by Home home
Langley, Virginia; the World Trade Center in
New York; the Sears Tower in Chicago; the
Transamerica Tower in San Francisco; and
the White House in Washington, DC… I
submitted my findings to NBI officials, who
most certainly turned over the report (and
the computer) either to then Senior
Superintendent Avelino Razon of the
[Philippine National Police] or to Bob Heafner
of the FBI… I have since had meetings with
certain US authorities and they have
confirmed to me that indeed, many things
were done in response to my report.”
Sam Karmilowicz, a security official at the U.S. embassy in
Manila said, just before Murad's extradition to the U.S, he
picked up an envelope, containing the Philippine
government's and Mega Group's evidence, and sent it to the
U.S. Justice Department office in New York City.
So it seems clear, following the GIA hijacking and Bojinka
investigation, by 1995, Western security services were aware
of the potential for Islamists to use planes as missiles. Some
Islamist terrorists had already attempted to do so, and
others were apparently considering the idea.
In 1999, the British military intelligence’ Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) handed a report to the U.S. alerting them to a
potential plot. The reports stated that al Qaeda had plans to
use “commercial aircraft' in 'unconventional ways......possibly
as flying bombs.” [143] Again, in 2001, British intelligence
sent a report to Prime Minister Tony Blair warning that al
Qaeda was in “the final stages” of preparing a terrorist attack
against the West. MI6 reported the warning was based upon
intelligence gathered by GCHQ and from U.S. agencies,
including the CIA and the NSA. They confirmed the sharing
of intelligence with their U.S. partners, adding that the
warning had been corroborated through surveillance of al
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Qaeda prisoner Khalid al Fawwaz.[144]
In July 2001, weeks before the attacks, the German
intelligence agency the BND informed their U.S, UK and
Israeli counterparts that terrorists were “planning to hijack
commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important
symbols of American and Israeli culture.” The BND uncovered
this information through their communication
eavesdropping system called 'Echelon.'[145]
In August 2001 President Bush was given an intelligence
report entitled 'Bin Laden Determined To Attack The U.S.'
The report was focused solely upon a suspected, imminent
major attack by al Qaeda on the U.S. mainland.[146] In
addition, prior to the 9/11, the U.S. intelligence agencies
received warnings from the governments of Russia, Pakistan,
Israel, France, Italy, Argentina, Jordan, Egypt, India,
Morocco, Afghanistan and the Cayman Islands.[147]
After 9/11 the scope and accuracy of this intelligence was
down played by White House officials. White House Press
Secretary, Ari Fleischer, told a press conference:
“All appropriate action was taken based on
the threat information we had. The
president did not — not — receive
information about the use of airplanes as
missiles by suicide bombers.”
The conspiracists think the evidence strongly indicates
otherwise. They suggest the proof of foreknowledge, based
upon intelligence reports, is so overwhelming only two
conclusions are plausible. Either, both the U.S. intelligence
agencies and the administration were criminally negligent, or
they were lying. Given the numerous training exercises
conducted, which precisely mimicked the use of airliners to
attack buildings (some on 9/11 itself[148]); that intelligence
agencies the world over were warning of impending airborne
attacks, the conspiracy theorists think 'lying' is the most
likely explanation.
However, while this evidence may tentatively suggest
culpability, one strand of inquiry, in particular, renders any
resistance to a further investigation untenable. 'Operation
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Able Danger' clearly indicates 9/11 was an inside job.
Writing in 2005, FBI Director Louis Freeh questioned why
the 9/11 Commission had apparently ignored vital
intelligence.[149] Able Danger was a Pentagon run data
mining operation which uncovered a number of terrorist
cells operating both within the U.S. and overseas. This
included identification of Mohammad Atta (the 9/11 lead
hijacker) and three other 9/11 terrorists, operating in the
U.S. in early 2000.
The Able Danger operatives claimed they tried, on three
separate occasions, to alert the FBI about Atta and his
cohorts, but were repeatedly blocked by the Clinton
Administration. After the 9/11 Commission Report was
published one of them, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, blew the
whistle and went public.
Shaffer received support from Congressman Curt Weldon
(Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland
Security Committees,) who joined him and Freeh in calling
for a new independent inquiry. Rallying support from both
sides of the house, Weldon built Congressional pressure to
try to force Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to allow
“former participants in the intelligence program-known as
Able Danger-to testify in an open hearing before the United
States Congress.”
This was opposed by some members of the 9/11
Commission. Slade Gorton stated there was nothing to the
reports about Able Danger, and they weren't “important
enough” to consider further action. Another Commission
member Tim Roemer said Able Danger presented “no helpful
information for the 9/11 Commission to consider.”
Former FBI Director Freeh reacted strongly to the 9/11
Commission’s treatment of Able Danger intelligence and its
total exclusion from the report. He accused them of ignoring
“the most critical evidence that could have prevented the
horrible deaths of 3,000 of our fellow citizens.” Freeh could
not understand why the 9/11 Commission had been
resistant to considering “undoubtedly the most relevant fact
of the entire post-9/11 inquiry.”
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A less restrained Congressman Weldon added:[150]
“There’s a cover-up here. It’s clear and
unequivocal”
What was revealed by Able Danger that nobody was allowed
to know?
Aside from Osama bin Laden, Mohammad Atta was the evil
face 9/11 horror. His photograph circulated the planet in the
winter of 2001 and has remained one of the enduring images
of 9/11. He was described by the 9/11 Commission as the
“tactical leader of the 9/11 plot.” and the “commander of the
operation in the United States.” Handpicked to slaughter
thousands by Osama bin Laden himself (who they say he
met,)
Atta represented the 'fear' of Islamist extremism and
was one of the leading poster boys that launched the global
'war on terror.' There was no doubt, according to all official
sources, Atta was the operational leader of the worst terrorist
atrocity ever committed.
The evidence, revealed by Able Danger, also suggests
Mohammad Atta was connected to a top secret operation of
the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM.)
Schaffer alleged that it was SOCOM, the Pentagon in other
words, who protected Atta in the lead up to 9/11.[151]
Of course, many will point out that allegations alone prove
nothing. So let's look at the evidence.
The Able Danger leadership team were:
· Navy Captain Scott Phillpott (the head of Able
Danger)
· US Army Lt. Col. Anthony E. Shaffer (on loan
from the Defense Intelligence Agency)
· Erik Kleinsmith (Army Major and the Chief of
Intelligence of the Land Information Warfare Activity)
· James D. Smith (a civilian defence contractor
from Orion Scientific Systems)
· Dr Eileen Preisser (Dual PhD, analytical lead,
from the Land Information Warfare Activity)[152]
Able Danger members were called to testify at a Senate
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Judiciary Committee hearing on September 21st 2005 and
also provided statements to the Armed Services Committee,
US House of Representatives, on February 15th 2006. The
day before the 2005 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
was due to convene, the key witnesses, Shaffer, Phillpott and
Smith, were placed under a gagging order by the Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.[154] This appeared to be a
desperate measure as the trio had already submitted written
statements.
Brian Whitman, a Department of Defense (DOD) spokesman,
later said that open testimony “would not be appropriate”
adding, “We have expressed our security concerns and
believe it is simply not possible to discuss Able Danger in any
great detail in an open public forum.” [155] Rumsfeld was not
able to stop Kleinsmith giving testimony. He testified that he
was ordered to erase all 2.5 terabytes of the Able Danger
data, destroying all the vital intelligence (and evidence) that
could potentially have averted the attack, three months
before 9/11.[156]
According to the 9/11 Commission “American intelligence
agencies were unaware of Mr Atta until the day of the
attacks.” Yet Captain Scott Phillpott (the head of Able
Danger) testified to the Commission in 2004. So why, just as
they had with many other witnesses, did they ignore his
testimony?
The Commission Chair, Thomas Kean, said Captain
Phillpot's “knowledge and credibility” were not “sufficiently
reliable.” They also concluded that Able Danger was not
“historically significant.”
Captain Scott Phillpott had been the holder of four US Naval
commands prior to being selected by the Pentagon to lead its
top secret surveillance operation.[157] The Commission did
apparently ask for documents relating to Able Danger but
recorded “none of the documents turned over to the
Commission mention Mohamed Atta or any of the other future
hijackers.” Seeing as Kleinsmith had been ordered to destroy
everything before 9/11, perhaps that's not surprising.
As far as the 9/11 Commission, the Department of Defense
and senior Pentagon officials were concerned, Able Danger
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was a waste of money. It's highly qualified operatives were all
useless, none of them had anything of value to say about the
alleged hijackers or their infamous leader. Should we take
this opinion at face value? Before we decide, perhaps we
should consider what the Able Danger team had to say and
examine any corroborating evidence.
By January 2000 they had identified a terrorist cell working
out of Brooklyn, New York. Mohammad Atta among them.
Schaffer recommended to Phillpott that they work with the
FBI to take the cell out. However, Pentagon SOCOM lawyers
stopped the team passing the vital information to the FBI.
Following 9/11 the Able Danger team were horrified when
they realised the men they were tracking, who SOCOM were
apparently protecting, apparently committed murder on an
unimaginable scale.
In 2003 Lt.Col. Schaffer was stationed in Afghanistan and,
when 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow
visited Bagram Air Force Base, he informed him that Able
Danger had identified Atta as early as January 2000. In an
hour long meeting Schaffer told Zelikow everything he knew.
Only a few months later, Schaffer's Defense Intelligence
Agency security clearance was revoked and he was unable to
access any further documentation.
Following their identification of Atta, the Able Danger team
drew up a wall chart of the terrorists and their suspected
network.[158] In 2005, Congressman Weldon showed the
chart to the House of Representatives. During his address he
asked:
“Why is there no mention, Mr. Speaker, of a
recommendation in September of 2000 to
take out Mohammad Atta’s cell which would
have detained three of the terrorists who
struck us? We have to ask the question,
why have these issues not been brought
forth before this day?
I had my Chief of Staff call the 9/11
Commission staff and ask the question: Why
did you not mention Able Danger in your
report? The Deputy Chief of Staff
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[Christopher Kojm] said, well, we looked at
it, but we did not want to go down that
direction.
So the question, Mr. Speaker, is why did
they not want to go down that direction?
Where will that lead us? Who made the
decision to tell our military not to pursue
Mohamed Atta?”
By 2005 the Able Danger senior operations team had gone
public. Speaking to the Armed Services Committee in 2006,
civilian defence contractor James D. Smith testified that he
was absolutely positive that Atta was on the chart and that
he had given a copy to Pentagon officials in 2000.[159]
Able Danger clearly placed Mohammad Atta, the 9/11
monster, in New York in early 2000. The Pentagon were
aware of his presence but the Pentagon’s Special Operations
Command stopped the security services from detaining him.
When the Able Danger team tried to tell the 9/11
Commission, the Bush administration attempted to silence
them and the Commission simply dismissed their testimony.
When asked why they had done so, Deputy Chief of Staff
Christopher Kojm replied, “It did not fit with the story we
wanted to tell.” [160]
The Able Danger team’s assertion that Atta was in the U.S.,
long before the official narrative claimed, was also
<
br /> corroborated by a number of independent witnesses.
In defiance of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's orders for
her to stay silent, Johnelle Bryant, from the USDA, told ABC
news that Atta had tried to secure a loan from her to buy a
small aircraft. She said ATTA came to her office sometime
between the end of April and the middle of May 2000. Bryant
reported that when she wrote down his name she spelled it
A-T-T-A-H, leading him to say: “No, A-T-T-A, as in 'atta
boy!'” [161]
A library worker reported that Atta repeatedly used the
computers in the Portland Maine Public Library In April
2000.[162] A federal investigator reported that Atta, and
another hijacker, rented rooms in Brooklyn in the spring of
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2000 and a senior Justice Department official reported that
Atta’s trail in Brooklyn began with a parking ticket issued to
a rental car he was driving in 2000. Yet despite the fact that
numerous independent corroborative witnesses are usually
good enough to substantiate testimony in a court of law, the
Pentagon's Inspector General’s 2006 summary report stated:
“We concluded that prior to September 11,
2001, Able Danger team members did not
identify Mohammad [sic] Atta or any other
9/11 hijacker. While we interviewed four
witnesses who claimed to have seen a chart
depicting Mohammad Atta and possibly
other terrorists or ‘cells’ involved in 9/11,
we determined that their recollections were
not accurate.”
Is it reasonable for to ask what this determination was based
upon?
Conspiracy theorists submit the evidence is persuasive. It is
not irrational to hypothesise that elements within the U.S.
government were behind the 9/11 attacks. The links
between the intelligence agencies and senior al Qaeda figures
were known. Al Qaeda itself was created as part of U.S.
covert operations in Afghanistan; its co-founder Ayman al
Zawahiri was possibly a NATO operative, working with
Western intelligence; the lead hijacker Mohammad Atta
appeared to have been protected by the Pentagon and the
instant blaming of Osama bin Laden, and subsequent
falsifying of evidence in an attempt to prove his guilt, seems
to have been deliberate misdirection.
What's more, conspiracy theorists claim they can
demonstrate that senior figures within the Bush
administration openly discussed their need for 'a new Pearl