X-craft, was adapted by Moore, who invented a homing device called ‘Trongles’ to allow swimmers to find a submarine at night. Moore also converted a Mark 20 torpedo into an underwater delivery vehicle called Archimedes and adapted a Polaroid camera to take reconnaissance photographs through submarine periscopes, as well as perfecting a technique whereby Special Forces could be parachuted to a waiting submarine, collect their equipment and proceed to their target. Moore was so dedicated and determined to see these new techniques succeed that he dropped by night to a waiting submarine to prove it could be done, disobeying the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Sir Frank Twiss, who had forbidden him from partaking in ‘aerial activities’.59
Moore also understood the importance of securing political support for his ideas. During a visit to the Far East in the summer of 1966, the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, asked to see what the Special Boat Service was up to. He watched as a group of Marines ‘parachuted from an aircraft into the sea and swam to meet me on the submarine’ – one of them was a young officer called Paddy Ashdown.60 When Sam Fry became Commander SM, 7th Submarine Squadron, in September 1967, he ‘found these gadgets very dangerous, and when we endeavoured to show them to the Commander in Chief they failed miserably. So much so that I was able to discontinue this dangerous waste of submarine time.’61 Moore’s pioneering tactics and equipment were later developed by the SBS and the Royal Navy in the 1970s.
TRANSFORMATION
When the Confrontation in Indonesia ended, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government, under substantial economic pressure, started to look objectively at the future of British commitments in the Far East. The eventual withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez in the late 1960s and early 1970s had a dramatic impact on the disposition of the Submarine Service, as the various submarine squadrons that comprised the post-war fleet were steadily disbanded. The process began when in August 1960 the 1st Submarine Division in Malta was rebranded the 5th Submarine Squadron and combined with the 108th Minesweeping Squadron to form the composite command Submarine and Minesweepers Mediterranean (SMS MED). The 1st Submarine Squadron title was then transferred to HMS Dolphin in Gosport. The 4th Submarine Division in Sydney and the 6th Submarine Division in Nova Scotia were discontinued in the mid-1960s after the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy acquired their own British-built ‘Oberon’ class diesel electric submarines (see here). In 1967, the remnants of the Malta-based 5th Submarine Squadron were disbanded when the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet was abolished, and following the disbandment of the Far Eastern Fleet in the early 1970s the 7th Submarine Division in Singapore was also abolished. This left the Royal Navy with just four Submarine Squadrons: the 1st Submarine Squadron at HMS Dolphin; the 2nd Submarine Squadron in Devonport; and the 3rd Submarine Squadron at Faslane, which shared the new operating base with the recently formed 10th Submarine Squadron, comprising the four new Polaris submarines.
The 1966 Defence White Paper considerably reshaped the Royal Navy, phasing
out the three large carriers, HMS Victorious, HMS Eagle and HMS Ark Royal by the 1970s and cancelling the new replacement carrier CVA-01.62 The role of the submarine had played a crucial part in the debates surrounding the future of aircraft carriers, with many, such as Joseph Mallalieu, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, believing that submarines, not aircraft carriers, were the future of the Royal Navy. In a note to the Minister of the Navy, Christopher Mayhew, Mallalieu wrote that ‘my own hunch is that, over the next 15–20 years, the role of the submarine is likely to be paramount. Should we not, therefore, be thinking of submarines, not only as hunter-killers and replacements for strike aircraft, but as all-purpose ships of the RN?’63 The announcement that the proposed new carrier was to be cancelled led Mayhew and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Luce, the first submariner to become First Sea Lord, to resign. It also led to a major reconfiguration of the Royal Navy, into a primarily anti-submarine warfare specialist force, whereby the Navy’s primary offensive and strike capabilities were transferred to the Submarine Service.64
These increased responsibilities required a different kind of submariner. There was little room for the hard-drinking culture that had characterized the early post-war years. Long gone were the days when ‘Some Commanding Officers suppressed their ambition and lived for the day, often imitating their perception of the wartime heroes. Inevitably this involved alcohol. There was an awful lot of it about.’65 Changes had already started to occur in the mid-1950s, brought on by the so-called ‘William Tell’ incident, when two submariners (one of whom was the duty officer) in the middle of a heavy drinking session, decided to liberate a pistol from the onboard weapons locker and take shots at a half-full whisky glass perched on a submariner’s head while standing in the Control Room. One of the officers missed the whisky glass and grazed the skull of his fellow officer.66 In the new Submarine Service, where submariners were the custodians of the deterrent, as well as the primary offensive and strike capabilities of the Fleet, ‘the drinking was decidedly moderate, everyone wore passable uniforms, and there was a general air of serious endeavour, some distance from the cheery piracy of the past’.67
The rest of the Royal Navy also struggled to come to terms with, and indeed understand, the new nuclear ‘black art’. One submariner took to the pages of a 1967 edition of the Naval Review to complain that the ‘last three issues, of a publication expressing a representative cross section of naval thought, make not even a passing reference to the nuclear attack submarine – a ship that is beyond doubt the most potent package of offensive power at sea today’.68 With HMS Dreadnought already in the Fleet, and HMS Valiant and HMS Warspite due to commission in the mid-1960s, the rest of the Royal Navy struggled to integrate the Navy’s new nuclear-powered submarines into the surface fleet. It chose to describe them not as SSNs, attack submarines or hunter-killers, but as ‘Fleet Submarines’, in order to emphasize that ‘this new and revolutionary form of submarine was a Fleet asset’ that ‘would not threaten the surface Fleet’.69
For much of the 1960s the Royal Navy’s first nuclear submarines were operated in direct support of surface units, much to the chagrin of submariners, who repeatedly complained that the Fleet submarines, which had proven themselves as the ‘most promising and effective anti-submarine vehicles found so far’, were being operated in a purely defensive role. ‘I believe a better name is Nuclear Attack Submarine (or SSN) which not only differentiates it from Polaris and conventional submarines, but lays emphasis on its primary ability – attack,’ argued one submariner in the Naval Review.70 Another anonymous submariner, also writing in the Naval Review, argued for ‘acceptance of these submarines for the magnificent, exciting, offensive ships that they really are’ as well as ‘Acceptance by the Navy as a whole that the Submarine Service has grown from a subordinate arm (dashing but rather scruffy) to a responsible maturity where it should be our major tactical offensive force.’ He urged ‘Acceptance by the Submarine Service itself, which must be partly to blame for the existing situation, by having been the silent service for too long.’71
When Harold Wilson’s Labour government entered office in October 1964, it inherited an SSN programme that had been postponed by the demands of the Polaris programme. Once the new Government clarified its policy towards Polaris – continuing with the programme, but cancelling the planned fifth submarine – it resumed the SSN programme.72 The fourth, and first post-Polaris SSN, HMS Churchill, the first of the so-called ‘Repeat Valiant’ class, was ordered from Vickers in Barrow in October 1965. Virtually identical to the original Valiant design, the ‘Repeat Valiant’ class included a number of minor improvements mainly consisting of ‘certain equipments not previously available’ that could be accommodated without detriment to the SSBN or other SSN development programmes.73 HMS Churchill was followed by two more SSNs: HMS Conqueror, ordered from Cammell Laird in August 1966, and HMS Courageous, ordered from Vickers in March 1967. Churchill differed from her two sister ships in that she was chosen to test a new experimental propulsion system, the culmination of a lengthy R&D programme at the Admiralty Research Laboratory in Teddington.74 Instead of a traditional propeller, Churchill was equipped with a pump jet, similar to a water turbine, consisting of a rotor and a stator, both with a large number of blades, surrounded by a carefully shaped duct.75 Churchill’s pump jet enabled the flow of water to be carefully controlled in velocity and pressure and could be either more efficient or quieter than a propeller or a bit of both.76 The trials in Churchill were so successful that the Navy later decided to fit pump jets to the next class of British nuclear submarine, what became known as the ‘Swiftsure’ class. It remains a standard feature of all British nuclear submarines.
With HMS Churchill, HMS Conqueror and HMS Courageous under construction, the Navy slowly began to embrace its underwater future. At the institutional level, the importance of the SSN was clearly demonstrated by the depiction of an SSN on the cover of volumes one and two of the 1967 Future Fleet Working Party report, which referred to the SSN as ‘the Navy’s main offensive weapon’, saying further that ‘no other type of warship holds so much potential for the future’ and that it ‘has brought a new dimension to naval warfare’.77 However, it was still unclear how many SSNs the Navy required or indeed how many the country could afford. When the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, began to examine the overall size of the submarine fleet in October 1967, he refused to commit himself to any rolling programme without ‘fuller information about the case for a force of 12 or more of these submarines’.78 In response, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, presented Healey with a detailed paper – a classic exposition of the attack submarine as the capital ship of the future – that illustrated the military and political value of an SSN force in the 1970s and beyond and outlined the role the SSN could play in the context of the Navy’s overall concept of naval operations, on which it was now basing the general shape of the Royal Navy’s future Fleet.79
This new concept of naval operations foresaw a Fleet that was capable of conducting operations both inside and outside the NATO area. The main force consisted of relatively lightly armed frigates which were intended to form a military presence and conduct anti-submarine warfare, backed up by ships of higher capability which would provide punch and power projection. Without aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines were now considered to be the most important higher-capability vessels where they would ‘provide an important part of the Navy’s anti-submarine capability’ and ‘provide the main independent offensive power of the Navy against enemy surface ships’. The paper also highlighted the way in which a nuclear submarine could be employed in a number of additional roles, any one of which could assume primary importance, depending on the circumstances. These included surveillance and intelligence gathering; special operations, such as the landing of intelligence agents or Special Forces; offensive minelaying; the training of Allied surface and air forces in anti-submarine warfare; and the protection and escorting of Polaris sub
marines.
In terms of future threats, all of these tasks, the paper explained, were important:
In the Atlantic the main threat to the NATO naval alliance will come from increasing numbers of Soviet nuclear submarines, and the Soviet missile-firing surface ships. The contribution RN submarines can make to NATO capability against both of these will therefore be of major importance. Elsewhere a relatively small number of modern submarines can pose a very powerful deterrent to hostile naval operations by any power who might wish to interfere with our maritime interests. Any country with naval pretensions contemplating local warlike operations contrary to British interests might be tempted to undertake maritime operations against a thinly-spread British surface fleet. It could suppose that even a small number of ex-Soviet missile-firing ships, including KILDIN and KOMAR types, or submarines, would provide an effective counter to interference by British surface units and conclude that it would have an advantage in local operations. The SSN, with its speed, endurance and immunity from air or missile attack, redresses this balance, and this is known now and will become more widely known by the Navies of possible opponents as well as those of our Allies.80
The paper also delicately demonstrated the advantages of nuclear submarines over conventional submarines. While it acknowledged that the ‘Porpoise’ and ‘Oberon’ class submarines, ‘with their silent operation under water, are the finest conventional submarines in the world’, it also highlighted two principal limitations: their need to surface at regular intervals and their slow sustained submerged speed. ‘Whatever further development and modernization is built into conventionally powered submarines in the future,’ the paper concluded, ‘the balance of the advantage will remain in favour of nuclear powered submarines and in favour of A/S forces armed with improved detection and quick reaction AS weapons, unless these fundamental limitations are overcome.’81 The advantages of the nuclear over the conventional submarine were overwhelming: