Descartes' Temporal Dualism

by Lloyd Waller, Rebecca;

  14. AT VIIIA 50, CSM I.230-1.

  15. AT VIIIA 26, CSM I.211.

  16. AT VIIIA 25, CSMI.210.

  17. Though Descartes himself never explicitly discusses temporal atoms in the ways that he does spatial atoms, it is evident that such parallel reasoning applies. Not only is the reasoning relating temporal and spatial extension straightforward, this reasoning was known and explicitly discussed by others prior to Descartes. See Samuel Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959): 103.

  18. AT VIIIA 51; CSM I.231.

  19. This is an idea from Jean-Marie Beyssade, and one that you can find explained by Dan Garber. See, for example, Dan Garber, “How God Causes Motion: Descartes, Divine Sustenance, and Occasionalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 571. See also: Kemp Smith, Cartesian Philosophy, 131–132.

  20. See, for example, Descartes’ discussion of the Second Law of Motion. AT VIIIA, CSM I.242.

  21. See for example: Levy, “Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist, 627–674. As this position is generally out of favor, however, it is not surprising that one can find a fast and efficient rejection of this account in Gorham, “Cartesian Temporal Atomism,” 625–637.

  22. See, for example: Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to Time,” 413–431; and Geoffrey Gorham, “Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts,” in Time and Identity, ed. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 165–182.

  23. For some of the many places Descartes claims this, see: AT XI 38; CSM I.93, AT XI 43; CSM I.96, AT Principles I.56: VIIIA 26; CSM I.211, Principles II.36: AT VIIIA 61; CSM I.240, Principles II.39: AT VIIIA 64; CSM I.241, Principles II.42: AT VIIIA 66; CSM I.243.

  24. AT X1.38; CSM I.93.

  25. See, for example: Gorham, “Descartes on Persistence,” 165–182.

  26. AT VIIIA 66; CSM I.243, emphasis added.

  27. Having mentioned Kant’s Aesthetic several times already, I want to briefly sketch the view that I have in mind. In the Aesthetic, Kant explains that there are two forms of intuition: space (the form of outer intuition), and time (the form of inner and outer intuition). In explaining how time functions as a form of intuition, Kant explains that time grounds all appearances; that one cannot remove time from appearances because it is a pre-condition for the possibility of having any appearance. As a form of intuition, Kant identifies time as being a feature of our subjective experiences that we bring to the world and through which we access the world, as opposed to an extramental fact of the world that we encounter and discover. It is in this way that I see Kant’s account as foreshadowed by Descartes’ innate idea of time. In arguing that time-in-thought is an innate idea, I argue that it is an idea contained within our inherent, conceptual apparatus. It is an idea that we bring to our experiences of the world (specifically to the enduring of substances), and through the use of it we are able to organize and structure the enduring of the substances we encounter. The two ideas will, of course, diverge in many ways. For example, I think that time-in-thought differs from Kant’s form of outer intuition insofar as the application of time-in-thought would tell us about more than merely how duration is conceived—it would tell us about the nature of duration itself.

  28. AT X 448; CSM I.62, emphasis added.

  29. In support of the plausibility of time-in-thought being the ground of the parts of duration, again recall Suarez. In chapter 1, I explained that Suarez’s extrinsic time played a comparable role for intrinsic duration. As I there noted, in Disp. Meta., 50.12.9 Suarez claims, “[Time] is not simply the number of a continuum, but the number of the parts of the same continuum, which in the thing is only number in potency, actualized through the operation and numeration of the mind.” In claiming that the parts of a continuum are only potential until they are enumerated by an act of mind, Suarez’s account shows a striking resemblance to my interpretation of time-in-thought’s role in enumerating the parts of duration. The only difference being that I do not claim that the parts are only potential parts.

  30. There are many texts that illustrate this point. See, for example, the following three passages. AT VII.78; CSM II.54: Sixth Meditation: I know that everything I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated, at least by God; AT VII.169; CSM II.119: Second Set of Replies, Proposition IV: God can bring about whatever we clearly perceive in a way exactly corresponding to our perception of it; AT III.477–478; CSMK 203: To Gibieuf: From the simple fact that I consider the two halves of a part of matter, however small it may be, as two complete substances, whose ideas are not made inadequate by an abstraction of my intellect, I conclude with certainty that they are really divisible. Someone may tell me that though I can conceive them apart, I have no reason to deny their inseparability because I do not know that God has not united or joined them together so tightly that they are entirely inseparable. I would reply that however he may have joined them, I am sure that he can also disjoin them; so that absolutely speaking I have reason to call them divisible, since he has given me the faculty of conceiving them as such.

  31. As I here claim that time-in-thought determines that duration has parts, one might worry that there is a tension between this claim and my argument in chapter 3. There I argued that motion depends on successive duration, and not on time-in-thought. But if duration is itself dependent on time-in-thought for its successive parts, then it seems that I must concede that motion is indirectly dependent upon time-in-thought. I still think that my analysis in chapter 3 is correct if we restrict that analysis to direct dependence. Though motion may be indirectly dependent upon time-in-thought (insofar as time-in-thought is the ground of duration’s successive parts), it is still true that motion is directly dependent on duration. Despite what may ground duration’s parts, the parts are genuine features of duration. Thus the parts of duration (which are a real feature of the nature of duration) are the things on which motion depends. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this perceptive insight.

  32. See Arthur, “Continuous Creation, Continuous Time,” 354; Beyssade, La Philosophie première de Descartes, 17; Laporte, Le Rationisme de Descartes, 158–159.

  33. AT VII 109; CSM II.79.

  34. AT VII 49; CSM II.33.

  35. AT VIIIA 13; CSM I.200.

  36. AT VIIIA 30; CSM I.214.

  37. AT VIIIA 30; CSM I.214.

  38. AT VIIIA 30; CSM I.214.

  39. In arguing for really distinct parts of time, my interpretation seems to suggest the odd account of persistence that is raised in Gorham, “Descartes on Persistence” 165–182, which relates to the grounds Bonnen and Flage used to reject that Descartes offered actual parts in Clarence Bonnen and Daniel E. Flage, “Descartes: The Matter of Time,” International Studies in Philosophy 32 (2000): 4; namely, that if there are really distinct parts, then these parts are distinct substances. If there are distinct substances at each moment then one “life” would actually consist of a collection of substantial parts. When Gorham presents this view, he accepts that the parts of time doctrine entails that Descartes offers a perdurantist account of persistence. Though I grant a perdurantist account might be an entailment of the view, I don’t think that Descartes recognized or intended this entailment. To whatever degree this entailment follows, I think this persistence problem will result from any interpretation that takes Descartes’ “parts” language seriously—it is certainly not a problem that is uniquely consequent on my interpretation. Indeed, I suspect that my interpretation weakens the problem by granting genuine continuity to substances by means of their creation. Moreover, I think that the really distinct parts that follow my interpretation are not obviously the sorts of slices that Gorham suggests. Whatever slices exist, on my interpretation, are those th
at can be conceived via time-in-thought. The types of slices that can be conceived, however, are limited by our capacities for conceiving the indefinite divisibility of any kind of extension. Though time-in-thought tells us that our temporal extension can be divided at any point, Descartes’ denial of atoms tells us that he does not think that we can conceive of extension being divisible down to final indivisible parts. Likewise, as Arthur (1988) points out, in Descartes’ rejection of Galileo’s proof that a line is divisible down to an infinite number of parts (373–375), Descartes would likewise seem to reject that a given temporal extension could be divisible down to some instantaneous time slice. Since Descartes would deny that we can conceive of any divisible or indivisible parts, it seems that the really distinct parts formed as a result of what we can conceive are neither atomic nor instantaneously small (i.e., infinitely small), since neither such slices are clearly and distinctly conceived. Any extension is indefinitely divisible. Thus, we only clearly and distinctly conceive that there it is divisible at any point, but we do not conceive of actual parts that result from such divisions. Rather, it seems we clearly and distinctly perceive the sorts of parts that Descartes himself describes; namely, the sorts of parts that would obtain if our durations included all of our existence up until the given moment when divine concurrence might be withdrawn. Such an account appears to suggest really distinct parts that better resemble a “growing block” than some unknown number of moment slices.

  40. See Arthur, “Continuous Creation, Continuous Time,” 349–375.

  41. AT VII 70; CSM II 255.

  42. Arthur, “Continuous Creation, Continuous Time,” 363. What is not evident in this description is if Arthur’s account of God would require that God Himself would be temporally extended in the way that Gorham later contends. Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to Time,” 413–431 and Gorham, “Descartes on Time and Duration,” 28–54.

  43. The difficulty in this discussion is that I appear to blur an epistemological fact with a metaphysical one. I am not intentionally hedging on whether or not time-in-thought serves a merely epistemic function, that is, to help us know that duration is composed of parts, or makes it the case that duration is actually composed of parts. There is a blurring of lines here, but this is a feature of the Cartesian system. Insofar as time-in-thought is an innate idea, whatever it clearly and distinctly tells us is the case must actually be the case. Thus, what it allows us to know is also what must be the case in virtue of what it allows us to know. In other words, given Descartes’ claims that whatever is clearly and distinctly known is actually the case, something that serves this type of epistemic ground also serves as a metaphysical ground sufficient for guaranteeing that whatever is known is as it is known to be. Thus, it is true to say that time-in-thought serves both an epistemic and metaphysical function in relation to the parts of duration. Possessing this idea is sufficient for guaranteeing that we can know that duration has parts and that duration actually has parts since God can accomplish anything conceivable.

  44. As being the feature of duration, which allows duration to be the attribute on which motion directly depends.

  45. AT VIIIA 29; CSM I.213.

  46. I will only briefly acknowledge that this general picture does (in “wild” moments) suggest to me a sort of 4-dimensionalist picture in Descartes. I will neither expand upon this point, nor defend it, since I think would conflict with many other passages in Descartes. Thus, defending the view would be a hefty (and likely unproductive) task. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that my line of reasoning may be consistent with 4-dimensionalism, and since a recent text has convincingly argued that Spinoza offered a 4-dimensionalist account of time, it seems that this point might be worthy of note. See: Jason Waller, Persistence through Time in Spinoza (New York: Lexington, 2012).

  47. Principles I.23: AT VIIIA 14; CSM I.201.

  48. See: Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to Time,” 413–431, and Geoffrey Gorham, “God and the Natural World in the Seventeenth Century: Space, Time, and Causality,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 862.

  49. Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to Time,” 419.

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