The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  The outstanding characteristics of nuclear-propelled submarines are their ability to remain under water for very long periods, where they enjoy virtual immunity from air attack and from the effects of the weather; their self-sufficiency for long periods; and their ability to move under water at speeds which equal that of most surface ships and exceed that of many, even in calm conditions. In rough weather, they may often have a speed advantage over all surface vessels. Nuclear submarines are not limited, as conventionals have been, to operating in focal areas, waiting for targets to pass. Nuclear submarines have the ability to perform in all roles now undertaken by conventionals, and to achieve, ship for ship, far more than any conventional can hope to do against other nuclear submarines and modern ASW defences. Furthermore they can keep up with the enemy, shadow him, attack and re-attack at will; they can also keep up with, and act in direct defence of surface units of the fleet. Nuclear submarines are much less vulnerable than conventionals and can operate successfully in a hostile environment in which conventionals would be at considerable risk. As air and satellite reconnaissance of the sea becomes more extensive and precise, the advantages of nuclear over conventional submarines will increase.82

  The paper then went on to examine the range of tasks that nuclear submarines could undertake. The first was the anti-submarine role:

  Nuclear-powered submarines have introduced a new dimension in to the concepts of submarine and anti-submarine warfare. They have multiplied many times the problem of surface ship defence against submarine attack; and all the means at our disposal now – surface ships, helicopters, LRMP [Long-Range Maritime Patrol] aircraft and submarines are barely sufficient to deal with the threat which they can pose. On independent ASW patrol our own Fleet Submarines can exploit their unique characteristics effectively to deter enemy submarine operations, at very long distances from their bases.

  In the close A/S role they provide a passive sonar capability superior to that of a surface ship or helicopter and thus provide early warning. In certain conditions of water and weather they can choose their depth of operations to provide a better active capability than surface ships. They can, while submerged, keep pace and co-operate with friendly surface and submarine (including POLARIS) forces and thus provide a submarine detection capability unaffected by the weather, and undisturbed by air attack. As they do not need any air defence when submerged they relieve the task of maritime air defence. In addition they can increase the tactical flexibility of surface ships which they are supporting. Lastly they are the only vehicles which can match the speed and endurance of another nuclear submarine in all weathers.

  Fleet submarines will therefore make an important (and unique) contribution to our anti-submarine deterrent forces which will complement surface ships and aircraft, whether for independent deterrent operations outside Europe or as part of an Allied force in the Atlantic or elsewhere.83

  The paper also emphasized the nuclear-powered submarine’s anti-surface ship role:

  The characteristics described earlier also make fleet submarines exceedingly powerful anti-surface ship weapon systems. They can be deployed overtly or covertly and quickly over very large distances. This means that they can be sent to carry out patrols of one to three months’ duration, unsupported, in any part of the world, sailing from and returning to the United Kingdom. In this way, they can be used at long range to deter enemy ships from leaving harbour; to trail and shadow them; and to attack and sink them. They can be switched immediately from a deterrent to an offensive role with or without alerting the enemy and without exposing themselves to pre-emptive attack.

  In considering how best to provide the Fleet in the late 1970s with an independent strike capability against missile-firing surface ships, and bearing in mind the contribution of RAF aircraft, the Admiralty Board decided to rely on the Fleet submarines. They therefore put forward only modest proposals for the arming of the surface fleet against the surface threat. No surface-ship SSGW is to be introduced – at least during the 1970s; and the only surface to surface capability which the Fleet itself will have will be armed helicopters, the 4.5" gun and such capability as surface to air weapons such as SEA DART offer against surface targets.84

  Thus in the later 1970s, the Fleet submarines will be a key element in the future Fleet ‘package’, The Fleet will have, in its surface ships, some high quality defence against aircraft, missiles and submarines, but without its own nuclear submarines, it would have only a small offensive or deterrent capability against an enemy on the surface.85

  Begg then went on to explain how the nuclear submarine could participate in surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations:

  The surveillance of enemy naval forces in peace-time can give a valuable indication of the future intentions, and can therefore make a vital contribution to the control of a crisis and consequently to the prevention of war. Intelligence gathering gives a long-range forecast of the enemy’s future capability, and is therefore important to the means of countering future threats.

  Fleet submarines are not the only means of carrying out these surveillance and intelligence tasks. But whenever these tasks have to be performed clandestinely – as is frequently the case – for either political or practical reasons, Fleet submarines with their long underwater endurance will be the best, and sometimes the only means to employ. Both these tasks were, for example, carried out by submarines off Indonesia during the period of confrontation. Patrol submarines [conventional submarines] were then used: but Fleet submarines would have been greatly superior, and in any more sophisticated hostile environment, even more so. Moreover, Fleet Submarines have a great advantage over conventional submarines for operations in northern waters where periods of darkness are short for half the year.86

  Finally he emphasized the training role of the nuclear submarine:

  Fleet submarines will also be required for training our own ASW forces, including surface ships and aircraft, if we are to maintain an effective capability in face of the growing nuclear submarine threat. Conventional submarines and synthetic training aids can, and must, be used for basic training; but there is no substitute for a nuclear submarine for the more advanced aspects. Although they are now obtaining their own patrol submarines, Commonwealth Navies have in the past relied heavily on RN submarines for their ASW training; and they are likely to continue to do so for the more advanced training in tactics against nuclear submarines, which they cannot yet afford themselves.87

  Before Healey made a decision on the overall size of the SSN fleet he wanted to ‘form judgments on the position of the submarine in an escalatory situation, and the extent to which we need SSNs as part of the conventional deterrent’. Outside of NATO, he wanted to ‘see settings in which we could assess the likelihood and scale of SSNs being used both in an anti-shipping role and also in an offensive role against enemy shipping and military installations. In the latter case, we would need to judge the capabilities of the SSN’s weapons and possible alternative ways of taking such offensive action.’88 In order to aid the development of a quantitative assessment of the requirement for SSNs, Healey established a Working Party to ‘provide material to assist in making an assessment of the nuclear submarine programme’ and to ‘consider possible political and military circumstances at various levels of activity in which maritime forces, including nuclear submarines whenever appropriate, may become involved, and prepare suitable scenarios for examination’.89

  The Working Party, chaired by Sir Alan Cottrell, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (Studies), presented its interim report in December 1967. It outlined a dozen scenarios, illustrating the kinds of operations and incidents, both inside and outside of NATO, which ‘might conceivably arise’ during the next 20–30 years. There are two examples which are very much a reflection of the concerns of the time; the first involved the protection of the US and Royal Navy Polaris/Poseidon submarines operating out of Scotland:

  NORTH ATLANTIC

  Background

  The gener
al build-up in Soviet maritime force in the late 60s and early 70s is accompanied by a gradual increase in single-ship and squadron passages and exercises on the high seas as well as in ‘domestic’ waters. The periodic detachment of ships from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean gives opportunities for either North Sea or Atlantic observation of British maritime activity. A more or less regular pattern of movement is established usually at a fairly low level of activity.

  Polaris

  Since 1968 the British Polaris squadron as well as the American Holy Loch squadron has been operating out of the Clyde. The arrangements which were made to evade any Russian attempts to track the submerged SSBNs worked adequately and to the best of our knowledge the Russians have not successfully pinpointed SSBN operating areas.

  In the summer of 1972 shortly after COMSUBRON 14 gets his first POSEIDON boat ‘Resolution’ comes out of her first refit and following the appearance of a small Russian squadron in British waters on their way home from Algiers, intelligence indications show unusual activity off the north of Scotland. There follows a series of associated incidents – trawlers fishing, some sonar contacts, aircraft sightings – which show clearly that a co-ordinated attempt at the surveillance of SSBNs on passage is being mounted. It is not clear whether American or British submarines are the prime target, but this is a threat to the NATO deterrent and a co-ordinated response is necessary.

  Development

  It becomes clear that NATO SSBNs are being shadowed by Soviet SSNs with active and passive sonar.

  Role of the SSNs

  (a) Deter the shadower by overt surveillance.

  (b) Attempt to decoy the shadower by producing sonar traces and noise interference.

  (c) Trace the shadower through a sanitizing area in which the surface ships might take active measures to interfere.

  (d) Hold the shadower when his contact with the SSBN has been broken, and report his movements if approaching an SSBN operating area.

  Working Party’s provisional assessment of SSNs on task

  1 possibly 2.90

  Another scenario, this time set in northern waters, envisaged the Soviet Union taking advantage of détente and a perceived lack of American interest in NATO and European affairs:

  Finmark [a county in the extreme northeastern part of Norway]

  By 1977, a prolonged period of détente and renewed prosperity have relaxed NATO attitudes. At the same time the European members of NATO have grown closer together in many ways: some people think that as a consequence the new administration in the United States will drift away a little bit more openly.

  The Scandinavian members of NATO have remained active, after their traditional fashion: no foreign troops, no nuclear weapons, but loyal and otherwise fully paid-up. Norway, for example, organizes an army exercise in the Spring, involving British, Canadian and German troops besides her own in Arctic manoeuvres.

  Russia unexpectedly reacts, and protests to Norway about an alleged frontier violation. She demands assurances that Norway will not allow foreign troops to use her facilities, and shows some indication of wanting to use the affair to test Western political solidarity.

  The Russian Northern Fleet undertakes some ostentatious exercises off North Cape. Maritime aircraft patrols are set up, and a limited amount of troop movement towards the Norwegian frontier is observed. All of these military gestures are made unprovocatively and there is no very clear evidence that the Russians intend to push the situation to the extremes. The Norwegians are badly rattled nonetheless and the affair has the result of forcing the US Government’s hand. They renew their undertaking to meet their obligations, but make it known that they will not ‘force the pace’. Quite what they mean is not clear.

  Development

  NATO decides therefore initially to make a limited response by deploying ships and aircraft to the area to demonstrate a measure of support and to keep an eye on Russian dispositions. The forces operate from the UK and Germany, but could be moved quickly to Norway. Preparations are made for land reinforcements which may be called for if the Russians persist. But finally, a form of words is found which satisfies the Russians, leaves the Norwegians unscathed and NATO formally intact.

  Roles of the SSNs

  (a) Close A/S support of the NATO Task force.

  (b) Surveillance of Soviet major units and of any further deployment from Northern Fleet bases.

  (c) Off shore patrols of possible landing areas.

  Working Party’s provisional assessment of SSNs on task

  1 in support of each of several groups

  3 for surveillance and offshore patrols

  TOTAL between 5 and 10, probably nearer 10.91

  The Working Party also outlined a series of additional scenarios in the North Atlantic, principally the Greenland Sea, northern waters and the Barents Sea. There were also Mediterranean scenarios off Malta and Hellenic Thrace as well as general cooperation with NATO and the United States in the region. Finally came scenarios in the Far East involving Indonesia/Australia and Hong Kong. Although the report was useful, the Working Party concluded that it ‘would be unproductive to try to base any further quantification of the SSN requirement on more detailed development of scenarios’ and instead recommended that a detailed study should be carried out of the number of SSNs to meet the expected training and other peacetime commitments.92

  A judgement of the general balance of capability required by the Royal Navy and of the proportion of limited financial resources that the Navy could afford to devote to SSNs began to crystallize at the end of 1967. For financial reasons, the figure was unlikely to be less than twelve and no more than twenty. The Navy eventually concluded that in order to fulfil the peacetime tasks of the Submarine Service, as well as make a worthwhile contribution to NATO’s maritime forces in war, it required between fifteen and eighteen submarines by the early 1980s, when the first of the ‘Oberon’ and ‘Porpoise’ class submarines reached the end of their projected operational lives.

  Initially the programme settled down to a planned order rate of one SSN every twelve months. This would have led to a fleet of eighteen SSNs by the time HMS Dreadnought retired from service at the end of 1982. However, as a result of the financial cuts imposed by the Wilson Government in January 1968, following devaluation in November 1967 (see here), this was reduced to one SSN every fifteen months. While this elongated the SSN programme and produced the required immediate, but not long-term, savings in cost, militarily there were a number of consequences. These included a reduced NATO and national SSN order of battle throughout the 1970s, which was reflected in UK force allocations to NATO (sixteen SSNs by 1982 as opposed to the earlier eighteen) and a reduced and delayed capability for the SSN fleet to assume the role of the Navy’s anti-ship strike capability in which it had been cast after the phase-out of the carriers in the early seventies. It also meant the possible life extension of some of the patrol class submarines in order to make good the shortfall in general submarine capability as well as a reduced ability to provide realistic anti-SSN ASW training for the fleet.93 The MOD also looked at ways of substantially increasing the productivity of SSNs on certain peacetime tasks.

  One of the biggest problems affecting the size of the Royal Navy’s SSN fleet was British industrial capacity. Since 1966 the Treasury had been pressuring the Navy to slow down the SSN building rate to the point where just one shipyard could cope with the Navy’s requirements, rather than the two (Vickers and Cammell Laird) that were still involved in both SSBN and SSN construction. After examining the economics of the proposal, considering the return on capital investment at each yard and the effects on the SSBN building programme of a decision to place no more nuclear work at one yard, the MOD concluded that it would not be more expensive to revert to one shipyard and could in fact be cheaper. Vickers was the obvious choice. As we have already seen, Cammell Laird did not have the design capacity or the experience to act as a lead yard and their performance over the Polaris programme compared unfavourably
with that of Vickers.

  Although Cammell Laird had been awarded the contract for the fifth SSN, HMS Conqueror, this was only done to avoid what is known in the shipbuilding industry as ‘last ship syndrome’ – whereby the workforce take longer on the last unit of a contract – having an impact on the Polaris programme. By the time HMS Revenge was finally accepted into the Navy in December 1969, Cammell Laird and its workforce had, in the eyes of the MOD, worked themselves out of the nuclear-submarine business. The final straw came shortly before Conqueror was completed when an individual put a handful of metal objects in the submarine’s gearbox, which later exploded during testing, delaying completion by many months and costing the taxpayer millions.94 Had the Navy’s fourth Polaris submarine, HMS Revenge, suffered the same fate as Conqueror, a Cammell Laird employee would have been guilty of delaying the Polaris programme and sabotaging the United Kingdom’s strategic deterrent.

  In 1969 the government announced that in future all nuclear submarines would be built in Barrow.95 The nearly 3000 highly specialized men taken on during the Polaris years were now surplus to the company’s needs.96 Throughout 1969, as 3000 ‘horrified’ workers at Cammell Laird looked on, the ‘Polaris birds came home to roost’.97 The pay and productivity deals awarded during the Polaris contract were viewed as inappropriate in the harsher world of competitive pricing for merchant shipbuilding, in which technology had moved on. Managers and men struggled to relearn habits more appropriate to the competitive environment of commercial work.98 The ‘easy regime’ of Polaris work had been ‘neither conducive to wise overall management of resources, nor to the cultivation of good practices’.99 Added to this was a realization that many of the fixed-price contracts that the company had entered into for merchant vessels to be delivered from 1969 to 1972 would lead to crippling losses. By spring 1970, losses on shipbuilding work were running at an annual rate of £10m and the Labour Government, worried about the forthcoming general election, stepped in to bail out the company.100 As Kenneth Warren has noted, ‘From these drastic changes of summer 1970 may be dated the beginning of the last phase of Cammell Laird’s business career.’101