The Silent Deep

by James Jinks

  In 1995 the US and UK governments signed a Foreign Military Sales Agreement to allow the Royal Navy to purchase the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, known as TLAM, which had been used successfully by the US military in the 1991 Gulf War, Operation ‘Desert Storm’. With approximately 70 per cent of the world’s population and the majority of the world’s largest urban areas within 100 miles of the coast, Tomahawk gave the Royal Navy and the British Government the ability if necessary to reach out from the sea over greater distances than ever before, by attacking not only the maritime defences of a country, but high-value targets and political centres far removed from the traditional front line. Tomahawk gave the UK a weapon with which it could affect the whole course of a conflict with, potentially, a single shot.78 The RAF did everything it could to prevent the Royal Navy from acquiring a land attack missile, as such a move of course threatened the future of its manned aircraft, which traditionally provided that capability. There were extensive arguments about the location of the new Joint Operating Headquarters, the RAF claiming that it should be located at High Wycombe, and the Royal Navy, particularly the Submarine Service, arguing that it should be located at Northwood alongside CTF 345. The matter was finally resolved when the role of FOSM was incorporated into a wider function, Chief of Staff Operations, or COSOPS, based in Northwood and responsible for both CTF 345 and CTF 311 as well as surface operations and the rest of the Royal Navy.

  Tomahawk, a winged, jet-powered, high-subsonic missile, includes a conventional warhead, solid-propellant rocket booster, and various underwater protection mechanisms contained within steel capsules, which also serve as smooth-bore launching devices when loaded into a submarine’s torpedo tube from which it is horizontally launched underwater. At launch the missile is ejected from the steel capsule held within the torpedo tube. Once clear of the submarine, a lanyard initiates the firing circuit and ignites a rocket motor, and the missile’s guidance system pitches the missile nose up. After it breaches the surface, the missile jettisons its engine inlet cover, wing plugs and the shrouds between the missile and the rocket booster, allowing the fins to deploy. Once airborne the missiles are highly accurate and use a number of different guidance systems and can fly up to 1000 miles to strike a target the size of a garage. The missiles are also very effective at evading detection due to their low-altitude flight path which is under the coverage of most radar systems.79

  The first Royal Navy submarine fitted with Tomahawk was HMS Splendid. Not only did this include a sheaf of Tomahawk missiles but also the introduction of the Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TWCS), responsible for route planning, initialization of the missile, downloading of data and ultimately the launch. In 1998 HMS Splendid conducted the first test firing of a live Tomahawk against a simulated target off San Diego. The Royal Navy accelerated the trials so that the missile could be brought into operational service in time for Splendid to take part in Operation ‘Allied Force’ against Serbia. During the operation it provided the Permanent Joint Headquarters with an independent, stealthy, autonomous land attack platform, capable of keeping the pressure on the Milošević regime by launching TLAM strikes by night and during weather that prevented tactical aircraft from making similar attacks.80 Splendid fired 20 of the 238 Tomahawk missiles launched throughout the conflict, including against a key military radar facility located near Priština airfield in Kosovo.81 The performance of the new system was described as ‘outstanding’, with 17 of the 20 missiles hitting their targets.82

  Tomahawk quickly became the ‘precision weapon of choice’ as both the Navy and the British Government recognized that it allowed SSNs to ‘achieve the application of force or influence at a time and place of political choice at minimum political risk and with a low probability of unwanted damage’.83 The equipping of Splendid was followed by that of HMS Trafalgar and HMS Triumph, which in 2000 were fully TLAM integrated with US Fleets in the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The capability came at a price, each TLAM costing over a million pounds. The Royal Navy initially purchased sixty-five Block III Tomahawk missiles and planned to equip only seven SSNs with the capability to fire them. In the 1998 SDR it was announced that all the Royal Navy’s remaining attack submarines would be TLAM equipped.84 As more and more SSNs were fitted with the TLAM system, the Submarine Service was able to provide the Government with continual SSN-based land attack capability throughout an extended crisis, an important step in its move away from the ASW orientated arena of the Cold War towards the new ‘littoral warfare concept’.85

  With the disappearance of the ‘Oberon’ and the ‘Upholder’ conventional submarines the requirement to embark and offload Special Forces transferred to the remaining SSNs, which because of their size were unsuited to covert operations in shallow waters. Despite this drawback the Navy developed a means of providing its SSNs with covert projection and insertion capability for Special Forces and their equipment. An SSN would approach land then raise its stern end out of the water to allow the aft engine room hatch to be opened and the Special Forces to leave the submarine, open and inflate their rubber dinghies on the after casing and float off as the SSN slowly submerged beneath them. While this may sound simple, it was more complex than operations conducted by the smaller and lighter diesel electric submarines. The Royal Navy also sought to enhance the capability of its SSNs to insert covertly Royal Marines without having to surface. This was achieved by using a portable structure known as a Dry Hangar, fitted to the upper casing of an SSN, with access through the submarine’s main access hatch. A Dry Hanger, adapted from an American design, codenamed Alameda, was first installed on HMS Spartan in 2003, which provided the Royal Navy with the capability until the submarine was retired in 2006. The Dry Hanger could house a number of Special Forces personnel and divers, as well as a mini-submarine, known as a Swimmer Delivery Vehicle. In 1999 the Royal Navy acquired three such mini-submarines from the United States Navy. These 22-foot-long, battery-powered craft can carry a pilot, a navigator and up to four Special Forces soldiers.86

  SEVEN DEADLY VIRTUES

  Although the addition of these two capabilities injected new life into the Submarine Service, there was little room for complacency. In 2001, the Flag Officer Submarines, Rear Admiral Rob Stevens, warned that:

  The Royal Navy’s Submarine Service’s past successes, unflinching courage and the bond between all of us could, if not properly harnessed, be the cause of our downfall as well. Our tactical and technological victory in the Cold War could lead us to think that the operational concept of covert independent operations was the only way to go. On this note, independent anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations are but one part of our capability. The integrated operations with the carrier, the intelligence-gathering Special Forces and the Tomahawk missile capability are all key ingredients in the maritime contribution to joint operations. If we do not improve on all our capabilities we could fall into the trap of complacency. This was a point made by Mr Richard Danzig, US Secretary of the Navy, when he drew the analogy that the submariners, were like the Narcissus; we are so busy admiring our own reflection in the water that we are in danger of failing to see the world is developing around us and eventually we too could wither and die.87

  The Service was very aware that it had to continue to build on its proven skills of anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare, but that if it was to survive and remain relevant into the twenty-first century, it had to integrate its existing skills effectively into joint and task group operations to ensure that the submarine became indispensable. The service began to emphasize the seven inherent qualities of the SSN, the ‘seven deadly virtues’ of flexibility, mobility, endurance, reach, autonomy, stealth, and punch. In 2001 Commander Nick Harrap, an officer on FOSMs staff, described these virtues in the following terms:

  Flexibility. The capability to change role almost instantaneously, without equipment reconfiguration and without changes in, or redeployment of, personnel. No arrangements have to be made for host nation support. The submarine is con
strained only by broadcast limitations – or communications windows when undertaking task group support operations – in that the transmission and receipt of an instruction takes a finite length of time. It is, however, true that some roles are mutually exclusive. Prime examples are the provision of indications and warnings and TLAM strike – the one inherently covert, the other necessarily overt in its execution.

  Mobility. The SSN is capable of high speeds, for sustained periods, independent of the surface and with no requirement for an accompanying logistic train. This allows for a Speed of Advance (SOA) potentially in excess of 500nm per day for as long as is required. It further allows efficient and effective employment in support of task group operations, bringing real meaning to the term ‘fleet submarine’. This inherent agility allows close range force protection or sanitisation operations ahead of the task group. It almost certainly means that the SSN can be the vanguard of follow-on forces to shape the battle-space at the direction of the joint force commander.

  Stealth. The SSN represents the only true ability to operate independent of the surface, up threat, regardless of who exercises sea control or air superiority. In this manner it may be possible to conduct operations either alone or in conjunction with Special Forces that are exactly in keeping with the precepts of manoeuvre warfare. The impending advent of the dry deck hanger and the ability to deploy the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) covertly represent a significant capability enhancement and force multiplier. The contribution to, and the effect on, the campaign estimates might be critical. Added to this is the psychological dimension. The mere threat of submarine presence has a coercive effect of its own and should not be underestimated.

  Endurance. There is no requirement for dependence on outside authorities either for support, or for withdrawal, from an area if the situation changes. All life support service can be provided onboard on a continuous basis. In combination with mobility and stealth, this capacity serves to give the widest range of military and political choice in campaign planning and execution. The only limitations are expenditure on food and weapons.

  Reach. Of itself, seapower provides ready and unique access to huge areas. The SSN is capable of taking this concept further, exploiting the environment to the full, including areas not accessible to other forces such as the marginal ice zone and under the ice canopy. This facilitates a variety of operational employments at the time and place of choice. It can range from mere physical presence to the delivery of selectively targeted ordnance, ‘behind enemy lines’ and regardless of who dominates the battle-space.

  Autonomy. This virtue embraces the ability to operate alone and without support at the direction of whoever exercises overall command, as a self-contained unit of force – with broad utility – rather than part of a force package, if that is what is required. The SSN is capable of self-protection and offensive action without assistance from other units.

  Punch. The punch ranges from the determination of the enemy’s centre of gravity through intelligence gathering and the provision of indications and warnings, through force protection, to precision strikes against land targets at a range of 1,000nm and to an accuracy of 25 feet.88

  The service also emphasized two unique contributions that it could make in joint operations. The first was in an area commonly described as indicators and warnings, obtaining intelligence that is not available to other sources, or is simply shut down and unavailable if a satellite or surface ship is known to be operating in the area and able to exploit the information. The capacity of SSNs to obtain electronic intelligence, intercept communications, exploit microwave links and platform-to-platform communication systems, conduct environmental assessments and close-range photography, obtain acoustic intelligence and pass tracking information was an enormous asset.89 HMS Tireless was involved in intelligence-gathering operations of this kind during the Kosovo crisis, monitoring radio transmissions, intercepting communications and passing information to Allied forces.90 The second unique contribution involved revisiting the concept of SSNs operating in support of a surface task group. With the advent of high-integrity, nearly real-time transfer of information, expanded bandwidth and high rate of data transmissions, the concept of SSN support operations of surface forces has become a more realistic and practised concept. SSNs could operate in cooperation with surface forces, providing protection from enemy submarines and surface ships. But both contributions depended on further advances in technology, particularly communications. ‘This is an area in which the Royal Navy must really improve if we are to break away from the unsatisfactory twelve-hour delay that the submarine [VLF] broadcast brings into any Joint Commander’s calculations,’ wrote Rear Admiral Stevens in 2001. ‘Until we make this transition, we in the Submarine Service will not be able to take advantage of the information revolution and make the submarine truly “joint”.’91

  In the early 2000s, the Royal Navy’s SSNs also underwent a number of capability upgrades designed to expand the role of the SSN and turn it into a truly multi-role platform, capable of carrying out a variety of operations. On the technological front, the service devised a number of innovative techniques to ensure that the remaining ‘Swiftsure’ and ‘Trafalgar’ class submarines remained as available as possible.92 A two-stage incremental programme to counter sonar obsolescence was introduced, designed to ‘shift the balance of operational capability further towards the UK by enhancing the submarines’ sonar performance and reducing the chances of counter-detection’.93 The Initial Phase was completed in 1996 and resolved sonar obsolescence, introduced enhanced sonar capability (Sonar 2074 and 2082) and the new integrated Submarine Command System (SCMS) and delivered an incremental improvement in weapon system effectiveness to the remaining SSNs. The Final Phase enhanced the operational effectiveness of the four most recent ‘Trafalgar’ class submarines, principally by the introduction of a new integrated sonar suite known as Sonar 2076 – a software intensive system that represented ‘a step change in both technology and military capability’, as well as an upgraded tactical weapons system and a number of signature reduction measures.94 In September 2006, an additional programme of work was also pursued with the aim of developing and de-risking the enabling technology that would allow a more affordable, timely and cost-effective means of sustaining and upgrading Sonar 2076 in the longer term, by using common modules from other UK submarine combat system projects as well as the sharing of advanced signal processing algorithms with collaborative partners.95 These systems were installed in HMS Trenchant, HMS Torbay, HMS Talent and HMS Triumph.

  EAST OF SUEZ

  The decisive shift away from Cold War-orientated ASW operations can best be seen by the increasing use of Royal Navy submarines in areas other than the North Atlantic. During the Gulf War in 1990–91, the Royal Navy augmented its Armilla Patrol, established in 1979 to protect merchant shipping during the Iran–Iraq War, with 11 destroyers, 2 submarines, 10 minesweepers, 3 patrol craft and 11 RFA vessels. During the war itself, the ‘Oberon’ class conventional submarines HMS Opossum and HMS Otus were involved in a variety of operations, including the deployment of Special Forces. Both submarines were camouflaged in black and light blue to cope with the clear Gulf waters when operating at periscope depth. ‘The biggest worry was mines,’ said HMS Opossum’s CO, Stephen Upright. ‘You simply couldn’t know if they were there until too late and that certainly made having to surface twice a day concentrate the mind.’96 Both submarines returned to HMS Dolphin in May 1991, flying the Jolly Roger with daggers.

  Royal Navy submarines continued to visit the region in the aftermath of the Gulf War to reassure allies and gather intelligence. In the early 1990s focus began to shift to the other submarine nations in the world. In 1993, HMS Triumph visited the Gulf to conduct what her CO, Commander David Vaughan, described as a ‘pathfinding’ operation, to develop tactics for operations in warm waters very different from those patrolled in the Cold War. The Royal Navy stressed at the time that the visit was not specifically connected with the
arrival of Iran’s first conventionally powered Russian-built ‘Kilo’ class submarine. However, the Gulf States regarded Triumph’s presence as ‘reassuring’, not only in the aftermath of the Gulf War but also in the face of a resurgent Iran. ‘The need to keep nuclear submarines close to home has changed,’ said Captain Martin Macpherson, representing FOSM. ‘The purchase of the Kilo-class from Russia is clearly a development. Whilst locally here the Iranian Kilo is obviously of strategic significance, similar problems exist all over the world.’97 In 1997 HMS Trenchant accompanied a Royal Navy Task Group consisting of twenty vessels led by the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, which sailed to the Asia–Pacific region on deployment ‘Ocean Wave 97’. The aim of the exercise was to demonstrate the UK’s continuing commitment to the Far East in the context of the transfer of Hong Kong to China and the Royal Navy’s ability to deploy operationally effective and self-sustaining maritime forces for a prolonged period.98

  1997 also saw HMS Trafalgar complete the first ever round-the-world deployment by an SSN using both the Suez and Panama Canals. ‘We are practising deploying more widely and in the last couple of years have deployed literally worldwide,’ said Trafalgar’s CO, Commander Matt Parr. ‘And as well as just going there we are actually doing things we didn’t have the equipment and the expertise to do during the Cold War. We are operating much more closely with surface ships and are operating under tactical command of surface ship commanders on a much more frequent basis.’ This took some getting used to. ‘When I had envisaged leaving harbour for the first time as CO I always expected to be in Faslane sailing into the North Atlantic. I never expected it to be Perth, Western Australia, sailing in the Indian Ocean.’99