Battlegrounds
Page 46
For ideological regimes or adversaries that do not possess valuable assets that the United States can hold at risk, a second form of deterrence is more appropriate. “Deterrence by denial” is based on the ability to convince adversaries that they cannot accomplish their objectives through the use of force or other forms of aggression. Applied to Putin’s playbook, deterrence by denial would entail closing fissures in our societies and restoring confidence in democratic principles, institutions, and processes. Deterrence by denial in cyberspace entails requiring resilient systems and an effective, layered, active defense of critical networks and infrastructure. Deterring potential military offensives, such as a Russian invasion of Baltic states or a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, requires convincing the would-be aggressors that defenses are strong enough to prevent their success.19
America’s allies on the Eurasian landmass and across the islands of the Indo-Pacific region are invaluable not only to deterring aggression, but also to engaging in critical competitions short of conflict.20 Strengthening ally defenses and augmenting them with American defense capabilities reduces burdens on the United States while bolstering allies’ security. But our allies provide us with competitive advantages that extend beyond deterring potential aggression. From a geopolitical perspective, allies on the “rimland” of the Eurasian landmass pose dilemmas for Russia and China and have the greatest potential to prevent what would be devastating wars. Alliances are also tools for accumulating greater moral as well as military capability than the United States has on its own. Allies magnify America’s voice and make it more difficult for countries to infringe on the sovereignty of their neighbors or their own citizens. And when facing forms of economic aggression, such as Russia’s use of energy for coercion or China’s effort to coopt nations and companies, allies can reach out to like-minded partners and help convince them not to compromise principles or their security for the lure of short-term profits or a great discount on 5G communications infrastructure. The Trump administration was right to demand a higher degree of burden sharing by allies and reform within NATO to cope with twenty-first-century threats, but expressions of doubt about the value of allies when Russia and China are doing their best to break alliances apart are counterproductive. Allies, along with knowledge of history and technology and collaboration across the military, government, industry, and academia, bolster our strategic competence.
STILL, THE ability to compete effectively requires confidence as well as competence. A general understanding of America’s role in the world is important because war and competitions short of war (such as defeating RNGW or the CCP’s sophisticated strategy of co-option, coercion, and concealment) are, fundamentally, contests of will. Over-optimism and retrenchment both stem from strategic narcissism and, in particular, the failure to acknowledge the degree of agency and control that the “other” has over the course of events. I had hoped, as we developed a National Security Strategy and integrated strategies for our most pressing challenges, to help the president develop a pragmatic approach based on neither over-optimism nor resignation. And because American influence depends, in large measure, on the confidence others have in our ability to execute an effective, long-term foreign policy, our team worked to develop options that were sound and sustainable such that they could garner support from the American people.
Partisan vitriol among America’s political leadership gives friends and foes alike the impression that the United States is incapable of competing effectively based on a bipartisan foreign policy. As the late professor and philosopher Richard Rorty observed, “National pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement.” If we lack national pride, how can we possess the confidence necessary to fight effectively in war or implement a competitive foreign policy? In the United States, civics education might try to reverse the shift toward micro-identities and the focus on victimhood to foster what political scientist Francis Fukuyama describes as “broader and more integrative identities.”21 Every time Americans talk or tweet about issues that divide them, they might devote at least equal time to what unites them—especially our commitment to the fundamental individual liberties contained in our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights. The academy’s role in restoring our confidence and national pride may include a review of history, literature, and philosophy curricula to ensure that they contain not only self-criticism and a broad range of cultural perspectives, but also an acknowledgment of the nobility and accomplishments of our great unfinished American experiment in democracy and liberty. There is important work to do in primary and secondary education to rekindle in our youth an understanding of our history, including not only the contradictions and imperfections in our experiment, but also the virtues and great promise of America. Our teachers should not overlook blights on our history—the profound failures in the forcible subjugation of Native Americans, in slavery, in the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, in institutionalized racism, in inequality for women, or in the mistreatment of other minorities—but they might place those stories in context. They might offer a progressive narrative that illuminates the advantages and resiliency of an American Constitution that placed sovereignty in the hands of the people and extended equal rights to previously excluded communities consistent with the nation’s founding principles.22 Besides education, public service is another means of strengthening strategic confidence and national pride. Working to eliminate opportunity inequality through educational and economic reforms is integral to the fight to defend the free world, as confidence in our democracies and free-market economies is essential to maintaining our will to compete.23
Immigrants have been and remain one of America’s greatest competitive advantages. Oppressed peoples who come to the United States, a self-selecting group, have the intrepidity to start a new life and are appreciative of the freedom and opportunity in America. A way to help overcome fractures in our society would be to talk less about who we do not want to come to America and more about whom America needs. Those who believe in our Constitution, the rule of law, and the opportunity to work hard to create a better life should be welcomed into our liberal-democratic culture.
An effort to restore confidence must extend to other free and open societies. Gains made in representative government and economic reform in the Western Hemisphere should not be taken for granted. And because Europe is particularly important to U.S. security, supporting its effort to overcome its struggle with identity politics and with Russia’s attempt to sow dissention within and among European nations should remain a top priority for U.S. diplomats.
I WROTE this book on the eleventh floor of the Hoover Tower at the center of the Stanford University campus. Herbert Hoover founded the institution that bears his name a century ago after witnessing the horrors of the Great War. Hoover, an orphan who graduated from Stanford University’s inaugural class and who would later become America’s thirty-first president, led a massive relief effort at the end of World War I in Belgium that was credited with saving more than ten million people from starvation.24 It was there that he bore witness to the horrors of war and resolved to do all he could to help prevent another one. The experience of World War I, a conflict that took the lives of more than sixteen million people, highlighted the need to understand the political and historical basis for violent conflict as critical to preserving peace and ending wars. Hoover founded the Hoover War Collection, later named the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, as a place where scholars might study past wars to prevent future conflicts. As we know, however, the “war that was to end all wars” was instead the first of two world wars that marked the bloodiest century in modern world history. The tower that contains the vast Hoover Library and Archives, a collection meant to provide scholars with materials that might help explain the origins of wars and uncover prospects for peace, was completed in 1941, the year the United States entered World War II. It is in the spirit of that
archive that I wrote this book, in an effort to use the study of the past to illuminate the present as the best way of influencing the future.
As historian Zachary Shore observed, “the greatest source of national strength is an educated populace.”25 It is my hope that this book will make a small contribution to the strength of our nation and other nations of the free world. Writing it was a continuation of my own education. I will judge it to have been worthwhile if it inspires vibrant, thoughtful, and respectful discussion of how we can best defend the free world and preserve a future of peace and opportunity for generations to come.
Acknowledgments
WHEN I joined the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, it was my first career change since I entered West Point at age seventeen. When I retired from the U.S. Army after thirty-four years, I knew I would miss serving alongside dedicated and talented young men and women. I am grateful now to work with graduate and undergraduate students at Stanford who also possess a strong desire to contribute to our nation and all humanity. I could not have completed a project of this scope and ambition without the assistance of a tremendous team of student research assistants who filled out innumerable evidence sheets, cleaned up the text and references, organized reviewer criticisms, and deciphered my cursive handwriting, which, for a generation who grew up with computers, must have been the equivalent of transcribing cuneiform. Our seminar-like discussions of the challenges to national and international security and the connections between them were enriching and helped me impose order on complex problems. I am particularly indebted to Chelsea Burris Berkey, Kate Yeager, Jeffery Chen, Sri Muppidi, Sylvie Ashford, Edouard Asmar, Lee Bagan, Megan Chang Haines, Rand Duarte, Eddy Rosales Chavez, Aron Ramirez, Nolan Matcovich, Griffin Bovée, Taek Lee, Kyle Duchynski, Sophia Boyer, Jonathan Deemer, David Jaffe, Samantha Thompson, Emma Bates, Lisa Einstein, William Howlett, Isaac Kipust, Cyrus Reza, Carter Clelland, Katherine Du, Hiroto Saito, Theo Velaise, and James Kanoff. Getting to know these talented young people bolstered my confidence in our ability to overcome the challenges that are the subject of this book.
There is no better place to research and write than at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. My colleagues at Hoover, the Freeman Spogli Institute, and the Stanford Graduate School of Business provided sage advice and contributed through their scholarship and research. I am grateful for assistance from Nadia Schadlow, Jakub Grygiel, Michael Auslin, Victor Davis Hanson, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Russell Berman, Michael McFaul, Abbas Milani, Kathryn Stoner, Daniel Sneider, Kevin Warsh, Niall Ferguson, Amy Zegart, James Timbie, Condoleezza Rice, David Mulford, Scott Sagan, George Shultz, Larry Diamond, Stephen Kotkin, Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Bernstam, Arye Zvi Carmon, Glenn Tiffert, Tim Kane, Peter Robinson, Karl Eikenberry, Herb Lin, Alex Stamos, Raj Shah, David Berkey, Saumitra Jha, and Charles O’Reilly. Erik Jensen from the Stanford School of Law also provided valuable advice. My thanks to the entire Hoover staff who, under director Tom Gilligan, provided encouragement and the ideal environment to write. Special thanks to Eryn Witcher Tillman, Denise Elson, Jeff Jones, Mandy MacCalla, Juanita Rodriguez, Erika Monroe, Silvia Sandoval, the late Celeste Szeto, Laurie Garcia, Dan Wilhelmi, Shana Farley, Megan King, James Shinbashi, and Rick Jara. Writing this book made me appreciate even more the privilege of holding the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellowship, a position named for a man I admired and made possible by the generosity of Michelle Ajami and Patrick Byrne.
Friends, former colleagues, and subject matter experts provided early guidance, read portions of the manuscript, and made helpful corrections and suggestions. I learned much from Zachary Shore, Fiona Hill, Marin Strmecki, Clare Lockhart, Michael Brown, Janan Mosazai, Hussain Haqqani, Seth Center, John “Mick” Nicholson, Norine MacDonald, Melissa Skorka, Gretchen Peters, Rob Kee, Larry Goodson, Fernando Lujan, Lisa Curtis, Michael Bell, Matthew Pottinger, Toby Dodge, Tristan Abbey, Thomas Lafleur, Joe Wang, Omar Hossino, Kenan Rahmani, Regis Matlak, Emma Sky, Dana Eyre, Kenneth Pollack, David Pearce, Ryan Crocker, Alton Buland, Diana Sterne, Kirsten Fontenrose, Ali Ansari, Yll Bajraktari, Ylber Bajraktari, Matt Turpin, Jeremie Waterman, Chas Freeman, Charles Eveslage, Jimmy Goodrich, Orville Schell, Alexander Bernard, Donald Sparks, Joseph Byerly, Christopher Starling, Scott Moore, Saad Mohseni, and Jordan Grimshaw.
I am indebted to Mark Dubowitz, Juan Zarate, Samantha Ravich, Bradley Bowman, Bill Roggio, Thomas Joscelyn, Cliff Rogers, and the team at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies for the opportunity to learn from their efforts to improve our strategic competence. This project also benefited tremendously from the opportunity to work with Ken Weinstein, Patrick Cronin, Ben Gillman, Taro Hayashi, and Masashi Murano at the Hudson Institute’s Japan Chair.
Other academic institutions hosted discussions that helped improve particular chapters. My thanks to Graham Allison and Fred Logevall of the Applied History Working Group at Harvard University for convening a group of talented scholars, including Josh Goldstein, Justin Winokur, Calder Walton, Carl Forsberg, Philip Balson, Paul Behringer, Anne Karalekas, Eugene Kogan, Charles Maier, Chris Miller, Nathaniel Moir, Laurie Slap, Peter Slezkine, and Emily Whalen.
I benefited tremendously from discussions that Michael Horowitz convened at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Christian Ruhl, LaShawn Renee Jefferson, Avery Goldstein, Alexander R. Weisger, Amy E. Gadsden, Scott Michael Moore, Mitchell Orenstein, Shira Eini Pindyck, Christopher William Blair, Casey William Mahoney, Joshua A. Schwartz, Michael Noonan, and Duncan Hollis provided constructive feedback and advice on early drafts. The errors and flaws that remain are mine alone.
I could not have asked for a better team of professionals to help bring this project to fruition. I am grateful for the assistance of Rafe Sagalyn and Amanda Urban at ICM Partners. And it was a pleasure to work with my editor, Jonathan Jao, Sarah Haugen, Jenna Dolan, Tina Andreadis, and the tremendous team at HarperCollins. The late Marion (Buz) Wyeth, with whom I was privileged to work two decades ago, would have been proud. My thanks, too, to Anne Withers, Mike Smith, and Keegan Barber at the White House.
I could not have completed this project without the love and support of my family. Thank you, Katie, for your encouragement, understanding, and for providing the foundation for our growing family. And thanks to my daughters, Katharine, Colleen, and Caragh, sons-in-law Alex and Lee, and my sister, Letitia, who all read portions of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. And finally, thanks to my grandsons, Henry and Jack Robinson, who brought our family such joy and reminded me of our generation’s duty to provide future generations with an inheritance of peace and freedom.
Selected Bibliography
Primary Sources
Belasco, Amy. “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11.” Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2014. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.
Carter, Jimmy. “Listen to North Korea.” The Carter Center, November 23, 2010. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorials_speeches/jc-listen-to-north-korea.html.
Department of Defence, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030,” Australian Government, Defence White Paper, 2009.
Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 12: Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 17–18, 1973.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d12.
Dinh Thi Kieu Nhung, “Afghanistan in 2018: A Survey of the Afghan People,” Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/publication/afghanistan-in-2018-a-survey-of-the-afghan-people/.
Gerasimov, Valery. “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations.” Military Review, January–February 2016. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archi
ves/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf.
Hecker, Siegfried. “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.” NAPSNet Special Reports, Nautilus Institute, November 22, 2010. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-return-trip-to-north-koreas-yongbyon-nuclear-complex/.
Mueller, Robert S. “Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election.” Volume 1 of 2. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, DC, March 2019. https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq.” Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, October 21, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-iraq.
———. “Statement by the President on Afghanistan.” Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, October 15, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/statement-president-afghanistan.
Pence, Michael. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China. Hudson Institute. Washington, DC, October 4, 2018.
Putin, Vladimir. “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” 1999. https://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm.
Rhodes, Ben. The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House. New York: Random House, 2018.
Rice, Condoleezza. Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom. New York: Hachette Book Group, 2017.
Rudd, Kevin. “China’s Political Economy into 2020: Pressures on Growth, Pressures on Reform.” Speech delivered at the Conference on China’s Economic Future: Emerging Challenges at Home and Abroad, Chatham House, London, July 11, 2019, https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/4.%20China%27s%20Political%20Economy%20into%202020_0.pdf.