R N Kao
Page 14
A tsunami of refugees from East Pakistan had hit India’s border states. A week after the crackdown in East Bengal, less than 300 refugees had trickled into India. However, in the next fortnight, over 100,000 people crossed over into the Indian states along the border. The figure swelled to over 4,300,000 by May end and to a staggering 7,232,000 by July end and then to a mammoth 10 million!
In New Delhi, the Indian Government was alarmed and harassed. Feeding millions of refugees and managing the logistics was a headache but the bigger challenge was to handle different Awami League leaders who had staggered into India at different times travelling incognito for days.
Tajuddin Ahmad and Amirul Islam, two prominent Awami League leaders, reached the Indian border on 31 March. Srinath Raghavan, who interviewed Amirul Islam years later, writes: ‘On the evening of 31 March 1971, having travelled incognito for five days on horseback and foot. Tajuddin Ahmad and Amirul Islam sat anxiously at a culvert in the no-man’s land near an Indian border outpost. Their messenger had gone across to establish contact but had not yet returned. Tajuddin was pensive, but Islam felt strangely energised. ‘The sun is setting,’ he said to Tajuddin, ‘but there will be a new dawn’ As night fell, they heard the thud of the boots heading in their direction. A small group of soldiers stood before them, presented arms, and welcomed them to India.’3
Once in India, escorted by men of Border Security Force (BSF), Tajuddin and Amirul were taken to Calcutta where the then Director General of BSF, K.F. Rustamji, met them and discussed the situation in East Pakistan in detail. The next day, the Awami League leaders were flown to Delhi in preparation to meet Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The leaders had realised that to wage a fight for liberation in East Pakistan, they needed to have an organisation and, perhaps, even a provisional government. Bengalis in different parts of the world—including those working in different Pakistani missions across the world—were willing to support the struggle for independence, but a recognised central authority was needed to lend that support. Inaddition, leaders like Tajuddin were worried that if they met the Indian leadership merely as representatives of the Awami League, Delhi would offer a sympathetic ear but would have held back from offering any substantial material support or even military backing in any war of liberation.
So on 10 April 1971, elected representatives from East Pakistan, who had made their way into India in different groups, came on one platform and under the leadership of Tajuddin Ahmad, resolved to set up the provisional Government of Bangladesh in order to carry out the massive mandate given by the people.
Their proclamation stated, ‘We the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, whose will is supreme, duly constituted ourselves into a constituent assembly, and having held mutual consultations, and in order to ensure for the people of Bangladesh equality, human dignity and social justice, declare and constitute Bangladesh to be a sovereign people’s republic and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and confirm and resolve that till such time as a constitution is framed, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be the President of the Republic and that Syed Nazrul Islam shall be the Vice-President of the Republic.…’ In the interim period, till a constitution was framed, the President was to exercise all the executive and legislative powers, and ‘do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people of Bangladesh an orderly and just government’. In the absence of the President, the Vice-President would exercise all his powers, duties and responsibilities. The proclamation also went on to say that, ‘we further resolve that we undertake to observer and give effect to all duties and obligations devolved upon us as a member of the family of nations and by the charter of the United Nations; we further resolve that this proclamation of Independence shall be deemed to have come into effect since the 26th Day of March 1971.’4
The proclamation came a week after Tajuddin and other top leaders had met Indira Gandhi in Delhi. No one was clear whether he presented himself as the prime minister of the government-in-exile but the Indian Government knew that after Mujib’s arrest, he was effectively the man in-charge of the provisional government.
The formal installation of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh took place on 17 April at Bhaberpura village in the Kustia district of East Bengal near the India-East Pakistan border. A small hamlet—Baidyanath Tala—was renamed as Mujibnagar. Hundreds of Indian and foreign journalists were present at the ceremony when Nazrul Islam took the Guard of Honour as acting President. He appealed to the world for immediate assistance. That evening, Tajuddin, as Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh appealed to the world to recognise the new nation and extend as much material and moral help as possible. He declared, ‘Pakistan is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses. The hundreds and thousands of people murdered by the Army in Bangladesh will act as an impenetrable barrier between West Pakistan and Bangladesh.’ He, however, made it clear that any help rendered by any country must be ‘free from any desire to control our destinies. We have struggled for too long for our self-determination to permit ourselves to become anybody’s satellite.’5
The proclamation had a cascading effect. The Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan in Calcutta, M. Hossain Ali, was the first one to switch his loyalties to the new government. All the 70 members of the Consulate’s staff, including the five officers, also transferred their allegiance to the government-in-exile. Two Bengali diplomats in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi also defected and were given asylum in India. By the end of the year, about 126 Bengali officials in Pak missions abroad, including Ambassadors posted in Iraq, the Philippines and Argentina, had declared their allegiance to Bangladesh.
In New Delhi, the R&AW was busy processing a flood of inputs coming from Calcutta through different sources but mainly through ‘Nath Babu’. RNK had already drafted Maj Gen S.S. Uban, the then Inspector General of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) (the ultra-secret, highly specialised, guerrilla force, mainly comprising Tibetans, which was raised in the midst of the 1962 war with China), to organise Bengali resistance fighters into a cohesive force. While Army Chief, Gen S.H.F.J. ‘Sam’ Manekshaw was to get the Army HQ to prepare a blueprint for a training programme, the on-ground coordination was to be handled by Maj Gen Uban.
Thanks to Banerjee’s knowledge of East Pakistan, and particularly the internal dynamics of the Awami League, the R&AW knew exactly who to support in a bid to get the underground armed movement going, even as it fell on RNK to coordinate the activities of diverse groups within the Bangladesh leadership.
One internal order also formally appointed Banrejee, ‘Nath Babu’, as the points person for liaison with the political leadership of the provisional government of Bangladesh. In addition, he was to coordinate between the R&AW and the operational headquarters for providing intelligence related to Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Haksar and Kao had decided to expand the Committee on East Pakistan to now include Defence Secretary K.B. Lall, since sooner or later, the involvement of the Indian armed forces would become inevitable. The Committee was entrusted with the task of overseeing multiple requirements—ranging from decision on giving shelter to important political leaders to installing a radio transmitter and organising armed training to arranging publicity in the media.
Kao’s calm and meticulous approach, acquired after years of practicing it as a leader and institution builder, was to prove an invaluable asset in the crucial months ahead as the Indian subcontinent hurtled towards a major crisis.
1 Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2013).
2 A.A.K. Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Pakistan: Oxford, 1998).
3 Ibid.
4 S.N. Prasad, The India-Pakistan War of 1971: A History (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2014).
5 Ibid.
TWELVE
RNK and the R&AW in Top Gear
This was to be R&AW’s finest hour, thanks to the excellent teamwork at the headquarters, enterprising field operatives led by Banerjee and unstinted support from Mrs Gandhi and her top bureaucrats. Kao’s equation with Gen Manekshaw also eventually contributed to India’s military success in the 13-day war with Pakistan in December 1971 that helped liberate East Pakistan and created a new nation. The Bangladesh covert operation lasted nearly nine months and kept everyone in the Indian establishment on their toes.
R&AW had to work on multiple fronts. From coordinating movement of Bangladeshi leaders in western countries to organising guerrilla fighters who would operate inside Bangladesh, it had to lead the multi-agency effort. RNK’s ability to multitask, assign the right job to the right person and work across ministries to ensure the best outcome possible proved to be a decisive factor in the success of this endeavour. In short, the challenge for RNK, as the man at the centre of the covert operations was to carry all elements of national power with him.
Going by the fragments of some notes, the smattering of correspondence that have survived to this day, and from the reminiscences of many protagonists of the time who penned their memoirs both in India and Bangladesh, RNK emerges as a composed, fully-in-control personality, unruffled by the enormous task on hand, ever ready to be the trouble shooter.
In mid-April of 1971, for instance, RNK had to advice, through foreign secretary T.N. Kaul, India’s High Commissioner in London, Appa Pant, how to treat a high-ranking jurist from Dhaka who did not want to return to Bangladesh but was keen to contribute to Bangladesh’s freedom struggle. Abu Sayeed Chaudhary, a judge of the Dacca High Court since 1961 and honorary Vice Chancellor of Dacca University, was, however, confused on what could be his exact role. So, he called on Pant at the Indian High Commission. The Indian High Commissioner wrote a detailed letter to then Foreign Secretary, describing Justice Chaudhary as ‘utterly sincere and dedicated’. Pant asked Kaul to assess whether ‘he [Justice Chaudhary] could become a nucleus of Bangladeshi upsurge abroad and what could be his relationship with other leaders.’1
Kaul, on RNK’s advice, wrote back to Pant. The Indian High Commissioner was told to help Justice Chaudhary set up an office in London to help Bangladesh affairs to gain greater publicity abroad. The broad principle, RNK advised, of this support should, however, be to make this set-up appear independent, although initial finance would be provided by R&AW. ‘His [Chaudhary’s] attempt should be to make the whole movement self-supporting on the basis of collections from citizens of Bangladesh and sympathisers. Unless this is done, Chaudhary’s cover might be exposed and his credibility as an independent Bangladesh statesman may suffer,’2 Kaul wrote to Pant after consulting RNK. Kao’s observation was because of division and personal rivalries, Bangladesh groups tended to operate independently of one another. Chaudhary was, therefore, told to set himself up as an independent Bangladesh leader at RNK’s recommendation.
The Bangladeshi diaspora was to play a major role in mobilising world opinion against Pakistan’s atrocities in the eastern Wing. R&AW, while remaining in the background, contributed its bit in coordinating the campaign worldwide. In fact, the Committee of Secretaries had laid down media publicity as a key task for the R&AW in one of its earliest meetings. Through its officers, mainly posted in western countries, the R&AW and MEA made sure that the genocide that was being committed in Bangladesh would be widely publicised. Of course, it helped western media, who was also keen to bring out the horrors of the crackdown in Dhaka and other towns in Bangladesh.
The Pakistani Army’s brutality ensured that the Bengalis, Hindus as well as Muslims, despite many political differences, rose as one against Pakistan. R&AW’s job was to tap into the rage. RNK used different agencies and personalities to harness and coordinate the raw anger amongst the refugees to create different outfits that would harass and impose a battle of attrition on the Pakistani forces throughout the summer and monsoon months of 1971, preparing the ground for the final assault by the Indian Army, which was brilliantly led by Sam Manekshaw.
It, of course, helped that RNK, had a very able and dedicated team in the R&AW. Sankaran Nair was an admirable foil to RNK. Kao looked at the bigger picture, attended the meetings at the highest level and left the day-to-day working of the organisation to Nair. Nair also ran sources inside West Pakistan and particularly in the highest echelons of the Pakistani Army which saved the day for India when the actual war began. But more of that later. Years later, B. Raman wrote, ‘The R&AW’s success in East Pakistan, which led to the birth of Bangladesh, would not have been possible without the leadership of Kao and the ideas of Nair. The vision was of Kao and the ideas to give shape to the vision were largely of Nair. Like Kao, Nair was held in high esteem in the community of international intelligence professionals.’3
Meanwhile, RNK’s two main links to the Bangladesh Government were two diverse personalities—Banerjee alias Nath Babu and Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, the IG of SFF.
Banerjee, as mentioned earlier, was to coordinate and shepherd the diverse personalities and organisations that jostled for influence and dominance in the provisional government of Bangladesh, while Uban, the artillery officer heading Establishment 22 or SFF, would organise armed training for volunteers. The volunteers consisted of a diverse group of Bangladeshi students, farmers, Awami League activists led by Mujib’s nephew, Fazlul Haq Moni. It had to be organised into a more disciplined and cohesive force for it to be of any effective use in a guerrilla campaign.
Banerjee and Uban had their own strengths. Banerjee, as the R&AW’s Joint Secretary in Calcutta, was the fulcrum around which RNK’s political outreach to Bangladeshi politicians revolved. Uban, on the other hand, was the quintessential military trainer, who could take diverse groups of people and forge them into a cohesive guerrilla force capable of operating behind enemy lines.
Uban’s task was approved by the Committee of Secretaries for East Bengal in mid-May 1971. He was to initially train the members of the Students League of the Awami League (also known as the Mujib Bahini as they would not have anything to do with the provisional government) at two training centres established at Tandawa near Chakrata in Dehradun district, and the other at the Halflong SSB training centre in Assam.
The training programme started on 1 June. About 850 selected persons underwent training at the two centres mentioned above. Most of these volunteers were handpicked by the four leaders of the Awami League, who were all close confidantes of Mujib. Uban told RNK, in one of his reports, that he learnt that the Students League was always treated by Mujib as his elite corps. Other Awami League leaders, such as Nazarul Islam and Tajuddin, who were leading the Bangladesh provisional government were only vaguely aware of the existence of the Students League and did not have any detailed knowledge of their activities. The training programme relating to the Students League, along with their identities, were, therefore, kept secret.
RNK had originally envisaged taking the help of the establishment set up by the army to run Operation Jackpot, a separate training programme from the one run by Uban. ‘On reconsideration, it is now felt that for various reasons it would be better if we try to do this with our own resources. Action is being taken accordingly,’ Kao wrote. As he remarked in one of the reports to the Committee of Secretaries, Kao said, ‘In the attached report, IG, SFF, has made some suggestion regarding the operational tasks to be performed by the trained cadres and their cooperation with Army’s Operation Jackpot. This involves certain major issues which we shall try to settle first throu
gh a separate discussion with the COAS (Chief of Army Staff, Gen Sam Manekshaw) and later at the Secretaries’ Committee.’
Uban had been instructed to train up to 6,000 volunteers. Apart from the general training programme, the IG, SFF, was also asked by RNK to have a few teams specially prepared to undertake specific operational tasks relating to targets like the jute mills, the tea industry and the ports in Chittagong and Chalna. ‘The training in respect of the targets in and around Dacca is already in progress. For the targets at Chittagong, and Chalna, etc., we had to look for volunteers with local knowledge and the tradition of waterman ship. With the help of the leaders of the Student League such people have also been located, and arrangements made through the clandestine channels to bring them out from East Bengal. It is hoped to start their training by the 10th of July,’ Kao informed the Committee of Secretaries on East Pakistan in June 1971.
The specialised training that RNK was talking about had already commenced. It has been documented in detail in a book published during mid-2019, co-authored by the late Captain M.N.R. Samant, Maha Vir Chakra, and one of India’s finest defence reporters, Sandeep Unnithan. The book, Operation X, chronicles the untold story of India’s covert naval war in East Pakistan in 1971.
As Prasad wrote, ‘It is noticeable that the nucleus of the Mukti Bahini frogmen was provided by the Bengali sailors, who had deserted the Daphne class submarine Mangro, under construction in France… a few sailors who had been dismissed from service after the Agartala conspiracy case also joined the Mukti Bahini frogmen. In addition, three merchant seamen also merged with this group. Besides the nucleus, 130 frogmen came from Chittagong, 100 from Chalna/Khulna, 40 from Narayanganj… They were essentially tasked to neutralise the main sea ports of Chittagong, Chalna, Khulna and Mongla with a view to prevent logistic support to the Pakistan army… they also aimed to disrupt port operations and prevent export of jute, tea and coir, which earned critical foreign exchange for Pakistan…’4