The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  The decision to proceed with the fourth ‘Vanguard’ class submarine was taken in July 1992, two months after the Conservative election victory. The keel of HMS Vengeance was laid down in February 1993. HMS Vanguard commissioned into the Royal Navy in August 1993, followed by HMS Victorious in January 1995, HMS Vigilant in November 1996 and HMS Vengeance in November 1999, long after the Cold War conflict in which they had been conceived had ended. As the submarines slipped away from the wall at Faslane and Devonport, their crews never lost the sense that they sailed into their own peculiar limbo somewhere between peace and war. But when Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues on MISC 7 slogged through the options between 1979 and 1982, there was no sign that, as the Duff–Mason Report had put it, a superpower Soviet Union would cease to pose a nuclear threat to Britain for decades to come.

  9

  The Silent Victory: The Cold War in the 1980s

  Our [RN] nuclear powered hunter killer submarines, and those of the United States, are the platforms best able to operate well forward and threaten the whole range of Soviet submarines and high value surface units.

  Admiral Sir William Staveley, First Sea Lord, May 1986.1

  ’I’m under no illusions. I was at war. I felt that when I was at home. We were all incredibly secretive in the Submarine Service. We didn’t talk to people outside our own group.’

  Rear Admiral Roger Lane-Nott, former CO HMS Splendid and former Flag Officer Submarines, March 2014.2

  ’The Forward Maritime Strategy depended entirely on getting nuclear-powered submarines up there early. Outcome unknown. [In the event of war] I do believe that we would have been quite good at it.’

  Commander James Taylor, former CO HMS Spartan, April 2014.3

  THE COLD WAR HEATS UP

  By the 1980s, the Soviet submarine fleet had made significant advances in worldwide deployment, submarine performance, and weapons. Submarines were now active in all oceans and backed by efficient worldwide command and control. The Russians had also made impressive technological advances, constructing submarines that were generally faster and deeper diving than their Western counterparts. They were also equipped with an impressive array of weaponry, and Soviet submarines led the West in their acquisition of tactical anti-ship missiles. However, it was weight of numbers rather than individual quality that was the strength of the Soviet submarine threat: by the 1980s the Soviets were completing one nuclear submarine every six weeks, well in excess of the combined NATO building rate. The UK’s Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) estimated that by 1985 the Soviets would have some 320 submarines in service, of which 210 would be nuclear-propelled. By comparison, in 1980 the Royal Navy submarine fleet consisted of 4 SSBNs, 12 SSNs and 16 conventional submarines. The DIS also estimated that at the start of a conflict there could be 70 Soviet nuclear cruise missile and attack submarines posing a threat in the Eastern Atlantic areas and, in addition, the Soviets could maintain around 45 SSBNs on strategic deterrent patrols from the Northern Fleet. In general, the Soviet submarine fleet constituted a formidable anti-ship force, being fast, well armed, and well directed. But it had a much lower anti-submarine capability, which gave US Navy and Royal Navy submarines, with their noise and sonar advantages, individual superiority.4

  In the late 1970s, the Royal Navy developed an anti-submarine warfare concept which looked into the 1990s.5 Because of the UK’s position on the maritime flank of Europe the Royal Navy was well aware that in the event of war it would have to provide the main contribution of maritime forces immediately available to the Alliance in the Eastern Atlantic as the US had ceased allocating surface ships to the area, and France had decided to place more emphasis on the Mediterranean at the expense of the Atlantic. UK forces were therefore configured to provide long-term surveillance of Soviet forces, to withstand an initial Soviet attack, and to sustain operations through all levels of conflict. The concept was designed to cover Royal Navy tasks in war, periods of tension and periods of peace:

  Missions in War. Soviet Submarines will have to be countered in a wide variety of settings in war. Furthermore, if hostilities are extended, attrition of Soviet submarines will become an increasingly important task. However, it can be seen that the main NATO maritime missions whose successful completion will depend on mastering the Soviet submarine threat are:

  a. Protection of NATO SSBN deployments. UK and some US strategic missile submarines deploy from the restricted waters of the Clyde. It can be expected that Soviet Submarines may attempt to detect and attack departing SSBNs in the Clyde approaches, and our maritime forces must be disposed and employed accordingly.

  b. Support of the NATO Strike Fleet Atlantic. The importance of the NATO Strike Fleet is unlikely to diminish in the timescale considered and is such that the Soviet Navy can be expected to make determined efforts to neutralize it by co-ordinated air, surface and sub-surface attacks. UK maritime forces would play a part in ensuring the Strike Fleet’s safe transit to and security within its operating areas, which could be anywhere in EASTLANT.

  c. Protection of Amphibious Operations. A prime NATO requirement is for the reinforcement of Northern Norway and the Baltic area. It will be the aim to commence such reinforcement before the outbreak of hostilities, but in any case the amphibious forces will require ASW protection in transit and whilst operating in their landing areas.

  d. Protection of Reinforcements and Resupply of ACE [Allied Command Europe] from North America and the United Kingdom. In a prolonged build up or in extended hostilities the survival of Europe would be largely dependent upon the safe arrival of war reserves and reinforcements, and a major Soviet onslaught on the Atlantic and [English] Channel lifelines can be expected, particularly from submarines.

  Tasks in Tension. In a period of tension all the main maritime missions referred to, and which require ASW protection in support, may have to be initiated. Otherwise Allied strategy remains essentially one of deterrence. Amongst other things this requires an increased emphasis on intelligence gathering and surveillance to acquire immediate and detailed information on Soviet submarine deployment. It will also be a requirement to trail or mark Soviet submarines, to allow NATO to take the offensive should hostilities occur.

  Tasks in Peace. The Soviet perception of the UK’s maritime capability is formed in peace. By conducting a range of activities in EASTLANT/ACCHAN [Allied Command Channel], UK maritime forces aim to demonstrate a broad span of defensive and offensive capabilities. In addition a number of national maritime tasks are undertaken, which in anti submarine operations include intelligence and surveillance to provide the basis for future action and planning, and the training and exercising of our own ASW forces to maintain their efficiency.6

  As always, the priority for SSNs was the protection of the UK Strategic Deterrent, the ‘Resolution’ class and later ‘Vanguard’ class submarines deploying from the Clyde areas, where they were potentially vulnerable to interception by Soviet submarines. SSNs were also used for ‘delousing’ SSBNs to ensure that they were not being tracked by Soviet submarines.

  Aside from this protection role, the Royal Navy also developed additional strategies designed to take advantage of long Soviet submarine transit routes, Soviet weaknesses in radiated noise levels and sonar, and the strength of NATO and UK passive detection technology that had been developed. The first such strategy, termed Forward Operations, involved anti-submarine warfare activity in northern parts of the Eastern Atlantic, with Soviet submarine bases in the Barents Sea and their approaches as key targets. In war, the Royal Navy intended to attack Soviet submarines immediately on leaving their bases, by either mines or torpedoes, or both. The strategy concluded that ‘nuclear submarines must be the means of delivery’ and that ‘only the SSN could conduct covert operations with a good chance of survival in such a hostile environment’.7 Other Forward Operations aimed at intercepting Soviet submarines while they were transiting to their patrol areas. These would take place early in any conflict, along identified Soviet submarine transit route
s in the general area of the Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap, or at other positions indicated by intelligence or the circumstances of a particular operation. At such points UK forces, including Maritime Patrol Aircraft and towed-array frigates, would mount area or barrier ASW operations with Royal Navy SSNs, with their noise and sonar advantage, locating, trailing and attacking Soviet SSNs.

  In any of these operations the SSNs’ roles would increase in proportion to the expected Soviet air threat, and to the degree of covertness required. The SSN was also ‘the only practicable vehicle’ capable of conducting a further type of Forward Operation, providing a counter to Soviet ‘Delta’ class SSBNs in the Barents Sea, an area of ocean that would be dominated by Soviet forces in the event of any conflict. As the only European country possessing SSNs (France did not commission its first SSN until February 1983), countering Soviet SSBNs was seen as an important UK role. But the Royal Navy also recognized that in a period of tension or conflict some of the large number of Soviet SSBNs could be deployed further south in the Eastern Atlantic and targeted against European nations. In either scenario, the Royal Navy expected counter-SSBN operations to absorb many SSNs and that would inevitably affect other ASW operations adversely. Operations in the approaches to Soviet bases also had their place in periods of peace and tension, for intelligence gathering and surveillance.

  The Royal Navy also intended its submarines to play a key role in supporting so-called Open Ocean Warfare operations in the Eastern Atlantic. Where SOSUS coverage existed, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft would be the primary means of following up on individual contacts, but SSNs were also required to covertly trail Soviet SSNs and SSBNs in open ocean waters. While Forward Operations and Open Ocean Warfare were expected to take their toll on Soviet submarines, the Royal Navy recognized that inevitably some Soviet submarines would penetrate to their targets. Alongside other ASW units, such as towed-array frigates, helicopters and Maritime Patrol Aircraft, SSNs were also involved in direct support of main NATO maritime missions in the Eastern Atlantic such as the NATO Strike Fleets, Transatlantic Reinforcement and resupply shipping to Europe, as well as amphibious operations on the northern flank. In the event of war SSNs would deploy at ranges of 50–100 miles from high-value targets and provide ASW protection against the large number of Soviet cruise missile submarines seeking to launch torpedo or missile attacks against NATO forces.

  In periods of tension, the Royal Navy’s ASW activity was ‘designed to deter the Soviets from increasing their pressure or resorting to open hostilities’, as the Operational Concept explained:

  To this end, increased emphasis will be placed on intelligence gathering and surveillance. An ability to trail or mark Soviet submarines will allow NATO to take the offensive should hostilities occur; this ability has been demonstrated by SSNs and MPA acting in accordance with SOSUS, and can be provided to the extent that numbers will allow. A primary consideration will be the protection of deploying SSBNs, in which MPA and large helicopters have useful capabilities. SSNs can be used to ‘delouse’ SSBNs, and towed array fitted SSKs might play a part. Fixed Arrays are expected to provide valuable protection for SSBNs in the Clyde Approaches.8

  In the early 1980s the Royal Navy’s submarines, particularly the new ‘Swiftsure’ class, continued to conduct covert ‘live’ operations against the Soviets exercising on operations in war deployment areas and to gain intelligence.

  In July 1980, HMS Spartan, under the command of Commander Nigel Goodwin, was diverted from Mark 24 Tigerfish deep-water test firings in an area between the Outer Hebrides and Rosemary Bank (a seamount just over seventy miles west of Scotland) to take part in Operation ‘Ephebe’, to obtain ‘current intelligence concerning the movements, missions, tactics, doctrine and operational patterns of Soviet and Warsaw Pact submarines’.9 Spartan’s primary target was a Soviet task force comprising the helicopter carrier Leningrad, two Soviet ‘Krivak’ class destroyers and a ‘Uda’ class tanker, Lena, all of which had entered the Norwegian Sea.10 Northwood wanted to determine whether or not Soviet SSNs were operating in direct support of the Soviet task group.

  Shortly after embarking on the operation Spartan quickly detected the task force and moved in behind it. Spartan also found two submarines operating approximately seven miles astern of the Leningrad, one of which had previously been picked up on SOSUS and was assessed as a Type II Soviet nuclear submarine.11 Spartan spent the next forty-eight hours loosely trailing the task force as it proceeded northeast at a speed of between 12 and 16 knots collecting intelligence from sonar transmissions, as well as the noise signatures of the various vessels. While in the trail Spartan made eight separate detections of the two Soviet submarines classified as a ‘Charlie’ class and ‘Victor’ class. To observe how the submarines were operating and interacting with the task force, Spartan then closed the range to five miles. But there was little evidence that the submarines were operating in a direct support role and Spartan’s crew concluded that they were simply exercising against the Soviet task force.12

  After collecting intelligence on the various vessels comprising the task force, Spartan moved away and returned to a central search position in the Norwegian Sea to intercept submarine contacts detected by SOSUS. The submarine spent the next forty-eight hours investigating two possible contacts, the first of which was a ‘Yankee’ class SSBN that appeared to be transiting back to its Northern Fleet base. Spartan closed the Yankee to an estimated fifty miles before breaking off and opening to the south in a planned withdrawal from the operation. While moving south Spartan detected a second submarine that was classified as a possible Type II/III Soviet nuclear submarine. Spartan closed the range until it was approximately five miles on the Soviet submarine’s port bow, before moving in and establishing a trail on its port quarter at a range of 6000 yards. Spartan spent the next hour following the submarine, which was continuing on a steady course at a speed of between 14 and 20 knots. After an hour in the trail the Soviet submarine suddenly started to clear stern arcs, turning quickly back towards Spartan, which was forced to evade to reduce the risk of counter-detection. After completing the evolution, the Soviet submarine returned to its original course and speed, while Spartan slowly moved away until it was beyond narrowband trailing range.13

  As Spartan continued south, Northwood extended the operation and ordered Goodwin to intercept a possible ‘Alfa’ class submarine which was detected operating to the northwest of North Cape, possibly waiting to delouse the inward-bound Yankee that Spartan had detected at the beginning of the patrol. Spartan sprinted to outflank the Alfa and head off the Yankee’s attempts to return to Russian waters. While moving east at high speed Spartan’s crew had considerable difficulty holding the Alfa on sonar. Goodwin slowed Spartan at periodic intervals in order to re-establish contact, but determining the range of the Alfa remained difficult. As the range closed Goodwin summoned his XO, Lieutenant Commander Dan Conley, to Spartan’s Sound Room. ‘The towed array displays were indicating a very confused picture,’ recalled Conley, ‘almost saturated by noise from the “Alfa”, but curiously there was no contact on the hull sensors.’14 Spartan’s sonar operators concluded that the Alfa was between thirty and forty miles away, but as more information became available it was obvious that this was wrong. Then a contact with a fast-moving bearing was detected. The Alfa was not 30–40 miles away, but around 10,000 yards off Spartan’s port beam. The range continued to close, until at one stage the Alfa passed approximately 3000 yards from Spartan.

  Fearing counter-detection, Goodwin attempted to manoeuvre Spartan behind the Alfa into its blind sonar arcs. However, it soon became clear from the continued bearing movement of the Soviet submarine that the Alfa was suspicious. It also began to circle and both submarines turned through approximately 240 degrees. ‘The Russian commander had clearly effected counter-detection and a situation had developed akin to an underwater dogfight, the two opposing submarines manoeuvring less than two miles apart and risking collision,’ wrote Conley.15 Goodwi
n waited for the range on the Alfa to open and then ordered Spartan away to the south at high speed, making frequent course alterations, hoping to increase the distance between the two submarines. But as Spartan sped away the Alfa started to transmit on active sonar, clearly attempting to confirm if there was indeed another submarine in its area.16 ‘Sonar transmissions now came from astern at regular intervals,’ said Conley, ‘a clear and unambiguous indication that “the opposition” was well and truly in active contact and that, quite simply, Spartan was now the Russian’s quarry.’17

  Spartan continued south at high speed, but with the Alfa capable of speeds of over 40 knots, compared to Spartan’s 30 knots, withdrawing was difficult and the Alfa remained on Spartan’s quarter, ‘very close and clearly having no trouble in keeping up’, remembered Conley.18 ‘There was little that could be done, other than hope the Russian would find it increasingly difficult to maintain sonar contact in the high-speed chase.’19 After an hour Spartan’s evasive manoeuvres succeeded in confusing the Alfa. Goodwin reported the possible counter-detection to Northwood, but instead of the submarine being ordered back to port, the Alfa was such a high intelligence priority that Spartan was ordered to relocate it. Spartan returned to the vicinity of the Alfa’s last known position, but after searching for thirty-six hours failed to detect anything of interest. Spartan returned to the UK with a significant amount of acoustic, electronic, and tactical and operational intelligence about the Alfa, including its broadband and narrowband noise signatures, as well as considerable evidence that it was fitted with some sort of propulsor and enhanced passive sonar capability.20