R N Kao

by Nitin A Gokhale

  Before concluding the meeting, Zhou tried another gambit. He asked RNK if he would write a joint report with Hsiung, since both had liaised closely in Hong Kong. The ever-cautious Kao simply said that he would let Delhi know of the matter and work according to directions given to him. Delhi promptly said no to the proposal and told Kao not to get ‘entangled’ in the matter. Hsiung also tried to persuade RNK to change his mind but to no avail. Finally, it was decided that Hsiung will write a report, which RNK would read through and suggest corrections informally without getting associated officially.

  The next day, Kao was invited for a special dinner with the Premier at the summer palace outside Beijing. It was a special honour for a relatively junior officer, but the dinner invitation impressed India’s ambassador and Bahadur Singh. Zhou Enlai was in his charming self. He thanked RNK for his effort and involvement. Kao’s Kashmir Princess sojourn was about to end.

  RNK returned to Hong Kong and briefed the Police Commissioner, the head of Special Branch and the Governor on his Beijing trip. Kao also had two lengthy meetings with Hanley. ‘My discussions with Mr Hanley were particularly interesting because being in the same kind of trade, we could talk without reservations and with the full confidence that our respective views would be fully understood and appreciated,’ Kao noted.

  Interestingly, in his notes, RNK has a detailed take on the KMT operation in Hong Kong, although he does not mention who gave him the information or how he obtained the inputs. Clearly, his curiosity and training played major a part in Kao getting the full details of KMT’s presence in Hong Kong.

  It was discovered that the KMT intelligence organization, called the Fifth Liaison Group, had been functioning in Hong Kong from a certain address in Temple Street behind the cover of an electrical shop. The object of this group was to work as an agency for securing KMT agents who were to be infiltrated into China, and also to arrange facilities for their travel and for the transmission of their reports. The owner of this shop, called Kwan Tsau Kee, was in a small way connected with the activities of this group, but the two main workers of this group were Tang Po Ting and Tsang Yat Nin. Two people who were also known to this group and who visited the shop often were Kwan Mao Kung and Chao San Yu.

  Meanwhile, by early 1955, the Bandung Conference was constantly in the news since it was going to be the first of its kind gathering of world leaders from Asia and Africa. The Chinese were reported to be sending a large contingent to the conference. This is where the entire episode appears to have become interesting.

  Sometime in March 1955, a man called Wu was reported to have got in touch with the Fifth Liaison Group of the KMT intelligence network at Temple Street in Hong Kong. Around 10 March, Wu met one Kwan Tsau and Tsang Yat Nin from whom he inquired whether they had a relative or friend working at the Hong Kong airport, who could undertake a job of national importance for him.

  Kwan informed Wu that he knew of no such person, but when this matter was later discussed with another colleague of theirs, Ghou Tsang Yu, he said that he had a man called Chou Chu working at the airport. This information was passed on by Kwan Mao Kung to Tsang Yat Nin, who took Kwan Mao Kung, on 18 March, to meet Wu at a coffee shop. The proprietor of the electrical shop was also present at this meeting. On 25 March, another meeting took place between Wu, Chou Tsang Yu and Tsang Yat Nin.

  In the following three days, meetings were held between Chou Tsang You and Chou Chu, who was later introduced to Wu. Wu made some preliminary proposals of relatively harmless nature and having accrued Chou Chu’s confidence, finally asked him whether he would undertake to sabotage a Communist plane. Substantial rewards and safety in Taiwan were promised. In the beginning, Chou Chu refused to undertake the task saying that it was too dangerous. Later, however, Wu seems to have persuaded Chou Chu to agree to do this assignment and promised to give him a reward of 600,000 Hong Kong dollars.

  There were several meetings again in various hotels between Chou Chu and, at least, two others. At these meetings, Chou Chu was given various sums of money and also trained in the use of a time bomb. Finally, the bomb was handed over to him wrapped in brown paper, at the hotel, by a man named Wong. On 10 April, while servicing the Air India international plane, the Kashmir Princess, Chou Chu planted the bomb with the help of a colleague. The bomb exploded in mid-air, leading to the crash of the Kashmir Princess as detailed earlier. As far as Chou Chu was concerned, his job was well done. But Wu decided not to pay the promised amount to Chou Chu, who in frustration and fear, smuggled himself out on a cargo plane to Taiwan, almost a month after the sabotage.

  Kao had also managed to get a fair idea about who Wu was through his contacts in the Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police. Apparently, Wu was actually Wu Yinchin, a resident of Shanghai, but someone who had made Hong Kong his home in the previous two years. Investigations had revealed that Wu had deep connections with the KMT’s intelligence network, and that he also handled enormous amount of money to fuel the KMT intelligence operations in Hong Kong and also in parts of mainland China.

  And yet, the Hong Kong Police could not arrest either the main conspirator or Chou Chu, the man who executed the conspiracy. However, for nearly six months after his return to India in mid-September 1955, RNK kept getting occasional updates from Willcox about the progress or lack of it in the investigation. In January 1956, the British Government in London announced its inability to extradite Chou Chu to Hong Kong since the KMT authorities had refused to hand him over, although the 31 Taiwanese who were detained in Hong Kong for their connection with the Kashmir Princess case had been deported to Taiwan. A British Officer in Delhi told Kao that 13 others were still under arrest in Hong Kong.

  It was now clear that the case was winding down with no apparent closure. In the middle of 1956, the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Granthom, while passing through Delhi on his way to London, met RNK at the British High Commissioner’s residence. From that conversation, and later from a chat with the representative of MI5 posted in Delhi, Kao realised that the Hong Kong authorities had prolonged the probe, made some efforts to get to the bottom of the conspiracy but eventually they had reached a dead end. To RNK, this now appeared to be the end of the matter.

  Kao could not help but recall his last meeting with Zhou Enlai in which he had expressed his doubt over the sincerity of the Hong Kong authorities in pursuing the investigation and prosecuting the perpetrators. ‘Now, in the event, it so happened that he was proved uncannily correct and the British were able to prosecute neither Chou Chu nor Wu and, in fact, the case was just wrapped up, as Zhou Enlai had said,’ Kao noted.

  In the end, RNK noted, apart from his written report to B.N. Mullik, he was also given personal audience by Prime Minister Nehru. ‘He was good enough to invite me to tea one afternoon at the Teen Murti House. For nearly two hours, I gave him a detailed account of what had transpired regarding this case since I had met him last in Bandung. At the end of my story, I remember, I said that I was much impressed with the courtesy and personal considerations, which Mr Zhou Enlai and other Chinese officials had shown to me. His reply was significant, and its full importance became clear to me only in the light of events which unfolded some years later culminating in the armed conflict between China and India in 1962. I distinctly remember that in reply to this observation of mine, Panditji had said, “Yes when they want to, the Chinese can be very polite and charming”,’ RNK wrote.

  Nearly four decades later, The China Quarterly, a scholarly journal of the SOAS University of London, published a research paper on the Kashmir Princess episode, based mainly on British archives. It shed light on the motive of the assassination plot against Zhou Enlai and the global situation prevailing then. Steve Tsang, a researcher, wrote, ‘The first half of 1955 was a testing time diplomatically for the KMT regime on Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek admitted privately to his supporters in the Koumintang that the three-month period, from April to June, was the most precarious time for the ROC’s (Republic of China or Taiwan’s) dip
lomacy.’

  The importance that Chiang Kai-shek attached to this period was because of the change of tactics by the People’s Republic of China (China). After attacking some islands that belonged to China, in 1954, Beijing had decided to pursue peaceful means. Zhou Enlai was leading the initiative on China’s behalf.

  According to The China Quarterly, ‘In Chiang Kai-shek’s eyes Zhou had two objectives: First, he wanted to persuade the United States to negotiate with the PRC [People’s Republic of China], isolate Chiang’s regime and neutralise the effects of the mutual defence treaty which his government had recently signed with the United States, Secondly, he tried to nullify the efforts to prevent the PRC from joining the United Nations. Chiang was also concerned about the British Commonwealth policy towards the Taiwan question, and the improvement in relations between Britain and the PRC…

  Tsang contends that from Chiang’s point of view, in early 1955, Britain was attempting to clear the ground for the PRC to enter the United Nations. In his calculation, Zhou’s peace offensive … was at least as dangerous as, if not more grievous than, the military confrontation in the Taiwan Straits. Having just persuaded the United States to guarantee Taiwan’s security by signing a mutual defence treaty, Chiang feared the British invitation for the PRC to join the United Nations would be the thin end of the wedge, which could only lead to either or a two China situation or United Nations trusteeship over Taiwan…’1

  In the circumstances, as The China Quarterly commented, Chiang Kai-shek had every incentive to assassinate Zhou Enlai, who could have caused greater havoc for him than the People’s Liberation Army. A successful assassination operation could greatly undermine the PRC’s peace offensive… An attempt on Zhou’s life staged in British Hong Kong, whether it was successful or not, could have added advantage of driving a wedge between the British and the PRC and put an end to their diplomatic flirtation started by Zhou and Sir Anthony Eden in Geneva. It would also provoke the PRC to accuse the United States of complicity, thus stiffening American resolve against admitting the PRC to the United Nations.

  On the question of any prior knowledge that Zhou or the PRC had about the assassination plot, Tsang contends that Zhou and his government were aware of this murder plot before it happened, yet they chose not to take all the necessary measures to prevent it. ‘In March 1955, shortly after Wo Yi-Chin (Wu, in Kao’s notes) activated the Number 5 Liaison Group in Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China authorities already knew that Secret Service organizations of the US and Chiang Kai-shek were planning to carry out sabotage against their delegation to the Bandung conference…’2

  In conclusion, Steve Tsang says, ‘There is no doubt that KMT agents organised the assassination, and PRC agents knew of it beforehand. Both sides achieved part of their objectives, but the PRC came out on top. By successfully blowing up the Kashmir Princess, the Nationalist Secret Service boosted its own moral and provoked a renewed Communist propaganda against the Americans. Chiang Kai-shek, however, failed in his primary objectives. Zhou Enlai was missed as a target, the PRC’s chance of joining the United Nations was not affected and Anglo-Chinese relations were not damaged. The PRC managed to rid Hong Kong of a significant number of nationalist agents, won the propaganda battle and gained better understanding of Hong Kong’s policy and Britain’s sincerity at a cost of 8 cadres. On moral grounds both sides were losers.’3

  With such high stakes, India was the unlikely important part of the triangle and Kao was lucky to be working in the midst of such a high-level political and diplomatic tussle between different powers.

  RNK spent around six months on the Kashmir Princess investigation. The time that he spent in the company of the Chinese and the British officers helped him establish a reputation for a quiet but effective working style and a life-long professional association with many in the British and the Chinese intelligence establishments.

  1 Steve Tsang, ‘Target Zhou Enlai: The “Kashmir Princess” Incident of 1955’, The China Quarterly 139 (September 1994), 766–782.

  2 Ibid.

  3 Ibid.

  SIX

  Of Observing People and Places

  Hong Kong presented several difficulties to RNK and his companions. The team had landed there at the end of April, which, apparently, coincided with the period of acute water scarcity. Running water was available only for a couple of hours per day. ‘I also realised that I did not have the right type of clothes, so as soon as I drew my first travelling allowance advance, we went to a tailor called Saklani on the Kowloon side, not far from Nathan Road, where I had a couple of suits made. I also had a couple of terylene shirts made of the wash-and-wear variety after which I was ready to live in Hong Kong for as long as necessary,’ Kao noted in his recollection.

  Hong Kong, then under British control, had a mixed population of Chinese-origin businessmen, Europeans and even Indian business community among others. On observing the ways different communities lived, Kao wrote, ‘While the poor Chinese in Hong Kong, mainly refugees from Communist China, lived in conditions of unbelievable squalor and crowded in hovels and huts, which they had temporarily built covering the whole hillside, richer Chinese lived in luxurious comfort. They were the members of the prosperous overseas Chinese community. And their love of luxury and sensuous pleasure, seemed to me, was in sharp contrast to the austerity which Indian businessmen, mainly the Marwaris, practiced or, at least, professed practicing.’

  ‘This, in many ways, provided a key to the difference in outlook between Indians and the Chinese. Though we belong to the same continent and have a lot in common, while in Indian life, the accent is on metaphysics or has been on metaphysics and austerity or, at least, display austerity in public, the Chinese are intensely practical people who are not ashamed of pandering to their senses. An example of this is the extent to which they have gone to give pleasure to different senses. It was explained to me by a Chinese in Hong Kong that while music delighted the sense of hearing, painting and gardening delighted the sense of vision, scents that of smell, delicious food that of the taste buds, it was the Chinese who discovered ways of flattering the sense of touch. And this led to the creation of small ball-like objects out of smooth jade, which the Manchu and Ming emperors kept in the palms of their hands and kept on rolling them constantly to give them sensuous satisfaction of the sense of touch. This also explains the almost complete lack of inhibition which the Chinese have about the food they partake, so long as it is good to taste or is reported to have good qualities.’

  RNK had a different take on the Indians living in Hong Kong in the 1950s. They could be divided amongst two main groups—one was that of the Sindhi businessmen and the other was the remnants of the large number of Sikhs, rather Punjabis, who had joined the Hong Kong Police before the Japanese invasion. The latter mainly did relatively low paid jobs, mostly as watchmen in banks, shops and other business establishments.

  To RNK, the Sindhi businessmen, most of whom belonged to the Bhaiban community, seemed to symbolise the nouveau riche, as they were loud and flashy, and the men adorned themselves with all kinds of gold bracelets and necklaces.

  ‘What I found quite nauseating was the habit of Sindhi young men, mainly the shop assistants, of wearing kohl in their eyes, and who spoke with an affected English accent which was totally unpleasant.’ However, by and large, Kao found them to be friendly people, who tried to be nice to visitors from India. ‘I would be ungrateful if I did not acknowledge the hospitality that I received at the houses of many of them,’ he wrote.

  Kao had an interesting take on the contrast between Hong Kong and Communist China. ‘It (Hong Kong) was a very wicked city, where everything could be bought and sold and everyone was, in a very cynical manner, engaged in the remorseless pursuit of wealth. In many ways, the mainland (Communist) China stood for something which was in stark contrast. The moment you entered China, gone was all the polish, glamour, colours, scintillatingly illuminated advertisements and the claptrap of consumer society. Instead of
that, you could see hordes and hordes of young people with intent expression on their faces, all of them in blue boiler suits, men and women dressed alike in loose tunics and loose trousers,’ he noted.

  In Hong Kong, he had noticed that the Chinese women were chic. By comparison, he noted, the Europeans looked somewhat coarse. ‘If you were in Hong Kong for three or four weeks, you would suddenly realise that European women looked somewhat coarse as compared to the smart chic and better dressed Chinese woman. Their general built was slim, skin was ivory-coloured, complexion clear and their straight, long limbs could not fail to impress even the casual visitor,’ RNK remarked.

  He contrasts this with an apt observation about Communist China and its women. ‘Now, the same people lived in mainland China but their dress was totally different. The women there were completely innocent of any perfume or cosmetics; of course, they pretended to despise these as symptoms of a decadent capitalism. Yet, I cannot believe that even in the heart of the most ardent Chinese women cadres, there was no desire whatsoever to prettify themselves.’

  RNK made only two visits to mainland China and spent the maximum time in Beijing, but his keen eye noticed the dilapidated condition of many of its buildings and roads that marked China’s capital city and the difficulty of living. ‘My first impression of Beijing was that it was a flat, calm and a very large sprawling city, with most buildings being of single storey, except for a few relatively new government structures. The roads were wide. On my first visit itself, I noticed that many walls of buildings were in disrepair and footpath along the minor streets were broken. Somehow, the city did manage to convey an impression of scrupulous cleanliness in the sense that throughout the vast sprawling metropolis, you would not find a single piece of trash lying on the road and in some streets, even fallen leaves had been carefully swept aside,’ he noted, concluding that the cleanliness was achieved through mass mobilisation.