by James Jinks
By the time the signal from Northwood had been pieced together Conqueror had fallen seven miles astern of the Belgrano and her escorts. Wreford-Brown ordered three Mark 8 torpedoes loaded into Conqueror’s torpedo tubes, along with three Mark 24s in the remaining tubes, and started the lengthy and time-consuming approach to a firing position. ‘It was still daylight. The visibility was variable,’ remembered Wreford-Brown. ‘It came down to 2,000 yards at one time. I kept coming up for a look – but when at periscope depth we were losing ground on them – and then going deep and catching up. I did this five or six times. They were not using sonar – just gently zigzagging at about 13 knots.’138 As Conqueror’s crew closed up at action stations to prepare for the attack ‘The atmosphere throughout the boat was extraordinary,’ wrote Powis. ‘Everybody had a role even if it was to sit tight and await damage to repair, we were all concentrating intently on the task at hand.’139
An hour later, Conqueror’s crew had succeeded in achieving a firing position on the port beam of the cruiser with the escorting destroyers on the other side. At 1813Z, Wreford-Brown wrote in Conqueror’s logbook:
In position 55 23.1S 61 21.oW. I am on the port quarter of TG 79.3 and my target, the Cruiser G BELGRANO, is on the left wing. My intention is to close to a firing position such that I shall fire a salvo of 3 × Mk 8 Mod 4’s from 1800 yds on a Torpedo Track Angle of 100° and a zero gyro angle. I shall then evade to the SE leaving the datum between me and the destroyers for as long as possible to assist my escape.140
For the next thirty minutes Conqueror went ‘deep and fast’, diving in order to close the range and coming up to allow Wreford-Brown to look through the periscope every few minutes. At 1851Z, Conqueror came up to periscope depth and Wreford-Brown sighted the Belgrano again, moving at 11 knots. He ordered torpedo tubes 1, 2 and 6 into standby mode and opened Conqueror’s torpedo tube bow caps. Two minutes later, at 1853Z, Conqueror’s crew started the final approach, with Wreford-Brown conducting a final all-round look through the periscope at 1854Z. ‘Nothing else in sight,’ he wrote in Conqueror’s log book, ‘M-04 BELGRANO is not aware of my presence. Intend to wait until the target’s relative bearing is G13 [Green 13 degrees, very fine on the starboard bow] when it will be a zero gyro angle shot.’
The Mark 8 torpedoes relied on a very old mechanical gyro that turned the torpedo when it was in the water. But submariners preferred not to rely on the gyro, preferring instead a straight shot. The ideal position for discharging the Mark 8 was on the beam of a target with angle on the bow at discharge of 90 degrees plus an angle equal to the speed in knots at a range of 1200–1500 yards, with the attacking submarine’s own course equal to the mean torpedo course. This meant that the weapons had a nearly zero gyro angle and, provided the target’s speed and course remained correct, the firing solution was independent of the target’s range.
‘The attack drill was conducted as if we were taking part in a demonstration for a training film,’ recalled Powis. ‘It was not a difficult attack, we were all well practised and the mood in the control room was tense but professional.’141 With only seconds to go before Wreford-Brown ordered the release of the torpedoes, McClement noticed that the Torpedo Course Calculator indicated that the three Mark 8 torpedoes were going to leave Conqueror at 17 degrees to the right, not the zero angle that Wreford-Brown was hoping for. At the moment of firing McClement shouted from the corner of the Control Room: ‘Do not fire! – gyro angle improving.’ Wreford-Brown lowered the periscope and waited for the Belgrano to reach the optimum position.142 Eventually, McClement signalled that it was okay to fire and Wreford-Brown raised Conqueror’s periscope again. ‘Do you mind if I fire now?’ he asked McClement. At 1857Z, HMS Conqueror fired three Mark 8 torpedoes at an interval of three seconds, from a range of 1400 yards.
Conqueror’s crew continued to plot the movement of the torpedoes as they streaked towards their target. When the Fire Control Officer’s stopwatch indicated 15 seconds to first impact, Wreford-Brown raised Conqueror’s periscope and focused on the Belgrano. The first torpedo missed and allegedly lodged in the bows on one of the Belgrano’s escorts. It did not explode. The second torpedo hit the Belgrano near the middle, while the third hit near the stern. ‘Orange fire-ball seen just aft of the centre of target, in line with the after mast, shortly after the first explosion was heard,’ wrote Wreford-Brown in Conqueror’s log. ‘Second explosion heard about 5 seconds after, I think I saw a spurt of water aft, but it may have been smoke from the first. Third explosion heard but not seen – I was not looking!’143 When the first torpedo impacted a cheer erupted in Conqueror’s Control Room. ‘There was a lot of jubilation,’ recalled Wreford-Brown, ‘when I looked around there were a lot more people than there should have been there, on the outskirts, hanging around the corners and things. I think everyone was very happy that we’d achieved what we’d aimed to achieve, what we’d been instructed to achieve.’144 But within seconds, silence descended once again as Conqueror’s men realized what they had done. On board Belgrano the first two explosions killed around 200 men while another 850 took to life rafts as the cruiser sank. In all, 321 men would lose their lives.
In the Control Room of every Royal Navy submarine is a piece of equipment that carefully records significant events during a patrol for later analysis. The ‘big brother’ recording of HMS Conqueror’s attack on the General Belgrano is harrowing to listen to. Three loud clanks, followed by an intense, humming machinery noise can be heard as each of the Mark 8 torpedoes leaves Conqueror’s torpedo tubes. ‘Weapon discharge,’ says a crackling voice. There then follows around 40 seconds of a noise not unlike an underwater recording until the sound of the torpedoes steadily intensifies. Fifty-seven seconds after the first Mark 8 was discharged there is a loud bang, followed by a cool calm voice: ‘Explosion.’ Three seconds later, a second loud, crashing thud follows. ‘Second explosion,’ says the calm, collected voice, before an almost identical third noise erupts. ‘Third explosion,’ says the voice, which is quickly followed by a fourth bang, which later analysis revealed was the direct path and bottom bounce of the first torpedo impact, which by chance arrived at the same time cadence as the firing interval.145 There is an eerie silence, calmness, the sound of water rushing down the side of the submarine’s hull, followed by a faint, tinkling, cracking sound, similar to someone running their hand through a chandelier. Only later did the analysis reveal that these were the sounds of the General Belgrano breaking up as the ship sank beneath the waves. Wreford-Brown finds it ‘remarkable how like an ordinary drill it was. It sounded like a good attack in the Attack Teacher at Faslane, everything tidy, no excitement. I’m not an emotional chap and I had been concentrating the whole time on getting into a good position. It was tedious rather than operationally difficult.’146
After watching the final torpedo strike the Belgrano, Wreford-Brown lowered the periscope, ordered Conqueror to a depth of 500 feet and set a course south, away from the scene of the attack at a speed of 22 knots. As the submarine moved away ‘banging’ noises could be heard in the distance. What they were was not immediately apparent. ‘If this is the Destroyers chasing me they are either lucky in their choice of direction, or there happened to be a NEPTUNE [Argentinian anti-submarine warfare aircraft] in the local area … that has directed them,’ wrote Wreford-Brown. ‘The “Bangs” reported by the Sound Room sound like gun fire – is it the BELGRANO’s ammunition going off?’ he speculated, ‘perhaps the “Big Bang” was her magazine.’ Later analysis revealed that the explosions might have been depth charges from the Belgrano’s escorts but by the end of 2 May Conqueror was well clear of any counter-attack. ‘I was both relieved and exhilarated that it had been successful,’ recalled Wreford-Brown. ‘I had no doubt about our capabilities and we had spent countless times practising; nevertheless, there was a certain sense of relief that the team had got it right.’147 ‘The Royal Navy spent thirteen years preparing me for such an occasion,’ he later said. ‘It would have been regarded a
s extremely dreary if I had fouled it up.’148
‘It had been by any standards, a textbook operation by Christopher Wreford-Brown and his team,’ said Woodward, ‘which is probably why it all sounds so simple, almost as if anyone could have done it. The best military actions always do.’149 ‘Mixed feelings of elation and envy,’ wrote Taylor, in HMS Spartan’s Report of Proceedings.150 ‘I was envious because he’d done it and we might still yet. There were all these mixed emotions. Did I think for one second about the poor bastards from the Belgrano floating around the Southern Ocean? No, I didn’t. I think that’s a luxury you can’t afford. You look back on it later and say that a bunch of kids got killed, but that’s what it’s all about, I’m afraid. I think the older wise guys thought about it quite deeply. The young guys were the hawks and they were cheering happily. They regarded this as just part and parcel.’151
Lane-Nott on Splendid was ‘thrilled to bits that we’d sunk it, but would admit fully that I was professionally extremely jealous that it was Chris that had sunk it and not me. That was my reaction at the time.’152 Now, on reflection, he is ‘extremely grateful … that it wasn’t me that sank the Belgrano, that it was him and not me. And I say that because I saw the pain that he had to go through and the examination and scrutiny he went through when he got back.’ When Conqueror returned to the United Kingdom, the press hounded her crew and many of their families. ‘The intrusion was disgraceful,’ says Lane-Nott. ‘People saying that he needed psychoanalysis and how much counselling has he had and all this nonsense. He’s a submarine Commanding Officer, for god’s sake, he doesn’t need any counselling. He did his job.’153
Accusations were later made that the Prime Minister had deliberately ordered the sinking of the Belgrano in order to scupper an American-backed Peruvian peace plan. Much of this controversy arose due to the complexity of the day’s events and a subsequent TV interview in which Thatcher was grilled by a 56-year-old teacher from Cirencester, Diana Gould, who accused the Prime Minister of ‘sabotaging any possibility of a peace plan succeeding’. In denying this accusation, Thatcher responded that ‘one day, all of the facts, in about thirty years’ time, will be published’.154 Those facts now show that on 2 May GCHQ intercepted Argentinian signals that indicated that Argentinian military chiefs had in fact ordered the Belgrano to reverse course. But although the order had been intercepted by GCHQ, it took time to process and the new intercepts containing the information were not distributed throughout Whitehall until 3 May, long after the decision to sink the General Belgrano had been taken. They did not influence events.155 Even if the latest intelligence intercepts had been available, those responsible for assessing them would have had to ask themselves a series of questions: was the intercept accurate? Was it a deception? What followed it? Was it followed by another signal rescinding the orders that had not been intercepted?156
There is so much information now in the public domain that it is possible to piece together what happened. The Belgrano did alter course at 0811Z on 2 May and Conqueror reported the alteration to Northwood at 1400Z, just as the signal with the ROE alterations came in. The information was not passed on to the MOD or to Woodward.157 It changed little. As Freedman has noted, ‘Concluding that an Argentinian attack was not imminent was not the same as presuming that it had been postponed indefinitely … If it was not attacked that day then it would be returning to the fray the next time the Argentinian Navy positioned itself for battle, by which time Conqueror could well have lost contact.’158 Quite aside from the possibility that the Belgrano would disappear over the shallow Burdwood Bank, the periods when Conqueror was actually trailing the Belgrano were considerably shorter, as were the periods when she was marking the cruiser with a fire control solution. These all absorbed time. Herbert ‘believed that the Task Force had to take its chances when it could, because the next day the chances might fall the other way’, and, as Freedman has noted:
Even if he could have gained political authority at this point to rescind the new ROE and transmit them back to Conqueror, which was highly unlikely, there is no reason why he would have thought that sensible. The change in ROE was seen as a necessary step that would have to be taken at some point, to enable the Task Force to engage an enemy that was clearly geared up for battle.159
Indeed, in 2003, the Captain of the Belgrano, Captain Héctor Bonzo, ended thirty years of silence and admitted that his change of direction was a temporary manoeuvre. ‘Our mission in the south wasn’t just to cruise around on patrol but to attack,’ he said. ‘When they gave us the authorization to use our weapons, if necessary, we knew we had to be prepared to attack, as well as be attacked. Our people were completely trained. I would even say we were anxious to pull the trigger.’160
There were few regrets on the British side. As Lewin put it:
A catastrophe like the sinking of a major unit was bound to happen sooner or later once the Argentines had invaded and the Task Force sailed. They must have realized the risks, we certainly did, and it was my job to ensure that if possible it didn’t happen to us first.161
Among Conqueror’s crew there was ‘a range of reactions to the events of the day’, according to Powis. ‘Some became rather introspective, some seemed unaffected, most were pragmatic. We were at war in all but name and assumed that the Argies would have had a go at us if they had detected our presence.’162 Wreford-Brown had mixed emotions. ‘Afterwards I had a certain amount of regret about the loss of life. I did not know the numbers involved, but one presumed it was considerable. But I feel we did just what we were invited to do and I would have no hesitation in doing it again. It is a fact of life that if you want to go to war, you must expect losses.’163 McClement holds a similar view:
They started it, so all the lives lost are the Argentinian government’s fault. In war, tough decisions have to be made and people die. The Argentinians had invaded our country aggressively and that’s war. We were protecting the carriers and if we had lost them we would never have won the war. It was the right thing to do and I believe it saved more lives being lost because their ships never came out again. It had a very aggressive psychological impact on the Argentinians. Admiral Lord Fisher said in 1903 “the art of war is violence, moderation in war is imbecility.” Once someone has started the war and once the other side has decided to go to war with them, then the best thing you can do is to do it as hard as you can. The sooner they realise there’s only one option for them – and that’s surrender – the better.164
None of this was lost on the Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher later wrote in her memoirs that:
As a result of the devastating loss of the Belgrano, the Argentinian Navy – above all the carrier – went back to port and stayed there. Thereafter it posed no serious threat to the success of the taskforce, though of course we were not to know that this would be so at the time. The sinking of the Belgrano turned out to be one of the most decisive military actions of the war.165
Following the sinking the Argentinian Navy was reluctant to run what was now a gauntlet of SSNs which had formed a barrier on the high seas. Herbert referred to the Argentinian Navy as the ‘Stay at home Navy’.166 That reluctance eloquently demonstrated the deterrent effect of the nuclear submarine, and as James Taylor commented at the time, ‘it was that, as much as any other factor, which permitted CTG 317.8 to win the crucial war of attrition in the air unmolested by the enemy surface fleet’.167 The sinking of the Belgrano was, as Woodward recorded, ‘one of the more riveting days in the history of the submarine service’, and he later remarked that ‘if Spartan had still been in touch with 25 de Mayo I would have recommended in the strongest possible terms to C-in-C that we take them both out that night.’168
FRUSTRATION
As Conqueror carried out the attack on the Belgrano, HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid continued to search for the Argentinian carrier, which by 3 May, intelligence indicated, was some sixty miles south of Puerto Deseado (the Argentinian mainland).169 Spartan sprinted to intercept but found n
othing.170 Lane-Nott also moved Splendid to the southwest until at 0330Z Splendid’s sonars detected between three and five ships around seven miles inside Argentinian territorial waters (twelve miles from the coast), close to Puerto Deseado. ‘We were right on the 12 mile limit, just outside it,’ recalled Lane-Nott:
with what we had convinced ourselves, not from intelligence reports, although some of them were vaguely in that direction, but from acoustics that what we were hearing on sonar, that we’d got the carrier and that it was running down the coast inside the 12 mile limit. And we spent an extraordinary night when we were at … action stations, waiting for the morning and the daylight, going along the 12 mile limit, following this vessel, which we were pretty convinced was the carrier, gradually going south at about 10 or 12 knots. It was an extraordinary night to the extent that Ian Richards [XO of HMS Splendid] and I didn’t go to sleep at all, we just sat in the Control Room the whole time and stayed with it. We normally shared things, I did a bit, he did a bit, he’d call me if something came on which allowed me to get some sleep. But we were so absorbed in it neither of us was prepared to go to bed and the adrenalin was such that we didn’t want to go to bed.171
Lane-Nott was convinced that he had the carrier. ‘There are numerous contacts off Deseado,’ he wrote. ‘Not surprising as it is a port with some facilities. However, I am sufficiently suspicious of some of these contacts to believe that they may be warships. Ranging manoeuvres indicate that they may be outside the TML [Twelve-Mile Limit] but I am not certain. We will have to wait until daylight.’172