Although the offence is considered the dominant form of war in space today, this may not necessarily always be the case. Satellites are getting smaller and therefore stealthier because space surveillance networks are less and less able to track them; avoiding tracking is starting to include manoeuvring satellites to undisclosed wartime orbits; space systems involve a growing number of cheaper satellites, thereby building in redundancy and creating a ‘swarming’ effect; and satellites increasingly include a mix of civilian and military applications, making them a complicated target for adversaries. In this context: ‘The best defense for a space system in the 21st century may be the dual use system that is owned, operated and used by broad international partners.’45
Conclusion
Strategic thought on spacepower is relatively new and, at least in the unclassified domain, limited only to some types of spacepower missions. Sparked by the 1991 Gulf War, much has been written from the mid-1990s onward about the value of force enhancement through space-based assets – that is, of enhancing the military effectiveness of land, sea and air forces through the integration of space-based capabilities. During the early post-Cold War period the force enhancement capability was dominated by the United States. But as new spacepower players emerged, thereby raising the potential for threats to US capabilities, strategic thinking evolved. The focus expanded to encompass space control and the imperative, during a conflict or crisis, of maintaining access to space-based assets while denying such access to adversaries. In the post-9/11 period the US Air Force and scholars associated with it have written quite extensively on space control or counterspace operations, including defensive and offensive measures. Because strategies associated with the latter range from relatively benign deception and denial, through to hostile destruction, certain aspects of the offensive counterspace mission start to look a lot like combat operations ‘in’ space, blurring the line between counterspace and space force application, a fourth military mission that appears within spacepower strategic thought.
For some spacepower thinkers true spacepower will arrive only when it is possible to directly inflict harm on an adversary’s sea, land, air or space forces using space-based assets, in essence a space-to-space or space-to-terrestrial capability. Although strategic thought in the open literature has yet to emerge on space force application against earthly targets, it seems likely that the value and use of such capabilities will have some resonance with debates about the value and use of strategic airpower. Strategic thinking on space-to-space combat, by contrast, promises to be wholly unique from that which we have seen before, largely because of the most important topographical aspect of space: its lack of gravity and resulting orbital dynamics.
Already theorists have put forth some ideas about what may be the impact of space’s topographical features on combat operations in space. They include an emphasis on the vulnerability of space forces; the difficulty of the defence; the relative advantage of the offence; some fledgling A2/AD ideas; the limited ability to manoeuvre whether on the offence or defence; the tendency toward cluster points and chokepoints which, depending on one’s perspective, make space forces either harder or easier to defend; and the measures that are being taken to increase the defence. This is not an exhaustive list. Notwithstanding the weaponization debate, in the future space warfare is bound to occur between two or more warring states if space is a critical medium for at least one side, and the other side has the capacity for space combat. Before then, much more strategic thinking will need to be done on the conduct of war in the space domain.
Questions
1 What is space and what is the general topography of space going out from earth?
2 What are the unique characteristics of space assets?
3 How can we define spacepower?
4 What is meant by the phrase ‘the 1991 Gulf War was the first space war’?
5 What are the key elements and constraining features of the space control mission?
6 What are the debates surrounding the space force application mission?
7 What are the key elements of strategic thought on the conduct of war in space and from space to earth and what are the linkages with strategic thought on airpower?
Notes
1 James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy, Department of Astronautics, March 1999), 123.
2 As quoted in Mark E. Harter, ‘Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power’, Air & Space Power Journal (Summer 2006), 77, fn 13.
3 M.V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002), 5.
4 David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988). Quotes by Lupton are directly attributed to him in the text but are not footnoted because the document has no page numbers.
5 Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays with Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick and M. Elaine Bunn, eds., Toward a Theory of Spacepower (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), xv–xvii.
6 Everett C. Dolman, ‘Geostrategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22:2 (1999), 96.
7 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 260.
8 Colin S. Gray, ‘The Influence of Space Power Upon History’, Comparative Strategy 15 (1996), 301.
9 Gray, Modern Strategy, 244.
10 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Publication 3–14, 29 May 2013), GL-8.
11 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC: January 2001), chapter 2, p. 10.
12 Oberg, 136.
13 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberwar’, Joint Force Quarterly 60:1 (2011), 48.
14 Gray, ‘The Influence of Space Power Upon History’, 300.
15 US Air Force, Space Operations (Washington, DC: Air Force Doctrine Document 3–14, 19 June 2012), 38.
16 Steven Lambakis, ‘Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond’, Orbis (Summer 1995), 418.
17 Gray, ‘The Influence of Space Power Upon History’, 306.
18 M.V. Smith, ‘Some Propositions on Spacepower’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2002/2003), 57.
19 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberwar’, Joint Force Quarterly 60:1 (2011), 49.
20 Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Space Policy), Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, 25 March 2015, http://docs.house.gov/meetings, accessed 5 January 2016.
21 US Air Force, 39; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-9.
22 Lambakis, 431.
23 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, II.1.
24 Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens and Michael Katz-Hyman, ‘Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of U.S. Spacepower’, in Lutes et al., Toward a Theory of Spacepower, 121, 128.
25 Everett C. Dolman and Henry F. Cooper, Jr., ‘Increasing the Military Uses of Space’, in Lutes et al., Toward a Theory of Spacepower, 107.
26 Report of the Commission, chapter 3, p. 33.
27 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, II-9.
28 US Air Force, Space Operations, 21.
29 US Air Force, Strategic Attack (Washington, DC: Air Force Doctrine Document 3–70, 1 November 2011), 11, 28.
30 Howell M. Estes III, ‘The Aerospace Force of Today and Tomorrow’, in Peter L. Hays et al., Spacepower for a New Millennium (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 171.
31 US Space Command Long Range Plan, April 1998, http://fas.org, accessed June 2011.
32 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Space and U.S. Security: A Net Assessment (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 2009), 3.
33 Report of the Commission, executive summary p. 10 and conclusion p. 100.
34 Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), 311.
35 Benjamin S. Lambeth,
‘Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberwar’, Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 2011), 48–49; see also Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 113.
36 Gray, ‘The Influence of Space Power Upon History’, 303.
37 Smith, ‘Some Propositions on Spacepower’, 64.
38 Everett C. Dolman, ‘U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space’, SAIS Review 26:1 (Winter/Spring 2006), 171.
39 M.V. Smith, ‘Spacepower and Warfare’, Joint Force Quarterly 60:1 (2011), 43.
40 John J. Klein, ‘Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory’, Naval War College Review 57:1 (Winter 2004), 69.
41 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=811B2B7A01B5362E3BE68774176C9860?doi=10.1.1.182.6911&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 21 July 2016)
42 Smith, ‘Some Propositions on Spacepower’, 61.
43 Klein, 67.
44 Smith, ‘Some Propositions on Spacepower’, 61.
45 Smith, ‘Spacepower and Warfare’, 44.
Further reading
DeBlois, Bruce M., Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp and Jeremy C. Marwell. ‘Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon’, International Security 29:2 (Autumn 2004): 50–84.
Lambeth, Benjamin S. Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003).
Lupton, David E. On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988).
Lutes, Charles D. et al.Toward a Theory of Spacepower (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011).
Lynn, William J. ‘A Military Strategy for the New Space Environment’, Washington Quarterly 34:3 (Summer 2011).
Oberg, James E. Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy, Department of Astronautics, March 1999).
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Space and U.S. Security: A Net Assessment (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 2009).
Smith, M.V. Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002).
US Air Force. Space Operations (Washington, DC: Air Force Doctrine Document 31–14, 19 June 2012).
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Space Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Pub. 3–14, 29 May 2013).
Conclusion
Strategy is the use of military force to achieve political objectives, while strategic thought pertains to ideas about how best to employ the military instrument – the conduct of war – for the ends of policy. The more than quarter century since the end of the Cold War has been one of almost continual conflict or war at some level in the international system. The prevalence of wars involving state and non-state actors, and the less frequent but continuing and perhaps increasing incidence of war between states, means that strategy and strategic thought remain critically important. Such thinking can help national leaders manage and contend with crises by shedding light on the contemporary role and contribution of military force in and to a nation’s security policy.
In the almost three decades since the Berlin Wall fell civilian academics and military practitioners have produced a substantial literature pertaining to one or more of the warfare domains – sea, land (conventional and irregular), air, space and cyber – as well as on military topics that do not fit neatly into one domain or another, including joint theory, nuclear warfare and deterrence, peacekeeping, stabilization missions and humanitarian intervention. In some cases their scholarship is explicitly structured around statements or principles about the conduct of war. But in most it is necessary to pull these themes together from elements of different works. Doing so for a range of notable scholars within a domain of warfare reveals learnings that help guide us on how best to employ the military instrument. Viewing these ideas in the context of earlier, pre-Cold War theorists can provide us with still greater understanding.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic thought on seapower focused on open-ocean warfare against other naval forces, while that of his contemporary Sir Julian Corbett incorporated the maritime dimension and the value of projecting naval force from the sea onto land. The views of Corbett predominated in the 1990s, both in terms of strategic thought – such as the US Navy’s ... From the Sea documents – and in actual missions like Bosnia (1993–1995). Over the subsequent decades Corbettian themes continued and continue to be relevant; witness Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and the mission against ISIS in Iraq and Syria (2014 onward). But at the same time Mahanian themes returned, first in the mid to late 2000s as a result of increased piracy and the need to maintain open the sea lines of communication, and more recently in the context of potential great-power naval warfare. Even as the need to operate from the sea on land has continued, perceived A2/AD strategies on the part of countries like China and Russia have pushed potential naval warfare further out to sea. There is a revitalized need to theorize about open-ocean warfare, and a renewed interest in assets and doctrines suited to blue-water missions, such as anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare.
Carl von Clausewitz’s strategic thought on land warfare as a bloody contest of wills that is ultimately resolved through a direct confrontation of military forces is often contrasted with that of Sun Tzu, who presents an indirect approach to warfare characterized by manoeuvre and deception to, ideally, achieve warfare aims without firing a shot. Contemporary strategic thought on landpower incorporates the battlefield strategy of Sun Tzu with the enduring insights on the nature of war expressed so strongly by Clausewitz. Landpower today is often employed using small, mobile units that are dispersed on the battlefield and are linked together through information technology. It features simultaneous and synchronized operations that are non-linear in nature, seeks massed effects with precision technologies and operates at all times in close conjunction with sea, air and space forces. A special emphasis is placed on SOF, a quintessentially Sun Tzuian instrument that relies on small-footprint mobility and surprise. Contemporary strategic thought tells us that with the dramatically increased lethalness of weapons, in order to avoid defeat militaries must move beyond the direct warfare of Clausewitz to the more complex indirect approach of Sun Tzu. But the nature of war as identified by the Prussian general endures. Notwithstanding advanced technologies, sometimes the only way to guarantee victory against the adversary is through direct confrontation and ‘boots on the ground’; non-linear warfare can be chaotic, resembling the game of chance that Clausewitz equates to war; and advanced military systems cannot eliminate – indeed, may exacerbate – the friction of warfare’s many moving parts on the battlefield.
For Giulio Douhet the value of airpower for achieving political objectives lay in securing command of the air, and employing airpower independently as an instrument of fear to target civilian populations and industrial centres. William Mitchell’s thinking, too, stressed command of the air, but also incorporated the notion of air forces working in conjunction with friendly land and sea forces to achieve warfare objectives. Contemporary strategic thought on airpower largely denounces the Douhetian approach, pointing to the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing against population and leadership targets and the limited utility of such bombing against war industry. At the same time, to date only the 1999 Kosovo War has approached realizing the Douhetian enthusiasm for airpower winning wars on its own. In the post-Cold War period the true value of airpower, along the lines of Mitchell’s thinking, has proven to be its use in conjunction with surface and especially land forces. Theatre attack against ground forces and the close air support of friendly forces, i.e. the integration of airpower and landpower, has proven critical in many post-Cold War conflict situations. Strategic thought on airpower has also gone well beyond that of Douhet and Mitchell, to incorporate its contribution to counterinsurgency operations and the notion of using airpower to support indigenous ground forces. Yet despite shortcomings in early thinking on airpower Douhet’s (and Mitchell�
�s) penultimate point remains true: the critical importance of command of the air. In almost every warfare environment since the end of the Cold War military force has operated against the backdrop of US air superiority. This, in turn, has significantly impacted the nature of ground, sea and air operations. UAVs, for example, cannot yet operate in a contested air environment. As peer competitors to the United States emerge, command of the air will no longer be able to taken for granted. Air-to-air doctrines of the World War Two and Cold War periods will have to be re-examined, updated to reflect robotic and unmanned technology, and incorporated into a new generation of strategic thought on airpower.
Classic Cold War nuclear strategists like Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling took an old concept – deterrence – and applied it to the post-World War Two reality of nuclear weapons. In the process they and others spawned a whole new language of deterrence, involving terms like ‘first strike’, ‘second strike’, ‘mutual assured destruction’, ‘deterrence by denial’, and ‘deterrence by punishment’. When the Cold War ended much of the theorizing on nuclear deterrence was no longer relevant, but this did not render the deterrence concept itself obsolete. A new generation of strategic thinkers adapted deterrence to post-Cold War circumstances, pointing out that deterrence strategies must start with Sun Tzu’s dictum of ‘know your enemy’ and be tailored to the specific adversary in mind. Deterrence can involve a combination of nuclear and conventional forces for increased credibility, and some would argue for new kinds of precision nuclear weapons for a credible deterrence strategy. Both defensive and offensive strategies are included in the post-Cold War and, especially, post-9/11 approach to deterrence (as compared to the Cold War’s complete focus on the offence). Contemporary strategic thought tells us that far from being irrelevant, deterrence can be effective even against non-state actors and terrorists if the strategy is one of deterrence by denial.
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