SS und Polizei: Myths and Lies of Hitler's SS and Police

by J. Lee Ready

  Then Wolff commanded some French government workers to find enough rope and ladders to hang 120 men. They did as ordered. Then German NCOs began throwing the ropes over lampposts and stringing up the prisoners. One ran for it and a recruit shot him down. When the 99th man began to swing, Wolff called a halt. The remaining 300 men were trucked away to a slave labor camp.

  The next day Lammerding was ordered to take his SS Das Reich to Normandy by road. He reported to his superiors that in three days of anti-partisan action his men had killed 500 terrorists and arrested 1,500. As these are round figures they are more than likely wholly inaccurate.

  On 9 June Obersturmbannfuehrer Helmut Kampfe was reported missing near Gueret, so troops of the SS Das Reich and policemen of the French GMR scoured the area looking for him. Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Diekmann, commander of the 1st Battalion of the SS Der Fuehrer Regiment [of the SS Das Reich], was already frantic with worry about his friend Kampfe when he was informed by French members of the SD in Limoges that the nearby village of Oradour sur Glanes was a Communist hideout and that Kampfe might have been kidnapped and taken there. Later Diekmann was informed on two separate occasions by French civilians that the Communists indeed had a senior German officer in Oradour and were bragging that they were going to publicly execute him. Then the French Milice informed Diekmann that Oradour was indeed a guerilla-friendly community and that recently another German had been kidnapped and taken there, but had escaped.

  With this much evidence, Diekmann’s mind was soon made up, and believing there was no time to lose he ordered Hauptsturmfuehrer Kahn’s company to accompany him to Oradour.

  Once inside the village Diekmann ordered a house-to-house search while everyone was hauled out to the village square. The sweep produced Jews and others who were hiding from the Nazis, but no Kampfe. Nonetheless for the three crimes of being Communists, being guerillas and obviously helping anti-Nazis to hide, Diekmann sentenced the village to die. At his orders the soldiers gunned down all of the men in the street. The women and children were then placed in a church that was then set afire and grenades were thrown through the windows.

  In a surrealist incident the burning church steeple fell on an officer and killed him. Later some civilians approached the village on personal business. Several were shot, but others were warned by SS soldiers to run for it. A streetcar bringing 30 people home from work was stopped by the SS. An NCO ordered them off and told them all to run for their lives.

  On 11 June the SS Das Reich reached Terasson on its way to Normandy, but the Communists had chosen to resist them here with barricades across the streets. The Germans used tank and artillery fire to smash the barricades, and then used machine guns to fire into the windows. Three villagers were killed in the crossfire and one Communist was caught and hanged. The remaining Communists ran away.

  When a German army unit drove through Oradour they stopped in surprise to view the burned village and the corpses of 190 men, 254 women and 207 children. Kahn’s men had in fact already reported Diekmann’s crime to his superior, Standartenfuehrer Sylvester Stadler of the SS Der Fuehrer. Stadler knew that the shooting of the men and women might have been justified if there was proof they were guerillas. Yet most certainly as far as Stadler was concerned the murder of innocent children was a blot on the honor of the Waffen SS, and he ordered Diekmann to be arrested and court martialed. However, Lammerding did not want too much publicity over the incident, so, though he agreed to a court martial, he allowed Diekmann to remain in command until it could be convened.

  __________

  The French police could hardly fail to notice the assembly of almost 4,000 guerillas in the Vercors area, especially as they were openly receiving supplies by parachute from Allied aircraft. Therefore the German and French authorities coordinated an assault on them with the Germans providing the 9th Panzer Regiment and 157th Infantry Division, and the French providing the GMR, police and Milice. The Germans also brought units of SD and Gestapo, most of whom were Frenchmen. For two weeks these formations battled the guerillas, following which a team of paratroopers of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion landed on top of the main enemy force. The surviving guerillas scattered.

  The guerillas in France also specialized in assassination. Even Darnand was not safe, despite having been promoted into the government as Minister of the Interior. Philippe Henriot the Minister of Information was shot dead in his home by ‘terrorists’. As his body lay in state in Paris over 400,000 of his fellow Frenchmen walked by to pay their respects.

  A Milice officer was attacked in his home by four Communist guerillas. They killed him, his two bodyguards, his wife, his eighty-year old mother, his ten-year old son and his fifteen-month old baby daughter!

  _________

  On 14 June 1944 in Normandy the Panzer Lehr Division counterattacked the British west of Villers-Bocage with panzergrenadiers and reconnaissance troops. This evening saw the arrival of the advanced elements of the German Army’s 2nd Panzer Division, spearheaded by four SS Tigers. The British were so alarmed that they called in artillery support from as far away as the US First Army to the south.

  The soldiers of the 12th SS HJ Panzer Division most certainly did not look upon the battlefield performance of the British and Canadians with disdain, for they had experienced their individual ferocity, but the Germans did assuredly think that British and Canadian generalship left something to be desired. It was not as good as Soviet generalship, they concluded, which by 1944 had improved tremendously.

  On 13 June the 17th SS GvB Panzergrenadier Division attacked the Americans at Coutances. They were repulsed.

  There was one thing for sure. The Germans had given up all thought of shoveling the Allies back into the sea. Allied naval gunfire, ground artillery and air support were slowly winning this battle of attrition. On the morning of the 14th an Allied spotter plane directed battleship gunfire onto Witt’s headquarters, and the old fire-eater was killed. Witt had risen to regimental commander even before the war, had served in every campaign of the Leibstandarte and had then created the SS Hitler Jugend Division. Yet he was only thirty-six when he was killed. Suddenly Dietrich needed a panzer division commander, and he needed him in a hurry, so Dietrich ordered Kurt Meyer, still only thirty-three, to take over the SS HJ. Meyer was now the youngest divisional commander in the German armed forces.

  Meyer’s first request was permission to withdraw in order to shorten his defensive line. Dietrich agreed. Even after this move Meyer would still have to defend an eleven-mile line. Panzer Lehr also withdrew slightly. The British did not follow. In fact only after shelling the empty foxholes and bunkers for a day did the British occupy them.

  On the 16th the commander of the SS GvB, Ostendorf, was wounded. Oberfuehrer Eduard Diesenhoffer replaced him.

  However, by the 17th the British were ready for another offensive and this day their 49th Infantry Division and 8th Armored Brigade attacked, running into some of Mohnke’s panzergrenadiers and a few Mark IVs near Fontenay. Mohnke’s people held their ground, inflicting twice as many losses on the British as they received, and after two days the British retreated. Nonetheless that night Meyer permitted Mohnke’s men to withdraw a thousand meters into Fontenay itself.

  On the 18th Standartenfuehrer Otto Baum took command of the SS GvB. At 32 he was now the youngest divisional commander in the German armed forces.

  The SS troopers prayed for some relief from the constant air raids and artillery fire and the continual British ground pressure, and on the 19th their prayers were answered. A storm arrived and pelted everyone with rain and high winds for three days. Normally this would have been demoralizing for the Germans - it certainly was for the British Tommies and American GIs in the mud - but for the Germans it was a Godsend, a divine wind, for it meant no air raids for seventy-two hours. Entire convoys were able to take to the hard surface roads and speed ahead.

  On 25 June 1944 the British Second Army launched yet another major onslaught, this time aiming straight for M
eyer’s SS HJ. In the pre-dawn early morning hours the SS troopers were ‘awakened’ when the British blasted them with fire from 250 artillery pieces, plus naval guns and flak guns, the latter used as direct trajectory artillery. Then they launched their ground attack. By mid-morning Mohnke’s panzergrenadiers and his few Mark IVs were fighting desperately to hold Fontenay against the British 8th Armored Brigade and 49th Infantry Division. A small SS counterattack into the Tessel Woods failed. However, Meyer sent Mohnke some pioneers, artillery and StuGs and some of Bremer’s men, and with these reinforcements Mohnke was able to hold Fontenay.

  Meanwhile Meyer ordered Obersturmbannfuehrer Max Wuensche to assemble a battlegroup of some of Mohnke’s panzergrenadiers, some of Bremer’s troopers and about a dozen Mark IVs and Panthers to counterattack towards Fontenay to relieve the pressure.

  Regardless of these efforts by nightfall Meyer was forced to allow Mohnke to pull out of the Tessel Woods and Fontenay.

  Dietrich was dismayed to say the least and he ordered Panzer Lehr and SS HJ to counterattack on the following morning to retake the lost ground. Meyer, despite his shortages, would obey the order. He even obeyed when Dietrich told him to loan some panzergrenadiers to Panzer Lehr.

  On the rainy morning of the 26th Wuensche’s battlegroup counter attacked again and his men ran straight into the British 49th Infantry Division advancing towards him. Meyer was here and witnessed the clash, and he was simultaneously informed that the right flank of his division was also under attack. Therefore he recalled Wuensche and told him to hold Rauray. Then he rushed a few Panthers, some pioneers and some of Mohnke’s panzergrenadiers to the division’s right flank north of the Odon River. Here the SS would be assisted by some Luftwaffe 88mm flak guns that would fire direct trajectory. In heavy rain they awaited the arrival of the British. The British assault began with a rolling artillery barrage that inflicted frightful casualties on the SS teenagers as they hugged the bottom of muddy holes in the rain. Then behind the rolling barrage came the advancing infantry of the 15th Scottish Infantry Division accompanied by slow-moving tanks of the 31st Tank Brigade. Only when the British were almost on top of them did the surviving SS soldiers spring into action and open fire. However, the Scots pressed on, and by noon these SS had been forced to fall back from La Gaule, St. Mauvieu and Cheux, and the SS pioneers were overrun, but the SS did hold onto La Haut du Bosq. After a brief respite, the SS were assaulted again in the afternoon by the British 11th Armored Division, but luckily Dietrich had sent reinforcements: some Mark IVs and StuGs from the 21st Panzer Division and a few SS Tigers. Arriving in the nick of time, they stopped the British attack.

  By dusk this two-day British offensive had only advanced eight thousand yards, but the SS HJ was in poor shape by now, having lost about 750 men and much equipment in those two days. Meyer was down to 47 tanks. There was some good news for him though: a few of the missing pioneers managed to reach German lines during the night.

  Dietrich had been yelling for reinforcements for his corps and was assured that friends were on their way, but would they arrive in time, he wondered? On the morning of the 27th his intelligence operatives and radio interception units told him that the British were planning yet another offensive against the SS HJ, this time with the British 4th and 8th Armored Brigades, 31st Tank Brigade, 15th, 43rd and 49th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Armored Division. In other words Meyer would be fighting at odds of 6:1 against, and higher than that in certain sectors.

  Between Marcelet and Grainville Mohnke held the line with a battle group made up of two thirds of his panzergrenadiers, the remnants of the pioneers and thirty Mark IVs, plus some small packets of the 21st Panzer Division. His men scanned the misty dawn horizon knowing the British 15th Infantry and 11th Armored Divisions were out there, ready to pounce. Wuensche held Rauray with a third of Mohnke’s panzergrenadiers and seventeen Panthers. Smaller packets of troops held the ground between these battlegroups.

  Then suddenly the British came on. Mohnke’s battlegroup fought all day and rejected the British attempt to cross the Odon River at Gavrus. Nearby at Cheux and Le Haut du Bosq seventeen Panthers of the 21st Panzer Division counterattacked and held up elements of the British 15th Infantry and 11th Armored Divisions. However, by early afternoon Bremer could not prevent part of the 15th Infantry Division from capturing Colleville, reaching Tourmauville and crossing the Odon. And Wuensche failed to hold Rauray when attacked by the 49th Infantry Division.

  Meyer was not one of those sycophants who took Hitler’s orders to ‘hold to the last man’ as verbatim, and he ordered his units to fall back during the night, anchoring their right (north) at Carpiquet Airfield. The SS HJ would fight its next battle in the western suburbs of the city of Caen. To reinforce the line Meyer grabbed an army Nebelwerfer regiment and a regiment of Luftwaffe 88mm flak guns. The 88s fired direct trajectory like a rifle and made excellent anti-tank or anti-personnel weapons, and no one liked to be on the receiving end for they made no warning howling sound like normal artillery.

  There was some good news for Dietrich and Meyer. The 1st SS LAH Panzer and 2nd SS Das Reich Panzer Divisions had begun to arrive!

  There were other changes too that involved the SS directly. Hausser had arrived in southern Normandy and was preparing his II SS Panzer Corps of the 9th SS Hohenstaufen and 10th SS Frundsberg Panzer Divisions for a counteroffensive to be launched on the 29th. The 101st and 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Detachments would be assigned to Hausser.

  However, on the 28th Hausser was informed that owing to the suicide of General Dollman, commanding Seventh Army, he was to take control of the entire Normandy campaign for a few hours. This marked a significant point in the history of the SS. For the first time an SS officer was given responsibility for a unit larger than one corps: indeed not just for an army, but for an entire campaign.

  Hausser promoted Gruppenfuehrer Willi Bittrich the commander of the SS Hohenstaufen to command II SS Panzer Corps while he was away. Bittrich’s chief of staff would be an army officer on loan, Oberst Rudiger Pipkorn, who was neither SS nor a Nazi. Oberfuehrer Sylvester Stadler was earmarked to take over the SS Hohenstaufen.

  Meanwhile the teenagers of the SS HJ, veterans by now, were astonished that the British had not continued their offensive, nor had they taken advantage of their bridgehead on the Odon.

  Meyer spent the breather wisely, welcoming the loan of Obersturmbannfuehrer Albert Frey’s 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment of the SS LAH. Frey was an old comrade of Meyer, as was Max Hansen, one of Frey’s battalion commanders. But there was little time for reminiscences: only a brief situation conference. Meyer ordered Frey to attack at once through Mouen to try to reach Gavrus and nip in the bud any plans the British had for using that bridgehead on the Odon. He reinforced Frey with five Mark IVs of the 21st Panzer Division, some army Nebelwerfers and three SS Tigers.

  Frey did as ordered, but in broad daylight his men quickly ran into serious opposition at Mouen, which was defended by infantry and tanks of the British 11th Armored Division. One of the first casualties was an important loss for the Germans, Max Hansen, who was wounded. His men knew he would be back, though - he was always getting himself shot. Frey reported to Meyer that he could not advance, and in late afternoon a British counterattack drove his men back slightly.

  This day the British 49th Infantry Division swerved south from Rauray into Panzer Lehr’s sector, but Dietrich had expected this move and had placed a battlegroup of the SS Das Reich in their path. Commanded by Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Weidinger, this battlegroup was built around the SS Der Fuehrer Regiment, including Otto Diekmann’s battalion. They stopped the British move immediately. And when British tanks tried to outflank him, Weidinger counterattacked and stopped them. Weidinger was one of those Waffen SS officers who was an expert, and knew it, and as a result tended to be irreverent to his superiors on occasion.

  Wuensche had identified a British probe by the 11th Armored Division towards a wooded hillock known as Point 112, and he ha
d sent some Mark IV tanks to check it out. They failed to halt the British. That afternoon he launched a formal attack with some Mark IVs and several hundred panzergrenadiers. They failed. A second attempt also failed. The British stubbornly remained on the slopes, but at least they had not advanced.

  On the morning of the 29th Frey’s people were severely hurt by a British tank/infantry assault and they had to back out of Mouen all the way to Verson-Fontaine.

  At Point 112 Wuensche’s men observed the British 4th Armored Brigade breaking out on the flank. But this potential threat had also been expected by Dietrich, and Gruppenfuehrer Karl von Treuenfeld’s 10th SS Frundsberg Panzer Division was waiting for them. The Frundsberg’s soldiers had fought the Russians and were looking forward to testing their mettle against the British. Hauptsturmfuehrer Karl Bastian, a panzergrenadier battalion commander, who had won two bravery medals in Belgium and France in 1940, cautioned his younger men that the British would not be a push over. Treuenfeld’s maneuver here was part of the counteroffensive by Bittrich‘s II SS Panzer Corps. Treuenfeld stopped the British, and later sent a few SS Tigers to stop a secondary flank attack.

  Wuensche himself battled the remaining Britons on Point 112, using the loan of fearsome army Nebelwerfers to good effect, which terrorized the Tommies with their moaning even before they hit the ground.

  However, Bittrich’s corps did not achieve his goal. He had yet to take Gavrus.

  Hausser now ordered Dietrich and Bittrich to coordinate an attack through Point 112 towards Gavrus, and at dawn on June 30 the SS Frundsberg and Wuensche’s men advanced under a massive artillery bombardment by army and SS. By noon both SS formations had reached the crest of Point 112, and by dusk they had occupied Gavrus and had destroyed the British bridgehead on the Odon. The British 4th Armored Brigade and 11th Armored Division had barely escaped.

  The Germans could have advanced even further, but instead chose to watch British heavy bombers obliterate the town of Villers-Bocage. The SS men could not figure out why the RAF had done this as it was behind British lines!