The Age of Eisenhower

by William I Hitchcock

  The blow fell savagely at 4:00 a.m. on November 4. Artillery shells slammed into the center of Budapest. Soviet troops moved swiftly into the city, capturing the radio broadcasting stations and munitions depots. They surrounded the Hungarian Army barracks and disarmed the troops. They occupied all the bridges across the Danube, and then seized the Parliament building. Soviet troops were met with fierce but sporadic and uncoordinated resistance. Prime Minister Nagy went on national radio to declare, “At daybreak Soviet forces started an attack against our capital, obviously with the intention to overthrow the legal Hungarian government. Our troops are fighting. The Government is in its place.” But that was not the case, for Nagy himself then fled to the Yugoslav Embassy, leaving his government in disarray. By noon most of the city was under Soviet control. The Hungarian Revolution, which had electrified captive peoples across Europe, lay crushed beneath Soviet tank treads.

  These events shocked a confused and anxious world. At the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge rose to denounce the Soviet invasion; he was met with a sneering, dismissive rebuttal from the Soviet ambassador, who asserted that the Western powers merely wanted to divert attention from the fiasco at Suez. The State Department hastily drafted a message for the president to send to the Soviet leadership, declaring his “profound distress” at reports of Soviet brutality in Hungary. The ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, an outspoken hawk and Eisenhower’s friend, wrote Ike a private cable calling for action to rescue the Hungarians: “Let us not ask for whom the bell tolls in Hungary today. It tolls for us if freedom’s holy light is extinguished in blood and iron there.” But Eisenhower understood there were no measures the United States could take to halt Soviet aggression. Hungary was landlocked and surrounded by Warsaw Pact countries. Any intervention there would certainly lead to a wider war. As he candidly wrote later in his memoirs, “We could do nothing.”49

  On the Suez matter, however, Eisenhower did have some leverage. But had he waited too long to use it? When he arrived at the Oval Office on the morning of November 5, he found on his desk an overnight cable from Eden, offering an unrepentant explanation for the British “police action” in Suez. The message was timed to arrive with the depressing news that at dawn British and French paratroopers had landed in the Suez Canal Zone—just the outcome Eisenhower most wished to avoid. Eden hoped to soften the blow, asserting, “This is the moment to curb Nasser’s ambitions. . . . If we draw back now, chaos will not be avoided. Everything will go up in flames in the Middle East.” Even as the president met with his advisers, Anglo-French units were fighting in Port Said, taking control of the key access point into the Suez Canal.50

  The Anglo-French landings stirred the Soviets into action. Their invasion of Hungary had produced an avalanche of global criticism, and they were all too keen to redirect the world’s focus to the Suez Crisis. Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet premier and titular head of state, delivered a barrage of public messages to world capitals. To Israel, Britain, and France came a searing condemnation and direct threat: Withdraw from Egypt or face Soviet military action. “We are fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East through the use of force.” At 2:00 p.m. the premier’s message to Eisenhower clattered out of the telex machine. Bulganin denounced Anglo-French military operations and demanded that the invaders accept the UN cease-fire resolution of November 1. Then came a shocking proposal: that the United States and USSR send a joint task force to Egypt to pull apart the warring nations, impose peace, and restore order. “If this war is not stopped,” Bulganin darkly concluded, “it is fraught with danger and can grow into a third world war.”51

  Coming at the very moment the Soviets were slaughtering Hungarians in the streets of Budapest, Bulganin’s outrage at Anglo-French aggression in Egypt revealed the worst kind of cynicism. Even so, Ambassador Charles Bohlen in Moscow urged the president not to dismiss the Soviet proposal as mere propaganda. The Soviets might be laying the ground for an intervention in the Middle East on the grounds of resisting imperialist aggression. They probably did not want to start “World War III,” Bohlen said, but they no longer seemed content to sit on the sidelines.52

  Eisenhower had predicted that the USSR would use the crisis in Egypt as an opportunity to spread its own influence in the region. It had been preoccupied with the Hungarian affair; now it seemed ready to exploit the Suez conflict to its advantage. Meeting with Hoover and other senior aides in the afternoon, Eisenhower wanted a reply sent to Bulganin immediately with “a clear warning” to stay out. The Soviets were embarking on “a wild adventure,” perhaps because their invasion of Hungary had been such a stain on their public reputation. They were “scared and furious” and therefore liable to make very bad decisions.53

  Emmet Hughes, who was present at the meeting, recalled that “the lines and pallor of [Eisenhower’s] face betrayed fatigue.” It had been a dreadful and tense two weeks for the president. During those days he suffered from hypertension, his pulse was erratic, his head ached, his abdominal scar throbbed, and his stomach was bloated with gas. He consulted Dr. Snyder every few hours during these days of crisis.54

  As he and his advisers crafted a response to Bulganin’s challenge, Eisenhower’s mind turned to the prospect of war. “He was thinking,” Hughes recalled, “with cold realism and as Commander in Chief of the menace that seemed to him implicit in the Bulganin message. ‘You know,’ he said tautly, ‘we may be dealing here with the opening gambit of an ultimatum. We have to be positive and clear in our every word, every step. And if those fellows start something, we may have to hit ’em—and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket.’ ”55

  After a somber discussion, Eisenhower issued a statement to the press rejecting the Soviet proposal for a joint task force as “unthinkable.” The UN already had agreed to send a peacekeeping force to Suez once a cease-fire had been accepted. That decision must be respected. The United States therefore opposed any “introduction of new forces.” The message did not state unequivocally that the United States would use force to oppose a Soviet move to aid Egypt, but, as the New York Times noted, “that was the implication.” On November 5 the Great Powers seemed closer to a world war than at any time since 1945.56

  VIII

  As Americans went to the polls on Election Day, November 6, they surely carried with them into the voting booths the images from the front pages of their morning newspapers. The Soviet Army had just invaded Budapest, killing as many as 2,000 Hungarians. Premier Bulganin had threatened to intervene in Egypt to halt the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion. British and French paratroopers continued to drop out of the Egyptian sky and were fighting for control of key points along the Suez Canal. Soviet MiG fighter aircraft had been spotted in Egypt. At any moment the “police action” Eden had designed could erupt into a much wider and more deadly war.

  For Eisenhower the day began with a worrisome intelligence briefing from Allen Dulles, who reported, “The Soviets told the Egyptians that they will ‘do something’ in the Middle East hostilities.” Just what they planned to do, Dulles could not say, though he suggested the Soviets might move aircraft to Syria in anticipation of a wider conflict. The president ordered Dulles to get U-2 planes over Syria as soon as possible to search for evidence of any such activity. Thinking of the vulnerable British and French planes and ships that were gathered in Cyprus, Eisenhower remarked that “if the Soviets attack the French and British directly, we would be in war.”57

  Shortly after 9:00 a.m. Eisenhower and Mamie got into a car for the two-hour drive to Gettysburg, their official voting district. No sooner had they arrived and cast their ballots than Eisenhower got word from Washington that he needed to return immediately. He boarded a helicopter and was whisked back to the White House, where he landed just after noon. The immediate cause for alarm was a message from Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow, which had arrived while Eisenhower was en route to Pennsylvania. He reported that the Soviet attitude had become “ominous.” The USSR seemed poised for s
ome kind of military action to demonstrate its solidarity with the Arab world.58

  Just after 12:30 p.m. the president went into a conference with his advisers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radford briefed Eisenhower on the steps that he proposed to take to increase America’s military readiness in response to the recent Soviet statements. Ike agreed that “we should be in an advanced state of readiness,” but he did not want to take any obviously provocative measure, such as calling for a general mobilization of active-duty troops. Radford doubted the likelihood of a direct Soviet military move into the Mediterranean because they had no naval presence in the region. They could use “long range air strikes with nuclear weapons,” but he said that seemed “unlikely.” Eisenhower approved Radford’s suggestion to send two aircraft carriers, the newly minted USS Forrestal and the USS Franklin Roosevelt, to the eastern Atlantic. He also approved putting the Continental Air Defense Command on increased readiness, thus sending more interceptor aircraft in the sky above the homeland. Eisenhower did not want to be the victim of a surprise Soviet attack.59

  Midmorning brought hopeful signs that the crisis might ease rather than worsen. The Israeli government told the UN secretary-general that it would agree to a cease-fire. And why not? By that time Israel occupied all of the Sinai Peninsula and had destroyed much of the Egyptian Army and Air Force. Its military aims had been achieved. Egypt, desperate to stem its losses, tentatively agreed to a cease-fire as well.

  In London, Eden was running out of time. At 9:45 a.m. the British cabinet convened to consider the news of the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire. British soldiers had only just gained control of Port Said, at the mouth of the canal; they had days of tough fighting ahead if they wanted to secure the entire Canal Zone. Eden was inclined to keep the invasion going. To halt military activities now would be an admission of failure and make Nasser look like the winner. Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, however, could see the game was up. He reluctantly concluded that Britain must accept the cease-fire, for three powerful reasons. First, the Soviet Union might well join the hostilities in the region, which would be a worldwide calamity. Second, the British had claimed all along that their invasion was mainly a “police action” designed to separate the Israelis and the Egyptians; now that those nations had agreed to a cease-fire, there was no plausible excuse to continue an armed invasion of Suez.

  The third and most pressing reason was that Britain had come under terrific economic pressure as a result of the crisis. With the canal blocked and the Iraq pipeline closed, Britain had lost about a quarter of its daily oil supply. The only way it could offset those losses was to purchase oil elsewhere, mainly from the United States or Latin America. That required dollars. And Harold Macmillan, chancellor of the Exchequer, reported that Britain’s dollar reserves were evaporating at an alarming rate. Markets do not like war, and Britain had started one. Currency traders and national banks around the world were rapidly cashing in their British pounds for dollars, threatening to wipe out Britain’s supply. Dependent on dollars to pay for oil imports, Britain could not survive long if its reserves disappeared. The British economy teetered on the brink, and only the Americans could help pull it back.60

  Yet the Americans showed no inclination to help. The U.S. Treasury kept the pressure on the British government by blocking what in normal times would have been a simple request: the repatriation of dollars that Britain had supplied to the International Monetary Fund. The previous night Macmillan had frantically called American officials to get them to release these British-owned dollars, but Treasury Secretary Humphrey refused to allow the transaction. Although no evidence exists to link Eisenhower to this decision, Humphrey never would have taken such an unfriendly position without the president’s approval. Britain had come up against a basic reality: it could not act alone on the world stage without the support of the United States.

  Macmillan, who only 10 days earlier had adopted a most bellicose posture and fulminated about the need for Britain to act decisively against the upstart Egyptians, now told the cabinet that Britain was going bankrupt and must cease its military operations. Prime Minister Eden, exhausted, outmaneuvered by his allies, and losing the confidence of his own cabinet, accepted the news stoically. He agreed that Britain must accept the cease-fire and appeal to the United States for immediate economic aid.61

  Eisenhower, hearing this news from his ambassador in London, put through a call to Eden. “I can’t tell you how pleased we are that you found it possible to accept the cease-fire,” he said, hiding his feeling of triumph.

  Eden, smarting over what he perceived to be American disloyalty, was sullen. “We cease firing tonight,” he repeated, unwilling to engage in a conversation. Ike said he was “delighted.”

  But he was not satisfied with only a cease-fire. Before approving any economic aid to Britain, Eisenhower wanted Eden to withdraw his troops from Egypt. The UN would send in a peacekeeping force now, and that force should have no troops from any of the “big five”—the United States, Britain, France, the USSR, and China. “You people ought to be able to withdraw very quickly.”

  This hit Eden hard. He had assumed that he would be able to keep his forces in the Canal Zone, thus giving him leverage over the Egyptians if they should not cooperate. Eisenhower foiled him.

  “May I think that one over?” Eden said.

  Yes, Ike replied. “Call me anytime you please.”62

  IX

  At 7:00 p.m. Washington time, the fighting in Egypt stopped—just as the first U.S. election returns began to roll in. The early results looked good. The safe Republican Northeast went solidly for Ike. Then the tallies from border states arrived; Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and Kentucky also went into the Republican column. Soon came the news that Eisenhower had broken open the solid Democratic South, winning Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, and Louisiana. “Louisiana?” he exclaimed when Hughes told him he was leading there. “That’s as probable as leading in Ethiopia!”63

  And so it went. By the time he made his way to Washington’s Sheraton Park Hotel for the victory party among 6,000 guffawing, backslapping, tipsy Republican celebrants, Eisenhower was on his way to a great reelection victory. He won 41 states to Stevenson’s 7, giving him 457 electoral votes to Stevenson’s 73. He took 57 percent of the popular vote, the biggest share since FDR’s landslide in 1936 over Alf Landon. Even in Stevenson’s home state, Illinois, Eisenhower won 60 percent of the vote. Stevenson won only states that had once been part of the Confederacy—the South’s sullen response to Eisenhower’s moderate proposals on civil rights. Eisenhower became the first Republican in the 20th century to win two consecutive presidential elections.

  At 10 p.m. the giant billboard above Times Square in New York City blazed with the news of Eisenhower’s triumph. It took Adlai Stevenson, sulking in his hotel room, another four hours to concede. “What in the name of God is the monkey waiting for?” fumed Ike. Not until 1:40 in the morning could the president enter the hotel ballroom to accept the cheers from his fans.64

  Eisenhower’s victory was due to his personal popularity and to the unprecedented prosperity over which he presided. But Americans also wanted an experienced leader at the helm in a time of crisis. “The voting took place under pressure of extraordinary events overseas,” James Reston wrote in the New York Times. “Not since the election of 1944, when the Second World War was reaching its decisive phase with the American armies deep in Germany, have the American people gone to the polls so preoccupied with alarming foreign policy developments.” Americans overwhelmingly agreed: they wanted Eisenhower’s steady hand to guide the country in this hour of crisis.65

  There was still urgent work to be done, however, and no time for celebration. Early on the morning of November 7, as the White House was savoring the election results, Prime Minister Eden called the president and asked if he could come to Washington to consult on the Suez matter—perhaps hoping that the personal touch would persuade Eisenhower to provide oil and financial aid to Britain.
Eden obviously thought that since he had accepted the cease-fire, he would be forgiven his trespasses. Eisenhower, pleased by his electoral victory and eager to mend the frayed special relationship, accepted Eden’s proposal. Sounding suddenly magnanimous, he said he wanted to clear up this “family spat.”66

  As soon as Ike hung up the phone, his advisers rushed into his office. Sherman Adams, staff secretary Col. Andrew Goodpaster, Herbert Hoover Jr., Treasury Secretary Humphrey—all strongly discouraged a personal visit, fearing that it would give Eden a reprieve before he had accepted the UN demand for withdrawal of all forces from Suez. An Eisenhower-Eden meeting now would send the Arab world into an uproar and forfeit all the gains Ike had made by holding to such a firm line against British policy. Reluctantly Eisenhower accepted the point and phoned Eden back. It was an awkward call, with Ike stumbling to make his excuses. “We will have to postpone it a little bit,” he said, pleading a sudden rush of other commitments.

  Eisenhower then motored to Walter Reed to visit Foster Dulles, still recovering from his surgery. They chatted about the election results briefly, then turned to Suez. For a man who had just undergone a major operation, Dulles was remarkably lucid. He described the British-French invasion as a “crazy act” and insisted that any meeting with Eden must be contingent upon a withdrawal of troops. As long as those 15,000 British and 4,000 French soldiers sat in Port Said, the Egyptians would not cooperate and the Soviets would very soon take advantage of the disarray, perhaps sending forces of their own into the region. It was essential to get the UN police force, to be made up of 3,000 Scandinavian, Indian, and Indonesian troops, into position in Suez and to get the Anglo-French forces out immediately.67