[47] Nec ceterae nationes silebant. subita per Pontum arma barbarum mancipium, regiae quondam classis praefectus, moverat. is fuit Anicetus Polemonis libertus, praepotens olim, et postquam regnum in formam provinciae verterat, mutationis impatiens. igitur Vitellii nomine adscitis gentibus, quae Pontum accolunt, corrupto in spem rapinarum egentissimo quoque, haud temnendae manus ductor, Trapezuntem vetusta fama civitatem, a Graecis in extremo Ponticae orae conditam, subitus inrupit. caesa ibi cohors, regium auxilium olim; mox donati civitate Romana signa armaque in nostrum modum, desidiam licentiamque Graecorum retinebant. classi quoque faces intulit, vacuo mari eludens, quia lectissimas Liburnicarum omnemque militem Mucianus Byzantium adegerat: quin et barbari contemptim vagabantur, fabricatis repente navibus. camaras vocant, artis lateribus latam alvum sine vinculo aeris aut ferri conexam; et tumido mari, prout fluctus attollitur, summa navium tabulis augent, donec in modum tecti claudantur. sic inter undas volvuntur, pari utrimque prora et mutabili remigio, quando hinc vel illinc adpellere indiscretum et innoxium est.
47 Nor were the other nations quiet. There was a sudden armed uprising in Pontus led by a barbarian slave who had once been prefect of the royal fleet. This was a certain Anicetus, a freedman of Polemo, who, having been once very powerful, was impatient of the change after the kingdom was transformed into a province. So he stirred up the people of Pontus in the name of Vitellius, bribing the poorest among them with hope of plunder. Then at the head of a band, which was far from being negligible, he suddenly attacked Trapezus, a city of ancient fame, founded by Greeks at the extreme end of the coast of Pontus. There he massacred a cohort, which originally consisted of auxiliaries furnished by the king; later its members had been granted Roman citizenship and had adopted Roman standards and arms, but retained the indolence and licence of the Greeks. He also set fire to the fleet and escaped by sea, which was unpatrolled since Mucianus had concentrated the best light galleys and all the marines at Byzantium. Moreover, the barbarians had hastily built vessels and now roamed the sea at will, despising the power of Rome. Their boats they call camarae; they have a low freeboard but are broad of beam, and are fastened together without spikes of bronze or iron. When the sea is rough the sailors build up the bulwarks with planks to match the height of the waves, until they close in the hull like the roof of a house. Thus protected these vessels roll about amid the waves. They have a prow at both ends and their arrangement of oars may be shifted, so that they can be safely propelled in either direction at will.
[48] Advertit ea res Vespasiani animum ut vexillarios e legionibus ducemque Virdium Geminum spectatae militiae deligeret. ille incompositum et praedae cupidine vagum hostem adortus coegit in navis; effectisque raptim Liburnicis adsequitur Anicetum in ostio fluminis Chobi, tutum sub Sedochezorum regis auxilio, quem pecunia donisque ad societatem perpulerat. ac primo rex minis armisque supplicem tueri: postquam merces proditionis aut bellum ostendebatur, fluxa, ut est barbaris, fide pactus Aniceti exitium perfugas tradidit, belloque servili finis impositus. Laetum ea victoria Vespasianum, cunctis super vota fluentibus, Cremonensis proelii nuntius in Aegypto adsequitur. eo properantius Alexandriam pergit, ut fractos Vitellii exercitus urbemque externae opis indigam fame urgeret. namque et Africam, eodem latere sitam, terra marique invadere parabat, clausis annonae subsidiis inopiam ac discordiam hosti facturus.
48 These events attracted Vespasian’s attention, so that he sent detachments from his legions under the command of Virdius Geminus, whose military skill had been well tested. He attacked the enemy’s troops when they were off their guard and were scattered in their greed for booty, and forced them to their boats; afterwards he quickly built some light galleys and caught up with Anicetus at the mouth of the river Chobus, where he had sought shelter under the protection of the king of the Sedochezi, whose alliance he had secured by bribes and gifts. At first the king sheltered his suppliant with the aid of threats and arms; but after the reward for treachery and the alternative of war were set before him, with the unstable loyalty of a barbarian he bargained away the life of Anicetus, gave up the refugees, and so an end was put to this servile war. While Vespasian was rejoicing over this victory, for everything was succeeding beyond his hopes and prayers, the news of the battle at Cremona reached him in Egypt. He moved with all the more speed to Alexandria, that he might impose the burden of famine on the broken armies of Vitellius and on Rome, which always needs help from outside. For he was now preparing to invade Africa also by land and sea, situated as it is in the same quarter of the world, his purpose being to shut off Italy’s supplies of grain and so cause need and discord among his foes.
[49] Dum hac totius orbis nutatione fortuna imperii transit, Primus Antonius nequaquam pari innocentia post Cremonam agebat, satis factum bello ratus et cetera ex facili, seu felicitas in tali ingenio avaritiam superbiam ceteraque occulta mala patefecit. ut captam Italiam persultare, ut suas legiones colere; omnibus dictis factisque viam sibi ad potentiam struere. utque licentia militem imbueret interfectorum centurionum ordines legionibus offerebat. eo suffragio turbidissimus quisque delecti; nec miles in arbitrio ducum, sed duces militari violentia trahebantur. quae seditiosa et corrumpendae disciplinae mox in praedam vertebat, nihil adventantem Mucianum veritus, quod exitiosius erat quam Vespasianum sprevisse.
49 While the imperial power was shifting with these world-wide convulsions, Primus Antonius did not behave so blamelessly after the battle of Cremona as before, whether it was that he thought that he had done enough for the war and that everything else would easily follow, or whether success in the case of a nature like his brought to the surface the avarice, arrogance, and other evils that had remained hidden hitherto. He stalked through Italy as it were captured territory; he courted the legions as if they were his own; he used his every word and act to pave his way to power. To inspire the soldiers with a spirit of licence, he offered to the rank and file the places of the centurions who had fallen. The soldiers chose the most turbulent of their number. The ranks were no longer directed by the will of their leaders, but the leaders were at the mercy of the common soldiers’ whims. These acts, which made for mutinies and the ruin of discipline, Antonius presently turned to his own profit. He had no fear of the arrival of Mucianus, although in the event this was more fatal for him than the fact that he had treated Vespasian with little respect.
[50] Ceterum propinqua hieme et umentibus Pado campis expeditum agmen incedere. signa aquilaeque victricium legionum, milites vulneribus aut aetate graves, plerique etiam integri Veronae relicti: sufficere cohortes alaeque et e legionibus lecti profligato iam bello videbantur. undecima legio sese adiunxerat, initio cunctata, sed prosperis rebus anxia quod defuisset; sex milia Dalmatarum, recens dilectus, comitabantur; ducebat Pompeius Silvanus consularis: vis consiliorum penes Annium Bassum legionis legatum. is Silvanum socordem bello et dies rerum verbis terentem specie obsequii regebat ad omniaque quae agenda forent quieta cum industria aderat. ad has copias e classicis Ravennatibus, legionariam militiam poscentibus, optimus quisque adsciti: classem Dalmatae supplevere. exercitus ducesque ad Fanum Fortunae iter sistunt, de summa rerum cunctantes, quod motas ex urbe praetorias cohortis audierant et teneri praesidiis Appenninum rebantur; et ipsos in regione bello attrita inopia et seditiosae militum voces terrebant, clavarium (donativi nomen est) flagitantium. nec pecuniam aut frumentum providerant, et festinatio atque aviditas praepediebant, dum quae accipi poterant rapiuntur.
50 Meantime, since winter was approaching and the plains were inundated by the Po, the Flavian troops moved without their heavy baggage. They left at Verona the eagles and standards of the victorious legions, such soldiers as were incapacitated by wounds or years, and also a number who were in good condition; the auxiliary foot and horse with selected legionaries seemed sufficient now that the worst of the war was over. The Eleventh legion had joined them; at first it had hesitated, but, now that the Flavians were succeeding, it became apprehensive because it had not joined them before. Six thousand Dalmatians, a new levy, accompanied them, led
by Pompeius Silvanus, an ex-consul. The actual guiding spirit was Annius Bassus, the legionary legate. Silvanus displayed no energy in war, but wasted in mere talk the days for action. Bassus directed him by pretending to defer to him, and continually attended to all necessary operations with unobtrusive activity. The marines at Ravenna now demanded service with the legions, and the best of them were enrolled among them; Dalmatians replaced them in the fleet. The troops and commanders halted at Fanum Fortunae, being uncertain as to the proper course of action, for they had received a report that six praetorian cohorts had left Rome, and they supposed that the passes in the Apennines were guarded. The commanders, too, were alarmed by the lack of supplies, being now in a district completely devastated by the war, as well as by the mutinous demands of the soldiers for the clavarium, as they call the donative. They had provided neither money nor provisions; moreover, their haste and greed in seizing as private booty what might have been stores to draw upon now proved embarrassing.
[51] Celeberrimos auctores habeo tantam victoribus adversus fas nefasque inreverentiam fuisse ut gregarius eques occisum a se proxima acie fratrem professus praemium a ducibus petierit. nec illis aut honorare eam caedem ius hominum aut ulcisci ratio belli permittebat. distulerant tamquam maiora meritum quam quae statim exolverentur; nec quidquam ultra traditur. ceterum et prioribus civium bellis par scelus inciderat. nam proelio, quo apud Ianiculum adversus Cinnam pugnatum est, Pompeianus miles fratrem suum, dein cognito facinore se ipsum interfecit, ut Sisenna memorat: tanto acrior apud maiores, sicut virtutibus gloria, ita flagitiis paenitentia fuit. sed haec aliaque ex vetere memoria petita, quotiens res locusque exempla recti aut solacia mali poscet, haud absurde memorabimus.
51 I have it from the best authorities that the victors had come to disregard the difference between right and wrong so completely that a common soldier declared that he had killed his brother in the last battle and actually asked the generals for a reward. The common dictates of humanity did not permit them to honour such a murder or military policy to punish it. They put off the soldier on the ground that he deserved a reward greater than could be repaid at once; nor is anything further told concerning the case. And yet a similar crime had happened in civil war before. In the struggle against Cinna on the Janiculum, as Sisenna relates, one of Pompey’s soldiers killed his own brother and then, on realizing his crime, committed suicide. So much livelier among our ancestors was repentance for guilt as well as glory in virtuous action. Such deeds as this and others like them, drawn from our earlier history, I shall not improperly insert in my work whenever the theme or situation demands examples of the right or solace for the wrong.
[52] Antonio ducibusque partium praemitti equites omnemque Vmbriam explorari placuit, si qua Appennini iuga clementius adirentur: acciri aquilas signaque et quidquid Veronae militum foret, Padumque et mare commeatibus compleri. erant inter duces qui necterent moras: quippe nimius iam Antonius, et certiora ex Muciano sperabantur. namque Mucianus tam celeri victoria anxius et, ni praesens urbe potiretur, expertem se belli gloriaeque ratus, ad Primum et Varum media scriptitabat, instandum coeptis aut rursus cunctandi utilitates disserens atque ita compositus ut ex eventu rerum adversa abnueret vel prospera agnosceret. Plotium Grypum, nuper a Vespasiano in senatorium ordinem adscitum ac legioni praepositum, ceterosque sibi fidos apertius monuit, hique omnes de festinatione Primi ac Vari sinistre et Muciano volentia rescripsere. quibus epistulis Vespasiano missis effecerat ut non pro spe Antonii consilia factaque eius aestimarentur.
52 Antonius and the other Flavian commanders decided to send their cavalry on ahead and to reconnoitre throughout Umbria, to see if they could approach the Apennines at any point without danger; they proposed also to bring up the eagles and standards with all the soldiers then at Verona, and to fill the Po and the sea with convoys of provisions. There were some among the commanders who devised reasons for delay; they felt that Antonius was becoming too pretentious, and they hoped to get more certain advantages from Mucianus. For Mucianus, disturbed by the speed with which the victory had been won, and believing that he would have no share in the glory to be gained by the war unless he took Rome in person, kept writing to Primus and Varus in ambiguous terms, saying in one letter that they must follow up their successes and in another dwelling on the advantages of proceeding slowly, so trimming his course that according to the event he might at will repudiate all responsibility for failure or take the credit for success. To Plotius Grypus, whom Vespasian had lately elevated to senatorial rank and put in command of a legion, and to all other officers who were loyal, he wrote admonishing them more frankly; and they all replied, putting the haste of Primus and Varus in an unfavourable light and saying what was likely to please Mucianus. By sending these letters to Vespasian, Mucianus succeeded in preventing the plans and acts of Antonius from being estimated so highly as the latter had hoped.
[53] Aegre id pati Antonius et culpam in Mucianum conferre, cuius criminationibus eviluissent pericula sua; nec sermonibus temperabat, immodicus lingua et obsequii insolens. litteras ad Vespasianum composuit iactantius quam ad principem, nec sine occulta in Mucianum insectatione: se Pannonicas legiones in arma egisse; suis stimulis excitos Moesiae duces, sua constantia perruptas Alpis, occupatam Italiam, intersepta Germanorum Raetorumque auxilia. quod discordis dispersasque Vitellii legiones equestri procella, mox peditum vi per diem noctemque fudisset, id pulcherrimum et sui operis. casum Cremonae bello imputandum: maiore damno, plurium urbium excidiis veteres civium discordias rei publicae stetisse. non se nuntiis neque epistulis, sed manu et armis imperatori suo militare; neque officere gloriae eorum qui Daciam interim composuerint: illis Moesiae pacem, sibi salutem securitatemque Italiae cordi fuisse; suis exhortationibus Gallias Hispaniasque, validissimam terrarum partem, ad Vespasianum conversas. sed cecidisse in inritum labores si praemia periculorum soli adsequantur qui periculis non adfuerint. nec fefellere ea Mucianum; inde graves simultates, quas Antonius simplicius, Mucianus callide eoque implacabilius nutriebat.
53 At this Antonius was indignant, and put the blame on Mucianus, whose base insinuations, as he maintained, had made the dangers that he had run seem trifling; nor did he pick and choose his words, being as he was immoderate in speech and unaccustomed to defer to another. He drew up a letter to Vespasian in a strain too boastful to use to an emperor; and he did not fail to attack Mucianus covertly: “It was I who armed the Pannonian legions. It was I who roused the commanders in Moesia and spurred them on. It was my bold action that broke through the Alps, seized Italy, and blocked the road against any assistance to Vitellius from Germany and Raetia.” As for the disaster inflicted on the discordant and scattered legions of Vitellius by a whirlwind of cavalry and the rout of those troops by a great force of infantry which pursued them for a day and a night, Antonius claimed that these were glorious achievements of which he deserved all the credit. The fate of Cremona he charged up to the chances of war; and pointed out that civil discord in earlier days had caused greater loss and had destroyed more cities. He declared that he did not fight for his emperor with despatches and letters, but with deeds and arms; he made no attempt to dim the glory of those who meantime had quieted Dacia; their desire had been to give Moesia peace, his to give Italy safety and security. It was due to his exhortations that the Gauls and Spains, the strongest part of the world, had turned to Vespasian’s side. “But,” he added, “my efforts will come to nothing if the rewards for dangers run are to be gained only by those who did not face the dangers.” Of all this Mucianus was fully aware, and the result was bitter enmity, fostered more openly by Antonius, with cunning and therefore the more implacably by Mucianus.
[54] At Vitellius fractis apud Cremonam rebus nuntios cladis occultans stulta dissimulatione remedia potius malorum quam mala differebat. quippe confitenti consultantique supererant spes viresque: cum e contrario laeta omnia fingeret, falsis ingravescebat. mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium; prohibiti per civitatem sermones, eoque plures ac, si liceret, vere narraturi, quia vetabantur, atrocior
a vulgaverant. nec duces hostium augendae famae deerant, captos Vitellii exploratores circumductosque, ut robora victoris exercitus noscerent, remittendo; quos omnis Vitellius secreto percontatus interfici iussit. notabili constantia centurio Iulius Agrestis post multos sermones, quibus Vitellium ad virtutem frustra accendebat, perpulit ut ad viris hostium spectandas quaeque apud Cremonam acta forent ipse mitteretur. nec exploratione occulta fallere Antonium temptavit, sed mandata imperatoris suumque animum professus, ut cuncta viseret postulat. missi qui locum proelii, Cremonae vestigia, captas legiones ostenderent. Agrestis ad Vitellium remeavit abnuentique vera esse quae adferret, atque ultro corruptum arguenti ‘quando quidem’ inquit ‘magno documento opus est, nec alius iam tibi aut vitae aut mortis meae usus, dabo cui credas.’ atque ita digressus voluntaria morte dicta firmavit. quidam iussu Vitellii interfectum, de fide constantiaque eadem tradidere.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 204