Battlegrounds

by H. R. McMaster

  35Crist, Twilight War, 530.

  36Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/17/the-iran-plans.

  37From 2012 to 2014, the Iranian economy contracted by 9 percent per year, crude oil exports dropped precipitously, and more than $120 billion in reserves abroad were inaccessible to the regime. The regime subsequently shifted assets to South Asia and the Noor Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates, but Noor suspended business with Iran, which precipitated a 30 percent fall in the rial. The regime could no longer conduct dollar transactions. On these statistics, see Jay Solomon, The Iran Wars (New York: Random House, 2016), 167.

  38Navid Hassibi, “Why Can’t Iran and Israel Be Friends?” Guardian, February 20, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/feb/20/why-cant-iran-and-israel-be-friends.

  39Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Boosts Military Support in Syria to Bolster Assad,” Reuters, February 21, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iran-insight/iran-boosts-military-support-in-syria-to-bolster-assad-idUSBREA1K0TV20140221; Hashmatallah Moslih, “Iran ‘Foreign Legion’ Leans on Afghan Shia in Syria War,” Aljazeera, January 22, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iran-foreign-legion-leans-afghan-shia-syria-war-160122130355206.html; Margherita Stancati, “Iran Backs Taliban with Cash and Arms,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-and-arms-1434065528.

  40Michael Doran, “Obama’s Secret Iran Strategy,” Mosaic, February 2, 2015, https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/politics-current-affairs/2015/02/obamas-secret-iran-strategy/.

  41Katherine Bauer, “Iran on Notice,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-on-notice.

  42On Hezbollah funding, see Nathan Sales, “Countering Iran’s Global Terrorism,” U.S. State Department, November 13, 2018, https://www.state.gov/countering-irans-global-terrorism/. On Iranian troops in Syria, see Laila Bassam, “Assad Allies, Including Iranians, Prepare Ground Attack in Syria: Sources,” Reuters, October 1, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iranians-exclusi/assad-allies-including-iranians-prepare-ground-attack-in-syria-sources-idUSKCN0RV4DN20151001. On the ballistic missile tests, see Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Iranian Ballistic Missile Tests Since the Nuclear Deal,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, February 9, 2017, https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/20917_Behnam_Ballistic_Missile.pdf; “Why Iran Targets ISIS Positions in Syria’s Deir Ezzor?” Iran’s View, June 9, 2017, http://www.iransview.com/why-iran-targets-isis-positions-in-syrias-deir-ezzur/1729/.

  43“نجهتس م لاناک ۱۵۷ مادهنا/یداصتقا داسف گرزب هکبش ۳ فشک,” Mehr News, February 23, 2017, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/3915666/%da%a9%d8%b4%d9%81-%db%b3-%d8%b4%d8%a8%da%a9%d9%87-%d8%a8%d8%b2%d8%b1%da%af-%d9%81%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af%db%8c-%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%85-%db%b1%db%b5%db%b7-%da%a9%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%86

  44“Victory for a Religious Hardliner in Iran,” The Economist, June 27, 2005, https://www.economist.com/news/2005/06/27/victory-for-a-religious-hardliner-in-iran.

  45Bill Chappell, “Iranians Vote in Parliamentary Election, After 1 Week of Campaigning,” NPR, February 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/02/21/807857001/iranians-vote-in-parliamentary-election-after-1-week-of-campaigning.

  46Hamid Dabashi, “What Happened to the Green Movement in Iran?” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html.

  47On the IRGC’s finances, see Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel, “Hold IRGC Accountable for Targeting U.S. Troops,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 12, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/04/12/hold-irgc-accountable-for-targeting-u-s-troops/. On state-controlled companies and the Iranian economy, see Yeganeh Torbati, Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “After Iran’s Nuclear Pact, State Firms Win Most Foreign Deals,” Reuters, January 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-contracts-insight/after-irans-nuclear-pact-state-firms-win-most-foreign-deals-idUSKBN15328S.

  48Wendy R. Sherman, Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power, and Persistence (New York: PublicAffairs, 2018), 13.

  49For the Mosaddeq documents, see James C. Van Hook, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954: Iran, 1951–1954, Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, June 15, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran; Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2008), 164–67. On U.S. university narrative on the 1953 coup, see Gregory Brew, “The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953,” Texas National Security Review, August 2019, https://2llqix3cnhb21kcxpr2u9o1k-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Brew_TNSR-Vol-2-Issue-4.pdf. On the media narrative on the 1953 coup, see Lawrence Wu and Michelle Lanz, “How the CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy in 4 Days,” NPR, February 7, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days.

  50“CIA’s Role in 1953 Iran Coup Detailed,” Politico, August 20, 2013, https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/cias-role-in-1953-iran-coup-detailed-095731.

  51Ray Takeyh, “What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-06-16/what-really-happened-iran.

  52On Ben Rhodes quotes, see Rhodes, The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House (New York: Random House, 2018), 329–30. On the dilemma of war or the JCPOA, see “Ben Rhodes on Iran: ‘You Either Have a Diplomatic Agreement with These Guys or There’s Something That Can Escalate into a War,” MSNBC, June 22, 2019, https://www.msnbc.com/saturday-night-politics/watch/ben-rhodes-on-iran-you-either-have-a-diplomatic-agreement-with-these-guys-or-there-s-something-that-can-escalate-this-into-a-war-62498885877.

  53Ali Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797: Reform and Revolution (New York: Routledge, 2019).

  54Rhodes, The World as It Is, 325.

  Chapter 10: Forcing a Choice

  1On Obama quote, see Firouz Sedarat and Lin Noueihed, “Obama Says Ready to Talk to Iran,” Reuters, January 27, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-arabiya/obama-says-ready-to-talk-to-iran-idUSTRE50Q23220090127.

  2On tanker attacks, see “Gulf of Oman Tanker Attacks: What We Know,” BBC, June 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48627014. On the drone strike on an oil facility, see Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz, and Stanley Reed, “Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran,” New York Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html. On the drone shooting, see Helene Cooper, “What We Know About Iran Shooting Down a U.S. Drone,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/drone-shot-down-iran-us.html.

  3“Iran During World War II,” United States Holocaust Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iran-During-World-War-II.pdf.

  4On France stay, see Elaine Ganley, “Khomeini Launched a Revolution from a Sleepy French Village,” AP News, February 1, 2019, https://apnews.com/d154664bcfed47e49b0ae0ff3648779c. On interviews, see Crist, Twilight War, 14. On Khomeini’s characterization of the Shah, see Suzanne Maloney, “1979: Iran and America,” Brookings, January 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/1979-iran-and-america/.

  On Khomeini’s return, see “1979: Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini Returns to Iran,” On This Day, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm. On slogans, see Associated Press, “AP WAS THERE: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Returns to Iran,” U.S. News & World Report, February 1, 2019. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-02-01/ap-was-there-ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-returns-to-iran
.

  “The Iranian Hostage Crisis,” Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises.

  5On protests, see “Iran Petrol Price Hike: Protesters Warned that Security Forces May Intervene,” BBC, November 17, 2019, https://www.bbccom/news/world-middle-east-50444429. On price increase, see Peter Kenyon, “Higher Gasoline Prices in Iran Fuel Demonstrations,” NPR, November 19, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/19/780713507/higher-gasoline-prices-in-iran-fuel-demonstrations.

  6“IRGC Head Calls Iran Protests ‘World War,’” Al-Monitor, November 25, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/iran-protests-number-deaths-mp-irgc.html.

  7Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (Basic Books: New York, 2006), 153–54.

  8Farnaz Calafi, Ali Dadpay, and Pouyan Mashayekh, “Iran’s Yankee Hero,” New York Times, April 18, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/opinion/18calafi.html.

  9On demographics, see Bijan Dabell, “Iran Minorities 2: Ethnic Diversity,” United States Institute of Peace, September 3, 2013, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity.

  10“Iran: Targeting of Dual Citizens, Foreigners,” Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/iran-targeting-dual-citizens-foreigners.

  11Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797, 407–9.

  12Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797, 274.

  13On Khamenei quotes, see Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei, “The Election of Donald Trump Is a Clear Sign of the Political and Moral Decline of the U.S.,” Khamenei.ir, June 4, 2019, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6834/The-election-of-Donald-Trump-is-a-clear-sign-of-the-political.

  14On Europe and the JCPOA, see Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran.”

  15On Salami quote, see “Tehran,” Flashpoint, International Crisis Group, November 28, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/tehran.

  16Editorial Board, “Justice Arrives for Soleimani,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-arrives-for-soleimani-11578085286?emailToken=e11bad7a48ad072ad8c3a7b409690538UNGHGeR+Gsa+R3fS5fT6VKBXwaoQHV/gUgQIC3GVRFNRnoUquqzK1B+0GtEll5XH8b2y5QxMjRIcJX3kI8UzLA%3D%3D&reflink=article_email_share.

  17On expenditure figures, see John E. Pike, “Iran—Military Spending,” Globalsecurity.org, updated July 20, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/budget.htm; “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

  18David Adesnik and Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Burning Bridge: The Iranian Land Corridor to the Mediterranean,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 18, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/.

  19This funding includes up to $800 million for Hezbollah and $100 million combined for Hamas and Islamic Jihad annually. See Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, “Hezbollah Financial Assessment,” Terror Finance Briefing Book, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2017; David Adesnik, “Iran Spends $16 Billion Annually to Support Terrorists and Rogue Regimes,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 10, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/10/iran-spends-16-billion-annually-to-support-terrorists-and-rogue-regimes/; Daniel Levin, “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, July 9, 2018, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad. On missile strikes, see Shawn Snow, “Drone and Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia Underscore Need for More Robust Air Defenses,” Military Times, October 25, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/10/25/drone-and-missile-attacks-against-saudi-arabia-underscore-need-for-more-robust-air-defenses/. On ship attacks, see Michael Knights and Farzin Nadimi, “Curbing Houthi Attacks on Civilian Ships in the Bab Al-Mandab,” Washington Institute, July 27, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/curbing-houthi-attacks-on-civilian-ships-in-the-bab-al-mandab.

  20“Saudi Crown Prince Calls Iran Leader ‘New Hitler’: NYT,” Reuters, November 23, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-iran/saudi-crown-prince-calls-iran-leader-new-hitler-nyt-idUSKBN1DO0G3.

  21On the connection to PLO camps, see Tony Badran, “The Secret History of Hezbollah,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 18, 2013, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2013/11/18/the-secret-history-of-hezbollah/. On Hezbollah provision of social services, see Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3”, RAND Corporation, 2007, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178.html.

  22On Hezbollah fighting in Israel and against ISIL, see Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon: The Shiite Dimension,” Wilson Center, August 27, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/lebanon-the-shiite-dimension. On Sunni attacks on Shia, see “Lebanon: Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project, November 1, 2019, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/lebanon. On Hezbollah protection of Shia sites, see Joseph Daher, “Hezbollah, the Lebanese Sectarian State, and Sectarianism,” Middle East Institute, April 13, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollah-lebanese-sectarian-state-and-sectarianism. For map of Hezbollah fighting, see “Hezbollah: A Recognized Terrorist Organization,” Israel Defense Forces, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/hezbollah/hezbollah/hezbollah-a-recognized-terrorist-organization/.

  23On recommendations, see Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, “Hezbollah Financial Assessment,” Terror Finance Briefing Book, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2017.

  24On Hezbollah casualties, see Aryeh Savir, “Study: 1,139 Hezbollah Terrorists Killed While Fighting in Syria,” Jewish Press, March 28, 2019, https://www.jewishpress.com/news/us-news/study-1139-hezbollah-terrorists-killed-while-fighting-in-syria/2019/03/28/.

  25On protests, see Rebecca Collard, “Untouchable No More: Hezbollah’s Fading Reputation,” Foreign Policy, November 27, 2019 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/27/lebanon-protests-hezbollah-fading-reputation/.

  26On Hezbollah and the IDF, see William M. Arkin, “Divine Victory for Whom? Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 104–5. On the IRGC and Israel, see Daniel Levin, “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, July 9, 2018, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad; Michael Bachner and Toi Staff, “Iran Said Increasing Hamas Funding to $30m per Month, Wants Intel on Israel,” Times of Israel, August 5, 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-agrees-to-increase-hamas-funding-to-30-million-per-month-report/. On IRGC threat, see Ahmad Majidyar, “IRGC General: Any Future War Will Result in Israel’s Annihilation.” Middle East Institute, April 20, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/irgc-general-any-future-war-will-result-israels-annihilation.

  27For more on the ideology of the IRGC, see Ali Ansari and Kasra Aarabi, “Ideology and Iran’s Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World,” Tony Blair Institute, February 11, 2019, https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/ideology-and-irans-revolution-how-1979-changed-world. On losses in the Iran-Iraq War, see “Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2019, chap. 1: “Tehran’s Strategic Intent,” https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-strategic-intent.

  28On IDF strikes, see Joseph Hincks, “Israel Is Escalating Its Shadow War with Iran. Here’s What to Know,” Time, August 29, 2019, https://time.com/5664654/israel-iran-shadow-war/. For Israeli perspectives on this point, see TOI Staff, “Gantz Positive on Gaza Disengagement in First Interview, Drawing Right’s Ire,” Times of Israel, February 6, 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-positive-on-gaza-disengagement-in-first-interview-drawing-rights-ire/.

/>   29John Kifner, “400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Tehran,” New York Times, August 2, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html?pagewanted=all.

  30On Sheikh’s execution, see Florence Gaub, “War of Words: Saudi Arabia v Iran,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2016, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_2_Saudi_Arabia___Iran_01.pdf. On Sheikh’s charges, “Saudi Arabia Executes 47 on Terrorism Charges,” Al Jazeera, January 2, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/saudi-announces-execution-47-terrorists-160102072458873.html.

  31On U.S. efforts to mediate, see Jackie Northam, “Saudi Arabia Sought Dialogue with Iran. Then the U.S.-Iranian Conflict Escalated,” NPR, January 9, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/09/794519810/saudi-arabia-sought-dialogue-with-iran-then-the-u-s-iranian-conflict-escalated.

  32On the foiled 1987 attack, see John E. Pike, “Iran Ajr Class Landing Ship,” Globalsecurity.org, updated July 12, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/ajr.htm; Bradley Peniston, “Capturing the Iran Ajr,” Navybook.com, http://www.navybook.com/no-higher-honor/timeline/capturing-the-iran-ajr. On the Aramco cyber attack, see David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (New York: Crown, 2018), 51–52.

  33On Osama bin Laden, see Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Analysis: CIA Releases Massive Trove of Osama bin-Laden Files,” FDD’s Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/11/analysis-cia-releases-massive-trove-of-osama-bin-ladens-files.php; Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Karim,” Files, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 18, 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Letter%20to%20Karim.pdf. On the Chabahar attack, see “Deadly Bomb Attack in Iran City of Chabahar,” BBC News, December 15, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11997679. On the 2017 attacks, see “Islamic State Claims Stunning Attacks in Heart of Iran,” Associated Press, June 7, 2017, https://apnews.com/510f0af4615443c08ff7f52c2657bb76/Islamic-State-claims-attacks-on-Iran-parliament,-shrine. On the parade shooting, see Erin Cunningham and Bijan Sabbagh, “Gunmen Kill at Least 2 Dozen in Attack on Military Parade in Iran,” Washington Post, September 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/several-killed-at-least-20-injured-in-attack-on-military-parade-in-iran/2018/09/22/ec016b97-a889-4a7d-b402-479bd6858e0a_story.html.