General ‘Boy': The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning

by Richard Mead

  Map 4. Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

  Horrocks had been caught at St Oedenrode, on the wrong side of the cut, and was only able to return by a cross-country route with a carrier platoon from 50 Division, not arriving back until the following morning. During his absence the operation to put 4 Dorset across the Lower Rhine had been a costly failure. The assault boats for the battalion had failed to arrive, two lorry-loads having gone off the road, whilst the other two had taken a wrong turning and ended up in the German lines. It was decided to transfer the boats allocated to the Poles to 4 Dorset, but after the delay it was past 0100 hrs on 25 September before the operation was able to commence. Many boats were destroyed on the bank or on the way across, and those men who landed on the far side found themselves under withering fire and showers of hand grenades from the Westerbouwing Heights, which dominated the landing site. Most of those who survived, including the CO, Lieutenant Colonel Tilly, were taken prisoner and a mere handful made it into the 1 Airborne perimeter.

  One of the few to survive the crossing and arrive in the perimeter was the division’s CRE, Eddie Myers. He carried with him a letter which Boy had given to him for Urqhuart after the meeting at the Airborne Corps HQ on 23 September. It read:

  Dear Roy

  Sosabowski will be bringing you this, I hope tonight.

  I will not labour your present position, and it may be little consolation to you and the 1st Division when I tell you that the opinion held this side of the river is that the action of the 1st Division has, apart from the killing of the many Boche it has undoubtedly achieved, enabled XXX Corps and the Airborne Corps between them to capture the Nijmegen bridges and to break clean through the main German defence line on the Waal.

  From the information at our disposal, the German undoubtedly moved back the bulk of his forces from Nijmegen to Arnhem just before our airborne attack took place, and instead of the Nijmegen crossings being an acutely difficult problem, the Arnhem crossings have become most acute in consequence.

  You can rest assured that XXX Corps are doing their maximum under the most appalling difficulties to relieve you. As you know, I am responsible for from inclusive Nijmegen down the narrow corridor for about 40 miles, and the road has been cut for 24 hours, which does not help matters much. It is now through again, and the Army is pouring through to your assistance but, as you will appreciate better than I do, very late in the day.

  I naturally feel, not so tired and frustrated as you do, but probably almost worse about the whole thing than you do.

  I enclose a letter from Field Marshal Monty,3 and I hope to see you in a day or two.

  It may amuse you to know that my front faces in all directions, but I am only in close contact with the enemy for about 8000 yards to the south-east, which is quite enough in present circumstances.

  Yours ever

  F.A.M. Browning

  Delivered twenty-four hours later than anticipated, the contents of the letter were already out of date. Boy had handed over responsibility for the corridor later on the day on which it was written and the road had been cut again. Boy’s assessment of the German movements around Nijmegen and Arnhem was quite inaccurate, largely because intelligence on the ground remained far from perfect. It is doubtful if the letter brought much comfort to Urquhart and the extent of his amusement or otherwise over the last paragraph has never been disclosed.

  Myers also brought with him a more useful letter from Thomas regarding a withdrawal, codenamed Operation ‘Berlin’. At 0800 hrs on 25 September Urquhart raised Thomas on the radio and told him that it had to happen that night. Together with Mackenzie, Myers and his remaining staff he then planned the withdrawal, based on the concept of the ‘collapsing bag’ derived from his knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign. This was to be covered by the artillery of 43 Division and XXX Corps and to be carried out by 16 assault boats manned by 43 Division’s engineers and 21 motorized storm boats crewed by Canadian engineers, all under the control of the division’s newly arrived CRE, Mark Henniker, formerly of Boy’s staff.

  In the meantime Boy and Horrocks had met on the latter’s return from the south. It took them fifteen seconds to agree on evacuation and authority was given by Dempsey at 1215. Montgomery had been at Dempsey’s Tac HQ again that morning and the two had discussed the situation fully. For the two most senior commanders, the Phantom message received by Boy from Urquhart on the preceding evening, and forwarded to Second Army and 21st Army Group, had been conclusive and Montgomery agreed that it was time to throw in the towel.

  In the event the evacuation, across the river from the vicinity of Oosterbeek church, was a success thanks to good planning, bad weather, the discipline of the airborne troops and the devotion to duty of the sappers manning the boats. A total of 1,741 men from 1 Airborne (out of 8,969 who had flown in), 422 glider pilots, 160 Poles and 75 Dorsets were brought across, and a number of others were to escape individually or in small groups over the coming weeks and months, including Hackett and Lathbury. The wounded were left behind under the care of the division’s doctors. After the crossing, the men were assembled at a reception area some way from the river and then most were transported by lorry to Nijmegen, although some had to march. Boy had sent Cator in his jeep to drive Urquhart back to Airborne Corps HQ. It surprised many at the time and has been the subject of criticism subsequently that he was not there himself to meet the survivors. The best that can be said is that it was atypical of him.

  When Urquhart arrived at the HQ at 0300 he was offered a change of clothing and a bed but he insisted first on seeing Boy, who entered after some delay, immaculately dressed as always. In Urquhart’s words: ‘He looked as if he had just come off parade instead of from his bed in the middle of a battle. I tried to display some briskness as I reported: ‘The division is nearly out now. I’m sorry we haven’t been able to do what we set out to do.’ Browning offered me a drink and assured me that everything was being done for the division. ‘You did all you could’, he said. ‘Now you had better get some rest.’ It was a totally inadequate meeting.’4

  Quite what Boy was doing on the evening and through the night of 25/26 September has never been explained. He still had significant responsibilities elsewhere, but although there was constant shelling of 82 Airborne’s positions and a number of small actions, this was a relatively quiet period on Gavin’s front. It seems most likely that he was following the example of Montgomery, who invariably insisted on a proper night’s sleep, regardless of the state of any battle in which he might be engaged. Whilst his attitude rankled with Urquhart, it was clearly not the time for a full debrief, but he could and probably should have shown more sympathy. As it was his Guardsman’s reserve and stiff upper lip came to the fore, although to judge by one of his letters to Daphne he was far from critical. ‘Roy Urquhart’s party has done magnificently,’ he wrote later, ‘but have been very badly knocked about. They have covered themselves in glory and without them we couldn’t have done what we have done.’5

  He did better on the afternoon of the next day when he addressed the survivors, going to each of the three buildings in which they were housed. One of those from 1 Airborne described the scene: ‘The Commander of the Airborne Corps entered with his retinue, and climbed a table in the centre of the hall. He had made many speeches in his time, but never one to an audience such as this. Their mood was dumb weariness, and a tremendous dignity. He realized that they were beyond authority, having no more to give; truth would be clear to them, insincerity would be scabrous. They were most expectant. It was difficult to hear, on all four sides of the General, and as they all wanted to hear, there was a little grumbling. It was a very courageous moment for him.’6

  Boy had confided to Cator earlier that he was dreading this task. He decided that only the unvarnished truth would do and so he told them exactly what had happened, why they had dropped in three lifts and so far away from their objective, how the rest of the Airborne Corps had fared and what had happened to XXX Corps on its way north. He
told them clearly that they should not regard their efforts as a failure, as these had enabled a springboard into Germany to be established at Nijmegen. Finally he assured them that they would be going back to England as quickly as transport could be arranged. The speech was well received, one glider pilot describing it as ‘impressive and very sensible’.

  Both this episode and the earlier meeting with Urquhart were examples of how Boy could keep his emotions under control, one of the most notable features of his character. He was, even at times of great stress, able to present a front to the world at large which was at odds with what he was really feeling. In replying to Cornelius Ryan’s research assistant for the book of A Bridge Too Far, Daphne wrote: ‘One thing I do know, although he did not talk about it, was that his grief at the loss of life at Arnhem was very deep indeed, and although the casualties of battle is a hazard that all military commanders have to face, this particular loss was something to which he could never become reconciled. He truly loved the men under his command, and the various regiments that combined to make up the Airborne Forces, his pride and his faith in them was tremendous, I would say – next to his family – the dearest thing in his life.’7

  Daphne herself had no idea at the time of what was happening. Although she knew that he was off on an operation on 17 September, there was silence after that, as any letters he wrote were subject to considerable delay. Not long after the evacuation, however, she was woken by a telephone call from a newspaper reporter at three in the morning to ask if it was true that Boy had been taken prisoner. A rumour had indeed been put about by the Germans that he had been captured. The War Office was roused into action and eventually Rear HQ managed to contact Chatterton and Loring, Boy’s DDOS, who both confirmed that he was alive and well. Chatterton, returning to England ahead of Corps HQ, rang Daphne to reassure her.

  The survivors of 1 Airborne Division moved to Louvain on 28 September and began to return to England on the following day. Urquhart’s mood had not improved on the day after the evacuation, when he attended a dinner to celebrate the division’s return, which he found an ordeal. When Sosabowski visited him, he found him ‘in a low state, both physically and mentally … his whole attitude was one of deep and bitter disappointment.’8 Things began to look up when he lunched with Dempsey before going on to stay with Montgomery at his Tac HQ. Urquhart found Montgomery, unlike Boy, totally understanding, and he was asked to give a full account of the battle. When he left the following morning, Montgomery gave him a letter which was written in terms guaranteed to raise morale, also sending a copy to the Director of Public Relations at the War Office, with instructions that it should be published in all the newspapers on 30 September. The letter concluded: ‘In years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: I fought at Arnhem.’ It was a modest but nonetheless valuable consolation. Boy had also written to Urquhart, but in much more formal terms (see Appendix 1), whilst Montgomery’s letter to Boy on 24 September was brief and to the point:

  My dear Browning

  I have been following with intense admiration the operations of your Airborne Corps. The whole Corps, British and American, has done magnificently. I send to you, and to all officers and men, my very best congratulations. Please let them all know how well I consider they have done.

  Yrs sincerely

  B. L. Montgomery

  HQ Airborne Corps was to remain in Nijmegen for nearly a fortnight longer. On the face of it, there was still much to do. Horrocks was fighting what was rapidly developing into a slogging match for control of the Island. Progress on either side of ‘Hell’s Highway’ remained slow and for a time there was only the most slender of contacts with VIII Corps north of Uden. The front facing the Reichswald remained vulnerable with activity continuing around the Kiekberg Woods, from which a number of German attacks were mounted and which Gavin was anxious to retake, and the Den Heuvel Woods between Groesbeek and Wyler. The weather continued unsettled and Boy’s cold, which had seemed to improve, started up again after he managed to get himself completely soaked.

  Unlike 1 Airborne the Poles had not been withdrawn to the UK. Instead, after marching back to Nijmegen they had been sent to guard the airfield at Oude Keent, for which they were placed under the command of 157 Brigade. As a major general, Sosabowski was incensed at having to take orders from a much younger brigadier, believing that it was a deliberate slight by Boy. He sent a message asking to be released from 157 Brigade’s control. Boy replied explaining that that move had been necessitated by the disorganization of the Polish Parachute Brigade after the fighting on the Island and the need for reinforcement of 157 Brigade, but also agreeing to bring the Poles back under the direct command of the Airborne Corps. They were ordered to guard the two bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal and hold a defensive position west of Grave. The episode did little to improve the relationship between the two men and made Sosabowski even more determined to maintain his brigade’s independence.

  Montgomery arrived in Nijmegen for the first time on 29 September and was received at I Airborne Corps HQ by a guard of honour from the Glider Pilot Regiment. He met Gavin, Taylor, Adair and Thomas and then held a conference with Dempsey, Horrocks and Boy, at which the immediate plans were discussed. Montgomery had already mentally cut his losses over the failure to get across the Lower Rhine and, as ever, remained outwardly optimistic about future operations. His priority was to retain the ground already captured on the Island, made more difficult the previous night by German divers destroying the Nijmegen railway bridge and severely damaging the road bridge. I Airborne Corps, with 82 Airborne Division, 157 Brigade, the Royal Netherlands Brigade and the Polish Parachute Brigade under command, continued to have responsibility for the whole area in Allied hands between the Waal and the Maas, and for the defence of Grave. On 1 October it also took responsibility for the immediate bridgehead north of the Waal and for the defence against future German raids of the Nijmegen road bridge and a newly constructed pontoon bridge.

  Notwithstanding its responsibilities and continuing probing attacks against the 82 Airborne sector, Brian Urquhart, who had arrived from the UK following his ‘sick leave’ recalled that the HQ ‘had virtually nothing to do in Nijmegen. We lived on the outskirts of the town in a villa which was periodically shelled by German 88mm guns and tried to keep ourselves busy, but nobody’s heart was in it.’9 After ten days, he found his position something of an embarrassment to himself and others and asked for a posting elsewhere, which Boy undertook to arrange. ‘As usual’ wrote Urquhart later, ‘he was as good as his word.’10 Boy wrote to Urquhart on his departure asking that their previous disagreements should be kept confidential between the two of them, to which the disillusioned young officer readily agreed.

  On 1 October 3 Division crossed the Maas ahead of VIII Corps, coming temporarily under Boy’s command and during the next few days the responsibility for his area was gradually handed over to O’Connor. 157 Brigade and the Royal Netherlands Brigade were transferred to XII Corps and 82 Airborne to XXX Corps. On 7 October the order was received for the HQ to move back to the UK and it was pulled out two days later.

  The causes of the failure of Operation ‘Market Garden’ were many and complex. A number of the senior commanders were subsequently to go into print with their own assessments. Montgomery blamed first the failure by Eisenhower to deliver the support he had promised, secondly the drops at Arnhem being too far away from the bridge, for which he took the blame himself, thirdly the weather and fourthly the battle state of II Panzer Corps being far beyond the Allies’ expectations. He wrote in his Memoirs that the first of these was the prime cause of failure: ‘In my – prejudiced – view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job – it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’S unrepentant advocate.’11

  The A
mericans blamed XXX Corps. Ridgway expressed their common view succinctly in his own memoirs: ‘I have always felt, and I still feel, that the sluggish actions of the ground armies in that campaign were inexcusable. A more vigorous ground supervision from the top could have driven that armoured force on through.’12 Roy Urquhart agreed with him, writing many years later ‘I think it is possible that for once Horrocks’s enthusiasm was not transmitted adequately to those who served under him.’13 He also blamed the choice of sites for the landing and drop zones, the poor intelligence on German forces in the area and the lack of close air support.

  Horrocks himself agonized over the XXX Corps performance and his own role, but concluded: ‘The sense of desperate urgency was there all right. There could be no doubt about that, and it was not for want of trying that we failed to arrive in time.’14 He did think, however, that he would have been wiser to have carried out a left hook with 43 Division over the Lower Rhine much further to the west and attack the Germans from behind, although to have done so would still not have enabled his corps to reach its planned objective on the Ijsselmeer. He also blamed his narrow front, famously saying to Gavin when they first met: ‘Jim, never try to fight an entire Corps off one road.’15