The flurry of strategic thought on counterinsurgency that was sparked by the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq consciously takes as its starting point ideas on insurgency and counterinsurgency from the last century. Of overwhelming importance is the support of the people, both from the insurgent and counterinsurgent perspective. In their thinking about insurgency, or what was at that time known as revolutionary war, Sir Lawrence of Arabia and Mao Tse-tung emphasized the imperative of seeking not the elimination of the enemy but the support of the people. Later, David Galula argues the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it is for the insurgent, and that a counterinsurgency strategy of striking and eliminating insurgents is ineffective since they will only re-establish themselves elsewhere. Rather, the strategy had to be to isolate insurgents from the population and, in this regard, it was critical to cut off porous borders through which insurgents receive outside support. Four decades later, Galula’s ideas formed the starting point of strategic thinking expressed in America’s field manual on counterinsurgency. FM 3–24 argues that killing every insurgent is not possible; rather, insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support. It also advises the counterinsurgent to focus on the population’s needs and security, and to establish and expand secure areas in part by cutting off and addressing porous borders.
Despite theoretical adherence to the ‘hearts and minds’ elements of Galula and his predecessors’ thinking, America was compelled to modify its approach in Afghanistan. It became necessary to use highly discriminate, direct combat strikes against a certain segment of insurgents upon which a population-centric approach had no impact. In fact, although not expressed in FM 3–24, the limited use of force was completely consistent with earlier strategic thought. Lawrence had argued that successful insurgency required only 2 percent of the population to actively support the rebellion with the rest passively supportive, while Galula pointed out that revolutionary wars have only an active minority for the cause, with the rest neutral or against. The challenge for the counterinsurgent was to eliminate – forcibly – the minority, i.e. Lawrence’s 2 per cent.
Peacekeeping started as a stop-gap measure to halt a conflict between states in its tracks in order to prevent a broader conflagration between the great powers. The ‘conduct of war’ in what subsequently became known as traditional peacekeeping operations was guided by the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality and the use of force in self-defence. The new circumstances of the post-Cold War era jettisoned or at minimum challenged each of these three principles. In an inherently contradictory approach, which continues to be pursued, forces were and are asked to remain impartial while at the same time operating in an environment where there is strategic but not tactical consent of the parties, and soldiers need to use force beyond self-defence.
Since the late 1980s new missions have also incorporated a wider range of players and activities, most notably civilians involved in diplomacy, development and building governance, and missions such as overseeing the withdrawal of weapons and holding elections. The nomenclature started as second-generation peacekeeping, then 3D, then the whole-of-government approach, and ultimately the comprehensive approach. These are stabilization and reconstruction missions and the mixed civilian–military approach is recognized by military leaders as being critical to effectively addressing the security concerns of war-torn societies. Humanitarian intervention is a distinct category of operation involving the use of military force on the side of one party with the goal, ideally, of reaching the point where a stabilization and reconstruction mission can be launched. While the theoretical bar on humanitarian intervention has arguably moved substantially forward over the past two decades, missions justified in terms of humanitarian invention have only been undertaken on two occasions – in Kosovo and Libya. Precision airpower and SOF appear to be the military instruments most relevant to such scenarios. The differing current circumstances in these two countries reveal the imperative of launching a stabilization and reconstruction mission following humanitarian intervention.
Strategic thought on joint, space and certainly cyberwar is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Although jointness in warfare – that is, one warfare domain working in conjunction with one or more other domains on the battlefield – can be seen historically, its full advancement and necessity is tied to the information revolution that began in earnest in the 1970s and was first exhibited in the 1991 Gulf War. Over the past quarter century it has become increasingly the case that the effective use of military force to further political objectives must involve the integration of sea, land, air, space and – since the late 2000s – cyber capabilities. Fledgling strategic thought on cyberwar tells us that cyber strikes should be launched offensively in the opening phases of a conflict, even pre-emptively, and that offensive cyber strikes should be closely synchronized with or conducted in parallel or simultaneously with conventional strikes. They might be employed as a one-time bolt from the blue or, conversely, be deployed over a long period of time, surreptitiously, stealthily and patiently to manipulate information. Surprise and deception are quintessential elements of cyberwar which, because of the difficultly of developing cyber tools that can achieve strategic objectives, is most effectively waged by state actors.
Space power involves the now familiar role whereby space-based systems are used to enhance the military effectiveness of sea, land and air systems. But as militaries become ever more dependent on space-based systems, the space control mission – ensuring friendly force access while denying access to adversaries – has grown in importance. Because of the unique physical properties of space, space control is best secured through defensive measures or offensive non-kinetic means against adversary assets. Principles of non-kinetic combat in space, in turn, may include the area defence of cluster and chokepoints. Kinetic space control is inherently self-destructive since the debris remains in orbit, ultimately putting one’s own assets at risk, although it is possible kinetic A2/AD strategies could be implemented in the lowest of low orbit bands where debris is likely to fall through the atmosphere. Looking still further out, principles of force application from space to land – which are as yet classified, if they indeed exist at all – will likely mirror airpower themes as to the value of strategic and tactical strikes.
One hopes that the world’s crises can be resolved without the use of military force. But this is not the evidence of history, nor is it likely to be mankind’s future, notwithstanding valiant efforts to reduce or eliminate the scourge of war such as the creation of the United Nations and the promulgation of the collective security concept. Negotiation, mediation and a range of diplomatic efforts are the first steps in international crisis management, to be followed, if these things are not successful, with economic sanctions. Yet even sanctions, which are a form of coercion, are not always sufficient and it often becomes necessary to undertake a limited or wider use of military force. When war comes, political leaders need to know how best to employ the military instrument – that is, to understand the link between the use of military force and the political goal they seek. For this they and their advisors must necessarily turn to existing strategic thought.
Strategic thought in the land domain of warfare emerged early in the nineteenth century, followed by the sea domain at the end of that century. The twentieth century saw further thinking on the sea domain and then much strategic thought about airpower and, later, nuclear power. Strategic thinking on insurgency and counterinsurgency is sprinkled throughout the twentieth century, which also included many ideas on peacekeeping from its mid-point onward. The post-Cold War era has been still more complex, necessitating entirely new strategic thought across the joint, space and, in the twenty-first century, cyber domains, as well as efforts to re-examine traditional domains (land, sea, air and nuclear) and types of missions (peacekeeping and counterinsurgency) to make them relevant to the contemporary period.
In the quarter century since the end of the Cold
War strategic thought has been abundant. The result, as recorded at the end of each chapter, is a number of principles that indicate how a particular kind of military power can best be employed to affect the course of a conflict. Still more important is the knowledge that pursuing strategic effects in war today must be a joint effort: war plans must account for sea, land, air, space and cyber forces working together to achieve the political objective of the mission, whether it be one of warfighting, peacekeeping or counterinsurgency. Further thinking remains to be done, particularly in the newest domains of space and cyber. Nonetheless, contemporary strategic thought has already gone some distance toward advancing a contemporary understanding of the role of military forces in a nation’s security policy – that is, modern military strategy.
Index
‘1,000 ship navy’ 13–14
3D 111, 112, 115, 180
Afghanistan 10, 49, 52, 78, 134, 179;
2001–02 war in 29, 44, 46, 122, 128, 137;
airpower in 50, 51;
counterinsurgency missions in 94, 95, 96;
NATO mission in 108, 112;
and special operations forces 32, 47, 48, 50;
and stability operations in 21, 111, 112
AirLand Battle 2, 21, 25, 38, 121
Airpower 25–26, 33, 36, 52;
and Afghanistan 46–48;
and counterinsurgency 42, 49–50, 178;
and Douhet 36–39, 178;
general theorists of 39–43, 131, 154, 165;
and Islamic State 49;
and joint operations 31, 47;
and Mitchell 38–39, 178;
and NATO operations 11, 45–46, 48–49, 103;
and peace operations 50–51;
and precision strike missions 41–47;
and situational awareness 43–44;
and space 160, 170, 172, 174;
and Special Operations Forces 32, 47–48, 180
AirSea Battle 16
Al Qaeda 32, 48, 85, 89, 94, 155
Anti‐Access/Area‐Denial (A2/AD) 2, 15–17, 39;
and China 16, 177;
and space 173–174, 181
Anti‐satellite weapons 96, 163, 172;
and China 167–169
Arquilla, John 85–86, 141–142, 155–156
Ballistic missile defence 56, 63, 68–69, 169
Biddle, Stephen 31, 45–48, 128
Biological weapons 68, 146, 170
Blitzkrieg 84, 121, 124–125, 135
Bosnia 11–12, 21, 108, 110, 117, 177;
and UNPROFOR 103–104, 106, 107
Boutros Ghali, Boutros 105, 107, 110
Brahimi report 109
Britain 41, 48, 51, 93, 102, 166;
and military innovation 135–137;
and nuclear doctrine 62, 68
Brodie, Bernard 56–57, 179
Bush, George W. 47, 128;
and deterrence 64–65, 70;
and nuclear doctrine 60–61, 68
C4I 123, 125–126, 129, 148
Callwell, C.E. 77–78, 80
Cambodia 104, 106, 112
Canada, and satellite technology 166
Cebrowski, Arthur 12–13, 128–131
Chechnya 95–96
Chemical weapons 68, 146, 156
China 10, 80;
and anti‐satellite weapons 167–169;
and cyberwar 145, 148–149, 156;
and navy/anti‐access strategies 14–17, 39, 177;
and nuclear doctrine 66–67;
and People’s Liberation Army 27–28;
and satellite navigation system 166;
and space power 170, 172;
and unmanned aerial vehicles 51–52
Cimbala, Stephen 61, 65
Clausewitz, Carl von 20–21, 121, 154, 178;
and airpower 40;
and contemporary warfare 29–32;
and high‐tech warfare 126–127, 129, 133;
and irregular war 77–78, 83–84, 89;
and peace support operations 107, 111;
strategic thought of 22–24
Cohen, Eliot 125–126, 129
Compellence 58
Comprehensive approach 82, 111–112, 115, 180
Computer network attack, see cyberwar
Computer network exploitation 141–142
Congo 104, 110
Corbett, Julian Stafford 7, 11, 13, 17, 121, 177;
strategic thought of 8–9
Corum, James 50
Counterinsurgency operations 21, 25, 33, 96–97;
and airpower 46, 49, 50, 52, 77–78, 178;
and Callwell 78;
critiques of 94–95;
and FM 3–24 91–93, 179;
and Galula 80–81, 179;
and Kilcullen 89–90;
and Krepinevich 82–83;
and military transformation 134–135;
and Nagl 93–94;
and New Wars scholars 87;
and Petraeus 90–91;
and stability operations 111–112, 181;
and Thompson 81–82
Crimea 96, 150
Croatia 103
Cyberwar (computer network attack) 56, 96, 156–157, 180;
character of 145, 147;
and China 145, 148;
conduct of 147–150;
defensive 149;
definition of 141–143;
goal of 146;
and non‐state actors/terrorists 155–156;
offensive 144, 147, 149;
and Russia 144–145, 150;
and strategic potential 154–156;
and US military 148–149;
and Stuxnet 146–147;
and war questions 150–153
Dayton peace accord 12, 103–104, 107
Defence Support Program satellite system 166
Deptula, David 130–131
Deterrence 56, 66, 72, 179;
and ballistic missile defence 69;
and chemical and biological weapons, 68;
Cold War 57–58;
conventional 61–62, 179;
and cyberwar 147, 153;
and drones 52;
Post‐Cold War 58–61, 63–64
and New Triad 60, 61, 63, 65, 68;
and terrorism 70–71;
and US Navy 8, 16–17;
Douhet, Giulio 52, 121, 178;
and contemporary warfare 39, 41–42, 44–45, 49;
strategic thought of 36–39
Drones (see unmanned aerial vehicles)
Earle, Edward Mead 1
East China Sea 52
Effects based operations 130–133, 137
Electronic warfare 142–143, 148
Estonia 143–144, 150–151, 153
Ethnic cleansing 87, 113, 115
European Union 14, 108, 166
Farrell, Theo 136–137
Fourth generation war 84–86, 88
France 48, 102, 166;
and military innovation 135–137:
and nuclear doctrine 62, 65–68, 70
Freedman, Lawrence 56, 70–71
Friedman, Norman 10, 171
Fulda Gap 25
Galula, David 82;
and contemporary thinking 83, 90–91, 93–94, 179;
strategic thought of 80–81, 96, 179
Gentile, Gian 94–96
Georgia: 2008 war in 28, 141, 143, 145, 150
Global positioning system 161, 166
Globalization 13, 15, 90, 97;
definition of 7
Goldwater‐Nichols Act 121
Goulding, Marrack 103, 108
Gray, Colin:
and nuclear power 63–65, 69, 72;
and the revolution in military affairs 125, 128;
and spacepower 163, 164–166, 171
Guerrilla war 77, 79–80, 82, 87, 97
Gulf War 1991 21;
and airpower 36, 39, 42–46, 49;
and effects based operations 130–131;
as ‘first space war’ 123, 160, 165, 167;
; and joint warfare 121
Hammes, Thomas 89–90, 93, 97;
and 4GW 85–87
Hezbollah 49, 95
Hoffman, Frank 95–96
Hohmann Transfer Orbit 162
Humanitarian intervention 101, 112, 177, 180;
and Libya 115;
and responsibility to protect 113–115
Hurricane Katrina 14
Hybrid war 95–96
Improvised explosive devices 20, 46, 50, 96
Information operations 142–143
Information warfare 141–143, 149, 156
Insurgency 94–97;
and airpower 50;
definition of 77;
and FM 3–24 91–92;
and Galula 80–81;
and Lawrence 78–79;
and Mao 79–80;
Post‐Cold War strategic thought on 82–83, 85–86, 89–90, 179
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 46, 50–51, 123, 125–126
International Telecommunications Union 164
Iran 51, 66, 146
Iraq War 2003 21, 29, 44, 47, 128;
and counterinsurgency 88, 94;
and high‐tech warfare 128, 132, 137;
and landpower 30–31;
and Special Operations Forces 32, 48
Islamic State 32, 47, 49, 51, 177
Israel 25, 49, 51, 95, 102, 147
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