Jerome's forces continued to push forward. His column was led by Latour-Maubourg, who was followed by Poniatowski's V Corps and Jerome's own VII Corps. On 7 June the French cavalry advance guard encountered Platov's rear guard. Platov had orders to hold Mir against the French advance.
Skirmish at Mir
On 8 June the French occupied the village of Korelitchi. Platov's forces (Illowaiski #5, #10, #11, #12, Syssoief #3, Karpov #2, Grekov #8, and Kharitonov Don Cossack Regiments, as well as two Don horse batteries) were deployed, for the most part, in the lablonovchtchina woods, south of Mir.
Platov posted the Syssoief #3 Cossack Regiment on the southern edge of Mir such that one sotnia was on the road to Piasotchna, one to the left of the road, and one on the right of the road. On 9 June the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Light Cavalry Division (the 3rd, 15th, and 16th Polish Uhlans) advanced from Korelitchi on Mir with the 3rd Uhlans leading the way. The 3rd advanced in a column of three squadrons.
When the 3rd Uhlans reached Piasotchna, they threw back Platov's advanced post and traversed the village at a gallop until they encountered the Syssoief #3 Cossack Regiment on the far side of the village. The 3rd Uhlans reformed, but were quickly engaged by the bulk of Platov's cossacks and nearly annihilated. The few survivors escaped only with the greatest difficulty as the two flanking squadrons of the Syssoief #3 Cossacks had struck their flanks and rear.
General Turno brought up the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, but was only able to temporarily hold Platov. He was thrown back with 356 dead and wounded. Turno was then reinforced by the arrival of Dziewanowski's 28th Light Cavalry Brigade (2nd, 7th, and 11th Uhlans). At the same time, Platov was reinforced by the arrival of Generalmajor Vasiltchikov with the Akhtyrsk Hussars, the Kiev and New Russia Dragoons, the Lithuania Uhlans, and the 5th Jager Regiment. However, as they arrived, night fell and the battle broke off.
On 10 June Platov drew up his rear guard (Akhtyrsk Hussars, Kiev and New Russia Dragoons, Illowaiski #5, #10, #11, and #12, and two horse batteries) along the road to Mir and placed the rest of the cossacks in an attempt to ambush the Polish cavalry as it resumed the advance. Kouneinikov's brigade (five sotnias of the Ataman Don Cossack Regiment, Grekov #18, Simpheropol Tartar Regiment, and Kharitonov Don Cossack Regiment) found itself almost to Slobtzi when it was recalled to Simakovo.
While the 7th Uhlans followed the retiring Russian rear guard, the 3rd, 15th, and 16th Uhlans remained on the edge of Simakovo. The 2nd and 11th Uhlans stood on the northern edge of the village. Platov ordered his rear guard to turn on the 7th Uhlans, throwing them back on Simakovo and continuing to attack the 3rd, 15th, and 16th Uhlans. The 7th Uhlans were in echelon by the right, supported by one squadron of the 3rd Uhlans to their west and one squadron of the 16th to the east. Two squadrons of the 3rd stood in reserve.
Behind these elements came the 4th Division, Kaminski's division of the V Corps. When this cavalry battle began, Kaminski was near Tyrskiewicz, a half mile from Mir. The 4th Division received orders to hold there, and the cavalry battle raged for a total of six hours.
About 2,100 men of Kouneinikov's cossack brigade arrived and charged into the melee, throwing back the French left wing. At the same moment, Platov charged Turno's brigade again, disordered it, and threw it back. Platov's forces then advanced into Mir, where they encountered Tyskiewicz's brigade (the 4th Polish Chasseur à Che vai Regiment) and the divisional horse artillery. Platov decided to withdraw, leaving 600 dead and wounded Poles in his wake. The Russian losses were considerably less. So ended the skirmish at Mir.
The Advance Resumes
At dawn of 28 June the French reached Vilna and encountered their first Russian rear guard. General Bruyere's light cavalry attacked them, but after a couple of cannon shots, the Russians abandoned their positions and burned the city's magazines. Davout's infantry and Murat's cavalry entered the city that morning.
The day before, Jerome had entered Grodno, opposed only by a few of Platov's cossacks. Reynier's Saxons seized Bialystok, while Schwarzenberg's Austrians concentrated at Syedletz. Oudinot pushed Wittgenstein's rear guard out of Vilkomir on the 28th of June and Mac-donald advanced slowly, opposed only by a screen of cossacks.
Barclay ordered Platov to join him by way of Smorgony to destroy the magazine there. Bagration was to cover the southern flank of the 1st Army of the West, protect the Minsk-Borisov road, and maintain contact with Tormassov's 3rd Army of the West. Alexander, fearing that Napoleon would cut Barclay off from Drissa, ordered Bagration to move via Vilekya to join Barclay. The possibility of their junction forced Napoleon to act quickly. When Bagration's 2nd Army was reported east of Ochmiana, Napoleon readjusted his plans and directed Murat to pursue Barclay towards Sventisiani. For this purpose Murat was assigned five cavalry divisions and a new, ad hoc corps formed from Friant's and Gudin's divisions, which were detached from Davout's I Corps. This infantry formation was placed under the command of Count Lobau. On the left, Macdonald's forces were still advancing in front of Ney's forces. Two more of Davout's divisions, Dessaix and Compans, were to remain in Vilna and protect the massing French supply convoys. On the right, Jerome was to move on Ochmiana in an effort to continue applying pressure on the Russians.
These maneuvers resulted in a pause in the French advance, which allowed Barclay to break contact with them. On 29 June Napoleon ordered a series of fruitful reconnaissances in his effort to reestablish contact with Barclay. These forces stumbled onto Docturov's corps, which had still not received orders to move. Napoleon thought Docturov was part of Bagration's army. Docturov realized his position was in peril and began moving without orders.
The weather had been hot up to this point in the campaign, but the weather broke with a day long deluge, flooding the roads and turning them into seas of mud. The French supply trains and all wheeled traffic bogged down quickly. The French troops broke into an undisciplined, aggressive foraging that alienated the Lithuanians. The number of horse losses rose alarmingly and many of the new recruits, less hardened to the life in the field, sickened and died. The artillery could barely move, and the rapid advance slowed to a crawl with the wheeled traffic falling farther and farther behind the vanguards.
Despite the heavy rains, on the 29th Davout's light cavalry, commanded by Bordesoulle, was advancing rapidly down the road from Lida to Wilkowszki. Pajol, with another force of light cavalry, advanced on Minsk. Davout had been given command of three columns. His goal was to trap Bagration, but the heavily wooded terrain quickly made this task impossible. Davout's losses from the advance were heavy and his report caused Napoleon to send reinforcements consisting of the 1st Chevauléger-lanciers de la Garde under the command of General Colbert and Claparede's division, drawn from the army reserves, on 4 July.
The French right column, commanded by Grouchy, consisted of Dessaix's division and two other brigades. Davout commanded the center column consisting of Compans, Pajol, Valance's cuirassiers, and the Guard lancers. The left-hand column was commanded by Nansouty and consisted of four heavy cavalry brigades and Morand's infantry division.
Davout's effort to trap Bagration went astray almost immediately. Eugene did not advance on Vilna as ordered, but spent the whole of 2 July in Piloni, fearing that a large Russian force was about to fall on his left flank. After a sharp tongue-lashing from Napoleon, he set out again and arrived in Vilna on the 4th. However, Napoleon also ordered the forces of Murat, Ney5 and Oudinot to pause and allow their artillery to catch up. The mud had delayed it too long, and the lack of artillery was becoming dangerous.
Bagration had slipped the net. The slow advance of Jerome had not been enough to hold him, and he easily broke contact. Not only had Jerome dallied, but it took him forty-eight hours to inform Napoleon that the Russians had abandoned Ochmiana and that Bagration was moving off towards Slonim and Minsk with his seven divisions. Napoleon instructed Berthier to inform Jerome “that it would be impossible to maneuver in worse fashion,” and concluded, “he has robbed me of the fruit of my ma
neuvers and of the best opportunity ever presented in war— all on account of his singular failure to appreciate the first notions of warfare.”* This was too much for Jerome's ego, and about a week later, after a clash with Davout, he quit the Grande Armée, turning his corps over to his chief of staff and returning to Westphalia.
In the meantime, Barclay concentrated his army around Drissa and quickly became disenchanted with the position. On 1 July Bagration marched on Nikolajef and hoped to cross the Niemen there on 4 July. He knew that Davout was in Woloschin and turned towards Mir, in order to march to Minsk. As he moved into Schwerschin his vanguard made contact with Davout's advanced guard. He took a detachment from Docturov's corps commanded by General Doroschov and moved to Njeswich, seeking to contact Barclay's army. He remained there three days to allow his baggage and artillery to catch up.
Tormassov was still in Volhynia, organizing the 3rd Army of the West. When Barclay learned that Davout had cut his lines of communication, he decided to move on Minsk, along the southern bank of the Dvina. He ordered Platov to cover his flank by holding Volozhin until 8 July.
Murat's forces continued to push eastward, continually defeating Barclay's cavalry rear guards, and on 5 July, Jerome finally began to advance once again. Jerome wanted Davout to continue towards Minsk and to continue to draw Bagration southward so that the French might reach Vitebsk before him. Murat and Ney would continue to cautiously push Barclay while Napoleon gathered up Eugene, St. Cyr, and the Guard to form a strike force that would swing up from the south, advance through Vitebsk, and move into the gap between Bagration and Barclay to strike Barclay's isolated army. At this time Napoleon gave Davout the secret authority to take command of Jerome's Westphalians, should the two armies come together, but ordered Davout to keep this authority secret. He had not informed his brother, Jerome, of this decision.
Napoleon had calculated that the Russians could not possibly reach Minsk before 11 July and directed Davout to advance as quickly as possible. In the meantime, Alexander had determined to make the planned stand at Drissa. He rebuked Bagration for not moving through Minsk, fearing that Davout might bypass the Russian armies and march directly on Smolensk.
Barclay and the other generals began to loudly object to General Phull's plans and the Drissa encampment. After much argument it was decided that the Russians would withdraw to Vitebsk, beginning on 14 July, and take up a strong position in the hope that Bagration would join them. Bagration received the czar's letter on 11 July and sent a hot retort that he was holding the main French army by himself, stating that Barclay should attack, since obviously only minor forces were in front of him. Two days later he wrote that it was his plan to first defeat Jerome and then Davout. He inferred that Russia was being betrayed by Barclay, who was of Scottish ancestry, and that all non-Russians were suspect. With that pronouncement he continued his retreat.
On 8 July, Davout's columns limped into Minsk, only to discover that Bagration had doubled back several days earlier and moved to Bobruisk when he learned of Davout's advance. Realizing that danger awaited them, the Russians had pursued a more southerly line of retreat than anticipated. After a nine-day march, Bagration reached Jesvizh and rested for seventy-two hours. If all had gone according to Napoleon's plans, Jerome would have been there on the 7th to greet Bagration, but he was nowhere near. The result of Napoleon's first maneuver against Bagration had ended in a dismal failure. The muddy roads, the exhaustion of his men, Jerome's infuriating failure to obey orders, and Napoleon's lack of energy—his age was beginning to tell—had contributed to its lack of success.
On 9 July, Napoleon issued orders for his renewed offensive. He ordered Macdonald to move on Jacobstadt along the Dvina. Davout was to move on Borisov and Orsha in an effort to keep Barclay and Bagration separated. Jerome, supported by Schwarzenberg, was to continue his pursuit of Bagration.
Davout planned to move from Minsk to Mohilev and Borisov once his corps was concentrated. As Jerome renewed his feeble advance, news came from Schwarzenberg that Tormassov had completed the organization of the 3rd Army of the West and was moving to join Bagration.
On 11 July, Napoleon ordered Davout to seize Borisov and move from there to Kokhanovo, where he would be able to move on Mohilev,Orsha, or Vitebsk, as required. Reynier and his Saxons were to remain in Slonim and operate independently against Tormassov, while Schwar-zenberg passed behind him towards Nesvizh and on to the Dvina River.
Jeerome Quits
On 12 July, when it became apparent that the Russians planned to make their stand at Drissa, Napoleon began the planned concentration on its southern flank. Davout's cavalry occupied Borisov and made contact with Jerome. The next day, Davout saw an opportunity to destroy Bagration before turning north and informed Jerome of the authority Napoleon had given him to take command of the Westphalians. In a fit of infantile rage, Jerome halted the forward movement of his corps, turned the com” mand over to his chief of staff, General Marchand, and deliberately did not tell him Napoleon's plans or orders. On the 15th, when Davout learned of Jerome's childish resignation, he tried to make him change his mind, but failed. Since Davout was too weak to attack Bagration alone, he moved on Mohilev instead, to bar the shortest road northward to Vitebsk.
When Jerome departed, he left Marchand totally in the dark about Napoleon's instructions. Marchand was forced to sift through all the orders before he was able to direct Poniatowski and Latour-Maubourg to advance on Bobruisk in an attempt to cut Bagration's line of retreat. This resulted in great confusion among the divisional commanders, and Poniatowski turned to Davout for instructions. Davout could give none.
Skirmish at Romanov
Platov had been charged with holding the French at Romanov until the 15th. He occupied the village with the 5th Jagers and placed his two 6-gun cossack horse batteries behind the Vousva River, to the north-east of Romanov. The bulk of his forces were on the right bank of the river. His right wing was commanded by Generalmajor Illowaiski with two regiments, and his left was commanded by Generalmajor Kouneinikov with three regiments. Platov established a reserve consisting of the Ataman Cossack Regiment behind the center. The Akhtyrsk Hussars, Kiev Dragoons, and Lithuania Uhlans were positioned in the village.
On the morning of 15 July the 1st Polish Chasseur à Cheval Regiment, the lead element of Latour-Maubourg's corps, encountered Platov's ad-vanced guard. The cossacks withdrew, pulling the Poles into an ambush. The remaining cossacks attacked in their famous ' iava” formation, where the sotnias were widely separated and the individual cossacks had a great deal of independence to maneuver. The 2nd squadron of the 1st Chasseurs broke into a skirmish formation as the remaining three squadrons formed in echelons by the left behind them. Latour-Maubourg ordered the Poles to attack. Their commander sent the 3rd and 4th squadrons forward. Illowaiski and Kouneinikov led their forces in a flank attack as the Karpov cossacks' attack struck the Poles frontally. The Poles lost 279 of the 700 engaged, and the battle ended with the arrival of the rest of the French corps. Platov recrossed the Vousva River, burning the bridge behind him. The battle was then taken up by the cossack horse batteries on the far bank. This dissolved into an artillery battle as Platov resumed his withdrawal.
Davout Takes Command
Davout received Jerome's refusal to reassume command on 19 July and began issuing orders directly to the VII Corps divisional commanders. He directed Poniatowski to march on Slutsk via Igumen and Mohilev. Latour-Maubourg was to advance on Bobruisk in an attempt to locate Bagration, and Tharreau was to move on Borisov via Minsk.
Napoleon learned of Jerome's departure on the 19th or 20th. He was furious with Davout, whom he accused of prematurely seizing command of the right wing. He directed Poniatowski to assume command and continue the pursuit of Bagration, while extending his left to maintain contact with Davout. He went on to order Reynier to remain in Slonim and Schwarzenberg to advance on Minsk. Davout was ordered to Mohilev, but no orders were issued to Tharreau, probably due to an oversight.
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On 20 July, as the orders were being written, Davout was throwing the 2,000-man garrison out of Mohilev, and by 5:00 he had occupied the city, capturing its massive magazine intact.
As a result of some misinformation, Napoleon believed there were Russian forces maneuvering on his rear and Minsk. To cover this eventuality he detached some cavalry to his rear. While Napoleon was reacting to this imaginary threat, Davout was facing an impending attack by Bagration's forces, which had been reinforced by Ignatiev's reserve division. Davout was facing twice his number. Davout had only the 6,000 cavalry of Pajol's and Bordesoulle's light brigades and the cuirassiers of General Valence and the 22,000 infantry forming Compans', Dessaix's, and Claparede's divisions.
Battle of Saltanovka
On 21 July, Davout ordered the 3rd Chasseurs à Cheval from Bordes-soulle's brigade to make a reconnaissance towards Dashkovka, about four leagues from Mohilev. These chasseurs soon encountered Bagration's advanced guard. When they reached the heights above Bouritniki, their colonel and his advanced squadron found themselves surrounded by 3,000 cossacks. They were quickly taken prisoner, while the remaining three squadrons were thrown back. The survivors took shelter behind the French 85th Line Regiment, which was also advancing in reconnaissance under the personal direction of Davout. It quickly turned back the cossacks with a few shots from their accompanying artillery.
The pending encounter was to occur on a field surrounded by forests and deeply scored by a ravine with a small stream running along its bottom. The terrain around Saltanovka was constrictive and would not permit the Russians to profit from their numerical superiority.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 16