The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution

by Amir Taheri

  Then came the ominous revelations of a secret Iranian program to produce enriched uranium as a first step towards manufacturing nuclear warheads. To this, the initial and by now well-practiced Western response was to blink. At the urging of the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency pointedly refrained from penalizing the Islamic Republic for violating the terms of the nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (of which Iran under the shah had been an early signatory). Instead, the EU, working through Britain, France, and Germany, offered the Islamic Republic a series of economic and political “incentives” in exchange for stopping what it should not have started in the first place. After months of diplomatic wrangling, Tehran agreed to suspend its uranium processing and enrichment activities—without, however, agreeing to a method of effective verification. The program was resumed in 2005, indicating that the Islamic Republic does not consider itself bound by any agreements reached with infidels.

  In May 2006, the United States joined the EU initiative in an expanded framework of talks that also included Russia and China. Condoleezza Rice even opened the possibility of direct talks with Tehran, with hints at concessions to the Islamic Republic. But Tehran declined to play. To the contrary, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then recently elected president, announced that the Islamic Republic was relaunching its uranium enrichment program on an even larger scale. Describing the West’s demands as a species of “nuclear apartheid,” Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran would now work to achieve “mastery of the full cycle of nuclear science and technology.” By September 2006, he had ignored three deadlines for changing his mind. As we have shown, Ahmadinejad considers a “clash of civilizations” to be both inevitable and welcome. Of course, he is ready to talk—so long as the Islamic Republic is not required to make any concessions. In a speech in Zanjan in the summer of 2006, Ahmadinejad assured his listeners that the United States would never be permitted to create “an American Middle East.” “The new Middle East,” he promised, “will be Islamic.”

  Why does the Islamic Republic behave as it does? The answer is that, as the spearhead of a revolutionary cause, it can do no other. The Islamic Republic is unlike any of the other regimes in its environment, or indeed anywhere in the world. Either it will become like them—i.e., a nationstate—or it will force them to become like it. As a normal nation-state, Iran would have few major problems with its neighbors or with others. As the embodiment of the Islamic Revolution, it is genetically programmed to clash not only with those of its neighbors who do not wish to emulate its political system but also with other powers that all too reasonably regard Khomeinism as a threat to regional stability and world peace. For as long as the Islamic Republic continues to behave as a revolutionary cause, it will be impossible for others, including the United States, to consider it a partner, let alone a friend or ally. This does not exclude talks, or even periods of relative détente, as happened with the USSR during the Cold War. But just as the Soviet Union remained an enemy of the free world right up to the end, so the Islamic Republic will remain an enemy until Iran once more becomes a nation-state.

  Hopes that the Khomeinist regime might somehow transform into a friend and ally of the democracies are based on an old illusion. There were those who also hoped the USSR could be reformed. Mikhail Gorbachev devoted his considerable energies to the cause of reform only to realize that a leopard cannot shed its spots. Having talked of glasnost and perestroika, in 1988 he ended up using chemical weapons to quell riots in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and ordered a full-scale invasion of Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, to crush another popular uprising. Gorbachev had to use such extreme measures because the USSR lacked the normal mechanisms for conflict resolution. In its political DNA, it was programmed to use violence. It had no choice but to behave in accordance with its nature. There had been other attempts at reforming unreformable regimes in Hungary with nagy, in Poland with Gomulka, and in Czechoslovakia under Dubcek during the so-called Prague Spring. For a time, some Western self-deceivers even believed that the Ceausescu regime in Romania could be reformed. It was in that spirit that President François Mitterrand of France tried to save Ceausescu’s regime until the very last phase of its existence. The Khomeinist regime, too, is unreformable, if only because it lacks the mechanisms needed for meaningful transformation.

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  Pre-emptive War or Pre-emptive Surrender?

  How, then, should one deal with Iran in its current phase? There are several options. The most obvious is to do nothing. Among the attractions of this option is that, at least theoretically, it would deny the Islamic Republic the chance to cast itself as the grand defender of Islam against the depredations of the infidel camp, led by the United States. It would also allow internal tensions in Iran to come to the fore, helping speed the transition from cause to state. But the risk in the do-nothing option is clear. Interpreting it as yet another sign of weakness on the part of its adversaries, the Islamic Republic may hasten its program to “export the revolution” around the Middle East and, more importantly, develop a credible arsenal of nuclear weapons. The result would be an even bigger challenge to the regional balance of power and to the world.

  An alternative to the do-nothing option is the one favored, today as yesterday, by the apostles of dialogue: namely, to reach an accommodation with the Islamic Republic on its terms, in the hope that this will somehow, in time, help to modify its behavior. Some Europeans clearly back this option. What matters, they say, is to engage the Islamic Republic as a partner in some kind of international arrangement that, over an unspecified period, will end up imposing restraints on its overall behavior. The risk here is equally obvious. Having won an initial concession from the infidels, the Khomeinist leadership could instantly and reflexively demand more. The Khomeinist revolution, after all, dreams of conquering the world in the name of Islam, just as Hitler aimed to do in the name of the Aryan master race and the USSR in the name of Communism. Indeed, Khatami’s idea of a “Yalta-like” accord with President Clinton was itself inspired by the mullahs’ claim to be the legitimate successors to the USSR as the global challengers to “American imperialism.”

  Those who pursue the elusive goal of behavioral change assume that a regime like that of the Khomeinists is a character actor that can easily switch from one role to another, one day playing a fiendish foe and the next reappearing as a faithful friend. In other words, this actor could play both the wolf and the grandmother. Within a democracy such as the United States, rival theories about how to deal with Iran may be aired and compared, and a change of administration can lead to a change of official behavior. But in totalitarian systems like the Islamic Republic, no such exchange of ideas is possible even within the narrow confines of the ruling elite. The United States is the foe that must ultimately be defeated and destroyed. Paradoxically, a policy aimed solely at behavioral change could encourage the Khomeinist regime to adopt an even more aggressive stance. Once assured that its hold on power in Iran is not in danger, the regime would try to pursue its strategic goal of total domination with even greater zeal. Foreign policy, of course, is a continuation and reflection of domestic policy. A regime that oppresses and terrorizes its own people, in fact is at war against them, cannot offer peace and understanding to other nations. Change of behavior on the foreign policy front comes only after behavioral change on the domestic scene. In 2008, however, the Khomeinist regime was behaving even more hysterically at home than ever. The hardening of its foreign policy positions reflected its harsher domestic policies, at least in part. A Persian proverb says: “Threaten him with death so that he accepts a fever!” This reflects the political psychology of the Khomeinist regime: it changes its behavior only when it feels its very existence is in danger.

  A regime that boasts a messianic mission cannot change its behavior on any of the major issues of foreign policy; and even if it did, this could be nothing but a tactical repositioning. Like other fascist and totalitarian regimes, the Khomeinist one behaves as it does because, like Goeth
e’s Mephistopheles, it cannot do otherwise. The scorpion does not sting because it wishes to behave badly; it stings because it is genetically programmed to do so. Machiavelli advised his prince never to wound an enemy and let him live. The wise prince, he said, would either turn the wounded enemy into a friend, or kill him. That advice, however, applies to mere enemies, not implacable foes bent on the total destruction of an adversary. Under the Khomeinist regime, Iran can never again be a friend and is certain to remain an implacable foe. This has been repeatedly illustrated by Ahmadinejad and Khamenehi, both of whom appear to have concluded that they have pushed the United States onto the defensive and all they need do now is push further until they accomplish its total defeat and perhaps even its destruction.

  In June 2008, Ahmadinejad told a summit of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United nations that the United States was largely responsible for hunger and famine in the world. nevertheless, he announced the “good news” that the Great Satan would disappear soon. “Today, the time for the fall of the satanic power of the United States has come and the countdown to the annihilation of the emperor of power and wealth has started. . . . I tell you that with the unity and awareness of all the Islamic countries all the satanic powers will soon be destroyed.” He also announced Israel’s destruction: “I must announce that the Zionist regime [Israel], with a sixty-year record of genocide, plunder, invasion and betrayal, is about to die and will soon be erased from the geographical scene.” It was clear that Ahmadinejad saw his policy of “waiting Bush out” as vindicated. The Bush presidency was drawing to a close and the only U.S. leader who had shown readiness to use force against its enemies since the 1960s had not taken action against the Islamic Republic. Was this not in itself a sign that the Hidden Imam was behind the Islamic Republic and about to return? “With the appearance of the promised savior . . . and his companions such as Jesus Christ, tyranny will soon be eradicated in the world,” Ahmadinejad said, implying that this return would mean the annihilation of the United States.1 To make sure that no one believed he was just addressing the gallery, Ahmadinejad repeated his analysis in several meetings with other leaders attending the summit in Rome. “The U.S. domination is on the decline. Iran and Japan as two civilized and influential nations should get ready for a world minus the U.S.,” he told the Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, and called for cooperation between the two countries. “Enemies do not wish Iran and Japan to find their historical and true status. The time has come for both countries to draw up the horizon for their long-term cooperation.”

  In 2004 the Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, revealed that Khamenehi had told him in a meeting in Tehran that the Islamic Republic was waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam and the expected destruction of Israel and the United States. Spanish leftists booed Aznar as a “warmonger” trying to incite Western powers against a Third World nation “standing up to Imperialism.” There were even suggestions that Aznar should apologize to the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad blocked such possibilities for obfuscation by stating his regime’s deep-held position with clarity. Thus, policies aimed at behavioral change through “engagement” and “constructive dialogue” with the Khomeinist brand of fascism are doomed to failure.

  There remains another option: regime change. The very mention of this term drives some people up the wall, inspiring images of an American invasion, a native insurgency, suicide bombers, and worse. In other words, regime change has a bad name these days. nevertheless, even the most ardent opponents of regime change cannot deny that in some cases it could be an option. What is wrong with wanting to change an obnoxious regime that is oppressing its people and threatening others? Was it not regime change that ultimately ended the Cold War, removing the threat of a global thermonuclear war between the free world and the Soviet bloc? And how many millions of people across the globe fought to change the apartheid regime in South Africa? This does not mean that regime change is always easy or even practical. What it means is that we should have the moral courage to stand for regime change when and if we sincerely believe that a regime deserves to be changed. In any case, military intervention and pre-emptive war are not the only means of achieving regime change. Between pre-emptive war and pre-emptive surrender—as the men of Munich practiced in their time and their heirs preach today—lie a range of options that anyone seriously interested in fighting evil regimes should consider.

  What matters is to be intellectually clear about the issue at hand. This requires a consensus on a definition of the Khomeinist regime. Is it one of those adolescent-like regimes that, intoxicated with hubris, make a bit of mischief to get noticed? Something like this has happened in many countries on different occasions. Juan Perón’s dictatorship did give Argentina a teenage rage for a while. Castro’s Cuba has been a nuisance for its neighbors for half a century. Today, Hugo Chavez is behaving like an adolescent in heat. Muammar Kaddhafi has presided over another angry teenager regime for four decades. The Burmese military junta, offering a cocktail of bad Buddhism and misunderstood Marxism, has ruined the lives of its people and produced millions of refugees across the region. But none of these regimes represents an existential threat to its neighbors and others. This is because none has had messianic pretensions or seen itself as the vanguard of global conquest in the name of religion.

  There are some Western politicians, like the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and the new American president Barack Obama, who believe, or claim, that Khomeinism could not be a threat because it lacks the resources. Still others, such as Senator John Kerry, argue that Ahmadinejad may not even mean what he says. Some self-styled American scholars have devoted time to arguing that Ahmadinejad’s utterances are mistranslations or misstatements. Another view, held by President Bush among others, is that the United States will not be safe as long as Iran, a key country in a region of vital importance to the world economy and to international stability, remains the embodiment of the Khomeinist cause. If this last diagnosis is correct, the United States cannot allow the Khomeinist movement, itself a version of global Islamism, to achieve further political or diplomatic gains at the expense of the Western democracies.

  Consider the consequences: The most immediate result would be to strengthen the mullahs and demoralize all those inside Iran who have a different vision of their country’s future and an active desire to bring it about. In 1937 and 1938, many professional army officers in Germany, realizing that Hitler was leading their nation to disaster, had begun to discuss possible ways of getting rid of him. But the Munich “peace” accords, negotiated by the British prime minister neville Chamberlain, handed Hitler a diplomatic triumph and with it a degree of international legitimacy that, from then on, any would-be putschists could hardly ignore. In the Middle East, this story has been repeated many times. The United States helped the Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel nasser transform the Suez fiasco into a political triumph, thereby encouraging an even bigger, and for Egypt more disastrous, war in 1967. The 1991 ceasefire that allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power in Baghdad after the expulsion of his army from occupied Kuwait was interpreted by him as a signal of American weakness, and emboldened him to eliminate his domestic opponents and begin preparations for a bigger war against the infidels. After the first al-Qaeda attack on new York’s World Trade Center in 1993, President Clinton dispatched a string of envoys to Afghanistan to strike a bargain with Mullah Muhammad Omar and the Taliban. Clinton’s envoy at the United nations, Bill Richardson, endured particular humiliation when he was kept waiting for two days for a meeting with the mullah only to be told that the “Emir” would not receive him. This was seen as “a sign of weakness in the Crusader-Zionists,” to quote the Taliban foreign minister, and it immensely enhanced the prestige of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. In addition, it discouraged the anti-Taliban forces, many of whom concluded that there was no point in fighting a foe backed by the world’s only superpower.

  That is the effect that reaching an accommodatio
n with the Khomeinist regime will have on Iran’s own democrats and reformers. And it will have the same weakening effect on the growing democratic movement elsewhere in the Middle East. Some signs of this are already visible. For example, the fragile consensus belatedly formed around the idea of a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians is under pressure from a new “one-state” formula propagated by the “defiance front” led by Iran and including Syria, Hezballah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Libya, and Sudan. In Lebanon, Hezballah and its allies have been encouraged by Tehran to pursue a systematic armed bullying of the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. In Syria, the pro-reform camp has been defeated, and the Baathist regime, a vicious menace in its own right, has entered into an unprecedented dependence on Tehran. In May 2008, Tehran and Damascus signed a new defense treaty, consolidating the Islamic Republic’s position in Syria. Even major powers like Russia, China, France, and Germany calibrate their relations with the Islamic Republic with reference to how they suspect Washington will, or will not, act.