Modern Military Strategy
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Box 4.3 Can terrorists be deterred?
• Examining ten case studies of conflicts between state and non-state actors over two centuries, Keith Payne and his colleagues set out to determine ‘whether the non-state actor was deterred at some point in the conflict and, if so, what non-state actors vulnerabilities, local conditions, and state measures may have been critical to that outcome’.
• In each case, deterrence of the non-state actor was not a goal of the state operation. Rather, states typically sought to defeat the non-state actor and eliminate the threat.
• But in the course of that action non-state actor leaders changed their behaviour in ways that suggested they were deterred from continuing their preferred course of action for some period or permanently.
• Denial measures designed to defeat the non-state actor demonstrated to the non-state actor that their actions were likely to be thwarted and that leaders might be captured, risking the loss of prestige.
• Effective deterrence by denial against non-state actor was most likely in situations where the non-state actor had:
• central control and leadership of its operations;
• a level of third-party support that could be targeted as an avenue of influence;
• a majority of its operations in territory accessible to the state power (i.e. no external sanctuary); and
• motives and goals that were not immediate or absolute and therefore allowed for tactical retreat.
See: Keith B. Payne, Thomas K. Scheber and Kurt R. Guthe, ‘Deterrence and Al-Qa’ida’, Comparative Strategy 31:5 (2012), 385–386.
If it transpires that suicide terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving the strategic effects so desired, then terrorists may, in the long run, be deterred. Freedman recommends a strategy that isolates terrorists rather than rooting them out through force, stigmatizing their ideas among sympathetic communities. Payne argues less emphasis should be placed on punitive threats than on ‘measures to frustrate their planning, operations, and goals – actions which compel them to move and hide, put pressure on their societal network and state sponsors, demoralize their personnel, and deny their aims’.52 The National Research Council, too, makes the case for indirect deterrence measures as a supplement to more direct brute force threats, while stressing the value of establishing communication with third parties, including other states, that have contact with terrorist supporters and may be able to influence their behaviour.
Conclusion
The study of nuclear power is quintessentially theoretical in nature and, one hopes, will remain so. Nuclear power is particularly amenable to being discussed in the context of something not happening, and therefore to the deterrence concept. Not surprisingly, the Cold War was a heyday of theorizing about deterrence and nuclear power, but the strategies that were associated with it, along with many of its underlying tenets, were rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War, even if much of the language it spawned remained pertinent. In the new era scholars such as Keith Payne and Colin Gray have examined the deterrence concept in the context of contemporary circumstances. At the same time US policy documents, especially the 2001 NPR and the Pentagon’s 2006 JOC, transformed the official US approach to deterrence and this new approach remained largely in place in the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR. Ideas presented by these scholars and documents have been challenged and debated, and this has served to further push forward the boundaries of strategic thought on deterrence, both nuclear and conventional. Yet old ideas should be set aside, not discarded. If, as Colin Gray argues, the second nuclear era is to be followed by a third that looks not unlike the first,53 yesterday’s tenets on nuclear power and deterrence may have to be dusted off and given new life.
Questions
1 What are the key elements of the traditional concepts of deterrence and compellence?
2 In what ways did the nature of the security environment change in the post-Cold era such that it impacted the concept of deterrence?
3 What is the essence of ‘tailored deterrence’?
4 How do conventional weapons figure in America’s contemporary approach to strategic deterrence?
5 What are the debates surrounding US nuclear force structure and the best means to deter contemporary threats?
6 What are the debates surrounding the NFU concept?
7 Are nuclear weapons relevant to deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons?
8 How do BMD systems impact the concept of nuclear deterrence?
9 What are the difficulties associated with deterring terrorists and in what ways might the deterrence concept be relevant to deterring terrorists?
Notes
1 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists’, in Peter Paret, Ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 735.
2 Bernard Brodie, ‘Implications for Military Policy’, in Bernard Brodie, Ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company for Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), 76.
3 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 271, 273–275, 277.
4 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), Chapters 2–5.
5 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 71–72, 100.
6 Michael Mullen, ‘It’s Time for a New Deterrence Model’, Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 2008), 2.
7 M. Elaine Bunn, ‘Can Deterrence be Tailored?’, INSS Strategic Forum (January 2007), 2.
8 Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 123.
9 Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 103. See also Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), 305–306.
10 Department of Defense, The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2006), 49.
11 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2006), 25, 29–30.
12 Keith Payne, ‘The Continuing Roles for U.S. Strategic Forces’, Comparative Strategy 26 (2007), 270.
13 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 35, 42.
14 Keith B. Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age’, Comparative Strategy 23:4 (2004), 415.
15 Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘Forward to the Nuclear Posture Review’, 8 January 2002, www.fas.org, accessed 2 May 2011, 3.
16 Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy: U.S. Nuclear Policy for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2005), 21, 69–70.
17 Willam J. Perry, ‘Desert Storm and Deterrence’, Foreign Affairs 70:4 (Autumn 1991), 80.
18 As quoted in David S. Yost, ‘New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States’, International Affairs 81 (2005), 86.
19 French Ministry of Defense, as quoted in ibid., 89.
20 Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 136.
21 Perry, 81.
22 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 203, 212.
23 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 36.
24 Michael S. Gerson, ‘No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy’, International Security 35:2 (Autumn 2010), 34.
25 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 33.
26 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘U.S. Military Options Against Emerging Nuclear Threats: The Challenges of a Denial Strategy’, IISS Strategic Comments 12:3 (April 2006), 1.
27 Charles L.
Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions’, International Security 30:2 (Autumn 2005), 84.
28 Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), xii.
29 Ibid. 146.
30 Colin S. Gray, ‘Gaining Compliance: The Theory of Deterrence and Its Modern Application’, Comparative Strategy 29 (2010), 281–282.
31 Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, 120, 145–8, 161.
32 Keith B. Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, Washington Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 2005), 144.
33 As quoted in Yost, 88, 90.
34 Yost, 89.
35 David S. Yost, ‘France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy’, Survival 47:3 (Autumn 2005), 128.
36 Ibid., 121.
37 James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2002–03), 10, 14.
38 As quoted in Stephen J. Cimbala, ‘Nuclear First Use: Prudence or Peril?’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2008), 28.
39 See Scott D. Sagan. ‘The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks’, International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000).
40 Perry, 66.
41 Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, 148.
42 Ibid., 102.
43 Sagan, 106.
44 Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction, 195.
45 Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 144.
46 Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age’, 416.
47 Cimbala, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy, 33.
48 Payne, The Great American Gamble, 293.
49 Former French President Jacques Chirac as quoted in Yost, ‘New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States’, 89.
50 National Research Council, Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11 (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002), 8–14.
51 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 25.
52 Payne, The Great American Gamble, 302.
53 Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, 170.
Further reading
Brodie, Bernard. ‘Implications for Military Policy’, in Bernard Brodie, Ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company for Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946).
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).
Cimbala, Stephen J. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy: U.S. Nuclear Policy for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2005).
Department of Defense. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2006).
Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
Gray, Colin S. The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
Mearsheimer, John J. Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
National Research Council. Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11 (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002).
Payne, Keith B. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
Payne, Keith B. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).
Payne, Keith B., Thomas K. Scheber and Kurt R. Guthe. ‘Deterrence and Al-Qa’ida’, Comparative Strategy 31:5 (2012).
Sagan, Scott D. ‘The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks’, International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000).
Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960).
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
Part II
Strategy and non-state actors
5 Irregular war
Insurgency, counterinsurgency, new war and hybrid war
In the decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a substantial amount of strategic thinking about irregular war. Broadly defined by what it is not – irregular war is not conventional or regular war between two organized militaries of opposing states – this form of war includes at least one non-state entity. Terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare may be considered as part of irregular war. Guerrilla warfare refers to the tactics of hit and run, of enemies who avoid direct battles by hiding in the countryside or urban areas, of opponents who, in the words of C.E. Callwell at the turn of the twentieth century, refuse ‘to meet [regular forces] in the open field’.1 Terrorism eludes a commonly accepted definition, but generally includes attacks on civilians or non-combatants, the seemingly random use of violence and the purposeful creation of fear or panic to intimidate a population or compel a government to do or not do something. Like guerrilla war, terrorism, notes contemporary strategic thinker David Kilcullen, ‘is in the tactical repertoire of virtually every insurgency’.2
In contrast to the tactical nature of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, insurgency, or what was at one time referred to as ‘revolutionary war’, is explicitly tied to an overall goal. ‘Revolutionary war’, argued scholars during the Cold War, ‘refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force … Revolutionary wars occur within states, and have as their objective the seizure of state power’ (emphasis in original).3 More recent US joint doctrine has placed the objective in broader terms, defining insurgency as an organized movement aimed at weakening the control and legitimacy of an established government or occupying power, with the aim of getting the people to accept the insurgents’ authority as legitimate.4 Kilcullen has expanded the goal still further to accommodate a global insurgency aspiring well beyond the control of a state or government apparatus. Insurgency, he argues, is a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through, in addition to terrorism, subversion, political activity, insurrection and armed conflict.5
This chapter examines strategic thought on irregular warfare and specifically on insurgency, counterinsurgency, new war and hybrid war. Apart from Sun Tzu, who was arguably the first to formulate the principles of revolutionary war – attack weakness, avoid strength and be patient (see Chapter 2) – strategic thinking about irregular and revolutionary warfare is relatively new. Jomini advised states to avoid involvement in what today would be called counterinsurgency operations while Clausewitz, notes military historian Martin Van Creveld, ‘ultimately … presented war as something made by [national] armies’.6 Insurgencies themselves are as old as warfare itself, but revolutionary warfare as a fully defined concept is relatively new because it is linked to two phenomena of more recent times: industrialization and imperialism. This chapter begins by briefly highlighting the strategic thought of early and mid-twentieth-century revolutionary warfare theorists and practitioners, including Callwell, T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung, David Galula and Robert Thompson. It then goes on to examine in more detail the substantial and accelerating amount of strategic thought on insurgency, counterinsurgency and new war from the mid-1980s onward. Notable thinkers include Thomas Hammes, Mary Kaldor, Kilcullen, Andrew Krepinevich, William Lind, Rupert Smith, David Petraeus and van Creveld. The chapter concludes by discussing the hybrid war concept, which combines the concept of irregular war with that of more traditional approaches.
Revolutionary war in the early and mid-twentieth century
C.E. Callwell on counterinsurgency
Described by some as the Clausewitz of colonial warfare, British Army Colonel C.E. Callwell fought in Afghanistan, Crete and South Africa in the 1880s and 1890s. His experiences led him to conclude that the conditions and mode of fighting in small wars were so distinct from those of conventional war that irregular warfare had to be carried out on the basis of tot
ally different methods. In his book Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice Callwell therefore sought to sketch out broad rules that governed the conduct of operations in conflicts against adversaries unaccounted for in the works of Clausewitz and Jomini. Small wars he defined by exclusion as all those where opposing forces were not both regular forces, and he makes the useful point that the term ‘small war’ in fact had no relation to the scale of the conflict, merely to the types of entities participating.7
Covering a great range of detail from the overall causes and objectives of small wars, to innumerable tactical elements of military operations, to problems of supply and intelligence, many of Callwell’s broad dictums survived the test of time. He notes, for example, the difficulty of determining the population’s support for an insurrection, the mobility and strategic advantage enjoyed by the insurgent, operating as he is on his home territory, and the need to set clear goals in the conduct of an operation. But others, like the requirement to seek enemy collapse as soon as possible, would seem unrealistic, and it is inevitable that the relevance of tactical elements, such as how best to employ camels and cavalry in flank attacks, would be washed away by time. But a more notable overall weakness was the entirely military focus of Callwell’s strategic thought on measures to kinetically eliminate the insurgent. In later years counterinsurgency would shift dramatically to focus on non-kinetic measures and securing the population.
Callwell sets out from the beginning to discuss his subject from the point of view of the regular troops seeking to quell the insurgency – that is, the counterinsurgent perspective. The unintended effect was that by the time World War One was under way Small Wars seemed obsolete. This was not because the primary war of the era was state to state but rather because, as T.E. Lawrence argued, the advantage had shifted to the insurgent. The new perspective of interest was from that of the irregular forces.