Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24)

by Publius Cornelius Tacitus

  26 Then Otho’s soldiers charged; they crushed the enemy’s line and routed also those who were coming to their assistance. For Caecina had not brought up his cohorts of auxiliary infantry all at once, but one by one, an action which increased the confusion while they were engaged, inasmuch as the bodies of troops which were thus scattered and nowhere strong were swept away by the panic of the fugitives. Even in the camp the soldiers mutinied because they were not all taken out together. They threw into chains Julius Gratus, the prefect of the camp, on the charge that he was having treacherous dealings with his brother who was serving under Otho, while Otho’s troops had put that same brother, the tribune Julius Fronto, into fetters on the same charge. But there was universal panic both among the troops who were fleeing and those who were advancing, in the lines and in front of the camp, so that on both sides it was commonly said that Caecina could have been annihilated with his whole force if Suetonius Paulinus had not given the signal to retire. Paulinus offered as excuse that he had been afraid of the effect of such great additional effort and the long march, lest the soldiers of Vitellius, fresh from camp, should attack his weary forces, and then, when they were demoralized, they should have no place of retreat. A few approved of the general’s plan, but it caused adverse comment among the mass of the soldiers.

  [27] Haud proinde id damnum Vitellianos in metum compulit quam ad modestiam composuit: nec solum apud Caecinam, qui culpam in militem conferebat seditioni magis quam proelio paratum: Fabii quoque Valentis copiae (iam enim Ticinum venerat) posito hostium contemptu et reciperandi decoris cupidine reverentius et aequalius duci parebant. gravis alioquin seditio exarserat, quam altiore initio (neque enim rerum a Caecina gestarum ordinem interrumpi oportuerat) repetam. cohortes Batavorum, quas bello Neronis a quarta decima legione digressas, cum Britanniam peterent, audito Vitellii motu in civitate Lingonum Fabio Valenti adiunctas rettulimus, superbe agebant, ut cuiusque legionis tentoria accessissent, coercitos a se quartadecimanos, ablatam Neroni Italiam atque omnem belli fortunam in ipsorum manu sitam iactantes. contumeliosum id militibus, acerbum duci; corrupta iurgiis aut rixis disciplina; ad postremum Valens e petulantia etiam perfidiam suspectabat.

  27 Their disaster did not so much drive the Vitellians into a panic as bring them back to a state of obedience. This was true both among the troops with Caecina, who blamed the soldiers, saying that they were readier for mutiny than for battle; and likewise among the forces under Fabius Valens, who had now reached Ticinum. They gave up their scorn of their opponents, and, prompted by a desire to recover their former reputation, began to obey their commander with more respect and regularity. A serious mutiny had broken out among them on another occasion, the history of which I shall now trace from an early point, since before I could not properly interrupt my account of Caecina’s operations. I have already related how the Batavian cohorts that had withdrawn from the Fourteenth legion in the uprising against Nero, on hearing of the revolt of Vitellius while they were on their way to Britain, had joined Fabius Valens in the country of the Lingones. These cohorts then began to be insolent, going up to the quarters of each legion and boasting that it was they who had checked the regulars of the Fourteenth legion, they who had taken Italy away from Nero, and that in their hands lay the whole fortune of the war. Such action was insulting to the legionaries, bitterly offensive to the commander; discipline was ruined by quarrels and brawls; finally their insolence began to make Valens suspect even their loyalty.

  [28] Igitur nuntio adlato pulsam Trevirorum alam Tungrosque a classe Othonis et Narbonensem Galliam circumiri, simul cura socios tuendi et militari astu cohortis turbidas ac, si una forent, praevalidas dispergendi, partem Batavorum ire in subsidium iubet. quod ubi auditum vulgatumque, maerere socii, fremere legiones. orbari se fortissimorum virorum auxilio; veteres illos et tot bellorum victores, postquam in conspectu sit hostis, velut ex acie abduci. si provincia urbe et salute imperii potior sit, omnes illuc sequerentur; sin victoriae [sanitas sustentaculum] columen in Italia verteretur, non abrumpendos ut corpori validissimos artus.

  28 So when news came that the squadron of Treviran cavalry and the Tungrian foot had been defeated by Otho’s fleet, and that the province of Gallia Narbonensis was blockaded, Valens, prompted by his desire to protect the allies and, like a wise commander, to scatter the auxiliary cohorts which were now mutinous and which, if united, would prove too strong, ordered a part of the Batavians to march to the aid of the province. When the report of this action became common knowledge, the allied troops were dissatisfied, the legionaries angry. They declared that they were losing the help of their bravest troops; that it looked as if the Batavians, veterans in so many victorious campaigns, were being withdrawn from the line after the enemy was in sight. If the province was of more account than Rome and the safety of the empire, then all ought to follow thither; but if the main support of victory depended on Italy, the strongest limbs must not be torn, as it were, from the body of the army.

  [29] Haec ferociter iactando, postquam immissis lictoribus Valens coercere seditionem coeptabat, ipsum invadunt, saxa iaciunt, fugientem sequuntur. spolia Galliarum et Viennensium aurum, pretia laborum suorum, occultare clamitantes, direptis sarcinis tabernacula ducis ipsamque humum pilis et lanceis rimabantur; nam Valens servili veste apud decurionem equitum tegebatur. tum Alfenus Varus praefectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit consilium, vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubae sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. igitur torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti et id ipsum quod nemo regeret paventes; silentio, patientia, postremo precibus ac lacrimis veniam quaerebant. ut vero deformis et flens et praeter spem incolumis Valens processit, gaudium miseratio favor: versi in laetitiam, ut est vulgus utroque immodicum, laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque in tribunal ferunt. ille utili moderatione non supplicium cuiusquam poposcit, ac ne dissimulans suspectior foret, paucos incusavit, gnarus civilibus bellis plus militibus quam ducibus licere.

  29 While the soldiers were thus savagely criticizing his action, Valens sent his lictors among them and tried to check the mutiny. Thereupon the troops attacked Valens himself, stoned him, and pursued him when he fled. Declaring that he was concealing the spoils of the Gallic provinces and the gold taken from the people of Vienne, the rewards of their own toil, they began to ransack his baggage and explore the walls of his quarters and even the ground with their spears and javelins. Valens, disguised in a slave’s clothes, hid in the quarters of a cavalry officer. Then, as the mutiny began gradually to lose its force, Alfenus Varus, prefect of the camp, helped the situation by the device of forbidding the centurions to make the rounds of the pickets and of omitting the usual trumpet call to summon the soldiers to their military duties. The result was that all were amazed, they began to look at one another in perplexity, frightened by the simple fact that no one issued orders. In silence and submission, finally with prayers and tears, they begged forgiveness. When Valens appeared in sorry plight and weeping, but unexpectedly safe, there came joy, pity, and even popularity. In their revulsion from anxiety to delight — mobs are always extravagant in both directions — they praised and congratulated him, surrounded him with the eagles and colours, and carried him to the tribunal. Valens showed a wise moderation: he did not demand the punishment of any man; at the same time, that an assumption of ignorance might not arouse suspicion, he blamed a few severely. He was well aware that in civil wars the soldiers have more liberty than the leaders.

  [30] Munientibus castra apud Ticinum de adversa Caecinae pugna adlatum, et prope renovata seditio tamquam fraude et cunctationibus Valentis proelio defuissent: nolle requiem, non expectare ducem, anteire signa, urgere signiferos; rapido agmine Caecinae iunguntur. improspera Valentis fama apud exercitum Caecinae erat: expositos se tanto pauciores integris hostium viribus querebantur, simul in suam excusationem et adventantium robur per adulationem attollentes, ne ut victi et ignavi despectarentur. et quamquam plus virium, prope duplicatus legionum auxiliorumque numerus erat Valen
ti, studia tamen militum in Caecinam inclinabant, super benignitatem animi, qua promptior habebatur, etiam vigore aetatis, proceritate corporis et quodam inani favore. hinc aemulatio ducibus: Caecina ut foedum ac maculosum, ille ut tumidum ac vanum inridebant. sed condito odio eandem utilitatem fovere, crebris epistulis sine respectu veniae probra Othoni obiectantes, cum duces partium Othonis quamvis uberrima conviciorum in Vitellium materia abstinerent.

  30 While the soldiers were fortifying their camp at Ticinum, word of Caecina’s defeat arrived; the troops almost mutinied again, for they suspected that their absence from the battle was due to treachery and delay on the part of Valens. They refused to rest; they would not wait for their general; they advanced before the standards, and spurred on the standard-bearers; and they quickly marched and joined Caecina. Valens did not enjoy a good reputation with Caecina’s troops; they complained that in spite of their great inferiority in numbers Valens had exposed them to an enemy whose strength was unimpaired, and at the same time, to excuse themselves, they praised and flattered the strength of the troops that joined them, for they did not wish these to despise them as defeated and cowardly soldiers. Moreover, although Valens had the larger army, in fact almost twice as many legionaries and auxiliaries, the troops were inclined to favour Caecina, not only for his kindness of heart, which he was thought to display more readily than Valens, but also because of his vigorous youth, his tall person, and a certain unwarranted popularity. This caused rivalry between the generals. Caecina made sport of Valens as a shameful and disgraceful character; Valens ridiculed Caecina as a conceited and vain person. Yet they laid aside their hatred and devoted themselves to the common interest; in many communications, sacrificing all hope of pardon, they heaped insults on Otho, while the generals of Otho’s party refrained from using the abundant material they had at hand for attacking Vitellius.

  [31] Sane ante utriusque exitum, quo egregiam Otho famam, Vitellius flagitiosissimam meruere, minus Vitellii ignavae voluptates quam Othonis flagrantissimae libidines timebantur: addiderat huic terrorem atque odium caedes Galbae, contra illi initium belli nemo imputabat. Vitellius ventre et gula sibi inhonestus, Otho luxu saevitia audacia rei publicae exitiosior ducebatur. Coniunctis Caecinae ac Valentis copiis nulla ultra penes Vitellianos mora quin totis viribus certarent: Otho consultavit trahi bellum an fortunam experiri placeret.

  31 In fact, before these two met their deaths, in which Otho won a glorious reputation while Vitellius gained infamy, the indolent pleasures of Vitellius were less feared than the fiery passions of Otho. Moreover the murder of Galba had made men stand in terror of Otho and hate him; but no one blamed Vitellius for beginning the war. The sensuality and gluttony of Vitellius were regarded as disgracing him alone; Otho’s luxury, cruelty and daring seemed more dangerous to the state. After Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians no longer hesitated to engage with all their forces. Otho, however, took counsel as to whether it was better to protract the war or to try his fortune now.

  [32] Tunc Suetonius Paulinus dignum fama sua ratus, qua nemo illa tempestate militaris rei callidior habebatur, de toto genere belli censere, festinationem hostibus, moram ipsis utilem disseruit: exercitum Vitellii universum advenisse, nec multum virium a tergo, quoniam Galliae tumeant et deserere Rheni ripam inrupturis tam infestis nationibus non conducat; Britannicum militem hoste et mari distineri: Hispanias armis non ita redundare; provinciam Narbonensem incursu classis et adverso proelio contremuisse; clausam Alpibus et nullo maris subsidio transpadanam Italiam atque ipso transitu exercitus vastam; non frumentum usquam exercitui, nec exercitum sine copiis retineri posse: iam Germanos, quod genus militum apud hostis atrocissimum sit, tracto in aestatem bello, fluxis corporibus, mutationem soli caelique haud toleraturos. multa bella impetu valida per taedia et moras evanuisse. contra ipsis omnia opulenta et fida, Pannoniam Moesiam Dalmatiam Orientem cum integris exercitibus, Italiam et caput rerum urbem senatumque et populum, numquam obscura nomina, etiam si aliquando obumbrentur; publicas privatasque opes et immensam pecuniam, inter civilis discordias ferro validiorem; corpora militum aut Italiae sueta aut aestibus; obiacere flumen Padum, tutas viris murisque urbis, e quibus nullam hosti cessuram Placentiae defensione exploratum: proinde duceret bellum. paucis diebus quartam decimam legionem, magna ipsam fama, cum Moesicis copiis adfore: tum rursus deliberaturum et, si proelium placuisset, auctis viribus certaturos.

  32 Then Suetonius Paulinus, who was regarded as the most skilful general of the time, thought it consonant with his reputation to express his views with regard to the whole conduct of the war, maintaining that the enemy’s advantage lay in haste, their own in delay. He spoke to this effect; “The whole army of Vitellius has now arrived, and there are no strong reserves behind them, for the Gallic provinces are growing reckless, and it would be unwise to abandon the bank of the Rhine when so many hostile tribes are ready to rush across it. The troops in Britain are kept away by their enemies’ assaults and by the sea; the Spanish provinces have no forces to spare; Gallia Narbonensis has been badly frightened by the attacks of our fleet and by defeat; Italy north of the Po, shut in by the Alps, can look to no relief by sea, and in fact has been devastated by the mere passage of an army. Our opponents have no supplies anywhere for their troops, and they cannot maintain their forces without supplies; then the Germans, who are the fiercest warriors in their army, if the war be protracted into summer, will soon lose their strength and be unable to endure the change of country and climate. Many wars, formidable in their first onset, have shrunk to nothing through the tedium caused by inaction. On the other hand, our own resources are rich and certain: Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia and the East are with us; their armies are undiminished; we have also Italy and Rome, the capital of the empire, the Senate and the People — names never insignificant, even if they be sometimes obscured. We have also on our side public and private resources and an enormous amount of money, which in time of civil strife is more powerful than the sword. Physically our soldiers are inured to Italy, or, at least, to heat. The Po is our defence; our cities are well protected by their garrisons and walls, and we have learned from the defence of Placentia that none will surrender to the foe. Your policy therefore is to prolong the war. In a few days the Fourteenth legion itself, a force of great renown, will be here with troops from Moesia besides; then you may again consider the question, and if we decide to fight we shall engage with increased strength.”

  [33] Accedebat sententiae Paulini Marius Celsus; idem placere Annio Gallo, paucos ante dies lapsu equi adflicto, missi qui consilium eius sciscitarentur rettulerant. Otho pronus ad decertandum; frater eius Titianus et praefectus praetorii Proculus, imperitia properantes, fortunam et deos et numen Othonis adesse consiliis, adfore conatibus testabantur, neu quis obviam ire sententiae auderet, in adulationem concesserant. postquam pugnari placitum, interesse pugnae imperatorem an seponi melius foret dubitavere. Paulino et Celso iam non adversantibus, ne principem obiectare periculis viderentur idem illi deterioris consilii auctores perpulere ut Brixellum concederet ac dubiis proeliorum exemptus summae rerum et imperii se ipsum reservaret. is primus dies Othonianas partis adflixit; namque et cum ipso praetoriarum cohortium et speculatorum equitumque valida manus discessit, et remanentium fractus animus, quando suspecti duces et Otho, cui uni apud militem fides, dum et ipse non nisi militibus credit, imperia ducum in incerto reliquerat.

  33 Marius Celsus supported the opinion of Paulinus. Annius Gallus did likewise; he had been incapacitated a few days before by a fall from his horse, but a delegation which had been sent to consult him reported back his views. Otho was inclined to fight. His brother Titianus and the praetorian prefect, Proculus, impatient as they were through inexperience, declared that fortune, the gods, and Otho’s good genius favoured his policy and would favour its execution; in fact they had taken refuge in flattery to prevent anyone from daring to oppose their views. When they had decided on an engagement, they debated whether it was better for the emperor to take part in the battle in person or to with
draw. Paulinus and Celsus now offered no opposition for fear that they might seem to expose the emperor to danger; so the same councillors urged on him the baser course and persuaded him to withdraw to Brixellum and there, safe from the risks of battle, to reserve himself for the supreme control of the empire. This day first brought doom to Otho’s side, for with him went a strong force of praetorians, of his bodyguard, and of horse, and the spirit of those who remained was broken; they suspected their generals; and Otho, in whom alone the troops had confidence, while he trusted no one but his soldiers, had left the authority of his generals in doubt.

  [34] Nihil eorum Vitellianos fallebat, crebris, ut in civili bello, transfugiis; et exploratores cura diversa sciscitandi sua non occultabant. quieti intentique Caecina ac Valens, quando hostis imprudentia rueret, quod loco sapientiae est, alienam stultitiam opperiebantur, inchoato ponte transitum Padi simulantes adversus obpositam gladiatorum manum, ac ne ipsorum miles segne otium tereret. naves pari inter se spatio, validis utrimque trabibus conexae, adversum in flumen dirigebantur, iactis super ancoris quae firmitatem pontis continerent, sed ancorarum funes non extenti fluitabant, ut augescente flumine inoffensus ordo navium attolleretur. claudebat pontem imposita turris et in extremam navem educta, unde tormentis ac machinis hostes propulsarentur. Othoniani in ripa turrim struxerant saxaque et faces iaculabantur.