Descartes' Temporal Dualism

by Lloyd Waller, Rebecca;

  [Aristotle] clearly recognizes that time and motion are interrelated. In the same way that space exists only in so far as there are bodies which occupy a certain place, time exists only in so far as there are bodies which, at different ‘nows,’ are in different places or in different states.[22]

  Though this relationalist approach accords with the reductivist desire to reduce discussions of time to discussions of events occurring within the physical world, they posited a more complex entity (i.e., a relation) as the thing to which time is reduced.

  In his analysis of the reductive strategies of thirteenth-century thinkers, Rory Fox argues that a relationalist reduction was the only type admitted by Aristotle, because Aristotle had ruled out reducing time to motion in “crude simplistic ways.” Fox argues that Aristotle had ruled out such reductions because time and motion possess divergent properties; namely, time is everywhere, whereas motion is in specific things, and motion can change velocities whereas time cannot.[23] A relationalist approach distinguishes itself from the “cruder” celestial reductionist account because the relationalist account only identifies time with one particular feature of motion and not with motion per se. The relationalist reduces time to that particular feature of motions whereby they indicate difference when they are compared to other motions. Likewise, the relationalist account distinguishes itself by identifying time with this particular feature as it is given in all motions, and not merely when it is noted in specific, cosmic motions. This subtler account seems to have been given its most careful presentation in Epicurus.

  From what is known of Epicurus’s account, it is evident that his account was reductive since it reduces discussions of time to discussions of relations. However, because Epicurus suggests that relations are not ontologically basic, his account does not reduce time to a basic ontological category. In Time in Late Antiquity, Ariotti claims that Empiricus and Laertius (the two primary sources of Epicurus’s account of time) “agree that for Epicurus time is neither an independent existent, nor a result of motion or chance, nor an essential characteristic of existents.”[24] Epicurus’s view, according to Ariotti, is that time is a “second order property or attribute of world existents.”[25] By this he means that time is neither an independently existing constituent of reality, nor even a basic attribute of such a body. Rather, time is an attribute of processes. Laertius writes that

  ...we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word “time.”[26]

  In describing time to be an “accident” or “attribute” of process, the Epicurean account that Laertius explains is that time is neither a true existent (i.e., a body), nor even one of the fundamental properties of a body (e.g., shape, color, magnitude, weight), but rather a non-permanent quality of bodies that is not essential to their natures. According to this framework, only bodies are true existents whereas the properties/attributes of bodies are also features of reality, but features of lower ontological standing. The fundamental properties that are permanently conjoined with bodies possess weaker ontological standing than bodies because they depend on bodies for their existence. Though time is like these properties in being likewise dependent on bodies, time is assigned an even lower ontological standing than these properties because it is not (like they are) a permanent property of bodies. Time is not a permanent property of bodies because it is possible to conceive of bodies without conceiving of time.

  In Ariotti’s attempt to elaborate on what Epicurus might have meant in designating time to be a non-permanent property of bodies, he contends that Epicurus may be suggesting that “time is a relation which we see or use in the comparison of motions.”[27] According to this account, time is not found in the motions of bodies per se, but rather, time is found in the comparisons or relations that obtain between various motions. An important point to note is that if Ariotti is correct in suggesting that Epicurus conceived time to be a relation that “we see or use” then this interpretation points to another question to ask of Epicurus’ account: What role do minds play in this account? In Time and Mind, J.J.A. Mooji wonders if according to Epicurus, time might be dependent on mind[28] and Ariotti’s analysis of Epicurus does suggest some grounds for supposing an affirmative answer to this query. If time is a relation that is seen or used, then it seems that this account might posit time to be dependent on a mind to do this seeing or using. As the next section will show that there were many who did suppose that time was somehow dependent on minds, this additional possibility might be important for fully understanding not only Epicurus’s account, but the relation between these standard views in the reductivist tradition and the mind-dependent tradition (which is the subject of the next section.) Because the texts on Epicurus’s view are so few, it is sufficient to note that this possibility arises within his account, and then to postpone an analysis of the role of minds in various accounts of time until the next section.

  Even the very brief sketch of Epicurus’s view that I have offered is sufficient for recognizing how the relationalist reductivist account of time offers a third perspective on the reductive v. absolute account of time debates prior to Descartes. Though relationalists certainly side with the reductivist’s position that time is not an independently existing constitute of reality, they offer a more complex reduction by positing that time reduces to a relation, and thus to a second-order property of bodies. As such, this view posits that time is neither substance, nor a fundamental attribute of substance. That is to say, time is neither substance, nor the motion of a particular substance, but rather, a relation that is found between various motions. To sum up, these standard kinds of reductivists answer the three central questions concerning the nature of time as follows:

  Is time an independent or dependent entity? According to both the celestial reductionist and relationalist, time is a dependent entity. The celestial reductionist argues that time is identical with a specific cosmic motion (thus accounting for the unity of time) whereas the relationalist argues that time is identical with a relation between motions.

  What is the relation between time and motion? According to both the celestial reductionist and the relationist, time is dependent on motion for its existence. They disagree about how time depends upon motion, however. According to the celestial reductionist, time is directly dependent on one particular motion. According to the relationalist, time is dependent upon motion as the relata that gives rise to time (the relation between motions).

  What is the relation between time and minds? Here we get the biggest difference between the two branches of reductionism. According to celestial reductionism, time is not dependent upon minds. According to at least some relationalist accounts (perhaps, for example, that of Epicurus) time might be dependent on minds for its existence if time is interpreted as being identical not to the relation between motions themselves, but rather to the conceiving of this relation.

  Tradition Three: Mind-Dependent Approaches to Time

  Though Epicurus’s account of time may suggest some level of mind-dependence, there were many others who not only included some kind of dependence on minds, but who made this mind-dependence central to their approach. In this section, I will explore influential examples of those whom I identify as proponents of the mind-dependent approach to time. Insofar as these approaches describe time as being mind-dependent, they might appropriately be classed among the broader heading of reductivists. As, however, they offer a different sort of reduction (i.e., one that reduces motion to features of minds rather than to concrete objects or their activities), they will be considered as offering a distinct approach to time.

  The notion that the nature of time was intimately tied up with the nature of minds was a recurring theme among many of Descartes’ predecessors. Even Aristotle had identified an important role for minds in his account of time.
By defining time to be the number or measure of motion, Aristotle suggested that time was dependent on minds since “if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted either.”[29] Accordingly, it is not surprising that many of Aristotle’s followers shared the belief that time is somehow dependent on minds.

  In The Physical World of Late Antiquity, Sambursky claims that considerations of time’s relationship to change led many to suppose that time might be dependent on minds. Sambursky explains how the “problem of time and consciousness” naturally arose from such considerations since time is “invariably connected with consciousness, with the apprehension of an eternal and continual flux . . . the very flow of time is bound up for us with the experience of the flow in our consciousness.”[30] Given this link, it is not surprising that one can find various thinkers giving minds central roles in their accounts of time. Plotinus, for example, claims that “time is the life of the soul as it moves from one state of life to another.”[31] Likewise, In book 11 of the Confessions, Augustine suggests that time is a distention of the mind itself.[32] Given that Augustine’s various cogito-like arguments are widely regarded as having greatly influenced Descartes’ thought,[33] Augustine’s explicitly mind-dependent account of time seems particularly important to study for the possible ways that Augustine’s views on time may have influenced those of Descartes.

  Augustine develops his mind-dependent account of time as a solution to certain of the paradoxes of time that had been posed by predecessors. He not only addresses the ancient worry of Aristotle that time might not exist at all,[34] but he also addresses a theological question that had received some attention; namely, he addresses the question of what God was doing “before” he chose to create. To the question of what God was doing before he chose to create, Augustine denies the question’s presupposition that there was time before creation. Indeed, Augustine argues that “there can be no time without creation”[35] since time just is the mode of being for creation, whereas eternity is the mode of being for the creator. To the Aristotelian worry that time might not exist at all since “one part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet,”[36] Augustine offers a more extensive response. Augustine focuses on the question of time’s seeming unreality because this question was one that he himself found perplexing.

  Augustine worries that time appears to have a very tenuous existence given that time consists merely of an instantaneous present poised between the apparent non-being of the past and future. As Augustine phrases the worry, “the past no longer is and the future as yet does not be.”[37] Such an account of the past and future suggests significant worries about the possible being of time given that Augustine also claims that “[The present] flies with such speed from the future into the past that it cannot be extended by even a trifling amount. For if it is extended, it is divided into past and future.”[38] If neither the past nor the future exist, and the present is fleetingly small, then Augustine is troubled by how one can make sense of the many accounts of time that describe it as not only existing, but existing according to a longer or shorter expanse. It is primarily to address this last, particularly sticky puzzle that Augustine offers his mind-dependent account of time.

  Though it was earlier noted that Augustine explicitly rejected celestial reductionism, he did see an important relationship between time and the motion of the sun; namely, Augustine suggests that time is the distention within which this motion takes place. That is to say, time is the extended period within which these motions occur since Augustine affirms that “a body is never moved except in time.”[39] In suggesting that the distention of time is required for the possibility of any motion, Augustine needed to account for how time might be extended in such a way that it might encompass the various stages of a body’s motion. Augustine recognized a need to offer some account of how time can possibly be extended over some length despite its seeming to be the progression between “that which does not yet exist, by that which lacks space, and into that which no longer exists.”[40]

  As Augustine is committed to the claim that existence is only a feature of the present, to explain how time can be extended he must explain how present existence can extend into the non-presentness of the past and future. Augustine achieves this feat by identifying the past, present, and future with features of minds. He identifies the past with one’s memories, the future with one’s expectations, and the present with one’s immediate attention. As one can focus immediate attention on things stored in one’s memory or on things that one anticipates, the mind is able to extend present existence to things that are past and things that are in the future. Thus, Augustine claims, “it might properly be said that there are three times, the present of things past, the present of things present, and the present of things future. These three are in the soul.”[41]

  Augustine argued for the mind-dependence of time in order to extend the present in this way because such an extension would allow a body’s motion or rest to be measured. As motion and rest both endure from the past through the present, and into the future, any measure of the distention through which these occur must likewise have some kind of being that endures through the past, present, and future. As existence is a feature of the present, and because a mind is able to bring the things that it recalls and the things that it anticipates into its immediate attention, the mind is uniquely capable of offering a type of present existence to the past and future. As a consequence, Augustine claims, “Time is nothing more than distention . . . and the marvel is, if it be not of the mind itself.”[42] Time is the distention of the mind itself because it is only within minds that the past and present have any being. As there could be no measure composed of a past and present without being, the only way that there is a distention through which an enduring body might be measured is if the distention through which bodies are measured is found in minds. As time is the distention through which bodies are measured, time is found in, and wholly dependent on, minds.

  Though Augustine may have offered the most explicitly psychological account of time among Descartes’ predecessors, the idea that time was dependent on minds was a recurring theme. Whereas few went as far as Augustine’s claims that time is identical with a distention of mind, there were many who took a more Aristotelian stance that time requires minds as the means of uncovering the more fundamental temporal features in the world. Among those who gave time some level of mind-dependence, there was one additional group that has not yet been considered. There were some who suggested that time might be mind-dependent because it exists as a type of an idea in minds. This last group tended to argue that time is not merely an idea, but that it also exists in some form in the physical world. This last group, who I will identify as temporal dualists, will be considered at greater length in the following section.

  To sum up in this section, mind-dependent theorists answer the three important questions in the following way:

  Is time an independent or dependent entity? According to the mind-dependent theorist, time is a dependent entity which requires minds in order to exist.

  What is the relation between time and motion? According to the mind-dependent theorist, time is distinct from corporeal motion, but depends upon the conceiving of change that occurs within minds.

  What is the relation between time and minds? According to the mind-dependent theorist, time is dependent upon minds for its existence.

  Tradition Four: Dualist Approaches to Time

  The last approach to time which received significant support among Descartes’ predecessors and contemporaries is what I am calling the dualist approach.[43] According to the dualist approach, there is more than one kind of time, with one kind generally serving as the measure of the other. I am examining this approach last because the dualist approach presupposes a familiarity with absolutist, reductive, and mind-dependent approaches to time. Thus, a temporal dualist might claim that time both is and is not mind-dependent—depending on which kind of time i
s under consideration.

  To a certain extent, one might argue that many (perhaps even most) of Descartes’ predecessors were temporal dualists. One might think that temporal dualism was the norm insofar as it was common to affirm the separate existence of time and eternity—with time characterizing the mode of existence of creatures and eternity characterizing the mode of existence of the creator. Though it’s true that the time/eternity divide was pervasive, the particular dualism that I intend is not a distinction between time and eternity. Rather, I am considering a distinction that is only found in discussions about time as conceived apart from eternity. Thus, the fact that various theorists maintained a distinction between time and eternity is not by itself sufficient for their being included among the class of temporal dualists. It also follows that persons classified as temporal dualists may offer more than two temporal accounts if one includes discussions of eternity in the analysis.

  In Time, Creation and the Continuum, Richard Sorabji offers the Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus (C.E. 250–325) as an early example of a temporal dualist. Sorabji explains that Iamblichus “treats eternity as distinct from his two kinds of time, since he draws a threefold distinction among them.”[44] The two kinds of time that Iamblichus identifies are distinguished as “higher” and “lower.” As their names suggest, Iamblichus does not give these two types equal ontological status. Rather, Sorabji explains how Iamblichus offers two types of time that appear to map on to a platonic form of time and the time that participates in the form.[45] Iamblichus’s “lower time” is composed of an ever-changing now. It is always in a state of coming to be rather than in a state of static existence, whereas his “higher time” is the “image of eternity.” As the image of eternity, this higher time endures as a static whole akin to a platonic form.[46]