Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  The Prussian Army

  If the Austrians could be declared a dubious ally, the Prussians must, by all rights, be considered marginal at best. The Prussians were an outspokenly arrogant and brash enemy that Napoleon had humiliated in one day in 1806. The vaunted army of Frederick the Great had been smashed and scattered to the winds. Prussian pride smarted under the humiliating terms of the subsequent treaties forced on them. However, their king was a weak individual who lacked the courage to act overtly.Indeed, when it came time for Prussia to change sides, it was his generals who forced his hand, leaving him little option.

  The Prussian army had undergone a series of major reforms since the 1806 disaster of Jena-Auerstàdt. On 15 July 1807 the king of Prussia appointed Graf Lottum and Generalmajor von Scharnhorst to head the new Military Reorganization Commission. Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the hostilities of 1806, the Prussian army was limited to 36,000 men: 22,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 6,000 artillerists. A royal Guard of 6,000 men was also authorized, but militia, civil guards, and all other paramilitary organizations were forbidden.

  Thanks to the efforts of Scharnhorst and his colleagues, the traumatic evisceration of the Prussian army by this treaty did not have totally negative results. Scharnhorst, Yorck, and Clausewitz began this reorganization by drafting a new training manual. The regulations they compiled, issued on 15 January 1812, included the use of both column and line, abolished regimental artillery, and made the cavalry arm subservient to the infantry—all concepts that were quite new to many members of the pre-1806 Prussian officer corps.

  Among the many other provisions of the new regulations was the establishment of the “Krumper” System, an ingenious means of increasing the size of the Prussian army, despite treaty restrictions. Men from active units were furloughed after a year's training, and they were replaced by new recruits. This provided the Prussians with a mass of trained soldiers, but only the treaty limit number in uniform at any given time.

  These army reforms also instituted a brigade system as well as a new system of officer selection and advancement. Officer selection was no longer restricted to the noble class. Artillery and engineering schools were established to teach the science of those arms, and cadet and military schools were established.

  The size of the Prussian contingent that accompanied Napoleon into Russia and the conditions under which it was to operate were established by the treaty signed on 24 February 1812. The Prussians did not send complete units of their standing army into Russia, but instead took individual battalions or squadrons from several regiments and formed combined regiments. This permitted them to “blood” portions of several of their regiments and generate some battle-hardened veterans.

  In 1812 the Prussian army had twelve infantry regiments, two jàger battalions, one schutzen battalion, and a two-battalion Guard infantry regiment. The line infantry regiments had a three-battalion establishment consisting of one fusilier battalion, which was trained to operate as light infantry, two musketeer battalions, and two grenadier companies. As in the Austrian and Saxon armies, these grenadier companies were detached from their parent regiments and organized into converged grenadier battalions that acted as an army reserve. The battalions were organized with four companies. The regiment had a total of 4,129 officers and men. Each company had a total of 156 officers and men.

  The independent schutzen and jàger battalions also had four companies. These companies had 106 men each. The battalions had a total of 428 officers and men. The converged grenadier battalions had a total of 631 men. Each company had 156 officers and men.

  In 1812 the Prussian cavalry had four cuirassier, six dragoon, seven hussar, and three uhlan regiments. In addition, there was a small Guard force that consisted of a normal dragoon, a normal hussar, and a normal uhlan squadron. All of the cavalry regiments, despite their type, had four 125-man squadrons. The regiments had a total of 536 officers and men.

  In 1812 the Prussian artillery establishment had four foot regiments and one horse regiment. Each foot regiment had twelve companies, while the horse regiment had only nine. The foot regiments were divided into 3 four-company brigades, each of which had three 6pdr batteries, a 12pdr battery, and a fifth company organized as a “parkkolonne,” or park company, in support. These park companies carried the infantry and artillery reserve ammunition.

  The batteries were organized with eight guns. The 6pdr foot and horse batteries had six 6pdrs and two 7pdr howitzers. The 12pdr foot batteries had six 12pdrs and two lOpdr howitzers. In all instances, the foot companies had 137 officers and men, and the horse companies had 153 officers and men.

  In addition to this, the Prussians had a small engineering force. There were two types of engineers. The Festung-Pionier-Kompagnien (fortress-pioneer companies) served as garrisons in the Prussian fortresses and took no part in the 1812 campaign. However, the Feld-Pionier-Kompagnien (field-pioneer companies) accompanied the field army. They served the same functions as the sappers and pioneers of any other country. These companies consisted of eighty-four officers and men.

  The Russian Infantry

  Prior to 1812, the Russian line infantry had three different regimental formations: grenadiers, jagers, and infantry. The basic organization of the component battalions was the same, but the battalions had different names. The grenadier regiments were composed of two fusilier battalions and one grenadier battalion; the infantry regiments, of two infantry battalions and one grenadier battalion; and the jager regiments, of two jager battalions and one carabinier battalion.

  During the period between 1804 and 1812, the regiments bore the name of the province in which they had been raised. This was referred to as the regiment's “inspection.” There were no permanent military field organizations larger than the regiment, the inspection being a purely administrative structure that included regiments of all arms.

  In 1806 most of the inspections were abolished and replaced with thirteen divisions. With this there appeared, for the first time in the Russian army, permanent standing field organizations on the “divisional” level. These divisions combined both the tactical and the administrative functions. By 1812 these divisions were, for the most part, organized with four line infantry regiments and two jager regiments. These regiments were organized into two-regiment brigades, with both of the jager regiments forming a single brigade.

  Only the Caucasus, Orenburg, and Siberian Inspections survived the first change. In 1807 the Caucasus Inspection became the 19th and 20th Divisions. At the same time a 21st and 22nd Division were raised. In 1808 the Orenburg Inspection became the 23rd Division and the Siberian Inspection became the 24th Division. In 1809 the 25th Division was raised, but its third brigade was weaker than normal.

  In early 1812 the regimental organization was altered. Although there were still grenadier, infantry, and jager regiments, each regiment was organized such that its 1st and 3rd Battalions served in the field and its 2nd Battalion was the depot battalion. In addition, an infantry regiment now consisted solely of infantry battalions, a jager regiment solely of jager battalions, and a grenadier regiment solely of grenadier battalions.

  Each battalion still consisted of four companies, but now one company was designated as the “grenadier” company in the infantry regiments. In the jager regiments it was a “karabinier” company. The grenadier regiments also had one of the grenadier companies designated as the “elite” grenadier company. This elite company was divided into a “grenadier platoon” and a “tirailleur platoon.” The remaining three companies were also broken into two platoons each, but they had no distinct title.

  The nonelite companies in a grenadier battalion were known as “fusiliers.” Those in an infantry battalion were known as “musketeers,” and those in a jager battalion were known as “jagers.”

  Each infantry regiment had a total of 2,033 officers and men, each battalion had a total of 646 officers and men, and each company had a total of 159 officers and men. These regiments had a s
urprisingly large staff of “noncombatants” that ranged from the usual regimental musicians to a Russian Orthodox priest and two alterboys. The regiments had a train formation consisting of an officer and forty-one drivers. These men handled the regiment's compliment of 161 horses and 41 wagons.

  As mentioned earlier, the 2nd Battalion was the depot battalion. It acted as the depot in the home province and was responsible for the training and equipping of new recruits. During the French invasion, rather than waste this manpower, the depots were either stripped of their grenadier companies which were then converged into battalions, or they were called up and formed into reserve divisions. These reserve divisions were extremely weak and rarely were a significant field force. The reserve divisions assigned to the Russian 1st Corps were so weak that they were lumped into “converged infantry regiments” in order to organize a viable military formation.

  The Russian company structural organization was very similar to that of the Prussian organization. The companies were organized in a three-rank formation. The interval between each rank was an “archine” (approximately fourteen inches).

  Tactics and Drill

  The Russian musketry drill was not dissimilar to that used by the rest of Europe. The companies were taught to fire by “divisions,” by platoon, by rank, and by file. Fire by file or by two ranks always started from the right and was executed by half-sections. During this evolution, the front two ranks fired and the third rank loaded muskets for the first two.

  When loading their muskets, the Russian soldiers did not always use the blunted ends of their ramrods which were designed for that purpose. Instead, they used the portion that was inserted into the stock to push the load home. Though faster, as it eliminated having to turn the ramrod around, it caused a large number of accidents.

  The Russians employed four march cadences. The first was the slow pace (“tchyi szag”) of 60 to 70 paces per minute. The second was the quick pace (“skoryi szag”) of 100 to 110 paces per minute. The third, introduced by the Grand Duke Constantine, was the redoubled pace (“udwonyi szag”), of 140 to 160 paces per minute. In the execution of this cadence, the soldiers were generally unable to maintain contact at their elbows, as prescribed by regulations. It was a very fatiguing pace, and if maintained for a long period, it would result in disorder in the ranks. The drummers beat their drums as long as the cadence was maintained.

  The fourth cadence was the “rapid pace.” This was faster than the redoubled pace. It was primarily used by skirmishers and rarely by formed infantry.

  For purposes of maneuver, the Russians renamed their companies “divisions.” These divisions consisted of two platoons, the platoon being the basic maneuvering element. Each platoon was divided into two half-platoons consisting of from twelve to fifteen files.

  The Russians used a variety of tactical formations. Their attack column was in fact two separate columns of platoons marching side by side. They formed a square like the French, but also formed a dense anticavalry formation identical to the Austrian “Quarre auf der Mitte.” In this formation the column closed up the intervals between the companies, and the center companies split into half-platoons, the central half-platoons pushing into the gaps between the flank half-companies and the front or back company. The flank of the battalion now gave the appearance of having six rather than the usual four companies, but the battalion was hollow in the middle.

  Skirmishing tactics in the Russian army were exceedingly primitive. It has been suggested that the Russians used their jagers as just another line infantry formation, but this is in error. While the Russians frequently employed skirmish tactics, they were not as sophisticated in their use as other European nations. Moreover, skirmishing tactics were not solely the domain of the jager regiments. Evidence repeatedly shows both line and militia units being used as skirmishers or having some portion of their forces detached as skirmishers.

  The jager regiments were taught to skirmish in battalion-sized formations. This was the primary distinction between them and the line infantry regiments. They operated under a cumbersome set of regulations derived from English, Prussian, and Austrian drill regulations. Since there was no firm, disciplined enforcement of regulations, skirmishing tactics were left to the discretion of the individual regimental commanders. This was further hindered by an almost absolute lack of peacetime exercises and some other, rather unfortunate habits of the Russian regimental commanders.

  Historical evidence indicates that skirmishers were an integral part of line battalions in 1812, but the use and organization of these skirmishers has only been confirmed by documentation dating after 1812. Such documentation is of interest, but cannot be taken as an exact description of how it was done. In the late 1820s, it was standard practice for each section to provide skirmishers from its second and third ranks under the direction of an underofficer (NCO). This means that a battalion could field 104 skirmishers. They were dispatched and recalled with drum rolls, but, like the French skirmishers, they were directed with bugles.

  The Russian Soldier

  The Russian officer corps was composed of members of the upper classes, a good mixture of provincial gentry, and foreign career officers. According to tradition, the Russian officer was supposed to work his way up through the ranks, but very few actually did this. Barclay de Tolly was one of the few who did. Well-connected youths generally entered through the Page Corps, the Noble Land Cadet Corps, or one of the several cadet houses, where they pursued a general and military education while being promoted in absentia through the ranks. They were normally commissioned when they graduated at the age of twenty.

  As in France, Russia conscripted its troops. Conscription was introduced in reaction to the growth of mass armies during the eighteenth century. In some years there was no draft, but in other years, like 1812, there were as many as three drafts, each taking up to five men per hundred souls.

  The term of service for the Russian conscript was twenty-five years or life, the latter usually being shorter. Recruits were sent to the regimental depots for their training. There were between 50,000 and 60,000 recruits being trained in the regimental depots at any given time.

  In 1810, when the elite companies were created in the infantry companies, the taller men became grenadiers and the smaller men became jagers. Barclay had decided that the elite companies would include only those whose skill and merit warranted the distinction. The slightest fault would deprive the jager and the grenadier of his distinction, and by 'fault' Barclay de Tolly meant not only carelessness in drill and similar mistakes, but any offense which might be inconsistent with good conduct and the honor of a crack soldier.

  Barclay was applauded by many adherents of the Gatchina School, which advocated improved treatment of the soldiers. Prior to Barclay's banning its use, cruel and often barbaric punishment was inflicted for the slightest offense. Officers and noncommissioned officers carried canes and made frequent use of them, beating the soldiers for any fault. It was not uncommon for soldiers to be punished with long sessions in the drill square, and whole battalions often faded away on a diet consisting solely of bread.

  Other innovations introduced in this period included the 110-pace-per-minute “quick pace” of Count Arakcheyev. Despite this modification, it was still executed in the stiff-legged goose-step. Barclay took much of the emphasis off rote drill and increased the attention to practical training. In prior years the Russian soldier had been taught by the school of Marshal Suvarov that the bayonet was “his friend and the musket was a lazy fellow.” Barclay wrote on 10 September 1810 that “the main occupation of the soldier's training should be shooting at a target. The men can become good marksmen only when their officers avoid all compulsion and have a fundamental understanding of the mentality of the soldier.” In 1811 Barclay issued his “Instructions for Target Practice.”

  Russian Weapons

  In 1812 the Russians went to war with twenty-eight different calibers of infantry muskets and eleven different short rifles. The
short rifles were issued to the flankers of the cavalry regiments. An additional twelve rifles were issued to the noncommissioned officers and the best shots in each jager company. In addition, as if to further complicate the number of calibers, the English provided 16,000 muskets. These were excellent weapons that were issued as rewards to the soldiers.

  Despite the improved attitude towards musketry and marksmanship, the Russians were too deeply steeped in the doctrine of Suvarov and the bayonet for much change to occur.

  Pre-War Developments

  On 22 November 1811, most of the regiments raised a fourth battalion known as the reserve battalion. The internal organization of these battalions was distinctly different from the organization of the first three battalions, and they were formed from new drafts. On 14 March 1812, the second and fourth battalions of the regiments were drawn together and formed into the 30th through 47th Divisions. During the course of the campaign, these divisions were stripped and fragmented to fill out the first and third battalions in an effort to replace casualties.

  Initially these reserve divisions were intended to operate in the rear of the main Russian lines. The 32nd Reserve Infantry Division, under Generalmajor Hamen, and the 33rd Reserve Infantry Division, under Generalmajor Villiaminov, formed the 1st Reserve Army under General-lieutenant Baron Muller-Zakomelski.

  The 2nd Reserve Army, commanded by Generallieutenant Ertel, consisted of the 27th Line Division, under Generallieutenant Neverovski, and the 36th Reserve Division, under Generalmajor Sorokin. In addition, the 35th Reserve Division, under Generalmajor Zapolski, and the 34th Reserve Division under Generallieutenant Ertel, operated along the tributaries of the Dnieper for most of the campaign.