59 1 While the occupation of Mevania had terrified Italy and had seemed to start a new war, it was also true that the timid retreat of Vitellius had increased the favourable feeling toward the Flavian party. The Samnites, Paelignians, and Marsians were jealous because Campania had anticipated them, and eagerly undertook all services required by war with the enthusiasm that attaches to every new devotion. Nevertheless, the army had been greatly exhausted by a severe winter storm while crossing the Apennines, and when the troops, though undisturbed by any enemy, found difficulty in struggling through the snow, the leaders realized what risks they would have run, had not that fortune which often served the Flavian commanders quite as much as wisdom turned Vitellius back. In the mountains they met Petilius Cerialis, who had escaped the pickets of Vitellius by disguising himself as a peasant and using his knowledge of the district. Cerialis was closely connected with Vespasian, and being himself not without reputation in war, was made one of the commanders. Many have reported that Flavius Sabinus also and Domitian had an opportunity to escape opened to them. Emissaries of Antonius by various cunning arts made their way to them and showed them the place to which to flee and the protection that they would have. Sabinus offered the excuse that his health was not fitted to stand fatigue or to engage in a bold enterprise; Domitian had the courage, but, in spite of the fact that the guards Vitellius set over him promised to join him in flight, he feared that they were planning treachery. And yet Vitellius himself out of regard for his own relatives, cherished no cruel purpose against Domitian.
60 1 On arriving at Carsulae, the leaders of the Flavian party rested a few days and waited for the eagles and standards of the legions to come up. They also regarded with favour the actual situation of their camp, which had a wide outlook, and secured their supply of stores, because of the prosperous towns behind them; and at the same time, as the troops of Vitellius were only ten miles away, they hoped to have conferences with them and to bring them over. The soldiers objected to this policy and preferred a victory to peace; they were opposed to waiting even for their own legions, which would share in the booty as well as the dangers. Antonius assembled his troops and pointed out that Vitellius still had an army whose allegiance to him would be doubtful if the soldiers were given a chance to deliberate, but which would be dangerous if driven to despair. “The beginning of civil war,” he said, “is necessarily left to fortune; but victory is always secured by strategy and wise counsel. The fleet at Misenum and the lovely district of Campania have already deserted Vitellius, and he now has nothing left out of the whole world but the land that lies between Tarracina and Narnia. We gained a full measure of glory in the battle of Cremona, but by the destruction of Cremona won greater unpopularity than we could wish. Therefore we should not long to capture Rome so much as to save it. You will have greater rewards and the greatest possible fame if you aim to secure without bloodshed the safety of the senate and the Roman people.” These arguments and others to the same effect quieted the soldiers’ impatience.
61 1 Not much later the legions arrived at Carsulae. The terrifying report that the Flavian army had been reinforced caused the cohorts of Vitellius to waver: no officer urged them to fight, but many to desert, rivalling one another in handing over their centuries and squadrons as a gift to the victors and as a security for their own reward later. From them the Flavians learned that Interamna in the neighbouring plain was defended by four hundred horse. Varus was despatched at once with a force in light marching order. He killed a few of the garrison when they resisted; the majority threw down their arms and begged for pardon. Some, escaping to the main camp, caused utter consternation there by exaggerated accounts of the bravery and the numbers of their enemies, which they gave to mitigate their own disgrace for having failed to hold their post. With the Vitellians there was no punishment for cowardice; those who went over to the Flavians received the rewards of their treachery; the only rivalry left was in perfidy. Among the tribunes and centurions desertions were frequent; for the common soldiers had remained steadfastly loyal to Vitellius until now; Priscus and Alfenus by abandoning the camp and returning to Vitellius set them all free from any shame of treachery.
62 1 During these same days Fabius Valens was killed at Urbinum, where he was under guard. His head was exhibited to the cohorts of Vitellius to keep them from cherishing any further hope, for hitherto they had believed that Valens had made his way to the German provinces, where he was setting in motion the old forces and enrolling new. The sight of his head turned them to despair; and it was extraordinary with what an enormous increase of courage the execution of Valens inspired the Flavian troops, who regarded it as the end of the war. Valens was born at Anagnia of an equestrian family. He was a man of loose morals but not without natural ability, save that he sought a reputation for wit by buffoonery. At the Festival of Youth under Nero he appeared in mimes, at first apparently under compulsion, but later of his own free will, acting in a manner more clever than decent. As a legate of a legion he courted Verginius and then defamed him. He put Fonteius Capito to death after corrupting him — or it may have been because he could not corrupt him. A traitor to Galba, he was faithful to Vitellius and gained glory from the perfidy of others.
63 1 Now that every possible hope from any source was destroyed, the troops of Vitellius were ready to come over to Vespasian’s side; but they wished to do it with honour, and some came down into the plain below Narnia with their ensigns and standards. The Flavian troops, all equipped and ready for the battle, were drawn up in close order along the sides of the road. The Vitellians were allowed to advance between the Flavian lines; then Antonius drew his forces about them and addressed them in kindly terms. Half of them were ordered to stay at Narnia, the other half at Interamna. At the same time some of the victorious legions were left behind, not to oppress the Vitellians if they remained quiet, but in sufficient strength to meet any rebellious movement. During this time Antonius and Varus did not fail to send frequent messages to Vitellius offering him safety, money, and a retreat in Campania, provided he would lay down his arms and give himself and his children up to Vespasian. Mucianus also wrote to him to the same effect; and Vitellius was often inclined to trust these proposals and spoke of the number of slaves he should take with him and the place he should choose for his retreat. Such a lethargy had fallen on his spirit that, but for others remembering that he had been emperor, he would have forgotten it himself.
64 1 On the other hand, the leading citizens began secretly to urge Flavius Sabinus, the city prefect, to claim his share of victory and glory. “You have,” they said, “your own military force in the city cohorts, and the cohorts of the police also will not fail you, nor will our slaves; in your favour are the good fortune of the Flavian party and the readiness with which all things become easy for the winning side. Do not yield in glory to Antonius and Varus. Vitellius has only a few cohorts, and those are in a panic because of the gloomy news from every quarter. The people are fickle, and if you but offer yourself as their leader, they will bestow the same flattery on Vespasian that they have bestowed on Vitellius, while Vitellius himself, unable to bear even success, is still more enfeebled by disaster. Gratitude for ending the war will belong to the man who seizes the city. It is for you to guard the imperial power for your brother, for Vespasian to put you before all others.”
65 1 Sabinus, however, listened to such appeals without enthusiasm, for he was impaired by old age. Indeed there were some who attacked him, covertly insinuating that, prompted by ill-will and envy, he was inclined to delay his brother’s success. For Sabinus was the elder, and so long as they were both private citizens, he was superior to Vespasian in influence and fortune; moreover, there was a report that once, when Vespasian’s credit had been affected, Sabinus had given him some scanty assistance and taken a mortgage on his city house and farms for security. So then, in spite of the apparent cordial feeling between them, there was a fear of secret misunderstandings. A kinder explanation of his hesitatio
n is that he was a gentle spirit who shrank from blood and slaughter, and for this reason he discussed many times with Vitellius the question of peace and of laying down his arms under terms. They had frequent private interviews; finally, as the story went, they came to an agreement in the temple of Apollo. Only two men, Cluvius Rufus and Silius Italicus, actually witnessed their words and statements; but those who were at a distance marked their faces and noted that Vitellius seemed downcast and humiliated, while Sabinus had a look of pity rather than triumph.
66 1 Now if Vitellius could have persuaded his followers to withdraw as easily as he brought himself to do so, Vespasian’s army would have entered the city without bloodshed. But as it was, his most faithful adherents rejected peace and terms with their opponents, pointing out that in such a policy lay danger and disgrace, and that they had only the victor’s caprice as guarantee. “Vespasian has not self-assurance enough,” they said, “to endure Vitellius as a private citizen, and not even the defeated party will allow it: their pity will be a source of danger. It is true that you are an old man yourself, who has had his fill of success and adversity; but what name and position is your son Germanicus to have? At this moment they promise you money, slaves, and delightful retreats in Campania. But when Vespasian has once grasped the imperial power, neither he nor his friends nor even his army will feel that they have any security until his rival is destroyed. Fabius Valens, though a captive, reserved as a hostage for a possible crisis, has proved too great a burden for his captors. Will Primus and Fuscus or that leading representative of their party, Mucianus, have any liberty in dealing with you except the liberty of killing? Caesar did not leave Pompey unharmed or Augustus Antony. What hope is there now for you, unless perchance Vespasian has a loftier soul — this Vespasian, who was once a client of a Vitellius, when a Vitellius was colleague of Claudius. No. You must prove yourself worthy of your father’s censorship, of the three consulships, and all the honours belonging to your famous house. In desperation at least you must gird yourself to bold action. The soldiers are loyal, the people enthusiastic in their support. Finally, nothing worse can happen than that to which we are rushing of our free will. We must die if conquered; die likewise if we surrender. The only question is whether we shall breathe our last breath amid mockery and insults or in valorous action.”
67 1 Vitellius’s ears were deaf to all sterner counsels. His mind was overwhelmed by pity and anxiety for his wife and children, since he feared that if he made an obstinate struggle, he might leave the victor less mercifully disposed toward them. He had also his mother, who was bowed with years; but through an opportune death she anticipated by a few days the destruction of her house, having gained nothing from the elevation of her son to the principate but sorrow and good repute. On December eighteenth, when Vitellius heard of the defection of the legion and cohorts that had given themselves up at Narnia, he put on mourning and came down from his palace, surrounded by his household in tears; his little son was carried in a litter as if in a funeral procession. The voices of the people were flattering and untimely; the soldiers maintained an ominous silence.
68 1 There was no one so indifferent to human fortunes as not to be moved by the sight. Here was a Roman emperor who, but yesterday lord of all mankind, now, abandoning the seat of his high fortune, was going through the midst of his people and the heart of the city to give up his imperial power. Men had never seen or heard the like before. A sudden violent act had crushed the dictator Caesar, a secret plot the emperor Gaius; night and the obscurity of the country had concealed the flight of Nero; Piso and Galba had fallen, so to say, on the field of battle. But now Vitellius, in an assembly called by himself, surrounded by his own soldiers, while even women looked on, spoke briefly and in a manner befitting his present sad estate, saying that he withdrew for the sake of peace and his country; he asked the people simply to remember him and to have pity on his brother, his wife, and his innocent young children. As he spoke, he held out his young son in his arms, commending him now to one or another, again to the whole assembly; finally, when tears choked his voice, taking his dagger from his side he offered it to the consul who stood beside him, as if surrendering his power of life and death over the citizens. The consul’s name was Caecilius Simplex. When he refused it and the assembled people cried out in protest, Vitellius left them with the intention of depositing the imperial insignia in the Temple of Concord and after that going to his brother’s home. Thereupon the people with louder cries opposed his going to a private house, but called him to the palace. Every other path was blocked against him; the only road open was along the Sacred Way. Then in utter perplexity he returned to the palace.
69 1 The rumour had already spread abroad that he was abdicating, and Flavius Sabinus had written to the tribunes of the cohorts to hold the troops in check. Therefore, as if the entire state had fallen into Vespasian’s arms, the leading senators, a majority of the equestrian order, and all the city guards and watchmen crowded the house of Flavius Sabinus. Word was brought there concerning the temper of the people and the threats of the German cohorts; but by this time Sabinus had already gone too far to retreat; and everyone, fearing for himself lest the Vitellian troops should attack the Flavians when scattered and therefore weak, urged the hesitating prefect to armed action. But, as generally happens in such cases, while all gave advice, few faced danger. As Sabinus and his armed retinue were coming down by the reservoir of Fundanus, they were met by the most eager of the supporters of Vitellius. The conflict was of trifling importance, for the encounter was unforeseen, but it was favourable to the Vitellian forces. In his uncertainty Sabinus chose the easiest course under the circumstances and occupied the citadel on the Capitoline with a miscellaneous body of soldiers, and with some senators and knights, whose names it is not easy to report, since after Vespasian’s victory many claimed to have rendered this service to his party. Some women even faced the siege; the most prominent among them was Verulana Gratilla, who was not following children or relatives but was attracted by the fascination of war. While the Vitellians besieged Sabinus and his companions they kept only a careless watch; therefore in the depth of night Sabinus called his own sons and his nephew Domitian into the Capitol. He succeeded also in sending a messenger through his opponents’ slack pickets to the Flavian generals to report that they were besieged and in a difficult situation unless help came. In fact the night was so quiet that Sabinus could have escaped himself without danger; for the soldiers of Vitellius, while ready to face dangers, had little regard for hard work and picket duty; besides a sudden downpour of winter rain rendered seeing and hearing difficult.
70 1 At daybreak, before hostilities could begin on either side, Sabinus sent Cornelius Martialis, a centurion of the first rank, to Vitellius with orders to complain that he had broken their agreement. This was his message: “You have made simply a pretence and show of abdicating in order to deceive all these eminent men. For why did you go from the rostra to your brother’s house which overlooks the Forum and invites men’s eyes, rather than to the Aventine and to your wife’s home there? That was the action proper to a private citizen who wished to avoid all the show that attaches to the principate. On the contrary, you went back to the palace, to the very citadel of the imperial power. From there an armed band has issued; the most crowded part of the city has been strewn with the bodies of innocent men; even the Capitol is not spared. I, Sabinus, am of course only a civilian and a single senator. So long as the question between Vespasian and Vitellius was being adjudged by battles between the legions, by the capture of cities and the surrender of cohorts, although the Spains, the Germanies, and Britain fell away, I, Vespasian’s own brother, still remained faithful to you until I was invited to a conference. Peace and concord are advantageous to the defeated; to the victors they are only glorious. If you regret your agreement, you should not attack me whom your treachery has deceived, or Vespasian’s son, who is as yet hardly more than a child. What is the advantage in killing one old man and
one youth? You should rather go and face the legions and fight in the field for the supremacy. Everything else will follow the issue of the battle.” Vitellius was disturbed by these words and made a brief reply to excuse himself, putting the blame on his soldiers, with whose excessive ardour, he declared, his own moderation could not cope. At the same time he advised Martialis to go away privately through a secret part of the palace, that the soldiers might not kill him as the mediator of a peace which they detested. As for himself, he was powerless to order or to forbid; he was no longer emperor, but only a cause of war.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 33