The User's Manual for the Brain Volume I

by Bob G Bodenhamer

  “we teach silence on the objective level in general… Any bursting into speech is not repressed; a gesture of the hand to… the objects, or action, or happenings, or feelings. Such a procedure has a most potent semantic effect. It gives a semantic jar; but this jar is not repression, but the realization of a most fundamental, natural, structural fact of evaluation” (p. 481).

  9.6.0.30 2. Static Words (Signal Words, One-Valued Terms) (SW)

  Like nominalizations, these terms indicate a frozen process turned into a frozen noun, and they do more. They indicate a use of such terms as if they only had one value to them. This arises from Aristotelian logic, according to Korzybski. “Whatever is, is.” “Nothing can both be and not be.” These terms often indicate a forgetting of the “map-territory” distinction.

  Because of our tendency to nominalize verbs (reify processes) and to therefore make static, definite, and absolutistic one-valued statements (p. 140), this leads us to create static expressions. These one-valued, static words and statements come across as sounding absolute and dogmatic thereby making our statements sound like pronouncements from heaven. Korzybski said that this creates a “legislative semantic mood,” absolutisms, and “the deity mode.”

  Aristotelian logic graphically illustrates such. The law of identity, “Whatever is, is.” The law of contradiction: “Nothing can both be and not be.” The law of excluded middle: “Everything must either be or not be.”

  Use the following means to challenge and question these linguistic ‘maps’:

  (1) Extensionalize. Enumerate the collection of items out of which we create the generalization. Extensionalize by dating and timing the referents. “Point out to me specifically what you mean.”

  (2) De-infinitize the state. Do this by identifying the stages and variables within the static over-generalized word. The extensional attitude represents the only one that accords with the survival order and nervous structure (p. 173).

  (3) Ask meaning questions. What do you mean by… ? Recognizing that words merely function as vehicles of meaning (effectively or ineffectively transporting meaning) enables us to remember that words exist as vehicles for our definitions. Therefore their existence operates as entirely arbitrary and optional. At the verbal level, all of our words and sentences exist only as forms of representations that evoke semantic reactions in our nervous system. When we realize that the objective level lies outside of our skin, then we can fully appreciate that events exist as unspeakable, absolute, and individual. Whatever we say about anything, those words “are” not that thing. Words and things exist on different logical levels. Our words merely express a verbalization about things. Static words convey a false-to-fact understanding. They over-evaluate words as things and falsely ascribe an objectivity to words that they do not and cannot have. Asking, What do you mean? avoids ascribing our own meanings to another’s words.

  (4) Develop the skill to “go meta” to move into higher levels of abstraction. This human capacity for higher abstracting makes for sanity and prevents the semantic blockage of being stuck at a word. What do you mean by that word? How does your use of this word contrast with X?

  9.6.0.31 3. Over-/Under- Defined Terms (O/U)

  Bandler and Grinder mentioned Korzybski and the role of “extensional” and “intensional” definitions in Magic, Vol. I (p. 56). Korzybski spoke of them also in terms of over-and under-defined terms. He said that we mainly over-define terms as we use an intensional orientation. This means moving into the world assuming that our dictionary definition of terms offers a completely satisfactory form of mapping. Hence, the gal who marries “a good husband.” Without extensionalizing the specific functions, behaviors, etc., of the guy who she sees in the category of “husband,” she may later discover the “territory” different from her “map”!

  Korzybski asserted that we have over-/under- defined most terms. We over-define (or over-limit) words by intension when we over-trust our verbal or dictionary definition. As we over-believe in our definition of the word as “reality,” we give it too much substance and concreteness. We under-define words by using too much extension (using too many specific facts and details) so that the generalizations become merely hypothetical.

  For example, a woman finds and marries “a good husband.” This conceptual linguistic reality (“a good husband”) exists, totally, and absolutely not as something in the world, but as a verbal definition in her mind. If she fails to recognize this, it will set her up for disappointment and neurological shock. The same occurs with all other generalized terms that exist only in the mind. We over-trust evaluative terms (in contradistinction to sensory-based words) like beauty, ugly, good, bad, productive, useful, wonderful, exciting, traumatic, etc., and our intensional orientation itself can do us harm.

  Utterances may have both extensional and intensional meanings. “Angels watch over my bed at night” certainly has several intensional meanings, but no extensional meanings.

  “When we say that the statement has no extensional meaning, we are merely saying that we cannot see, touch, photograph, or in any scientific manner detect the presence of angels.”

  This distinction proves valuable because extensional statements have an empirical and sensory-based nature. Thus with them we can bring an argument to a close. “This room measures fifteen feet long.” No matter how many guesses individuals make about the room, all discussion ceases when someone produces a tape measure.

  Not so with intensional meanings. Here discussions and arguments can go on world without end. “You have decorated this room in a really nice way.” This statement can provoke all kinds of disagreements, because the speaker has not based it on “sense,” but based upon “non-sense” evaluations, meanings, definitions (intensional meanings). The utterance does not refer to sense data at all; so one cannot collect sense data to end the discussion. The speaker’s statement does not refer primarily to the external world—but to their internal world of evaluations.

  To question these linguistic forms of ill-formedness, we can:

  (1) Chunk down the over-defined words of intensional statements and chunk up the under-defined words. This evokes a richer representation of the person’s meaning(s) and reference(s). Ask the person for extensional evidence of their intentional meanings.

  (2) Explore a person’s presuppositions in their undefined terms. Ask, “What does this assume? What have you presupposed in stating this?” This gets them to put their epistemology out on the table.

  9.6.0.32 4. Delusional Verbal Splits (DVS)

  I use this phrase to highlight the General Semantic (GS) emphasis on “Elementalism.” Korzybski said that we often take reality-as-a-whole and split it up into parts (in our languaging) and then forget the “map-territory” distinction. The result: we begin to treat the “map” “elements” that we have identified as real and separate. Hence, “mind” and “body” as if you can have one without the other. “Space” and “time.” Quoting Einstein, Korzybski suggested that in the territory we only have a “space-time” continuum and this introduced the field of quantum mechanics. We only have “mind-body,” “thoughts-emotions,” etc.

  Korzybski said that we often take reality-as-a-whole and split it up into parts (in our languaging) and then forget the “map-territory” distinction. The result: we begin to treat the “map” elements that we have identified as real and separate.

  Words provide a good function as they enable us to sort, separate, divide, and categorize the ever-connected flow of processes of the world. Words split up, sort out, organize, and punctuate the flux of reality. Verbally (but not actually) we split up the world by means of our conceptual ideas. By languaging we inevitably dichotomize the rich interconnectedness of reality. This creates “elements” or pieces of reality. Yet, sometimes we forget that we have so slaughtered the territory and begin to believe that the elements exist as separate entities. This Korzybski called “elementalism.”

  In language we talk about “body” and “mind,” “emoti
on” and “intellect,” “space” and “time,” etc. The referent of these individual words do not exist in reality as separate elements. They cannot exist as separate elements. Their existence involves an interconnected process. We can only split them at the verbal level in thinking and talking about the parts of these things. In linguistic form (mental conceptual form) we treat them as separate words. This makes them “elementalistic” and false-to-fact—not accurately representing the territory.

  Since we cannot actually, literally, or really separate “emotions” and “intellect,” this division structurally violates the organism-as-a-whole generalization (p. 65). So with “body” and “soul,” and other verbal splittings—by them we only confuse understanding, hamper development, and create false-to-fact ideas. An elementalistic terminology assumes a sharp division between “mind” and “senses,” “percept” and “concept,” etc. To challenge these elementalisms:

  (1) Hyphenate the Verbal Delusional Split. When you catch elementalizing and dichotomizing in language, stick in hyphens. Korzybski said this functional process enables us to reconnect holistic processes that we can only separate verbally. “A little dash here and there may be of serious semantic importance when we deal with symbolism” (p. 289). Hence, “time-space,” “mind-body,” etc. Organism-as-a-whole words provide a representation that remind us of the systemic nature of the world. It reminds us of the holistic and inseparable processes with which we deal.

  (2) Question the elementalism. “Does X truly stand alone? What context does X occur within? Can we deal with X without also considering Y or Z?”

  9.6.0.33 5. Either-Or Terms and Phrases (E-O)

  Another Aristotelian way of thinking involved viewing and languaging things in either-or terms, thereby create two-valued terms. Yet with most things in the world, this maps another false-to-fact distinction—leaving out the excluded middles, continua, and both-and perspectives.

  When we make statements phrased in an Either-Or format, we represent the territory, and orient ourselves to that representation, as if it only offered two choices in viewing, valuing, and responding. Yet this seldom accurately represents reality.

  We have created an either-or orientation and set of representations in psychology with the classic heredity/environment, nature/nurture, genetic/learning debate. Yet such false-to-fact concepts assumes that we can divide an organism’s characteristics into two distinct classes: one due to heredity, the other to environment. This demonstrates the excluded middle of Aristotelian logic. It excludes any kind of inter-actionalism as a third possibility. Yet undoubtedly human experience arise from an interaction between genes and environment, between inherent hard-wired nature and the nurture we receive along the way. To challenge these:

  (1) Reality test the Either-Or structure. “Does this reflect an either-or situation? Can I discover any in-betweens, grays, or other considerations which may enter into consideration and influence my representation of this reality?”

  (2) Explore the possibility of Both-And. “Could we have overlooked that in some way, at a larger frame, or in different contexts, both of these seemingly opposite responses stand as true? In what way could we consider both of these choices as accurate and useful?”

  9.6.0.34 6. Pseudo-Words (PW)

  Non-Referencing Words (Masquerading Noises & Spell-Marks)

  Korzybski also called these “noises” (in the auditory channel) and “spell-marks” (in the visual). Here we find linguistic “maps”, but they reference nothing. Nothing exists in the actual world or in the world of logic (logical existence) to which such words can stand as true symbols.

  When we use words that actually refer to nothing outside themselves, we merely make noises. What shall we say of “maps” that allude to no actual territory? We might find them interesting, even entertaining. Science fiction depends on such! But shall we find them useful to conveying accurate information or orienting ourselves to reality? No. They exist as pseudo-words. This makes them tricky. They look like words, they sound like words, yet they do not reference anything real—whether in the world of physics or the world of meaning and communication. These non-referencing words have no referent. These noises made with the mouth or marks spelled on paper only give that impression.

  How do we tell the difference between true and pseudo words? What criteria do we use? By definition, for a sound or image to function as a true word it must operate as a symbol that stands for something other than itself. To the extent that it stands for, or refers to, something, it serves as a true symbol, elicits internal representations, and mentally “anchors” the referent. If it does not, it merely stands as a noise. It refers to nothing. Before a noise or image can function as a symbol, something must “exist” (actually or logically). If it does not, then it simply functions as a semantic noise, hence a meaningless sign (p. 79).

  Before a noise (or a mark-sign—doing it in writing) can exist as a symbol, something must exist. Then the symbol can symbolize that existing thing, process, or concept. In language and “knowledge” there exists two kinds of existences. We have both physical existence and logical existence. So unicorns do not exist in the external world of unaided nature. They do not belong to zoology. When we apply the word unicorn to the field of zoology, we employ a pseudo-word. If we employ the word with reference to mythology or human fancy—the word there has a referent and functions meaningfully as a symbol (pp. 81-82).

  Korzybski calls this a form of fraud since it literally involves “the use of false representations.” The word “heat” illustrates this (Korzybski, p. 107). Grammatically, we classify the term “heat” as a substantive (noun). Yet physicists labored for centuries looking for some “substance” which would correspond to the substantive “heat.” They never found it. It does not exist. Today we know that no such thing as “heat” exists. “Heat” refers to a manifestation of “energy” which arises as a process, or action, between processes. A verb or adverb (thermo-dynamic) more accurately represents the referent. Today we recognize that no such “substance” as “heat” exists, so we talk about the process of “thermo-dynamics.”

  What we call “heat” speaks about our sense of temperature, the result of energy. “Heat” speaks about a relationship between phenomena in motion. To use this non-referencing word as a word engages in a linguistic fiction false-to-facts. No wonder the scientists looking for “heat” found themselves ill-adjusted to reality. Here, the verbal symbolism of language did not point to anything; it had no reference. Linguistically, the word deceptively mapped a road that took people down a blind alley.

  Verbal forms which have no meanings, no actual referents function as pseudo-words, a mere mechanism of our symbolism. So with spell-marks (noises which we can spell). They have the appearance of words, but we should not consider them words since they say nothing in a given context (pp. 137-138). In practical life, we often do not even suspect collections of noises (spell-marks) as functioning without meaning (p. 142).

  As we realize that many “words” have no referent, but that we use such pseudo-words this enables us to not immediately “buy into” words. Many find this absolutely shocking having so long confused “map” with “territory.” Yet once we make this distinction, we will shortly develop a new automatic response to words. We will first test words to make sure of them as true symbols. To challenge non-referencing words:

  (1) Reality test the reference. Challenge pseudo-words by referencing them. Date and time index the referents. “Suppose I could see-hear-feel this, what would I see or hear or feel? To what kind or dimension of reality does this word refer?”

  (2) Explore the possibility of the word as a non-referencing word. “Could this word, term or phrase have no actual referent in reality, but exist as a fictional and constructed understanding? Does this linguistic symbol reference anything that has actual or logical existence?”

  9.6.0.35 7. Multi-Ordinality (MO)

  These nominalizations have another quality, namely, they stand for ter
ms that have no specific referent, hence only an over-generalized meaning, and the meaning and referent changes according to the level of abstraction or context. These then involve infinite-valued terms, hence multi-ordinal. And they have a reflexivity so that we can use them on themselves.

  Multiordinal words, involving a deletion and generalization show up as words that we can use on many different levels of abstraction—hence multi-ordinal. Some exist as so multiordinal in nature that they function as an infinite-value term. These exist as among the most common terms we use in life.

  “Mankind, science, mathematics, man, education, ethics, politics, religion, sanity, insanity, iron, wood, apple, object, etc.” We use them not as one-valued terms for constants of some sort, but as terms with inherently infinite-valued or variable referents (pp.138-139, 433).

  A majority of our terms consist of names for infinite-valued stages of processes with a changing content, hence multi-ordinal in nature. They represent infinite-valued variables and in principle, exist neither as true nor false, but ambiguous in meaning. Consider “love” as multiordinal. To challenge these:

  (1) Use co-ordinates. Using co-ordinates enables us to assign single values to the variable (p. 139). We can identify time co-ordinates or space co-ordinates to contextualize the specific referent. If a word or phrase expresses ambiguity, we need to contextualize the level of abstraction. This makes the multiordinal word specific—preventing it from remaining ambiguous. These words frequently appear as nominalizations. When they do, simply de-nominalize them by recovering the hidden verb or process (p. 208).