16 1 Corsica, Sardinia, and the other islands in the neighbouring sea were kept faithful to Otho’s side by the report that his fleet was victorious. But Corsica was almost brought to disaster by the rash action of Decumus Pacarius, the procurator, an action which would have contributed nothing to the sum total in so great a war, and which was fatal to Decumus himself. For, hating Otho, he decided to use the strength of Corsica to help Vitellius — an assistance of no value even if he had succeeded. Accordingly he summoned the leading men of the island and disclosed his pupil when Claudius Pyrrichus, commander of the Liburnian ships there, and Quintius Certus, a Roman knight, dared to oppose him, he ordered them to be killed. This execution terrified those who were present; and along with them the uninstructed populace, sharing in its ignorance the fears of others, swore allegiance to Vitellius. But when Pacarius began to raise a levy and put the exhausting burdens of military service on undisciplined men, disgusted with their unfamiliar labour, they thought of their own weakness; they realized that their land was an island and that Germany and the strength of its legions were far away, while even those who were protected by auxiliary infantry and cavalry had suffered rapine and robbery from the fleet. They suddenly repented their action, but yet did not resort to open violence; they selected a fitting time for treachery. When the attendants of Pacarius had left him, they killed him in his bath, naked and helpless. They slaughtered his attendants also. The murderers themselves carried the heads of the slain to Otho, as if they were the heads of enemies. Yet Otho did not reward them or Vitellius punish them, lost as they were in such a medley of foul acts and greater crimes.
17 1 The road into Italy had already been opened and the war transferred there by Silius’s cavalry, as we have said above. Although no one favoured Otho there, this success was not due to the preference of the people for Vitellius; but long peace had broken their spirits, so that they were ready for any kind of servitude, an easy prey to the first comer and careless as to who had the better cause. The richest district of Italy, all the plains and cities between the Po and the Alps, were now in the possession of the forces of Vitellius; for the auxiliary infantry which Caecina had sent on in advance had already arrived. A company of Pannonian infantry was captured at Cremona; a hundred horsemen and a thousand marines were intercepted between Placentia and Ticinum. Encouraged by this success, the troops of Vitellius were no longer checked by the banks of a river. On the contrary the Po itself roused to fury the Batavians and those from beyond the Rhine; they suddenly crossed the stream by Placentia, captured some scouts, and so terrified the rest that, in their alarm, they spread the false report that Caecina’s whole army was close at hand.
18 1 Spurinna (for he was the commander at Placentia) was sure that Caecina had not yet come and had decided, in case he were approaching, to keep his soldiers within the fortifications and not to oppose to a veteran army three praetorian cohorts, a thousand reservists and a few cavalry. But the soldiers were not to be restrained, and in their ignorance of war they seized the standards and colours and rushed out. When their commander tried to restrain them, they threatened him with their weapons and scorned the centurions and tribunes. More than that, they kept shouting that Otho was being betrayed and that Caecina had been sent for. Spurinna joined the folly that others started, at first under compulsion, later pretending that it was his wish, for he desired to have his advice possess greater weight in case the mutiny subsided.
19 1 After the Po was in sight and night was at hand, Spurinna decided to entrench camp. The work involved was strange to the town troops and broke their spirit. Then all the older soldiers began to blame their own credulity and to point out their dangerous and critical situation if Caecina with his army should surround so few cohorts in the open country. Presently throughout the camp more temperate speech was heard, while the centurions and tribunes made their way among the common soldiers and praised the foresight of their general for selecting as a strong base of operations a colony which possessed great natural strength and resources. In the end Caecina himself, not so much reproving their faults as showing the reasons for his action, left some scouts and led the rest back to Placentia. They were now less mutinous and more ready to accept orders. The walls of the town were strengthened, battlements added, towers built higher, arms were provided and prepared, and steps were taken to secure good discipline and a ready obedience, which were the only things that side lacked, for there was no reason to be dissatisfied with the soldiers’ bravery.
20 1 But Caecina seemed to have left behind the Alps his cruelty and licence, and now advanced through Italy in well-disciplined order. His manner of dress the towns and colonies interpreted as a mark of haughtiness, because he addressed civilians wearing a parti-coloured cloak and breeches. They seemed to feel offence and annoyance over the fact that his wife Salonina also rode a fine horse with purple trappings, though it did no one any harm. But they were prompted by that inveterate trait of human nature, which makes men look with unfavourable eyes upon the recent good fortune of others and to demand moderation from none more than from those whom they have recently seen their equals. Caecina, having crossed to Po, tried to break down the loyalty of Otho’s followers by a conference and promises, and was himself assailed by the same devices. Finally, when in vain and empty phrases they had bandied back and forth the words “peace and concord,” he turned his purpose and thoughts to storming Placentia with terrific force, well aware that the success he made in the beginning of the war would determine his reputation thereafter.
21 1 The first day was spent in a furious onslaught rather than in skilful attacks appropriate to a veteran army. The troops, heavy with food and wine, came under the walls without protection and without caution. During the struggle the handsome amphitheatre, which was situated outside the walls, was burned, being set on fire either by the besiegers as they threw firebrands, hot bullets, and burning missiles against the besieged, or by the besieged themselves as they directed their return fire. The common people of the town, being given to suspicion, believed that inflammable material had been treacherously brought into the amphitheatre by some persons from the neighbouring colonies, who looked on it with envy and jealousy, since no other building in Italy was so large. However it happened, the loss was regarded as slight, so long as they feared more awful disasters; but when a sense of security returned, they grieved as if they could have suffered nothing worse. Nevertheless Caecina was repulsed with great loss to his troops, and the night was spent in the preparation of siege-works. The Vitellians made ready mantlets, fascines, and sheds to undermine the walls and protect the assailants. Otho’s followers prepared stakes and huge masses of stones and lead and bronze to break through and overwhelm the enemy. On both sides was a feeling of shame; on both an ambition for glory. Different exhortations were heard: one side exalted the strength of the legions and the army from Germany, while the other praised the high renown of the town soldiery and the praetorian cohorts. The Vitellians assailed their opponents as lazy and indolent, soldiers corrupted by the circus and the theatre; those within the town accounted the Vitellians as foreigners and barbarians. At the same time, while they thus lauded or blamed Otho and Vitellius, their mutual insults were more productive of enthusiasm than their praise.
22 1 Almost before dawn the walls were filled with defenders, the plains all agleam with armed men. The legionary forces in close array, auxiliaries in open order, assailed the higher parts of the walls with arrows or stones and attacked at close quarters the parts of the walls that were neglected or weak from age. Otho’s soldiers poured a shower of javelins from above with more deliberate and certain aim upon the German infantry who approached with little caution, singing their wild songs and brandishing their shields above their shoulders, while their bodies, according to a native custom, were unprotected. The legionary soldiers, defended by mantlets and fascines, undermined the walls, built an earthwork, and assailed the gates, while the praetorians on their side rolled down upon them millstones
of great weight, arranged for the purpose, which fell with a mighty crash. Many of the assailants under the walls were thus crushed, many were pierced and bleeding or mangled; since their panic increased their demoralization, and the weapons rained upon them more fiercely from the walls, they began to withdraw, thus injuring the prestige of their side. Caecina, however, prompted by shame at his rash attempt to carry the town by storm and desiring to avoid appearing ridiculous and useless by remaining in the same camp, crossed the Po again and hurried to attack Cremona. As he was leaving, Turullius Cerialis, with a large number of marines, and Julius Briganticus, with a few horsemen, surrendered to him. Briganticus, a Batavian by birth, was commander of a squadron of cavalry; Cerialis was a centurion of first rank and no stranger to Caecina, for he had served in Germany.
23 1 When Spurinna learned of the enemy’s route, he informed Annius Gallus of everything that had happened, of the defence of Placentia, and of Caecina’s purpose. Gallus was at the time bringing the First legion to help Placentia, for he feared that the few cohorts there might not be able to withstand a long siege and the force of the German army. When the news came that Caecina had been repulsed and was marching on Cremona, he had difficulty in restraining his legion which, in its enthusiasm for battle, had reached the point of mutiny, but he succeeded in stopping them at Bedriacum. This is a village which lies between Verona and Cremona, and two Roman disasters have given it an unhappy celebrity.
During these same days, Martius Macer had had a successful engagement not far from Cremona; for by a prompt decision he had transferred gladiators to the opposite bank of the Po, and suddenly hurled them at the enemy. This had thrown the auxiliaries of Vitellius into confusion and, while most fled to Cremona, those who resisted were cut down. But Macer checked the enthusiastic advance of his victorious troops, prompted by fear that the enemy might be reinforced and change the fortune of battle. This roused suspicion in minds of Otho’s troops, who put a bad construction upon every act of their leaders. Blustering in speech to match their cowardice at heart, they vied with one another in bringing various charges against Annius Gallus and Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, for Otho had appointed the latter two also as generals. The murderers of Galba were the most ardent promoters of mutiny and discord, for, driven mad by guilt and fear, they sought to cause utter confusion, now by openly seditious expressions, now by secret letters to Otho, who, between his readiness to trust the meanest and his fear of honest men, was in a state of trepidation, hesitating in prosperity and yet showing himself the better man in adversity. Therefore he sent for his brother Titianus and appointed him to the chief command.
24 1 In the meantime the generals Paulinus and Celsus had met with brilliant success. Caecina was distressed by the failure of all his efforts and by the waning reputation of his army. Driven from Placentia, he had lately had his auxiliaries cut to pieces, and, even when his scouts engaged in skirmishes which were frequent but not worth recording, he was worsted. Therefore, as Fabius Valens was approaching, he feared that all the honour in the campaign would fall to him, and hurried to recover his reputation with more impetuosity than wisdom. Twelve miles from Cremona, at a place called “The Castors,” he concealed the bravest of his auxiliary troops in some woods which overhung the road. His cavalry he ordered to advance and provoke battle, then to feign fright and draw the enemy into a hasty pursuit until the troops in ambuscade could assail them. This plan was betrayed to Otho’s generals, and Paulinus took command of the foot, Celsus of the horse; they stationed a detachment of the Thirteenth legion, four auxiliary cohorts of infantry, and five hundred auxiliary cavalry on the left flank; the causeway three praetorian cohorts occupied in deep formation; on the right front the First legion advanced with two cohorts of auxiliary infantry and five hundred cavalry. In addition to these they were accompanied by a thousand praetorian and auxiliary horse to give them additional weight if victorious, or to act as a reserve if they were in difficulties.
25 1 Before the lines engaged the Vitellians fled; but Celsus, aware of the tricky stratagem, held his men back. The Vitellians rashly left their ambuscade, while Celsus gradually withdrew. They pursued too far and themselves fell into a trap; for the auxiliary infantry hemmed them in on the flanks, the legions opposed them in front, and their rear the cavalry cut off by a sudden manoeuvre. Suetonius Paulinus did not at once give his infantry the signal to engage, for he was naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success. So he kept issuing orders to fill up the ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line, thinking that it was soon enough to begin to conquer when they had made provision against defeat. This delay gave the Vitellians time to retreat into some vineyards which were obstructed by the intertwining vines. There was a small wood also near at hand, from which they dared to issue again and killed the boldest of the praetorian horse. Prince Epiphanes was wounded as he was enthusiastically cheering the soldiers on for Otho.
26 1 Then Otho’s soldiers charged; they crushed the enemy’s line and routed also those who were coming to their assistance. For Caecina had not brought up his cohorts of auxiliary infantry all at once, but one by one, an action which increased the confusion while they were engaged, inasmuch as the bodies of troops which were thus scattered and nowhere strong were swept away by the panic of the fugitives. Even in the camp the soldiers mutinied because they were not all taken out together. They threw into chains Julius Gratus, the prefect of the camp, on the charge that he was having treacherous dealings with his brother who was serving under Otho, while Otho’s troops had put that same brother, the tribune Julius Fronto, into fetters on the same charge. But there was universal panic both among the troops who were fleeing and those who were advancing, in the lines and in front of the camp, so that on both sides it was commonly said that Caecina could have been annihilated with his whole force if Suetonius Paulinus had not given the signal to retire. Paulinus offered as excuse that he had been afraid of the effect of such great additional effort and the long march, lest the soldiers of Vitellius, fresh from camp, should attack his weary forces, and then, when they were demoralized, they should have no place of retreat. A few approved of the general’s plan, but it caused adverse comment among the mass of the soldiers.
27 1 Their disaster did not so much drive the Vitellians into a panic as bring them back to a state of obedience. This was true both among the troops with Caecina, who blamed the soldiers, saying that they were readier for mutiny than for battle; and likewise among the forces under Fabius Valens, who had now reached Ticinum. They gave up their scorn of their opponents, and, prompted by a desire to recover their former reputation, began to obey their commander with more respect and regularity. A serious mutiny had broken out among them on another occasion, the history of which I shall now trace from an early point, since before I could not properly interrupt my account of Caecina’s operations. I have already related how the Batavian cohorts that had withdrawn from the Fourteenth legion in the uprising against Nero, on hearing of the revolt of Vitellius while they were on their way to Britain, had joined Fabius Valens in the country of the Lingones. These cohorts then began to be insolent, going up to the quarters of each legion and boasting that it was they who had checked the regulars of the Fourteenth legion, they who had taken Italy away from Nero, and that in their hands lay the whole fortune of the war. Such action was insulting to the legionaries, bitterly offensive to the commander; discipline was ruined by quarrels and brawls; finally their insolence began to make Valens suspect even their loyalty.
28 1 So when news came that the squadron of Treviran cavalry and the Tungrian foot had been defeated by Otho’s fleet, and that the province of Gallia Narbonensis was blockaded, Valens, prompted by his desire to protect the allies and, like a wise commander, to scatter the auxiliary cohorts which were now mutinous and which, if united, would prove too strong, ordered a part of the Batavians to march to the aid of the province. When the report of this action became common knowled
ge, the allied troops were dissatisfied, the legionaries angry. They declared that they were losing the help of their bravest troops; that it looked as if the Batavians, veterans in so many victorious campaigns, were being withdrawn from the line after the enemy was in sight. If the province was of more account than Rome and the safety of the empire, then all ought to follow thither; but if the main support of victory depended on Italy, the strongest limbs must not be torn, as it were, from the body of the army.
29 1 While the soldiers were thus savagely criticizing his action, Valens sent his lictors among them and tried to check the mutiny. Thereupon the troops attacked Valens himself, stoned him, and pursued him when he fled. Declaring that he was concealing the spoils of the Gallic provinces and the gold taken from the people of Vienne, the rewards of their own toil, they began to ransack his baggage and explore the walls of his quarters and even the ground with their spears and javelins. Valens, disguised in a slave’s clothes, hid in the quarters of a cavalry officer. Then, as the mutiny began gradually to lose its force, Alfenus Varus, prefect of the camp, helped the situation by the device of forbidding the centurions to make the rounds of the pickets and of omitting the usual trumpet call to summon the soldiers to their military duties. The result was that all were amazed, they began to look at one another in perplexity, frightened by the simple fact that no one issued orders. In silence and submission, finally with prayers and tears, they begged forgiveness. When Valens appeared in sorry plight and weeping, but unexpectedly safe, there came joy, pity, and even popularity. In their revulsion from anxiety to delight — mobs are always extravagant in both directions — they praised and congratulated him, surrounded him with the eagles and colours, and carried him to the tribunal. Valens showed a wise moderation: he did not demand the punishment of any man; at the same time, that an assumption of ignorance might not arouse suspicion, he blamed a few severely. He was well aware that in civil wars the soldiers have more liberty than the leaders.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 23