Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  The ultimate function of the penal regiments was not combat. Prior to the invasion of Russia they were to serve as manpower pools for other units, replacing losses and providing new drafts to fill out new units. The Regiment had a force of 4,000 men, but prior to 1812 it had sent 600 others to form the fifth battalions of the 29th and 112th Line Infantry Regiments, 840 to form the 7/6th Line Infantry Regiment, 500 to the 14th Légère, 860 to the 6th Line Infantry Regiment, 560 went to the 5/14th Line Infantry, and 360 were detached to form the 1st and 2nd Sapper Companies de l'Elbe. This indicates that a total of 8,590 men passed through the regiment and into the regular army. In addition, the 2eme Regiment de la Mediterranée processed 8,160, l'Ile de Walcheren processed 10,831, Belle-Isle processed 4,580, and l'Ile de Ré processed 6,220 men. This means that the penal regiments salvaged and rehabilitated 38,351 deserters, returning them to the ranks. This number, which is equivalent to a full division, clearly indicates the importance of these regiments to Napoleon.

  Tactics and Drill

  In 1812 there was only one set of drill regulations in effect for the French, the Regulation of 1791. These regulations were founded on the linear tactics of the eighteenth century but had undergone major modifications during the wars since the French Revolution. The modifications were principally in the field of skirmish tactics (something not discussed in the regulation), a new form of the basic anticavalry formation known as the “square/” and a few other tactics.

  The French infantry company, when used as a tactical organization, was renamed and known as the “peloton.” It was formed in three ranks spaced at thirteen-inch intervals. The first rank was composed of the tallest men and the second rank had the shortest men. During a campaign, if casualties were sufficiently great, the third rank would be fed into the first two ranks to maintain the peloton” s frontage.

  Each peloton was divided into two sections for drill purposes. Two pelotons operating together formed a “division,”' which should not be confused with the larger formation consisting of thousands of men. All maneuvers and tactics were performed with either the section, peloton, or division.

  The tactics and linear evolutions employed by the armies of this period were extremely complicated and called for extensive schooling of both the soldiers and officers. The first step for a new recruit was the “école du soldat99 or soldier's school. This school was divided into three parts. The first taught the recruit how to carry his weapon; the second taught him how to maintain, load, and fire it; the third taught the different marching cadences, the principals of marching, dressing of the ranks, formation conversions, and changes of direction. From there the soldier learned and relearned each maneuver in successively larger and larger formations.

  The basic pace was twenty-six English inches (two French feet) in length. The French used this pace with five cadences: the “pas ordinaire” (76 paces per minute), the “pas de route99 (85-90 paces per minute), the “pas acceleré99 (100 paces per minute), the “pas de charge99 (120 paces per minute), and the “pas de course” (200-250 paces per minute). The “pas de course” was used after 1792 to some advantage and was prescribed in the Exercise Regulation of 1769. However, Napoleon generally preferred the “pas acceleré.”

  Musketry

  The system of fire used by the French prior to this period had been established by the Regulation of 1764. It was based on the three-rank peloton. The Regulation of 1791 had established a two-rank voluntary firing system to supplement it, because fire from the third rank had proven impractical when the troops were wearing backpacks. In this situation the third rank loaded muskets and passed them forward.

  The French infantry were taught to fire by peloton, by demibattalion,and by battalion. They were taught an advancing fire where the battalion would advance alternate pelotons, which would fire when they halted. The nonfiring pelotons would then advance. Though the men were taught to fire with the front rank kneeling, in actual combat this was discouraged. It was found that the men were unwilling to stand up once permitted to kneel.

  One of the principal forms of musketry was fire by ranks. During this evolution, the third rank stood six and one-half inches to the right and fired through the gaps in the two front ranks. In this system the third rank fired first, then the second rank fired and the first rank fired last. Since the ranks were never permitted to fire voluntarily, the peloton was always able to maintain a reserve firing capability. This was intended to protect it against a surprise cavalry attack. In comparison, the British two-rank system seems to have proven superior, but it should be remembered that the Prussians, and no doubt other armies, practiced a “swarm attack” with light cavalry that was designed to tease a line into firing. Once the line had fired and was struggling to reload, heavy cavalry, which had been masked by the light cavalry, would sweep down upon the now helpless infantry.

  A musket ball if fired horizontally would carry about 400 paces. In order to hit a target at 800 or 900 paces it was necessary to aim three feet above the target. Formal guidance was provided for aiming, but in actual practice aimed shot was rare, and someone being hit by an aimed musket shot was even rarer. In combat situations, men would begin to load and fire automatically, ignoring target location or terrain. They were known to fire horizontally from parapets, and the shot would pass over the heads of their enemies.

  Musketry in this period was inaccurate at best, even without considering the problems of the individual handling the weapon. The tolerances of the weapons were crude and as the ball passed down the barrel it bounced from one side of the barrel to the other, seldom going in the direction in which it was aimed. This inaccuracy led to the dependence on massed formations that fired generally unaimed weapons at another large target.

  The Regulation of 1791 was exacting in its requirements for target fire. Marshal Davout further reiterated this ordinance and ordered on 16 August 1811 that “all soldiers shall exercise at 50 toises (108 yards = 100 meters), then at 100 toises (216 yards = 200 meters), and finally at 150 toises (324 yards = 300 meters). He added that at “50 toises the troops would see their shot falling low and at 150 toises their shot would fire higher”—that is to say above the point at which they had aimed.

  The Prussians, as did others, performed a famous experiment to determine the accuracy of their weapons. They erected a canvas screen, 100 feet by 6 feet, roughly the shape of a formed infantry peloton. A grenadier company fired volleys at this target from ranges of 225, 150, and 75 yards. The hits registered on the target were 25 percent, 40 percent, and 60 percent respectively. The geometric increase in accuracy resulting from the decrease in target range had bloody ramifications if a trained unit held its fire to the last minute. Despite this, most battlefield casualties resulted from casual musketry fire and artillery fire, not from volleys exchanged between two infantry formations.

  A good shot from a musket under combat situations could hit a man at 100 yards, despite the target practice prescribed. Rifles were more accurate than muskets, but were handicapped by a much lower rate of fire. While rifles were in use by the military during this period, they had generally disappeared from the French army. The Bavarian, Austrian, and Prussian light infantry were armed with rifles, but in the French army only the sergeants of the light infantry voltigeur companies carried them.

  The musket of this day had several drawbacks besides the lack of accuracy. The principal charge in the musket was detonated by a spark produced by a flint hitting the steel frizzen. This spark ignited loose powder in the pan which, in turn, transmitted the fire into the musket via the touch hole. The flint was subject to wear and required adjustment or replacement after about twenty rounds. The powder in the pan was also known to “flash” without igniting the main charge (hence the phrase “a flash in the pan”). This was dangerous because soldiers often did not realize that their musket had not fired. If they reloaded the musket and attempted to fire it a second time, the double or multiple charge in the barrel could detonate with disastrous results.

/>   Assuming that everything went well and the piece fired, a rate of three to four rounds a minute could be attained. This rate of fire could not be maintained very long. The barrel would foul from the residue of the coarsely milled and refined powder. Accuracy would also diminish as repeated volleys fouled the barrels and filled the air with smoke that obscured the enemy.

  Maneuvering and Formations

  Upon completing this phase of training, the soldier advanced to the “école de bataillon.” This school was divided into five sections. The first was concerned with the opening of ranks and firing in formation; the second dealt with formation changes to column from line; the third addressed long-distance marching and such diverse movements as changes of direction and countermarching; the fourth section taught the different methods of passing from column to line; and the fifth section taught the different methods of entering and exiting the battlefield, changes of front, the passage through line formations, the attack column, and how to rally and reform.

  The linear evolutions in the field were little more than a regiment or brigade application of the lessons taught in the battalion school. This drill permitted the regiment or battalion to perform all that was necessary for it to operate in the field.

  The Regulation of 1791 had directed that the square, an anticavalry formation, be formed in the shape of a dense, solid column if a single battalion was to form the square. The only hollow square discussed was a multibattalion formation. However, because of the reorganization of the battalion from the eight-company organization to a six-company organization by the Decree of 18 February 1808, this formation was not readily adaptable. In place of the dense column, the “carré d'Egypte” became far more commonly used. This formation was rectangular, formed with a one-peloton depth and a division (two-peloton) frontage. It was only three ranks deep. Since this formation had two different-sized faces, it could be arranged parallel or perpendicular to the battle, depending on where the greater fire was required.

  In addition to battalion squares, the French also formed regimental squares. These were often massive formations formed with several battalions. They were arranged to maximize the fire that could be directed against the enemy cavalry. They were used at the battle of Borodino and many battles in 1813.

  The three infantry schools produced a soldier capable of performing every maneuver necessary. The officers and noncommissioned officers attended these schools so that they might obtain a complete understanding of the maneuvers, but after they completed those schools they passed on to further training provided in “regimental schools” established for that specific purpose. Marshal Davout was the first to formally establish these schools, and he made them standard preparation for command. In February 1811, the regimental schools had the goal of training 200 students per infantry regiment (60 corporals and 140 soldiers) and 100 per cavalry regiment (30 brigadiers and 70 troopers), all chosen for their aptitude.

  These regimental schools ran for two to three months. They were taught by officers and noncommissioned officers from a manual on the duties of an officer written by Marshal Davout. This manual, which presented everything in a practical manner, with an eye towards actual field considerations, concerned itself with every aspect of the regiment's functions. These included placing sentinels, going on patrols, making day and night reconnaissance, searching woods and villages, constructing field works, occupying defiles and bridgeheads, crossing ditches, serving guns, spiking and unspiking guns, and other necessary skills. In addition there was training in writing, mathematics, and bookkeeping.

  During the Armistice of Schònbrunn, in 1809, General Mathieu Dumas was charged with drawing up a regulation on the service of troops on campaign. Unfortunately, this regulation was drawn up in too great haste and was little more than a compilation and revision of the old regulations. It proved to be an unworkable tangle that was of little use to the French army.

  In 1812, General Preval undertook the same project and wrote “Projet de règlement de service pour les armées en campagne.” Chapter X was particularly instructive. It addressed general tactics that were, in the author's words, “no stranger to any military man of the times,” discussing the procedures for advanced guards, approaching the battlefield, dispositions to be used, and successful tactics. Part of this work stated:

  One may not write regulations on the manner for the disposition of one's forces that are fixed and inflexible, since situations and types of troops interact with the nature of war and terrain to make different demands upon a general.

  The advanced guard should be preceded during the march by a screen of skirmishers to protect it from attacks. These skirmishers are to occupy, fatigue and disconcert the enemy, containing his skirmishers, proving and examining enemy positions and prepare for the coming combat.

  After the advanced guard overthrows the enemy's advanced positions it is to occupy the important points and facilitate the maneuvers of the main body. In addition, it is to engage in probing attacks and other diversions to confuse the enemy's maneuvers.

  When in the proximity of the enemy, one should form several lines, if the number of troops permits. If this is not possible and only two lines can be formed, one should place several battalions behind the wings of either flank. These lines may be of troops in column or line, according to the terrain and the desires of the general, be it to demonstrate or attack. The forward guard, so as not to become confused with other troops, should be placed on the wings, in villages or in raised or broken terrain.

  The reserve shall be behind and at the center or rear of important points. It shall be, as much as possible, composed of the elite corps, both infantry and cavalry. Its objective is to achieve the defeat of the enemy, reestablish a lost battle, or cover a retreat. Celerity should be one of the principal qualities of this reserve corps.

  Cavalry should be placed in echelons on the wings, terrain permitting. One should recommend to it vigor and quickness, and the goal of turning the enemy. It should never accept an enemy charge standing. It should use the superiority of its formation and never go to the gallop closer than 100 yards from the enemy.

  The artillery shall be employed to extinguish the enemy batteries, when one is disposed to attack a point. In defense they shall direct their fire upon the troops advancing on them. In these two cases, they should be massed as much as possible, since the effect of their fire is superior when concentrated.

  In combat and other field operations, it was always desirable to take the offensive and to force the enemy over to the defense. The French strove to initiate attacks with a superior force as soon as possible, using false attacks to disguise the target of the main thrust. Advantage was taken of terrain to conceal the main striking force and permit the massing of superior forces without detection by the enemy. An excellent example of this was Napoleon's use of terrain and fog at Austerlitz.

  The French considered it necessary for a general to be slow in making his plans and swift in executing them. It was important that he never hazard an attack without assuring his communications and lines of retreat, should it be necessary to break off the action and retreat.

  Napoleon required that the army corps, the divisions, and even the brigades always operate in a mutually supporting manner. He was not pleased if a general ignored this procedure, no matter how great that general might win, if the other general and his forces were lost because of his failure to support them.

  When successful, the French employed their light troops to pursue the beaten enemy. Other forces were not generally used in this function until order had been reestablished and they were formed into columns. Even in pursuit, the French would advance cautiously, moving from position to position, always ready to receive an attack if the enemy succeeded in reforming or if pockets of resistance were encountered.

  Skirmishers

  Further tactical advice was provided by Marshal Davout, who issued two instructions that went into effect during the last months of 1811. The instruction dated 16 October 1811 c
oncerned itself with skirmishers. The second instruction, dated 3 November 1811, addressed the use of squares. In both instances, Davout's instructions were probably a reflection and codification of the general practices of the French army in this period. Davout wrote them down and formally distributed them to his generals because he felt some concern about the lack of training in his recently expanded regiments.

  In the first instruction he acknowledged that it was always preferable to employ entire pelotons as skirmishers rather than sections or other smaller units. He directed that the skirmish line would operate about 200 paces in front of the column or line and was to be divided into three sections. The first and second ranks of the two wing sections would be deployed immediately by files and form a semicircle at intervals of fifteen paces between pairs of soldiers.

  In each section, the third rank, the sergeant, the corporals, and a drummer or bugler were held in reserve with an officer, either a lieutenant or a sous-lieutenant. The peloton captain remained in the center of this formation with his sergeant major.

  This reserve, generally no fewer than six men, was to furnish replacements for the line, reinforcing points where the skirmish line was attacked and providing escorts for the officers. They also served as rallying points and guided withdrawals. If a noncommissioned officer was detached to carry orders to the skirmishers, he was escorted by a fusilier drawn from the reserve. The skirmishers were trained to work in a mutually protective pair. One member of each pair always had his musket loaded and ready to fire in case they were attacked while the other member of the pair was reloading.