by James Jinks
Back in London, the reported position of the carrier raised ‘a potentially tricky problem’. The sonar contacts appeared to be moving north to ‘a vulnerable position off the coast of Argentina … outside what Britain would recognize as territorial waters but in a bay which the Argentinians claimed was inside the territorial waters baseline.’173 The War Cabinet was forced to seek the advice of the Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers. Although Havers advised that the sonar contacts were approaching an area that was outside Argentinian territorial waters, he stipulated that the carrier could only be attacked if it was more than 12 miles from the nearest point of land.174
As London debated what to do, on board Splendid excitement was building as the crew waited for dawn. In the submarine’s Manoeuvring Room, the engineering crew had linked up with the Sound Room so that reports could be broadcast to the Engine Room. ‘At least four contacts are heading North West towards Cabo Blanco,’ wrote Lane-Nott at 0947Z in the morning. ‘Intend following them North outside the 30 fathom line until sunrise when we will close to identify and attack a selected target. It is possible that they are forming up into two groups.’175 As dawn approached Lane-Nott took Splendid to action stations and up to periscope depth in order to see if he could visually identify the carrier.
‘The ship was at action stations, we went to periscope depth,’ recounted Lane-Nott, ‘and you won’t believe it, the visibility was about ten yards, we were in solid fog. You couldn’t see a damn thing. The visual aspects had gone, ok the electronic aspects were there, but the visual aspects had gone. You couldn’t possibly do a visual attack on a carrier with ten yards’ visibility, you could do it deep if you were convinced. But one of the things that the Rules of Engagement talked about was visual identification, so we had to have the visual identification. If we hadn’t had that, I might well have fired on it.’176
By the end of the morning intelligence information, possibly gleaned from US satellite reconnaissance, indicated that the ‘Argentine aircraft carrier group was in-shore … and enjoying close air cover from the mainland’ and that the ‘Argentine commander had apparently questioned his orders to move forward and launch air attacks and had pulled back for reasons of weather and military prudence’.177 The carrier then reportedly moved away to the north.178
‘A day of frustrations’ was how Lane-Nott summed up 4 May. He moved Splendid east, just outside the Argentinian twelve-mile limit, hoping to intercept the contacts as they continued north to Cabo Blanco, a chokepoint for coastal traffic from Deseado and the Golfo San Jorge. ‘They have certainly not come outside the TML or run the gauntlet across the Eastern edge of Golfo San Jorge,’ he wrote. ‘By standing off to the East we should be better placed to detect the one who does do something out of the ordinary and is therefore worth prosecuting.’179 But by 5 May, as Herbert noted in his war diary, ‘At present, the Argentinian units do not appear to have any intention of moving … outside the TML.’180 But this did not stop the Argentinians from mounting other air assaults on the Royal Navy Task Force and on the afternoon of 4 May HMS Sheffield was attacked.
With the conflict intensifying, further intelligence on the location of the Argentinian carrier prompted the War Cabinet to revisit the matter. On 5 May, Francis Pym explained that:
we have good reason to believe that she is in, or very close to, Argentinian territorial waters, heading North and so away from the Falkland Islands and our Task Force, and that her attack capability is reduced to six aircraft with a radius of only 200 miles. Thus the carrier in her present posture can hardly be regarded as a direct or imminent threat to our Task Force.181
In a two-page memo to the Prime Minister, Pym argued that ‘there is not in my judgment an immediate military need to attack the carrier in its present posture’. He urged the Prime Minister to ‘have possible political consequences of an attack on the carrier at the front of our minds’ due to the ongoing Haig negotiations, which the Cabinet had endorsed. ‘I am in no doubt whatever,’ he wrote:
about the political consequences of an attack upon the carrier in that posture while we were waiting for the Argentine response to the proposals which Cabinet endorsed this morning. International opinion would be outraged. We should, I believe, forfeit much of our Parliamentary and public support at home. We should make it impossible, at least in the short term, for Argentina to accept an agreement of the kind envisaged. And most important, we should be thought by the Americans, and by Mr Haig in particular, to have deliberately destroyed the prospects of an initiative to which we had just given our conditional agreement. I believe that the consequences of that for American public opinion and the American Government’s support could be incalculably grave.182
As Freedman has shown:
This was the most dovish point in British thinking. The risk of political isolation and the pressure from the Americans was palpable. The War Cabinet and then the full Cabinet had been in discussions all morning about an unsatisfactory American plan that might have to be accepted. A cease-fire might be imminent. In these circumstances it seemed folly to push Britain’s luck by attacking the carrier close to the Argentine mainland.183
Pym recommended ‘that the instructions to the submarine concerned should now be modified, at least until we know whether the Argentines are going to accept the Haig proposals to the effect that the submarine should not attack the aircraft carrier so long as she continues on a northerly course in or close to Argentine territorial waters’.184 Pym recommended that ‘the Submarine Commander might be authorized to attack the carrier only if she has moved out of the vicinity of Argentine territorial waters and has changed course in a direction which clearly implies hostile intent’.185 The Attorney General backed Pym’s recommendation and insisted that the ‘legal defensibility of an attack on the Argentine carrier would be reduced if she were not within 12 hours’ steaming of a point from which her aircraft could threaten British forces.’186 Havers also pointed out that ‘even outside the 12 mile limit, an attack on the Argentine aircraft carrier might be difficult to justify legally if as a result of moving northwards she was much too far away to pose an immediate threat to British forces’.187
Nott later recorded that:
One of our nuclear submarines found the Argentine aircraft carrier lurking within Argentinian territorial waters … and the rules of engagement did not permit an attack within Argentinian territorial waters. The Navy sought a change in the rules, although the shallow water would have posed a hazard to our submarine. Margaret Thatcher was keen to agree the change, on the basis that the aircraft carrier would present a continuing threat to our ships and to take the Falklands even after we had recaptured them. I opposed the change, arguing against her and Terry Lewin on the grounds that action in South American territorial waters could bring in other countries on the Argentinean [sic] side just as we were about to achieve a victory. We did not agree the change.188
Although the War Cabinet decided that ‘no immediate changes were needed in the Rules of Engagement’, they were amended on 6 May and British forces were restricted from carrying out attacks on the carrier when it was more than twelve hours’ steaming from the Task Force.189 Haig was also informed that Britain was exercising restraint in its search for the carrier, while Argentinian commanders were not operating under similar restrictions.190
The next day, 7 May, the MOD objected to the restrictions on the grounds that ‘the range of the carrier was not fixed but dependent upon the relative weights of the weapons and fuel being carried as well as their ability to refuel in-flight’.191 The War Cabinet once again issued a warning to Argentina through the Swiss explaining that any Argentinian warship or aircraft found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentinian coast would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. This effectively extended the Total Exclusion Zone right up to the Latin American coastline. A public announcement and formal notification to the Argentinian Government were made later that day and, after allowing twenty-four hours for the Argentinians to
act on the warning, the ROEs were once again altered to remove the previous restrictions on SSNs attacking the carrier.192
Back in the South Atlantic, Splendid was no longer in a position to search for the carrier. The submarine was suffering from a number of mechanical defects, the most serious of which concerned one of its two electrical generators. To repair it, Splendid would need to snort, or to run its diesel engines while on the surface. On 6 May, Lane-Nott decided to withdraw from his operating area to well outside any areas of Argentinian activity to carry out repairs. From 6 May until 14 May Splendid’s engineering team battled to repair the faulty generator. While they were able to repair the machinery, in order to bring full power back on line Splendid’s reactor had to be scrammed and restarted, a procedure that required a great deal of power, more than was available in the submarine’s batteries. To provide that power, Splendid would have to run on diesel engines.
‘We came up to periscope depth to find ourselves in the worst weather that we had in the whole of the time we were down there,’ explained Lane-Nott. ‘It was storm force twelve, mountainous seas, I mean staying at periscope depth is difficult enough in those weathers, yet alone snorting in it … We managed to get a snort on, we then full scrammed and we were into the process of doing this and we lost it and we couldn’t stay at periscope depth, we couldn’t keep the thing open. We had no alternative but to go deep and try and hang on … “reactor is critical”, “normal electrical supplies restored” were two phrases that will remain ingrained in my heart because I honestly thought we were going to run out of battery. I won’t tell you what was left at the end, but it was absolutely touch and go. I mean, another thirty seconds I reckon and we would have been out of gas.’193
VALIANT ARRIVES
While Splendid was carrying out repairs a fourth SSN, HMS Valiant, entered the South Atlantic. The day before Conqueror sank the Belgrano, HMS Valiant, the Royal Navy’s oldest SSN, under Commander Tom Le Marchand, sailed into Faslane after conducting an operational workup with HMS Torquay and HMS Oracle. Once in Faslane she embarked a full war load of weapons and topped up on stores and victuals. ‘Earnest preparations at base ensued,’ recalled Le Marchand. ‘Our weapon system was upgraded to the most recent Tigerfish development, stores and provisions for 95 days were stuck down below, and one member of the ship’s company married his fiancée. From the outset, we were utterly convinced that this was going to be a shooting war, and that our task was going to be to take the Argentinian navy out of the equation.’194 Valiant sailed for the South Atlantic on 2 May and arrived in the hostilities zone at 1800Z on 15 May after a transit of 7000 miles at over 500 miles per day.
Although Valiant had only just arrived in the South Atlantic, Le Marchand described how:
Keeping the highly sophisticated but 21-year-old nuclear submarine at peak performance for night after day was a fantastic achievement. Heroes daily dealt with steam leaks, hydraulic bursts and even the odd fire; one person, the smallest man on board, had to slide 12ft down between the pressure hull and the port main condenser (a space of 9 by 18 inches cross-section) to replace a flange from which steam was leaking. Unrepaired we would not have been able to use full power – a crucial get-away requirement. Discipline and morale were outstanding.195
On 17 May, two days after arriving on station, Northwood received further intelligence which indicated that the Argentinian submarine San Luis was transiting to Puerto Belgrano and Valiant was ordered to intercept and sink it. Although weather conditions were flat and calm, and sonar conditions were excellent, a fishing trawler ‘remained in the general area during the rest of the day, often confusing the towed-array picture with bursts of cavitation, flutter, diesel signature and tonals’. Also, the shallow water and no fewer than 180 biological contacts, such as whales, prevented Valiant from achieving a firm classification on the ‘plethora of contacts’ that she detected over a six-hour period, from 1200Z to 1800Z.196 In order to remain vigilant, Le Marchand kept the bow caps on Valiant’s torpedo tubes open all afternoon. This was a typical entry in his log:
At 1452 another promising [submarine] contact was gained (S92) to the East moving left. A rapid ranging manoeuvre gave 1936 range of 1600 yds, and VALIANT was on the point of cutting the firing bearing when the ‘contact’ split, passing down either side at 200 yds. Further attempts at relocation produced intermittent detections, but none with sufficient confidence or collateral to justify firing, and subsequent careful re-examination of the LOP confirms that no meaningful solution was obtainable. Nevertheless much disappointment was felt, and it will never be known for sure whether S92 was a missed opportunity, although on board analysis points yet again to a BIO contact. Most pundits would agree that a great deal of luck would be necessary for an SSN to hold an S209 class on main motors long enough to attack it, even without the unpredictable distractions caused by fish, fishermen and amorous sea mammals.197
With the arrival of Valiant the SSNs were all, by 17 May, involved with providing full defensive cover for the Amphibious Group. Three of the four SSNs were tasked with intercepting and attacking Argentinian surface ships moving east from their bases on the coast to strike the UK amphibious force, with the fourth SSN, HMS Valiant, positioned behind, acting as a sweeper to provide defence in depth. At first Valiant was allocated an area to the northeast of the Falkland Islands, in effect a centre billet, with Spartan to the west covering the northern ports, Conqueror to the east and Splendid, which had returned ‘into the CVA [carrier] chase again’ after successfully repairing its faulty turbo generator on 16 May, covering the Tierra del Fuego area to the southwest.198 However, Conqueror was unable to take up its position due to yet more communication problems. Instead, Valiant was ordered to a new patrol area to the northwest of the Falklands, covering the port of Comodoro Rivadavia and the direct route between Argentina and the Islands.
Conqueror’s communications equipment had in fact deteriorated to such an extent that it proved impossible to transmit or receive any communications traffic. The communication problems were now so severe that Wreford-Brown was forced to withdraw her sixty miles to the east and surface at night in order to attempt to replace the wire. ‘This has most probably been the most frustrating day of the Patrol,’ he wrote in the Conqueror’s patrol log:
We were all set to move West into water where the ARG Warships are thought to be, when reception on the HF tail on the floating wire started to show signs of deteriorating. I therefore withdrew 60 NM to the East to surface in order to replace it with one of the other two I carried. On surfacing these were both found to be damaged by water ingress – Why? Brought all three below to work on them, but successful repair seems unlikely. I then had to watch the water to the West of me be reallocated to VALIANT, so that I now sit with an SSN buffer between me and any chance of some action. Present indications (confirmed at 190050) show that all 3 wires are just as useless. The result – I have wasted at least 36 hours operational time, lost the water where I might do something useful and now have to sit in a passive posture, not the best employment of an SSN; all because of the inability to repair a wire.199
Conqueror dived and after taking advice from Northwood the crew attempted to adapt all three wires. When Conqueror surfaced late on 21 May, in rough weather, and streamed one of the newly built wires it became wrapped around the submarine’s propeller. This only became apparent when Conqueror dived and cavitated heavily at speeds above 7 knots, with obvious detection opportunities for the enemy. ‘I sound as though I am trailing a metal dustbin,’ wrote Wreford-Brown.200 Attempts to dislodge the wire by putting Conqueror through a series of vigorous manoeuvres failed. The only option was to surface again and put a diver in the water to cut the wire, but the weather had deteriorated to such an extent that it had become too rough to surface again. ‘It is too rough to put Divers down at present,’ wrote Wreford-Brown, ‘I shall have to wait for the weather to improve … it is very restrictive and gives excellent opportunities for counter detection.’201
By the time Conqueror returned to operations, the Falklands conflict had entered its final phase. On 21 May, British forces began the invasion of the Falkland Islands, with 3000 troops and 1000 tons of supplies landing at San Carlos on East Falkland. This first phase of the invasion came at great cost. The Royal Navy frigate HMS Ardent was sunk by Argentinian aircraft, leaving twenty-two dead, while HMS Argonaut and HMS Antrim were hit by Argentinian bombs that failed to explode. Three days later, HMS Antelope was lost after a bomb disposal expert was killed attempting to defuse an unexploded bomb. The next day, the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Coventry was also sunk with the loss of nineteen men after it was attacked by Argentinian aircraft. The Merchant Navy container ship Atlantic Conveyor was also hit by Exocet missiles and later abandoned with the loss of twelve crew and vital supplies.206