Bloody Citadel

by Andrew McGregor

  Hitler initially signed the order for the offensive in March for April, then delayed this decision in April to May. General Walther Model met with Hitler on 27th April, expressing the opinion that the longer the delay, the less feasible the operation would become, wary of the extensive defences the Russians were now digging and preparing. By mid-April, Von Manstein was also in agreement with Model, stating the offensive should be cancelled and the ‘backhand’ tactics adopted, luring the Russians into attack before strong counter strokes would destroy overextended units in low supply and capture vast quantities of equipment (just as had been achieved in the third battle of Kharkov).

  On 4th May in a meeting at Munich, Hitler procrastinated, stating the need for new tanks and weaponry for the new offensive and that these were coming from Germany’s factories. The meeting ended without a decision, but just three days later, Hitler announced the operation would commence on June 12th. The offensive was then delayed again until 20th June, then on the 17th, delayed once more until July 3rd.

  Finally, on 1st July, Hitler announced the operation would commence on July 5th, three months after the initial proposal by Von Manstein…any momentum had perhaps now been lost.

  The Russians were fully aware of the offensive, receiving information from the Lucy Spy Ring in Switzerland and the British at Bletchley Park. They had three months to prepare, digging vast defensive works, anti-tank ditches and bunkers, planting extensive minefields (over 130,000 mines) and utilising 300,000 civilians to complete the task. There were three main defensive belts, extending for 130-150 kilometres from the front and if the Germans had broken through, there were additional defensive lines beyond these.

  Knowing the Germans were to deploy a highly potent armoured strength, additional anti-tank guns and rifles were deployed, infantry even offered financial incentives for each enemy tank destroyed…1000 rubles, a considerable amount in these days.

  There were further omens for the Germans, the Luftwaffe was no longer able to provide sufficient strength to sustain air superiority due to shortages in fuel and aircraft. In past campaigns, the German air force had flown almost unopposed into enemy rear areas, providing valuable intelligence on reinforcements, concentrations and guidance for follow up bombers. In 1943, the Luftwaffe was simply unable to accomplish these tasks, weakened by continuous campaigning and attrition and also having to provide fighter pilots to defend German cities and factories from American bombing by day and British raids at night. The new pilots were becoming younger, the experience less as training was fast tracked to provide the numbers required.

  The Red Air force was also rising dramatically in strength by 1943, their aircraft increasing in number and technically becoming more advanced. The IL2 Sturmovik was the main ground attack aircraft, being heavily and robustly armoured and quite difficult to shoot down, over 36,000 were produced during WW2. The Yak in a variety of models was the standard Russian fighter, a similar number produced to the Sturmovik.

  The time was slipping past, the allies in other theatres preparing another assault, their eyes falling on Sicily and the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe. The ideal target to isolate Italy and perhaps knock them out of the war, but also to undermine the German assault in the east, creating alarm in the German High Command and a ‘second front’ in Europe, a continual concern and fear of the Axis powers.

  Six days after the Germans attacked in Operation Citadel, the landings in Sicily occurred, forcing the Germans to reconsider and withdraw valuable forces from the eastern offensive to counter the threat. However, the attacks had already begun to show signs of failure, the advances too small to demonstrate ultimate victory. In the north, the advances were approximately 9-12km and stalled, in the south about twice this…it was hardly the breakthrough required and heavy fighting ensued, the Russians preparing their own counter offensives once the Germans had been stalled and worn down over several defensive lines. Blitzkrieg had finally been beaten…this was the first time a major German offensive had met with failure and the whole world was watching.

  Two of the highlights of Operation Citadel for historians are the battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank confrontation in history, and also the use of ‘tank busting’ aircraft with cannons for the first time, the German’s successful in destroying numerous Russian armoured vehicles and tanks, including an entire unit, the first time this had ever been accomplished in this way.

  Debate rages as to which side won at Prokhorovka and personally I have no real view as the decisive moment of the campaign and war in the east seems to have already passed. Did the ‘accidental’ battle actually matter in the wider context of what was happening? Needless to say, although some argue it was a marginal German battlefield victory with the Russians losing more tanks, the SS and Wehrmacht ultimately cede the terrain and are unable to utilise any advantage even if it existed due to the deteriorating situation at the time. Others, including the Russians, argue it was a tactical victory for the Red Army, with numerous German tanks left in the battlefield. Either way, the Soviet war machine was easily able to replenish losses, whereas Germany was now with a war on two fronts and an ever vicious air campaign targeting production.

  Ultimately, the Citadel operation was a failure, months of waiting and preparation thrown away against what was understood by frontline commanders to be virtually impossible superior defences and a cunning enemy in waiting…watching and perhaps deliberately bleeding the Germans of their last carefully gathered military resources.

  The long awaited tanks and armour had not completed full testing, many breaking down before they got to the battlefield (Panthers) or ill equipped to engage in close combat due to the lack of exterior machine guns (Ferdinands)…these were basic lessons and a clear insight for frontline personnel of the chaos at home…of the meddling and misdirection in development.

  Casualties were high…the attrition in armour as Guderian had feared and voiced openly as was his character…the Germans had thrown away their newly found reserves.

  This was the last major offensive of the German Army on the Russian Front, they would never again possess the strength or initiative as the Red Army surged forward in vengeance…the writing was on the wall for German defeat, and it was becoming apparent for all, including frontline German soldiers…it was now only a matter of time. All the potential opportunities to win had been squandered.

  Apologies for the indulgence, but if I have any considerations of the German situation at the time, then they are as follows…

  That in Citadel the last two unbeaten forces available to Germany were defeated by being prevented from achieving their objectives…the SS and the newly developed heavy and medium Panzer arm…the last strands of realistic hope and belief for the Nazi regime. Tigers had to be used to front the advances due to their thick armour and resilience, a task they were simply never designed for. Ideal for taking on significant numbers of enemy tanks in open battle, the Tigers were never considered to be the mainstay of an advance, slow and cumbersome due to their weight and armour, they were better suited in taking on enemy tanks at medium to long range. By forcing the Tigers to assume the role of lead assault, this negated some of their power and reduced the speed of the advance considerably, the medium tanks now no longer able to compete against the enormous numbers of Russian T34s and pak guns, the Panthers mostly too unreliable to risk in the role.

  That frontline commanders, suspicious until this point of possible incompetence in the High Command had these concerns confirmed. Frontline observations and intelligence was ignored, local commanders overruled and a lack of concern for casualties fully confirmed…attacking what was known to be hundreds of kilometres of defensive depth months after the enemy starts digging can only be defined as illogical or failing to understand reality. The German High Command knew of the extensive defensive preparations, but chose to continue the offensive…several high ranking generals even opposed the offensive openly but were ignored, what does that possibly say for competence?

 
; The Nazis developed mass propaganda and I believe it only fitting that this campaign could perhaps have been the greatest self-inflicted defeat whilst the world watched. Not only were the strategic reserves thrown away, but it became crystal clear to soldiers on the front line that limiting casualties was not a concern…one of the basic morale fundamentals for any individual soldier. Now even individual German soldiers may or would consider the orders to attack or defend…they had also long suspected certain units received the best equipment and reinforcements…now this was confirmed.

  Belief in new ‘super’ tanks or weapons also floundered with the new Panthers simply breaking down and Ferdinands unable to even defend themselves against infantry, forced to use their main gun against attacking soldiers…’shooting quail with cannon’ as Guderian referred in frustration to the obvious shortfall. Tiger tanks were exceptional machines and ultimately feared, but never deployed or available in enough numbers due to the technological challenges of production and extensive cost.

  I honestly believe that this was the ultimate and possibly most obvious opportunity for the Germans to realise that their covert codes had been broken. Some front line commanders were very suspicious, especially to the north of the salient, when defences were strengthened exactly where they were due to strike…that Russian reserves always seemed to know exactly where to be. These reports seemed to not have been collated for an overall picture to be confirmed…or even ignored…despite the fact it was probably already too late. This view was confused however, as Hoth in the south chose not to advise superiors where he would strike, thus preventing the Russians from finding out through radio and enigma interceptions.

  With this, everyone could now see the end was possibly in sight…but that it would be hard fought.

  One quote by Major-General von Mellenthin seems to sum up the German situation in the Eastern Front as of 16th July 1943 in grim reality.

  ‘We were now in the position of a man who had seized a wolf by the ears and dare not let him go.’

  Please investigate the following adventures currently available or in production from the author:

  World War Two:

  Bloody Iced BulletBloody RattenkriegBloody Kessel Bloody Stalingrad (Trilogy)

  Bloody Kharkov IBloody Kharkov IIBloody Citadel

  Bloody Red Storm RisingBloody Retreat to the Dneiper

  Science Fiction:

  The Last Marine in the Galaxy The Red Leopards of Zaxon B Galaxies Collide: First Contact

  Planet Genocide I Zaxon B: The Final StruggleDarkness in the Stars

  Planet Genocide IIPlanet Genocide IIIGalactic Freedom: First Mission

  Fantasy:

  Blades of the Undead Blade of the Iced WarriorArmy of the Skeletal Prince

  Crime Drama (Dark Humour):

  Bloodied Hunger Bloodied InsurgentsBloodied London I

  Blood and Intoxication Blood of the InnocentsThe Hong Kong Scotsman

  The Werewolves of New Hong KongNew Hong Kong: Demonology

  The Scourge of the Northern Lights

  Historical Drama:

  The Last Highlanders The Last Highlanders: Rebels

  Story Prequels

  Leutnant Hausser’s and his squad’s individual stories begin a long time before Kharkov and Stalingrad, further works are planned to reveal how the characters met and their previous war exploits. From the war in France to the Balkans and the opening of Operation Barbarossa through to a bitter first winter before Moscow and then the Crimea lies the experiences that created the soldiers of the small unit.

  Story Sequels

  The war for Leutnant Hausser continues in Bloody Red Storm Rising and then Bloody Retreat to the Dneiper, with some German forces planned to withdraw from Operation Citadel and rush to Italy to stem the American landings, any momentum created at Kharkov has been relinquished through continuous delays. There is still a last gasp of hope…the SS Divisions and Grossdeutschland are about to advance…

  After only six days of battle, the allied landings in the ‘soft underbelly of Europe’ as Churchill called the continuing operation has turned the tide in Russia, the Red Army preparing to launch its own massive offensive in the north and south.

  This time the doubt that had been sown into the minds of the average German soldier after Stalingrad had formed roots…the war would go on, but with little sight of victory…it had probably slipped from their grasp, aided by incompetence in Berlin. Now it was simply a battle for survival, with a chance that the wide Dneiper River near Kiev could provide a natural defensive line and obstacle to stop the Russian hordes…those with geographical knowledge and access to full maps realising in dread…the wide river was the last natural obstacle before the western Ukraine and then the border of Poland.

  Contributors:

  I would like to thank four of my colleagues for their voluntary assistance with this project.

  Kara has offered continual encouragement throughout the previous book and the current projects. Listening to ideas and offering ideas on alternatives or additions to existing plot lines. This has been of considerable assistance and I am very grateful for the ‘on-call’ facility that emerged for me to express ideas and twists as they came to mind.

  Sally has offered many ideas and sat politely listening to the ramblings as I formulated ideas and incidents in my mind. Patiently offering advice and never displaying frustration and impatience as I bounced from idea to idea. This has been immensely helpful and reassuring.

  Nigel has offered ideas and pictures to work from completely at his own motivation, a contribution I am very grateful for.

  Kevin has helped with plots and offered structured ideas, including changes in direction or alternatives. Never complaining when I developed other ideas or rang/texted at inhospitable times. He provided an inspirational level of support during recent personal losses and for that alone I will be eternally grateful.

  Reviewers assist with motivation and learning, creating a constructive environment for improvement. I have considerable gratitude for the people who spend their own valuable time expressing their views and how to make the story better.

  Thank you all so very much.