The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  On board the SSNs, the crews were all frustrated by the absence of any contacts, feelings that were deeply exacerbated by the news of British losses in the amphibious operating area in and around the Islands. HMS Splendid’s crew took the losses very hard. ‘Ardent and Alacrity and Sheffield really hit us hard,’ recalls Lane-Nott, ‘very hard indeed because we were frustrated that we were not being used properly, we weren’t getting the information and they were getting through to these guys and why weren’t we in there. I would have liked to have operated inside the Falkland Sound. I felt that we could have been a great support to the landings.’207 Taylor on Spartan felt like ‘some sort of detached visitor’ compared to those in the ships sitting in bomb alley. ‘We were out there tucking into our soup and sarnies in a shirt-sleeved environment and getting really quite frustrated.’208 ‘Throughout the deployment all were acutely interested in how the “real battle” was going,’ recalled Le Marchand, ‘and determined to do all possible to contribute.’209 At the time of the landings HMS Valiant was ‘ideally placed’ in the centre of the Estrecho – straits – de le Maire to attack two Argentinian destroyers it had sighted. However, the two destroyers were firmly within the Argentinian twelve-mile limit and Valiant was unable to attack without a change in the Rules of Engagement. After identifying the destroyers, Le Marchand signalled Northwood, ‘seeking an ROE change in order to effect retribution for British losses within the British territorial waters of the Falkland Islands’.210

  Back in London, Le Marchand’s request triggered an intense debate about how to respond to British losses and the Argentinian warships lurking inside the Argentinian twelve-mile limit. On 27 May, the Chiefs of Staff argued that there had been ‘a considerable change in both political and military circumstances’ since the previous discussions about the Rules of Engagement in Argentinian territorial waters on 7 May. ‘Negotiations are no longer taking place,’ they said. ‘The military conflict has escalated dramatically with four of our warships having been sunk. The Argentines have not imposed any parallel restrictions upon their own freedom of action. On the contrary they continue to occupy much of the Falkland Islands and are attacking from safe bases British forces within the Falkland Islands (i.e. British) territorial waters.’ As two such losses had occurred in the British territorial waters, the Chiefs of Staff believed that the time had now come to ‘remove the sanctuary’ which the British Government had ‘allowed up to now for Argentine forces within 12 NM of their own coast’.211

  At a meeting of OD(SA) on 28 May, the Chiefs put their case forward in a paper that sought ‘discretion for the Argentine Navy to be attacked inside the 12-mile limit’.212 During what Mrs Thatcher described as ‘difficult’ discussions, ministers pointed out that ‘Britain had lost 4 ships in the past week, two of them in British territorial waters’ and that ‘The Exocet missiles with which a number of Argentine navy ships were armed constituted a serious threat to current operations, and the possibility of a sudden sally by such ships could not be ruled out. In these circumstances,’ they argued, ‘it was unreasonable and dangerous that the Argentine navy should be allowed sanctuary if within 12 miles of the coast of Argentina.’213 Despite ministerial concerns that ‘Public opinion would not understand if opportunities … were missed and later a major British ship such as the SS Canberra were in consequence sunk’, ministers were concerned about the lack of ‘legal justification for operations within what Britain herself regarded as Argentine territorial waters unless war had first been declared’. Ministers also argued that the ‘threat posed by the Argentine navy, while within these waters, was not direct enough to justify action under the right of self-defence’ and that ‘Force could not be used if it was disproportionate.’ Ministers were also concerned about wider arguments against what would be seen as ‘the equivalent of an attack on the Argentine mainland’ and the possibility that such attacks would increase the danger of other Latin American countries joining the conflict on Argentina’s side.214 The War Cabinet postponed a decision as to whether or not to allow the attack of Argentinian Navy ships within the twelve-mile limit from 28 May until the following week.215 They had two further meetings, but failed to reach a decision.216

  Mrs Thatcher was well aware of how frustrated the submarine commanders were:

  We remained grievously concerned at the naval losses and aware that the surface Argentine navy had retreated into 12 mile territorial waters. As two of our ships had been sunk in our territorial waters we tackled the A. G. [Attorney General] – could we not sink theirs in their territorial waters. There were parts of the coast where the water was deep enough for our submarines to operate. But time and time again the A. G. said No. Once they moved out & into the direction of the Falklands – yes – but not unless. Our submarine commanders were left prowling up & down the line, very frustrated.217

  There is little doubt that, had the Cabinet allowed attacks within Argentinian territorial waters, Valiant would have been able to sink the destroyers. ‘Weather conditions in the area were ferocious,’ recorded Le Marchand, ‘although visibility was generally very good, and predicted sonar ranges gave a high probability of detecting the enemy.’218 That afternoon, Valiant also detected a ‘Ton’ class minesweeper, but as with the destroyers was unable to attack it. On 31 May, Valiant was ordered to locate the hospital ship Bahia Paraiso, which was suspected of abusing her hospital status in carrying supplies or reinforcements to the Argentinian land forces. Le Marchand had ‘severe misgivings’ about taking Valiant into the declared destination of the hospital ship, the Bay of Harbours in the Falkland Islands, and after carefully considering all the navigational data for the harbour, parts of which were shallow and badly surveyed, he decided not to take Valiant inside.219 On 6 June, Le Marchand then sighted Hipólito Bouchard well inside the twelve-mile limit south of Tierra del Fuego. As Le Marchand wrote:

  This was a particularly frustrating event because enemy action in the Falkland Islands was at its height and already had brought the devastating loss of four of Her Majesty’s Ships and many lives, but Rules of Engagement specifically precluded an attack on Argentine forces within their own territorial waters. An understanding of the immense political implications of such an attack did nothing to allay my own and my Ship’s Company’s disappointment as the destroyer had to be permitted to pass a ‘90-track’ at a range of two thousand yards, and proceed unmolested to Ushuaia.220

  HMS Conqueror was also operating off the Argentinian coast, just outside the twelve-mile limit, reacting to intelligence which indicated that two Argentinian Task Groups, the first consisting of the Type 42s and American-built destroyers, and the second of the Type 69 frigates, were both moving down the Argentinian coast to an area between Puerto Belgrano and Puerto Deseado. But on 4 June intelligence indicated that one of the Argentinian Type 42 destroyers, Hércules, had damaged a shaft and had retreated to Puerto Belgrano with Santísima Trinidad in company. After briefly patrolling off Delgado Point, Conqueror then moved north to search for Hércules, which, on 5 June, intelligence indicated was creeping along the coast as far inshore as possible. The Gulf of San Matías presented an opportunity for Conqueror. The entrance to the bay was greater than twenty-four miles, so Hércules would have to leave safe water unless she continued to hug the coast and went around the inside of the bay to remain in territorial waters. Conqueror waited, but detected nothing. It looked as if the Argentinian destroyer had taken the long way round inside the bay. Wreford-Brown decided to take Conqueror inside to have a look. ‘This was another interesting navigational challenge,’ noted Powis. ‘The area of chart on which we were to navigate was a little smaller than a post card: approximately 5 miles to the inch.’221 Conqueror moved into the bay, which in places was so shallow that the depth beneath Conqueror’s keel was between 130 and 34 feet, and spent until 8 June searching for the Hércules. But by 8 June Wreford-Brown was forced to reluctantly conclude that Conqueror had missed the target. He withdrew Conqueror from the bay and later that day intellige
nce indicated that Hércules had arrived at Belgrano, seventeen hours ahead of schedule. ‘Therefore we missed her before even entering Gulf San MATIAS,’ wrote Wreford-Brown. ‘However, it was an interesting experience!’222

  HMS Spartan was also searching for targets. Intelligence indicated that Veinticinco de Mayo was operating off Cabo Blanco.223 At one stage Spartan came slowly but inexorably – and inexplicably – to a complete halt. Eventually it became clear that the 4900-ton submarine had been arrested by a giant bank of kelp, a reminder that the sea still had some surprises to spring.224 Spartan was eventually propelled free after varying her depth by pumping and flooding. ‘Very bizarre experience,’ noted Taylor, who made extra efforts to avoid the ‘water gardens’. Eventually Spartan ‘Intercepted contact heading North across mouth of Gulf.’ Spartan’s operators detected two shafts, five blades. ‘This looked very hopeful,’ wrote Taylor, ‘all swing into action well at the prospect of a target at last.’ But as with the other SSNs there was nothing to shoot at. ‘A terrible anti-climax to find a modern 9000 tonne M/V on arrival at P/D,’ he recorded. Spartan continued to hunt, but with little success. ‘No other contacts, no intercepts,’ continued Taylor on 4–5 June. ‘A depressingly quiet billet, and the enemy shows little sign of wishing to run the gauntlet.’225 ‘Not enough targets’ was how Able Seaman Graham Wrigley later summed up his view of HMS Spartan’s Falklands tour.226

  Back in Northwood, Herbert was distinctly aware of how tedious the SSNs were finding the restrictions they were operating under. On 6 June, he signalled Conqueror:

  I am sure you are frustrated by lack of Targets and last minute programme changes. However, during this critical period when we are unclear of ARG intentions, we must remain ready to support TG 317.8 with all available assets. The overall programme is being kept under continuous review and I will keep you informed once plans firm up.227

  By early June, Northwood started to look again at its long-term plans to maintain a force of SSNs in the South Atlantic. Wreford-Brown was asked how long Conqueror’s crew could survive with the supplies on board. He advised that there were enough supplies for a further twenty-eight days on normal diet and forty-two days on a restricted diet. On 3 June, in anticipation of a prolonged stay in the South Atlantic, Wreford-Brown introduced food rationing just in case the submarine was required to remain at sea into July. ‘Enforced Dieting’ was implemented with a typical day’s meals on board Conqueror looking like this:

  Breakfast One egg

  One piece of bacon OR One sausage

  Baked Beans OR Spaghetti

  Arries

  ‘Special’ every other day

  Bread/Toast – as normal

  Jams/Marmalades – as normal

  Butter/Margarine – will be rationed

  Tea/Coffee as normal

  Lunch Thick home-made soup with bread

  Cold meats/pickles three times a week

  Sundays – Normal full Roast and duff

  Supper Normal 2 choice main course with 2 veg + spuds

  Duff

  Sundays – Rice/Curry/Chinky/Stroganoff/Pot Mess228

  Taylor also introduced a restricted diet for HMS Spartan’s crew, after forty-five days at sea, which consisted of a single-choice cooked breakfast, lunch of soup, bread and a pudding, and single-course evening meal. This diet was further restricted after sixty-four days by the introduction of a ‘continental breakfast’ consisting of coffee or tea and a bun on alternate days. The diet proved less unpopular than might have been supposed, and in many cases led to a welcome weight loss.229

  REINFORCEMENTS

  As the battle for the Falklands continued the beginning of June saw the withdrawal of the first SSN, HMS Splendid, which began its transit back to Devonport on 28 May. Splendid was replaced by HMS Courageous, which had arrived back in the United Kingdom in early May after a 26,000-mile, 302-day deployment. The submarine was put into the floating dock in Faslane, where ‘manic’ much-needed hull preservation and essential maintenance were rushed through in order to get the submarine in a fit and ready state to deploy south. Courageous’s CO, Commander Rupert Best, was concerned that ‘the leave and maintenance, harbour training and Index/Calibration period might be barely sufficient to rectify the many accumulated defects as well as complete the programmed maintenance’, but thanks to the support of the Faslane Base and assistance from other submarines the submarine sailed for the Falklands on 12 May, ten days earlier than originally planned, with a full war load of thirty-one weapons, including Tigerfish, Mark 8 torpedoes and the new Royal Navy Sub Harpoon missile system – the first time it had been deployed operationally – which the crew were eager to use against the Argentinian carrier. ‘To 25 de Mayo, from Courageous’ was inscribed on one of the capsules that housed the deadly missiles.230

  Courageous arrived in the waters surrounding the Falklands on 28 May, the day Splendid left for the UK, and was positioned to the west of the Islands, transiting down the 100-fathom line to the twelve-mile limit off Puerto Deseado. ‘Depending upon where we were, our task was to patrol and look out for aircraft and surface ships,’ recalled Best. ‘We were shifted about a bit, first north and then north-west of the Falklands before returning to the Argentinian coast and the airfields at Comodoro Rivadavia, Puerto Deseado (where the story behind the Rime of the Ancient Mariner originated) and San Julian.’ Best was ‘keen that the Task Force should recognize the unique capability of RNSH [Royal Navy Sub Harpoon] as an anti-ship weapon and therefore position us so that we would be in the right place to take advantage of this long range missile should any opportunity to use it occur’. But aside from contact with the Argentinian hospital ship Bahia Paraiso, which Best also allowed to proceed on her way, Courageous saw little of the enemy. ‘On occasions we were going quite close in, to about 20 miles off the coast,’ recalled Best. ‘The Argentinian fleet was in harbour, the Hércules … and one or two others came out occasionally, but well inshore and basically scuttled from one place to the next. We were there listening out and waiting for any intelligence that we could gain on their carrier 25 de Mayo or anyone else.’ Disappointingly for Courageous’s crew, the carrier failed to appear. ‘On the whole we were doing our own thing and rather independent of all that was happening around the Falkland Islands,’ said Best.231

  The SSK HMS Onyx also arrived in the waters surrounding the Falklands, bringing the total number of Royal Navy submarines in the South Atlantic to five. Onyx, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Andy Johnson, was equipped with a new five-man chamber for deploying and recovering Special Forces. The submarine had been recalled from Devonport on 18 April and ordered to proceed to Gosport to store for war. An intense week at Portsmouth followed, while the crew prepared for departure, carrying out essential maintenance, storing supplies and loading weapons, including 10 Mark 24 torpedoes, 11 Mark 8s and 2 Mark 20s. ‘There was also a need for briefing, planning and the assimilation of large quantities of data concerning both our own and Argentine units, not least of which was a geography lesson,’ remembered Johnson, ‘Few of us had any idea of the size or exact location of the islands we were off to recover!’232 A week later, on 26 April, Onyx departed from HMS Dolphin in Gosport and set course for the South Atlantic.

  On 16 May, the submarine arrived at Ascension Island to restock stores and carry out what was probably the first submarine refuelling at sea from a tanker in over forty years. During the refuelling one of Onyx’s external fuel oil tanks was punctured, but the leak was only discovered after the submarine had left Ascension and it was forced to return and find sheltered waters so that divers could carry out a quick repair. Onyx finally departed Ascension on 19 May and set course for the South Atlantic. Diesel electric submarines were considerably slower than their nuclear-powered counterparts so travelling to the Falklands was a feat in itself, a journey that was expected to take just over a month. ‘We found the passage a trial,’ admitted Johnson, ‘particularly after we left the tropics and entered the South Atlantic winter.
Surfaced at night to travel faster was wet, cold and uncomfortable, dived in the day was quieter, but it seemed we would be travelling for ever.’233

  Onyx arrived in San Carlos Water on 31 May. Although intended to insert and extract Special Forces, the submarine was only used in this role once operationally. ‘It was a great pity that she had not been dispatched in time to reach us before D Day for the four nuclear boats in the South Atlantic were not ideal for SBS insertions in shallow water,’ wrote Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour.234 Onyx was to have played a pivotal role in an aborted Special Forces assault, codenamed Operation ‘Kettledrum’, on the Argentinian mainland, designed to destroy Argentina’s Exocet missiles before they could be launched by the Super Etendard fighter-bombers that carried them. Onyx was to have delivered a team of Special Boat Service Marines to attack a naval airbase at Puerto Deseado, which Northwood suspected was being used by Argentinian pilots following missions against the Task Force and the Falkland Islands.235 However, the day before HMS Onyx arrived in San Carlos, the Argentinians had expended the last of their Exocet missiles and due to the considerable efforts of the British Secret Intelligence Service there was little prospect of the country obtaining any replacements. Thus the need for the operation was questionable. The Officer Commanding, SBS, Major Jonathan Thomson, was so concerned about the operation ‘inside the borders of a country with which the UK was not, in any legal sense, at war’ that he insisted on leading the operation himself.236