On 22 September it was reported that Kapsevitch's and Docturov's forces were moving north. In November it was found that the 9th and 17th Divisions had left the Dniester and moved into Moldavia. Some cadres of regiments destroyed in fighting the Turks were withdrawn to Podolie and the Polish Ukraine. From there they went to Kiev to be rebuilt with men drawn from the recruiting depots formed in 1810.
It was reported that the 7th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Divisions were ordered to detach some battalions into Moldavia to support Kutusov's operations against the Turks. For the most part, however, these were regimental reserve battalions. Those regiments that did not have their reserve battalions were obliged to send one of their field battalions. This movement of veteran forces north continued, and on 12 November a major transfer of veteran troops out of Moldavia was reported, despite the continuing war with the Turks. They were being replaced to a greater and greater extent with new recruits.
In January the French noted that the Russians had stopped withdrawing troops out of Moldavia because of the unsatisfactory state of the war with the Turks. However, just before the French invasion, the Russians negotiated and signed a treaty with the Turks, freeing their southern forces.
Between January and June 1812, when the invasion began, there were relatively few changes in the disposition of the Russian army. The forces north of the Pripet Marsh were formally organized into the 1st Army and 2nd Army of the West. Those forces south of the Pripet were still organizing and were to become the 3rd Army of the West. The 3rd Army was not to be completed until the invasion began.
Geography and the Plans
The geography of Russia has always played a major role in its military history. This vastness is filled with every imaginable type of terrain and is sharply divided in the west by the Pripet River along an east-west line. Though the Pripet River is not a major river, it is surrounded by the largest marsh in Europe. It is an impenetrable and militarily impassable area of swamp, forest, and lakes pierced by very few roads.
Ancient Lithuania lies north of the Pripet. It is heavily wooded and liberally sprinkled with swamps and lakes, with little open terrain suitable for the deployment of a major army. Lithuania further complicates military operations with a series of rivers running north and south. Among these formidable barriers to an invading army are the Niemen, Vilia, Berezina, and Dvina Rivers, all of which must be crossed before an invader arrives before Moscow.
Any terrain in Russia was complicated, not eased, by the Russian road system. The roads through Lithuania were little more than dirt tracks. After a rain these tracks quickly turned to a sea of mud that sucked the boots off men's feet and strangled wagons in their grasp. If dry, the thousands of feet and hooves that were to pass over them quickly raised clouds of choking dust.
There were three main roads leading east from western Europe. The first passed through Brest-Litovsk and led on to Kiev. From there it moved to Smolensk and Moscow, passing around the Pripet Marsh from the south. The second road to Moscow ran through Grodno and Minsk, along the northern flank of the Pripet where it joined the main route east at Vitebsk. The third road ran from Kovno directly to Smolensk, the religious capital of Russia, and then on to Moscow.
In deciding which route to use for his lines of communication, Napo-leon realized that the southern route through Brest-Litovsk would expose his communications to the mercies of the Austrians. Though he had recently married an Austrian princess, Austria had been his staunches! enemy for years. It was too great a risk to take. The central route had much the same problems.
The northernmost route, through Kovno, was the superior choice. It passed from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon's staunchest ally, through the heart of Lithuania, which could be counted on to receive the French as liberators.
Espionage had informed Napoleon that the main Russian forces were concentrated north of the Pripet. Barclay de Tolly commanded a total of six infantry corps and three cavalry corps over a front of 250 miles, His forces stretched from Slonim in southern Lithuania to Shavli in Courland. Bagration, with two other corps and a sizable cavalry contingent, was concentrating around Lutsk, 200 miles south of Slonim, to the south of the Pripet. Napoleon felt that the Russians had three military options. Their first option was to fall back and refuse to allow the French their decisive battle. In this instance, Napoleon felt he could outmarch them, pierce their center, and destroy the two fragments separately and in detail. Their second option was to abandon Vilna and fall back to a position between Grodno and Slonim. Here Napoleon planned to trap them against the Pripet and smash them.
The third option, and the most likely in Napoleon's opinion, was that the Russians would slowly give ground while Bagration moved up from south of the Pripet, took Warsaw, and cut Napoleon's communications. To counter this, Napoleon tasked Jerome and Schwarzenberg to tie Bagration down while he advanced and seized Vilna. Prince Eugene was to advance along the main army's flank and prevent any unexpected blows from striking it. After about twelve days, Jerome was to withdraw slowly up the Nraew River, drawing the Russians after him. When he contacted Eugene and Davout he was to stop, and the trap would slam shut as Napoleon concentrated 400,000 men against Bagration. He had every reason to expect another Ulm.
All of Napoleon's plans were aimed at bringing the Russians to battle and winning a total victory within twenty days of the beginning of the campaign. This is substantiated by the Grande Armée's being provisioned with twenty-four days' supplies as it crossed the Niemen. Once the Russian armies were destroyed, the czar would be at his mercy. Despite the brilliance of this plan, it had not made allowances for the distances and roads. In his previous campaigns Napoleon had been able to communicate easily with his subordinate commanders. The roads were good and the distances relatively small. Thus he had been able to bring his forces into a decisive concentration at the critical point time after time, smashing his outnumbered and outmaneuvered enemies. To accomplish this Napoleon had dominated his subordinate commanders and directed their every move. This overcontrol had resulted in the stifling of initiative and confidence in many of these men. In consequence, when his corps commanders were forced to operate in Russia without this spoon-fed direction, they had to operate on their own skills and initiative. Unfortunately the results were often marred with fatal errors and misjudgments of Napoleon's desires.
The Camp at Drissa
The initial Russian defensive plan, designed by the Prussian general Phull, was based on the concept of an entrenched camp that would support the Russians while the French starved at its gates. Once the French were sufficiently weakened, the Russians would strike them and drive them back to Germany.
The position chosen for this camp was near Drissa, on the Dvina. Phull had induced the czar to dispatch Colonel Wolzogen, also a former Prussian officer, with instructions to select a site for this fortified camp. The position chosen had the sole advantage of being in a “U”-shaped bend in the Dvina with a gap of about three miles at its mouth. The camp extended beyond this gap in a slight curve that was supported on either end by the banks of the river. On the right bank of the Dvina, above and below the camp, there were several minor streams, of which the Drissa was the largest. These streams provided strong positions for any army wishing to assume a defensive posture”
The slightly curved front of the camp was fortified with a triple ring of works, closed and opened, planned by Phull himself. Communications eastward from the camp were secured by seven bridges. On the other side of the Dvina there were no fortifications, despite the fact that the river was shallow enough to be forded. As a result, the tactical strength of the position was not great and it could readily be turned.
Strategically, the location was even worse. It lay between the roads leading from Vilna to Moscow and St. Petersburg, but dominated neither of them. The shortest road to Moscow passed by Vitebsk, twenty-four miles from Drissa. The road to St. Petersburg passed four miles from Drissa.
Barclay de Tolly, Bennigsen, and Arenfeld d
isagreed with Phull's plan and attempted to persuade the czar to drop it. Their effort began with the proposal to accept battle at Vilna. At this point Wolzogen attempted to arrange an interview with Barclay in an effort to provide communications between him and Phull. He induced Barclay to request the services of an officer for the establishment of a small bureau to handle these communications. The choice fell upon Clausewitz, who rose to fame of his own accord in later years.
Clausewitz 's first task was to evaluate the condition of the Drissa camp. When he arrived, he met considerable resistance from the suspicious commander, who considered Clausewitz a spy. This was neither unusual nor surprising. There was a great deal of resentment for all non-Russians in the czar's service.
According to Clausewitz the outer circle of fortifications comprised a line of embrasures for musketry; some 50 or 60 paces back was a line of works alternately open and closed. The former were intended for batteries, the latter for single battalions that were to protect the batteries. Some 500 or 600 paces behind this enceinte was considered a reserve position; in the center, and in the third line, there was a still greater entrenched work, serving as a redoubt to cover a retreat.
Although this system of fortifications was evidently too artificial, the number of works was too great, and the whole deficient in a particular view, yet the defense of it with a considerable mass of men, and with the known valor of the Russians, promised serious resistance. One may even maintain with confidence that the French, if they had chosen to frontally attack this camp, would have consumed their force without gaining their objective.
The profile of the works was good, the ground however was sandy; and as no external devices for strengthening had as yet been resorted to, palisades, felled trees, wolves teeth, and etc.,there was much to be desired on this side. (Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia. John Murray, London, 1943. P. 22)
When Clausewitz inspected the Drissa camp, he discovered that none of the required seven bridges had, as yet, been built, and that the camp commandant was incapable of the task.
Phull's idea was to garrison the camp with 50,000 men, and with another 70,000 advance against the French, who he assumed would have crossed the Dvina to attack the camp in the rear. If the French failed to leave sufficient force on the western bank, he hoped he would be able to break out of the camp, overpower and overwhelm those French left to guard the lines of communication, and cut off the main French army. The tactical advantage of the camp was “inside lines of communication.”
To support such a plan, the location of the camp should have provided more favorable terrain for the battle. But the left bank was covered with woods and swamps that would not permit easy observation of the French. In addition, to support this maneuver, a fortified bridgehead on the right bank, behind the camp, was an absolute necessity. The probable result of adherence to this plan by the Russians would have been the loss of whatever unit was assigned to serve as a garrison of the camp.
On 28 June, when Clausewitz returned to the imperial headquarters, now at Svieciany, he presented his report on the Drissa camp to the czar. Phull was there, and Clausewitz's criticisms were hammerlike blows to his pride. Clausewitz's words caused the czar to reconsider the plan. When he conferred with his other officers, he found them even more outspoken than Clausewitz.
Scorched Earth
At this point the idea of using the great distances of Russia to defeat Napoleon arose. It originated in Berlin and was transmitted via Scharnhorst to Count Lieven, who spoke of its wisdom to the czar. The concept was that no battle should be permitted until the gates of Smolensk were under attack. Clausewitz informed Phull of this idea, but Phull was so entranced with his own plan that he failed to grasp the wisdom of what eventually became the Russian strategic plan. By the time the campaign had begun, Phull's plan had fallen into disrepute, but it was not entirely abandoned.
At the outbreak of the war, the forces of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly were dangerously separated and the fortifications at Dinaburg and Borisov were barely begun. Almost by default, the plan for drawing the French into the vastness of the Russian steppe was adopted. Barclay embraced this tactic and would pursue it as long as necessary. However, this commitment was to have serious detrimental effects on his command. No one, even Barclay, envisioned the distances that the retreat would entail. There was continuous pressure for him to turn and fight the French.
Initial Maneuvers
By 18 March 1812 the principal French forces were massed between Danzig and Warsaw as well as along the banks of the Vistula. On 23 June 1812 a closed carriage drawn by six horses suddenly appeared in the middle of the bivouac of the 6th Polish Uhlan Regiment. The troopers were even more startled when it stopped and Napoleon, himself, climbed out.
Spotting a major, Napoleon approached him, asking to see the regiment's commander. Major Suchorzewski, not mentioning that his colonel was still asleep, stated that he was temporarily in command and was awaiting Napoleon's orders. Napoleon asked the route to the Niemen River and the location of the most advanced Polish outposts. The next request was the most surprising. Napoleon requested Polish uniforms for himself and his staff. There was a standing French order that no French uniforms were to be seen on the Russo-Polish border. Napoleon did not wish to warn the Russians of the pending invasion. Napoleon and his staff quickly exchanged their uniforms with some very surprised Polish officers and headed for the border.
Two horses were provided. Napoleon and Berthier mounted them, moving towards the Niemen with Lieutenant Zrelski, whose company had the picket duty that day. As they approached the village of Alexota, near the jumping off points on the Niemen, Napoleon carefully examined the terrain.
As they returned from their reconnaissance, a hare sprang between the legs of Napoleon's mount, startling it. Napoleon was thrown to the ground, but quickly remounted. All those who witnessed it knew it was a bad omen. Marshal Berthier confided to Caulaincourt later, “We should do better not to cross the Niemen. This fall is a bad sign.” (With Napoleon in Russia, Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt … N.Y., William Morrow & Co. 1935, P. 46)
At 10:00 P.M. General Morand passed three companies of the 13th Légère across the Niemen in small boats so they could serve as a screen to protect General Elbe's engineers as they raised the pontoon bridges. At the sight of this crossing, a group of Polish uhlans, probably belonging to the 6th Uhlans, spurred their mounts forward into the river, hoping to seize the honor of being the first to be on Russian soil. Unfortunately, the current proved too swift and they were quickly swept downstream, engulfed by the river. As the men slipped beneath its waters they were clearly heard to cry, “Vive FEmpereur!”
Meanwhile elements of the 13th Légère landed and began spreading across the far bank. They quickly encountered a company of Russian hussars. A Russian officer advanced and challenged the French skirmishers. They responded to this challenge with musketry.
Had Russians been on the bank when dawn broke, they would have seen three pontoon bridges across the Niemen and Morand's division deployed on the Russian bank. They were promptly followed by Murat and the greater part of the reserve cavalry. On 24 and 25 June the rest of the Grande Armée made an unopposed crossing and began to fan out across the Russian countryside.
Oudinot and II Corps turned north after crossing the Niemen and crossed the Vilia, Ney and III Corps had originally been scheduled to cross the Niemen at Prenn, but Napoleon began to feel uneasy about the lack of Russian contact. Napoleon felt that Ney was too isolated and directed him to redirect his forces to the main crossing site. On late 24 June, Kovno was occupied without opposition.
Napoleon had expected that Murat and the 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps would have established contact with Barclay de Tolly by this time, but the continuing reconnaissance had revealed no indication of their presence. The French crossings had taken Barclay by surprise. He had expected the crossing to be on 25 June and had directed General of Cavalry Platov to concentrate near Grodno and
attack the right flank of the Grande Armée. Barclay had intended to strike the French as they neared Vilna, and if no resistance was encountered, he planned to advance to Svencoiny to offer battle. Bagration was to support Platov's attack and conform to Barclay's movements. If forced to retreat, he was to move to Borisov.
The Grande Armée's advance a day earlier than anticipated forced Barclay to withdraw and concentrate around SventisianL Docturov, who apparently did not receive the orders to concentrate at Sventisiani, remained immobile. Napoleon had not expected Barclay's withdrawal,but he was even more surprised by Bagration's failure to advance on Warsaw. Bagration was also withdrawing north to join Barclay. This caused Napoleon to believe that the Russians had divined his main line of attack through Kovno and would not play into his hands.
Meanwhile Barclay moved towards Drissa, unaware that Bagration was attempting to join him. His movements delayed this union. The gap between these two armies attracted Napoleon and he hoped to trap Bagration by thrusting Eugene's corps into it. Jerome's Westphalians were to change over from a defensive posture and advance so as to maintain the pressure on the 2nd Army of the West.
Unfortunately for the French, this opportunity slipped by. Eugene's forces were two days behind schedule. This delay prevented Napoleon from pushing forward until his flank was secure. Eugene had been delayed at the Niemen with the tangle of his supply train. It also became evident that Jerome was not advancing quickly enough to maintain good contact with Bagration. Schwarzenberg and Reynier had conformed to the Russians” movements and moved towards the Bug River and Lublin. It was becoming quickly obvious that the lack of mobility was hindering Napoleon's strategic plans already.
Despite this, Napoleon continued to advance, sending Murat, Davout, and the Guard towards Vilna. Ney was to cover the left flank and Eugene was urged to advance more quickly. On the other side, Bagration, seeking to impress Alexander, was demanding authorization from him to advance into Poland.
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