Descartes' Temporal Dualism

by Lloyd Waller, Rebecca;

  Though this interpretation of Principles I.21 may indeed pose a significant difficulty for line (6) in the Argument from Radical Contingency,[27] this worry actually invites another, simpler argument against reading Descartes’ account of time as being consistent with its being a substance. Namely, it invites the ‘argument from numerically distinct parts.’ In this, my fourth and final argument, I argue against time’s being a Cartesian substance while assuming that moments are not essentially relational.

  We have just seen that Principles I.21 offers one of Descartes’ strongest statements of his parts of time doctrine by its assertion that “the nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist.”[28] With the parts of time doctrine in hand, an immediate problem with any account positing that Descartes held time to be a substance presents itself. If Descartes maintained that time is composed of independent, separable parts, then one can ask how these parts could be distinguished if time were a substance? If one denies that moments can be distinguished in virtue of the external relations between moments, then one must appeal to some other basis for the distinction between moments. There must be some basis or other for a distinction between moments, since a minimum criterion for something’s existing at all would seem to be that there is something that it is to be that thing. In other words, for a thing to exist, there must be something that gives that thing a distinct nature. If one excludes an appeal to the essential relations between moments (based on Principles I.21), then it seems that there are very few other alternatives capable of providing moments with a distinct nature.[29]

  To claim that Cartesian time is a substance one must grant that time is capable of independent existence. Thus, a proponent of the substance thesis cannot claim that moments of time are individuated by appealing to any other thing, including things that are “in time.” That is to say, the substance thesis excludes one from claiming, for example, that t1 is distinguished from t2 by way of the occurrences happening at t1 or t2. These occurrences could not ground a distinction between t1 and t2 because this would make it the case that the identity of t1 and t2 depends on those occurrences. To posit that the identity of t1 and t2 depends on the occurrences happening within them would be to contradict the claim that time exists as an independent entity. Though the thesis that moments are individuated by external relations between moments offered the advantage of making time only dependent on itself (i.e., only dependent on its own various parts), if Principles I.21 disproves this option (at least on this reading) then it seems that all reasonable grounds for a distinction between moments are lost. If the distinction cannot be grounded on (1) occurrences in time, or on (2) relations between moments, then it seems the only other alternative is (3), that moments are distinguished in virtue of individual essences or haecceities possessed by each moment.[30] This last suggestion is, however, difficult to take seriously since it is hard to even conceive what such an individual essence for a moment might be, and since there is no textual evidence to indicate that Descartes held such a view. If the sheer implausibility of (3) is sufficient for excluding it, then it seems a simple argument against time’s being a substance presents itself. For, if it is true that there would be no basis in the world for a distinction between these parts (i.e., moments) of time, then it seems that time would not possess the numerically distinct parts that Descartes posits for it. More formally, my argument is as follows:

  Argument from Numerically Distinct Parts

  Time has numerically distinct parts (Premise 1, Principles I.21)

  If time were a Cartesian substance, then it could not have numerically distinct parts (because these parts could not be individuated).[31] (Premise 2, argued above)

  Thus, time is not a Cartesian substance (by Modus Tollens).

  In this argument, Premise 2 is obviously doing all of the work. This premise was defended above. In short, I argued that moments could not be distinguished by

  occurrences happening at a time because then time would lack the independence that the substance theorist wants to attribute to it.

  relations between moments because that would make moments essentially relational (thus subjecting the defender of this claim to the Argument from Radical Contingency).

  or their individual essences because such a view is a highly implausible interpretation of Descartes.

  Thus, this final argument shows the inconsistency in positing that time could both be a Cartesian substance and that it could be composed of parts. As the very possibility of time’s possessing numerically distinct parts demands that there exist some grounds for a distinction between parts, and since a substantial time would not admit of any of these grounds, the two views contradict. It seems that Descartes could not consistently hold that time is composed of parts and hold that it is a substance. Thus, even when focusing on Descartes’ parts of time doctrine, one finds strong reasons for denying that time could be a substance.

  Conclusion

  Having considered evidence for and against the view that Descartes might have granted time the status of a substance, I have shown that the weight of evidence opposes this position. Through the four arguments of section III, I have shown that there are both strong textual and philosophical grounds for denying that Descartes could have taken time to be a type of substance. By showing the inconsistencies that would hamper such a position, I have argued that there are deep metaphysical reasons that could have prompted Descartes’ claims in Principles I.57. Given that the grounds explaining I.57 are extracted from an analysis of the parts of time doctrine, I have thereby additionally shown strongly that I.57 should not be treated as an anomalous passage. I have shown that Descartes’ discussions of the parts of time reinforce the importance of I.57 insofar as this principle explicitly states what is only entailed by other discussions; namely, that time is an attribute and not a substance. When I.57 is conjoined with the analysis of the parts of time doctrine, one discovers that time not only is not but indeed could not be a Cartesian substance.

  Notes

  1. Principles I.51: AT VIIIA 24, CSM I.210.

  2. Principles I.51: AT VIIIA 24, CSM I.210.

  3. Principles I.51: AT VIIIA 24, CSM I.210.

  4. Principles I.52: AT VIIIA 25, CSM I.210.

  5. Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 69.

  6. AT IXB 13, CSM I.200.

  7. For a very good discussion on this point, see Geoffrey Gorham, “Cartesian Causation: Continuous, Instantaneous, Overdetermined,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2004): 389–423.

  8. This discussion is the focus of chapter 5.

  9. AT IXB 13, CSM I.200.

  10. Though Descartes of course distinguishes in Principles I.56 among modes, qualities, and attributes, this still seems to be a fair classification, since modes and qualities are also ways that a substance can be, though they are ways that would cause the substance to be modified or distinguished.

  11. Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, 266–268.

  12. Ken Levy, “Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist?” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2005): 627–674.

  13. “Strongly discontinuous” is the view that different moments of time are not only separate, but actually separated by a gap in which there is no time at all. See Levy, “Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist?” 633.

  14. Ibid., 628.

  15. Ibid., 637.

  16. Ibid., 663.

  17. Ibid., 663.

  18. Given contemporary discussions on spacetime one might want to argue that Cartesian time could be spatially extended. However, this position seems to offer a highly implausible interpretation of Descartes’ own view. As Descartes had so much to say on the nature of space and extension, and had so little to say on the nature of time, it seems evident that these categories were not conjoined in his own thinking.

  19. AT VIIIA 26; CSM I.212.

  20. Levy, “Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist,” 662.
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br />   21. Ibid., 662. I quite strongly disagree with Levy’s characterization of I.57 as a “minor passage” or even the suggestion that anything offered in the Principles might count as “tucked away.”

  22. AT VII 49; CSM II.33.

  23. AT VII 49; CSM II.33.

  24. AT VIIIA 24; CSM I.210.

  25. In this definition, I set aside the case of an identity relation, since this is not a distinguishing type of relation.

  26. AT IXB 13, CSM I.200.

  27. It is worth noting, however, that this type of “worry” only exists for someone who is reading moments as existing as parts of an independent, substantial time. If, instead, one reads moments as stages of an enduring thing (which I think is correct), then there is not a problem of how to individuate moments, since moments would be individuated by the substance of which they are an attribute, and would thus not need a ground for their independent existence as such.

  28. AT IXB 13, CSM I.200.

  29. Bonnen and Flage note a similar concern when they describe the difficulty of trying to conceive of “bare atoms” of time. Clarence Bonnen and Daniel E. Flage, “Descartes: The Matter of Time,” International Studies in Philosophy 32 (2000): 3.

  30. Alexander U. Bertland of Niagara University suggested a fourth option for how individual moments might be distinguished for Descartes. As his suggestion seems both clever and initially plausible, it is worth considering. Dr. Bertland wondered if individual moments might be distinguished just in virtue of their unique creation acts by God, that is, moment t1 is distinguished from moment t2 in virtue of the fact that moment t1 was created prior to moment t2. Though this suggestion seems initially appealing, there are a couple of significant flaws with this option. First, if the differences between moments are caused by differences in particular creative acts, then this would suggest a violation of Descartes’ commitment to divine immutability. For different moments to be differentiated by their different causal acts alone, then each causal act would need to be fundamentally different in a way that the acts of a radically simple and unchanging being could not seem to be.

  31. Though one might object that this premise confuses an epistemological fact with an ontological one, I think this objection misses the idea. I am not arguing that one could not distinguish one moment from another without there being some grounds for distinction (though of course this would be true). Rather, I am arguing that the very possibility of there being distinct parts requires that there be some basis upon which an actual distinction might rest. That is to say, some basis upon which it is true to say that moment t1 is not identical to moment t2.

  Chapter 3

  Descartes’ Temporal Dualism

  In the first chapter I noted that proponents of a reductive approach generally claimed that time is dependent on motion—either through its being reducible to a particular motion (i.e., celestial reductionism) or through its being reducible to a relation between motions (i.e., relationalism). In the second chapter I explained why time cannot be a Cartesian substance, and thus why Descartes must favor the reductive approach over the absolutist approach. I can now consider what kind of reductive approach Descartes favors by considering what role motion plays in Descartes’ account of time.

  Since Descartes’ texts so frequently link discussions of time with discussions of motion, it is evident that Descartes at least followed the historical precedent of conceiving of one in terms of the other. However, Descartes’ account diverges from the traditional, reductive approaches by seeming to offer two, inconsistent ways of relating time and motion. If Descartes were following a simple reductive approach, then he would need to maintain that time is ontologically dependent on motion. Though Descartes does appear to presume this in some passages, he elsewhere seems to suggest the opposite; namely, that motion depends on time.

  Rather than following one of the more common reductivist approaches, I here argue that Descartes follows a dualist approach to time. I argue for this claim by analyzing the seemingly inconsistent ways that Descartes relates motion and time. As temporal dualism offers a clear resolution to these inconsistencies, while also being consistent with Descartes’ own texts, there is strong support for interpreting Descartes as a temporal dualist. In claiming that Descartes is a temporal dualist, I am claiming that he posits two really distinct temporal attributes. The first kind (which I call ‘duration’) is not dependent upon motion for its existence. The second kind (which I call ‘time-in-thought’) is somehow dependent upon motion.

  This chapter has two major goals—first, to establish the fact of Descartes’ temporal dualism; second, to begin sketching the character of this dualism. The first goal is addressed in sections I and II. In section I, I identify the various, apparently inconsistent relationships that Descartes suggests between time and motion in several significant texts. In section II, I show how Principles I.57 shows Descartes offering a real distinction between the two temporal attributes: duration and time-in-thought. As this real distinction suggests temporal dualism, and this dualism offers a resolution to the apparently inconstant accounts of time suggested in other passages, Principles I.57 does the major work for establishing my dualist interpretation. Having argued for the fact of Descartes’ temporal dualism, I then (in sections III and IV) begin analyzing the nature of this dualism. In section III, I begin considering each of the two attributes in isolation from each other. In section IV, I compare Suarez’s dualist account of time with the view emerging of Descartes’ account. This final task continues into chapter 4, since noting how Descartes’ view diverges from that of Suarez helps show the interesting and unusual character of Descartes’ temporal dualism.

  Relating Time and Motion

  Though reductivists had good philosophical grounds for supposing that time is dependent on motion, there are also good philosophical reasons for thinking instead that motion is dependent on time. In different passages, Descartes seems to reference and endorse the grounds supporting each of these contrary dependence relations. For example, in Principles II.39, Descartes seems to point to reasons why one would claim that motion depends on time. In this text, he claims that “no motion takes place at a single instant.”[1] In asserting that there is no motion in a single instant, Descartes appears to acknowledge the uncontroversial point that there can be no motion or change without some type of temporal succession, since motion is itself inherently successive. That is to say, since something cannot simultaneously hold contrary properties, the very possibility of movement or change in something presupposes that the thing is able to be one way at t1 and another way at t2.

  Though Principles II.39 suggests that Descartes conceives of motion as dependent on time, he elsewhere seems to endorse the reductivist stance that time is instead dependent on motion. There are additional, good philosophical grounds why Descartes might have maintained this contrary order of dependence. The central reason why Descartes, like others before him, would plausibly suppose that time depends on motion is because time is inconceivable without motion. Without some kind of motion or change, two moments or states of an individual substance are indistinguishable. As any conception of time requires that successive moments are distinguishable according to before and after, motion is required to make time conceivable. Descartes discusses this point in Rule 12, when he explains that the concepts of duration and time are necessarily conjoined with a concept of motion because “we cannot conceive either of them distinctly if we judge them to be separate from [motion].”[2]

  Though Rule 12 only claims that motion is required for time to be conceived, this epistemic point can have ontological import for anyone who endorses the reductivist suggestion that time is a “measure of motion.” This Aristotelian phrase is one that Descartes explicitly employs in Principles I.57, when defining time “as distinguished from duration.”[3] This phrase and the view it suggests are quite significant since, if time is the measure of motion, then the very possibility of time existing would thus be dependent on time’s being conceivable by a
mind. As Aristotle himself claimed, “if there cannot be someone to count there cannot be anything that can be counted either.”[4] In other words, if time cannot be conceived without motion, then it cannot exist as a measure, since measures require a measurer. Thus, if Descartes held time to be the measure of motion, then the fact that time could not be conceived without motion would entail that time could not exist without motion. In this case, an epistemic fact about what is required for time to be conceived carries ontological import. Accordingly, it seems that there are good philosophical grounds that might have compelled Descartes to think that time depends on motion, just as there were good philosophical grounds for him to think that motion depends on time.