Gangster State
Page 34
His detractors cried foul, saying that the announcement of the PGC
had caught them off guard, and that it was a desperate attempt by Magashule to have the Free State back the Dlamini-Zuma slate amid the unresolved disputes. ‘This is the chair’s only path to a national career in the ANC,’ a former provincial leader told News24. 18
Naturally, many of the party members who supported the Ramaphosa slate decided to boycott the PGC. Few observers were therefore surprised when the PGC delegates overwhelmingly voted in favour of the Dlamini-Zuma slate. Magashule received 216 votes against 36 cast in favour of former KwaZulu-Natal premier Senzo Mchunu, the Ramaphosa bloc’s choice for secretary-general. 19
Later developments suggest that Magashule did not view this questionable victory as enough of a guarantee to ensure his political future. In an apparent attempt to secure a fall-back position in case he
got routed at Nasrec, Magashule and his PEC pressed ahead with plans to convene a provincial conference, despite the High Court’s firm warning not to do so until all branches affected by the judgment had held lawful BGMs.
The latest provincial conference was held in Magashule’s hometown on Monday 11 December, less than a week before the Nasrec conference was scheduled to start. Thabo Manyoni, the former mayor of Mangaung, was supposed to challenge Magashule for the position of provincial chairperson, 20 but he and his backers boycotted the conference, adamant that the problems at the disputed branches had not been resolved.21 With his only challenger absent, Magashule secured a landslide victory. 22 But it would prove to be short-lived. On the Friday before the national conference was due to begin, the Bloemfontein High Court yet again ruled in favour of disgruntled party members who sought to have the Parys conference declared unlawful and its decisions void. The court found that fourteen of the twenty-nine disputed branches could not send delegates to Nasrec. 23 This translated into a loss of about eighty voting delegates for the province. Although the voting at Nasrec for some of the Top Six positions ended up being extremely close, the Free State’s ‘lost’ votes alone would not have changed the outcome in any of those contests. 24
Magashule’s victory at Nasrec over his challenger Senzo Mchunu certainly deserves scrutiny. The result surprised not only onlookers and commentators, but conference delegates too. Mchunu had received more branch nominations than Magashule and was widely expected to win. 25 Many delegates therefore struggled to contain their shock when the outcome was announced. 26 The battle for secretary-general yielded the tightest result of all the major races. Exactly 4 696 votes were
tallied, and Magashule won by just twenty-four. 27 But the new secretary-general barely had time to soak up his success before trouble brewed once again. While the Nasrec delegates were still casting their ballots for the ANC’s new NEC, there were strong indications that Magashule’s victory may have been secured through the same political dark arts that had kept him in power in the Free State.
Some delegates noticed that the numbers released by the EleXions Agency, a private service provider that oversaw the voting, did not add up. Word quickly spread through the venue that there were sixty-eight votes that had not been factored into the result. 28 Most concerning, it appeared that the ‘missing’ ballots were those of delegates who represented pro-Mchunu branches in Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal. 29
As it turned out, the missing votes had been placed in ‘quarantine’
amid uncertainty over the affected delegates’ credentials. The sixty-eight conference-goers had accreditation tags, but their names were not on the voters’ roll.30 Mchunu was both furious and dejected. His chief campaigner, Jomo Sibiya, insisted that the affected delegates had been
‘properly accredited’. 31
The issue threatened to derail the entire conference. Some of the sixty-eight delegates indicated that they would take legal action. 32
Eventually, the conference steering committee decided that fifteen of the sixty-eight votes were legitimate and could be added to Mchunu’s tally. 33 But he still came up short. Mchunu probably would have pursued the matter, but his support within the Ramaphosa camp began to dwindle. Some Ramaphosa backers were afraid that further pressure to probe the issue could spark calls for a recount of the votes for the entire Top Six, possibly jeopardising Ramaphosa’s own narrow victory over Dlamini-Zuma. 34 In the end, Mchunu relented. He took up a job
at Luthuli House in early 2018, after which the controversy over the uncounted votes died down. 35
But mere days after news broke of Mchunu’s move to the ANC’s headquarters, a fresh scandal engulfed the party. The Mail & Guardian revealed that the Maluti-a-Phofung municipality, stronghold of Magashule ally Vusi Tshabalala, had suddenly appointed about 200
new ‘assistant general workers’ the previous December. Some of these new ‘employees’ were also Nasrec delegates from branches in the Maluti-a-Phofung region. Four of them told the newspaper that they scored the jobs in exchange for supporting Dlamini-Zuma, and that they received their first salaries a day before the conference kicked off.
Others claimed their appointments were in no way related to Nasrec and strongly denied that it was a ‘jobs for votes’ scandal. 36
A senior political figure provided me with a list of the Maluti-a-Phofung region’s Nasrec delegates. There were about fifty of them representing thirty-six branches. I found the names of twelve on a list of municipal workers fired by the Maluti-a-Phofung municipality in May 2018, after an investigation by the provincial Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. Most of them said they could not talk to me without permission from their branches. One of them denied that any of the Maluti-a-Phofung workers who attended Nasrec voted for the Dlamini-Zuma slate in exchange for a job. He claimed that the allegation was ‘political propaganda’ from the province’s anti-Magashule faction, and that their employment at the municipality had been ‘unfairly terminated’. But a delegate from another branch who also scored a municipal job sang a different tune.
This person claimed that he had been instructed to vote not only for Dlamini-Zuma, but also for ‘the full slate’, which of course included
Magashule as secretary-general. He did not want to divulge who had issued the order.
The DA reported the alleged ‘jobs for votes’ scandal to the Hawks in January 2018, but it remains to be seen whether anyone will be brought to book. The Hawks told me they had completed an ‘initial investigation’ and submitted the docket to the NPA for possible prosecution. However, according to an update sent to me by the law-enforcement agency in January 2019, in July 2018 ‘the case was returned to the Hawks for further investigation, which is still underway’.
30
New dawn, old guard
After Cyril Ramaphosa’s victory at Nasrec, his promised ‘new dawn’
broke unexpectedly early, or so it seemed.
The new ANC leader had not even formally taken over the country’s reins from Jacob Zuma when, in late January 2018, the Hawks raided the Bloemfontein offices of outgoing premier Ace Magashule. They were searching for possible evidence related to the Gupta-linked dairy venture in Vrede. They also hit the offices of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development that same morning. ‘We are looking for documents and any electronic information pertaining to our investigation,’ Hawks spokesperson Hangwani Mulaudzi told reporters.
‘We are going to be here the whole day.’1
Many South Africans welcomed this dramatic turn of events. The Hawks, other law-enforcement bodies and the country’s prosecutions authority were all widely criticised for their apparent lethargy and inaction during Zuma’s time in power, especially regarding politically sensitive cases. The raid on the offices of the ANC’s newly elected secretary-general suggested that the police and the National Prosecuting Authority were finally being released from the clutches of Zuma and his allies. The raids in Bloemfontein were followed by one at the powerful Gupta family’s estate in Johannesburg, sparking further optimism ab
out the new regime’s willingness to pursue corrupt politicians and their state-capture partners.
But there is a disconcerting backstory to the Hawks’ operations in early 2018.
About two weeks before the law-enforcement body rolled into the Free State, Kopung Ralikontsane, the director-general in Magashule’s office, allegedly warned fellow provincial officials about the pending raids.
‘We knew the Hawks were coming well in advance,’ one current MEC
told me. ‘Ace’s DG told us to be ready.’ Someone within the law-enforcement environment must have tipped off Magashule or one of his colleagues.
The sources I spoke to were not surprised by allegations that Magashule’s office knew about the raid beforehand. ‘Ace was in total control of the Hawks and the police in the Free State,’ Beatrice Marshoff, Magashule’s predecessor as premier, said when I interviewed her about Noby Ngombane’s murder. A former senior Hawks officer told me that this influence stretched beyond the Free State’s borders.
‘There were top-level people in the Hawks and the SAPS who were looking out for Ace all these years,’ this person alleged. ‘Whenever a member of the public or a government official laid a criminal complaint that involved Ace or one of his associates, that news would very quickly reach Ace’s ears.’
Judging by an event that occurred shortly before the raid, it seems Magashule had indeed been tipped off. Allegedly, a small group of men removed heaps of documents, computers, printers and other items from the Office of the Premier a few days before the raid. Two sources familiar with the development claimed the men had been instructed to get rid of material that could have implicated Magashule and some of his colleagues in dodgy government deals. My sources gave me the name of a former staffer in Magashule’s office who allegedly oversaw the operation. They also showed me photographs of the computers, documents and other items. It was enough material to fill a small room.
A bar code on a computer captured in one of the photos showed that the item belonged to the ‘Department of the Premier – Free State’. The small mountain of potential evidence was allegedly taken to a house located in one of the townships on the outskirts of Bloemfontein. I was given an address.
Tiisetso Makhele, the spokesperson at the Office of the Premier, said the Free State provincial government rejected the allegations ‘with the contempt that they deserve’. He claimed the Hawks ‘seized all the items they were searching for as part of their investigation’.
My contacts in the police and in the province’s political set-up, however, said they were sure Magashule had been warned about the raid. They also feared that future police investigations would be similarly compromised. One of my sources, the former senior Hawks officer, said Magashule’s influence over key personnel in the law-enforcement environment did not end when he vacated his Bloemfontein office for his new position at Luthuli House. ‘As SG, Ace is still making himself heard within the SAPS and the Hawks,’ alleged this source. ‘He is close to some very senior people in the police’s national structures.’
If these allegations are anything to go by, it is interesting that both the national police commissioner, Khehla Sithole, and the deputy commissioner for crime detection, Lebeoana Tsumane, are former Free State provincial commissioners. Sithole, who served as Free State commissioner between 2011 and 2013, became national commissioner in November 2017. 2 This was one of Zuma’s final major appointments.
Sithole subsequently appointed Tsumane as one of his deputy commissioners. Tsumane had led the SAPS in the Free State from late 2016 until his promotion to the national office in December 2017. 3
Of particular concern is the fact that the two former Free State commissioners are implicated in an alleged plot to buy votes at the 2017 Nasrec conference using ‘laundered’ funds from a dubious Crime Intelligence (CI) operation. The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), which is investigating the matter, has alleged in court papers that Sithole, Tsumane and other SAPS and CI officers pushed for the procurement of surveillance equipment shortly before the ANC’s elective conference. The equipment was reportedly valued at about R7 million, but the SAPS and CI head honchos were allegedly willing to pay R45 million for the device. The difference of about R38
million would then have been used to buy votes for an unnamed
‘faction’ at Nasrec, IPID has claimed. 4 The court filings do not specify which faction was to benefit from the alleged scheme, but they offer pretty strong hints. King Bhoyi Ngcobo, one of the CI officers implicated in the saga, is one of Jacob Zuma’s former bodyguards. 5
If Magashule does have a few top cops on his side, South Africa remains in peril, especially in light of his apparent contempt for the outcome of the Nasrec conference. At an ANC Youth League gathering in January 2018, Magashule urged party members to ‘work hard’ so that ‘the ANC that we know returns’. 6 The alleged Durban plot of September 2018 by Zuma, Magashule and others to challenge Ramaphosa’s leadership spells more trouble. 7 Any suggestion that Magashule’s faction has allies within police or intelligence structures needs to be probed and dealt with immediately, lest these vital agencies get sucked into a dangerous political battle.
For Magashule, there is more at stake than political power. The ANC
secretary-general is alleged to have presided over a decades-long statecapture scheme in his home province. This may yet land him in some
serious trouble. This book and the myriad media reports over the years should contain enough material to at least prompt the authorities to begin looking in the right places. But that will only happen once the Hawks, the SAPS and the NPA are released from the clutches of their captors. In this regard, Ramaphosa’s ‘new dawn’ has so far been just that – a faint glimmer of hope peeking over the horizon. What this country needs now is direct sunlight. The ANC’s secretary-gangster and his cohort need to feel the heat of a truly independent and unfettered law-enforcement environment.
Acknowledgements
My first word of gratitude has to go to the Taco Kuiper Fund for Investigative Journalism, administered by Wits Journalism. A generous grant from the Taco Kuiper Fund allowed me to work on this book full time for almost a year. I hope Gangster State will encourage other journalists and authors to embark on a similar writing journey and broaden the body of literature that shines a light into this country’s darkest corners.
Investigating and writing about politicians’ secret lives can be a lonely, daunting and at times risky business. Fortunately, I am able to rely on a solid support base that consists of family, friends and colleagues in the media industry. I am thankful for each and every person who has in some way helped, supported or encouraged me.
Politicians, government officials, businesspeople and a myriad other sources collectively dedicated hours of their time to help me better understand my subject and to share vital information with me. Many of them have asked to remain anonymous due to the climate of fear that permeates politics in South Africa. But they know who they are, and I owe them much gratitude for their time and assistance.
Those who can be named and whom I would like to thank include the DA’s Leona Kleynhans and Roy Jankielsohn, and COPE’s Dennis Bloem and Papi Kganare. Former Bloemfontein mayor Thabo Manyoni deserves special acknowledgement for the courage he demonstrated by sharing with me his recollections of his trip with Ace Magashule to the Guptas’ Saxonwold estate in Johannesburg. Mxolisi Dukwana was also willing to share some of his experiences in the Free State on the record.
Beatrice Marshoff, Magashule’s predecessor as premier, committed her name to the important information she shared with me. Nokwanda Ngombane spoke to me about an extremely painful and distressing period in her life – I am truly thankful for her time and courage.
Basildon Peta’s insights were also invaluable. If I have forgotten anyone, please forgive me!
Finally, I must thank the team at Penguin Random House, and attorney Willem de Klerk and his candidate attorney, Charl du Plessis.
These are the smart and talented people who worked tirelessly in the background to help get this book on the shelves.
PIETER-LOUIS MYBURGH
FEBRUARY 2019
Notes
INTRODUCTION
1. Pieter-Louis Myburgh, ‘Onmin broei oor sport se Oscars’, Rapport, 9 June 2013.
2. Pieter-Louis Myburgh, ‘Exclusive: Man killed in Sandton “hit” linked to R255m Free State contract’, News24, 19 April 2018, available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/exclusive-man-killed-in-sandton-hit-linked-to-r255m-free-state -contract-20180419 (last accessed 12 February 2019).
3. Sapa, ‘Criminals within ANC: Magashule’, IOL, 31 July 2012, available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/criminals-within-anc-magashule-1353140 (last accessed 12 February 2019).
CHAPTER 1: THE TUMAHOLE ‘TREASONIST’
1. Interview with Elias Ace Magashule by Moses Mzwandile Hadebe, for the ANC Oral History Project, n.d.
2. If this is correct, Magashule would have turned seventeen in his Grade Eight year.
3. Fiona Forde, ‘Magashule: premier in waiting’, Sunday Independent, 12 October 2008, https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/magashule-premier-in-waiting-419845 (last accessed 11 September 2018).
4. Tshepo Cyril Moloi, ‘Black politics in Kroonstad: Political mobilisation, protests, local government, and generational struggles, 1976–1995’, PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2012.
5. Interview with Elias Ace Magashule by Moses Mzwandile Hadebe, for the ANC Oral History Project, n.d.
6. ‘Who is Ace Magashule?’, official website of Dr Ace Magashule, 1 October 2017, available at https://acemagashule.co.za/wp/2017/10/01/who-is-acemagashule/ (last accessed 11 September 2018).