Knowing of the impending storm, Davout spent the evening of the 22nd preparing his position. He had the bridge on the Staroi-Bickov road barricaded. On the right, his sappers broke down the bridge and dam by the Fatova mill. They also cut loopholes in all the neighboring buildings. On his right wing, in the village of Fatova, Davout placed five battalions of the 108th Line and one battalion of the 85th Line. To the left, near Saltanovka, he placed three battalions of the 85th Line and an independent company of voltigeurs. Behind the right wing, between Fatova and Seletz, he positioned four battalions of the 61st Line as a reserve. He established a general reserve consisting of one battalion of the 85th and 61st Line Regiments, Valence's cuirassier division, Chastel's 3rd Light Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Chasseur à Cheval Regiment near Seletz.
At 7:00 A.M. on the morning of the 23rd, the Russian general Raevsky advanced with orders to take Saltanovka with the 6th and 42nd Jagers in the lead. Bagration had given him five regiments of the 12th Division, five more from the 26th commanded by Paskevitch, twenty squadrons, three cossack regiments, and seventy-two guns. General Raevsky, with the 12th Division, was to attack the French frontally, while Paskevitch and the 26th Division were to attack Fatova after turning the French right.
At 7:30 A.M. the advancing Russians pushed the French advanced posts back. The 26th Division advanced, with a battalion of the Orel and another of the Nivegorod Infantry Regiments leading the way. Behind them advanced twelve guns, the Poltava Infantry Regiment, six more guns, the Ladoga Infantry Regiment, the second battalion of the Nivegorod Infantry Regiment, and finally the rest of the cavalry.
At the same time the skirmishers from Prince Charles of Mecklenburg's and Voronzov's divisions as well as those of the 18th Division attacked Atovka. This force encountered the battalion of the 85th Line in the woods near Fatova, pushing them back. At the same time Bagration posted a battery of twelve guns on the plateau dominating Atovka. A battalion of the 108th Line with a few guns advanced to the 85th, and the two battalions took up a position to the south of Fatova, on a low ridge, formed in columns and covered by a thick screen of skirmishers. Bagration then began deploying the heads of his column for the pending assault. Davout sent two battalions of the 61st Line to support the 85th and 108th.
The leading Russian battalions of Orel and Nivegorod, supported by twelve guns, attacked and carried the village. However, as they cleared it on the far side, they were struck by the four battalions of the 108th concealed in the wheat fields behind the village. At the same time the Poltava Infantry Regiment threw back the battalion of the 108th posted to the west of Fatova.
In its turn, the Poltava Infantry was pushed back by two battalions of the 61st led by General Guyardet. The Russians established a six-gun half-battery on their side of the stream, and its fire prevented the 61st from pursuing the retreating Poltava Infantry Regiment. Paskevitch positioned the Ladoga Infantry Regiment to the west of Fatova, and to its right, in the woods, he posted a chain of skirmishers. Though this shored up the Russian left, the two French battalions pushed back the two battalions of the Orel and Nivegorod Infantry that had crossed the stream. Paskevitch advanced the Poltava Infantry and four masked guns to stop the French advance and prevent their turning the Russian right wing.
The battalions of the 85th and 108th Line pushed back the Poltava Infantry and attacked the Russian guns, which showered them with cannis-ter. Colonel Achard, with a battalion of the 108th and one from the 85th, advanced with great energy, crossed the stream near Atovka, and succeeded in capturing the Russian position. However, he was wounded at the critical moment, and the Russian counterattack pushed his forces back.
At the same time that Achard was advancing, Bagration formed the Smolensk Infantry Regiment into an attack column to act in concert with Paskevitch, when he resumed the offensive. The 6th and 42nd Jagers covered the head of the Smolensk Infantry as they advanced. Raevsky, flanked with his two sons, stood at the head of the Smolensk Infantry. Unfortunately, he did not hear the cannon shots that signaled Paskevitch's advance over the noise of the battle and started his advance too late. The Smolensk Regiment advanced into a terrible artillery fire directed by Chef d'escadron Polinier, which inflicted heavy casualties on it. The advance stopped, and as Raevsky learned of the advance of fresh French forces, he called off the attack and began to withdraw from the battlefield.
Davout assumed that Bagration's main effort was on the right, but by noon the reconnaissance he had directed towards this flank had encountered nothing. He then ordered the 111th Line, Chaste!”s light cavalry, and Valence's cuirassiers to advance in support of General de division Dessaix in a renewed attack on the Russian center at Saltanovka.
The successful battalions of the 61st and 85th Line crossed the stream and attacked the Russian left. Dessaix crossed between Fatova mill and the Saltanovka bridge, moving forward and attacking the Russian rear, throwing their center into disorder. Bagration, already disquieted by the French success on his left, ordered a general retreat.
General Compans, at the head of the 61st and 111th Line, charged the Russians again, pursuing them until nightfall. They were near Nowiel-ski when the pursuit stopped.
The battle continued until nightfall. The French had outfought twice their number, killing 2,548 Russians and taking 200 prisoners, while losing 4,134 dead and wounded.
The Advance
The Battle of Saltanovka ended as General Raevsky withdrew from the field. He moved his corps towards Smolensk and arrived there on 4
August, two days after Bagration. Meanwhile, Grouchy had advanced through Kokhanovo on the 17th and established contact with Eugene on the 18th. On the 19th, Grouchy surprised Orsha, seizing the immense magazines there. The garrison fled before they could fire the supplies. Grouchy continued to force his passage over the Dnieper, and within three days his forces had passed through Babinovitshi and were reconnoi-tering the roads to Smolensk and Vitebsk.
Jerome's VII Corps had been passed to General Vandamme, but later General Tharreau assumed command and marched on Minsk and Orsza to join the Grande Armée. Poniatowski and the V Corps continued to follow Bagration, but only as far as Romanova9 where the great forests began. From there he moved on Igumen and Mohilev, where he arrived six days later. Latour-Maubourg pursued Bagration as far as Blusk, arriving on the 24th. However, he was unable to move on the fortress of Bobruisk, so he crossed the Berezina at Berezino and moved on Mohilev, arriving on 5 August.
* (David Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, N.Y. Macmillan, 1966. p. 776)
To the south, Reynier, commanding the VII Corps, composed entirely of Saxons, and Schwarzenberg, commanding the Austrian Hilfkorps, were operating against Tormassov's 3rd Army of the West. Reynier moved against Tormassov, who was threatening to move against Lubin, but he had only 10,600 men to face Tormassov's numerically superior forces. Napoleon, under the mistaken impression that Tormassov had only about 10,000 men, assumed that Reynier could hold him at bay and intended to recall Schwarzenberg to the Grande Armée. He recommended that Reynier invade Volhynia so as to better defend Muchavetz and Precipiez. Reynier advanced and on 25 July found himself at Chomsk. From there he detached Klengel's brigade to Kobrin and other small detachments to Brest-Litovsk and Pinsk.
The Battle of Kobrin
In mid-July Tormassov received orders to advance. He moved on the French rear along a line that extended from Pinsk to Brest-Litovsk, but his main forces moved on Kobrin. Kobrin was a small country village at the junction of the Dvina-Pruszany and Brest-Pinsk roads, standing on the banks of the Murawiec River. There were only a few houses on the right bank of the river, connected to the village by a wooden bridge over which the road to Pruszany ran. The only stone building had been converted by the Saxons into a strongpoint. It was a small cloistered church on the left bank. Below the church, on the other side of the street, was a tumbled-down redoubt left over from the days of Charles XII of Sweden's invasion of Russia. It was completely surrounded by wooden buildings.
Klengel deployed his troops as follows: On each of the three main roads entering the city he positioned two or three companies of infantry with a pair of guns. In the market, in front of the church, he posted a battalion of the Kònig Infantry Regiment as a reserve. On the right bank of the Murawiec there were two companies, two guns, and a squadron of the Prinz Clemens Uhlan Regiment under the command of Matthai. The approach to the city was barricaded, a single house being occupied. Major von Becka's squadron of the Prinz Clemens Uhlans stood a half-hour from the city on the road to Brest and that of Major Piesport stood on the road to Polska.
Klengel had 2,433 men under his command: the Kònig and Niese-meuschel Infantry Regiment with 1,019 infantry and the regimental artillery with 2 officers and 123 men. There was sufficient ammunition on hand, but insufficient rations. Fifty of the brigade's train wagons loaded with rations had not reached the main body, even after a night march. Delayed by a broken bridge, the ox-drawn wagons had been forced to seek another route to Kobrin. The train was captured by cossacks.
On the morning of 27 July, thanks to a reconnaissance report from Major von Becka, Klengel learned that the road to Brest was swarming with 'Kalmucks and bashkirs.” Von Piesport's squadron was also attacked, and both squadrons were driven back to Kobrin. The third squadron, posted on the right bank of the Murawiec, commanded by Matthai, pulled back to Kobrin as more Russian squadrons crossed the river to face them.
The main body of Tormassov's forces approached along the road from Antopol. The attacking Russians came from Zalesie. Major Bevilla-qua, with two companies of the Kònig Infantry Regiment and two 4pdr guns, faced them alone. Opposing him were twelve Russian squadrons and a battery of twelve guns. Bevillaqua had no choice but to withdraw into Kobrin.
The village was completely surrounded by Russian cavalry. The Russian artillery battered the city, and around 10:00 A.M. their dragoons attempted to break into it. Though the Saxon positions were still holding, Klengel ordered Colonel Zechwitz to break out in the direction of Pruszany with the Prinz Clemens Uhlans. They broke out and eventually rejoined Reynier's main force.
Around 11:00 A.M. the Russian assault columns approached the city along all three main roads. Colonel Gophardt” with a portion of the Kònig Regiment, moved down the road towards Brest in an attempt to stop the Russians. Major Bevillaqua held the Antopol road with his two companies of the Kònig Regiment. Major von Schlieben, with six companies of the Niesemeuschel Regiment, held the southern portion of the city and a furious house-to-house battle began.
An hour later, Major von Schlieben fell back to the market place. The Kònig Regiment took up positions in the church, on the bridge, and in the redoubt. An hour later the Niesemeuschel Regiment also moved into the redoubt.
The Saxon infantry was running out of ammunition and the guns were down to fifty rounds when the columns began their assault on the redoubt. They struck ' iike a whirlwind” and General Klengel capitulated. Generals Markoff and Oldekopf accepted his surrender. In this action the Russians captured 62 officers, 1,992 men, 4 guns, and 4 flags. There were 13 officers and 260 Saxon officers hors de combat, while the Russians lost about 600 men.
Reynier had been marching to Klengel's aid, but he encountered the Russian advanced guard near Antopol and was forced to retire. Schwar-zenberg, knowing of Tormassov's strength, had not moved to join the main army as Napoleon directed, but had remained at Slonim. With the fall of Kobrin he moved to Reynier's assistance, obtaining Napoleon's approval for his actions after the fact.
Northern Operations
On the northern flank of the main army, Marshal Macdonald was advancing against Riga while Marshal Oudinot operated between him and the main army. The Russians had detached Wittgenstein's 1st Corps to operate against Oudinot and maintain communications with General Essen, the garrison commander of Riga. On 18 July the principal battle formation of the Russian 1st Corps was in Balin with twenty-two battalions, eight squadrons and seventy-two guns, totaling 13,065 men. The second line of battle, under General Sazonov, had eight battalions and totaled 4,559 men. He was posted near Pridouisk to cover the reconnaissance forces of Prince Repnin and General Kulniefif. Prince Repnin had a detachment of two battalions, eight squadrons, and a position battery. This force had 1,607 men.
General Kulnieff, who commanded another reconnaissance force of four battalions, eight squadrons, and two guns, totaling 3,731 men, moved out at the break of dawn, sending his cossacks across the Dvina, forcing back the French pickets. His cossacks continued on to Onikschti, where they encountered eight squadrons of the 11th Chasseur à Cheval Regiment and the 10th Polish Hussar Regiment, detached from the 2nd Light Cavalry Division. The French cavalry advanced against the cossacks, attempting to push them back. However, the Russian advanced guard crossed the bridge at Drouia and began to deploy before the village. The cossacks continued to hold the French cavalry until Lieutenant Colonel Ridiger arrived with four squadrons of the Grodno Hussar Regiment. The Russian hussars immediately attacked the French and pushed them back to a ravine by Litichki. Here the French reformed their cavalry and formed them into four columns. Ridiger, seeing the remaining four squadrons of his regiment closing in, moved on the French flanks and threw them in great disorder to the village of Jaga. The French reformed their cavalry there.
While the French reformed, part of the chasseurs dismounted and formed a skirmish line. The Russian hussars charged again while the cossacks attacked the French in the flank. The French fell back with the Russians in pursuit until they reached Tschernevo.
The remainder of Kulnieff's forces remained in place to cover the movement of his cavalry against a potential advance of the French main body, which was camped near Drissa. Kulnieff learned that a considerable French force was advancing along the right bank of the Drouia and that more French infantry was between Trouia and Tschernevo. Having completed the reconnaissance and located the French forces, Kulnieff determined that they were making no offensive move in this area. He recalled his cavalry and recrossed the Dvina, leaving only the cossacks on the far bank.
This small clash cost the Russians twelve dead and sixty-three wounded, while the French losses were considerably higher. The main battle line of the Russian 1st Corps and the corps reserve moved to Pokahevzi to replace Baggovout's corps. Baggovout was forced to move because of the movements of the French on the Russian left. The reconnaissance assured Wittgenstein of the safety of this move.
Oudinot and the French II Corps had been surrounding the city of Dinaburg during this period. He received orders on 19 July to rejoin the main army. He evacuated his positions around the city and moved out.
In the face of the French, Wittgenstein made an attempt to cover the territory between Novgorod and the Dvina River. A chain of observation posts was established between Drissa and Dinaburg and north to Jacobstadt. Another bridge was erected by the Russians in Dinaburg, and Colonel Count Sievers erected a small fieldwork to defend the bridgehead. The bridge at Dinaburg was evacuated because of its isolation, and its guns were moved to Pskof. Six of those guns, however, were assigned to the garrison of Dinaburg.
On 21 July Colonel Baron Diebitsch made another reconnaissance across the Dvina with a large cossack force, three battalions and six squadrons. The force was unable to advance far and was forced to return after a long detour. On the same day, Generalmajor Hamen was sent to Dinaburg to assume command of its garrison, relieving Prince Jachwill, who returned to Wittgenstein's staff.
On 23 July the movement of the main Russian armies drew it away from Wittgenstein and caused a large gap to appear between them. To plug the gap and secure his communications, Wittgenstein sent General Balk with two battalions of converged grenadiers from the 5th Division, six guns from Horse Batt
ery #3, and a detachment of the Riga Dragoon Regiment to Leschkova. Barclay gave Wittgenstein orders that if he were separated from the main army he was to move on Vitebsk and take the offensive at the first opportune moment. He was to act in support of Riga and prevent any successful siege of that city.
On 24 July Balk was reinforced by a battalion of the 36th Jagers, two more reserve battalions of grenadiers, two converged grenadier battalions from the 14th Division, a squadron of Guard Hussar Regiment, and six guns from Position Battery #28.
By 26 July Macdonald had advanced his X Corps into Courland and secured the Dinaburg bridgehead. His movements had, however, opened up a gap between himself and Oudinot, providing the Russians with an opportunity to cross the Dvina near Drouia and move on the French lines of communication.
The Russians began this maneuver on 26 July. Their reserve remained until a detachment from Kastschkovski arrived. General Balk was left in Wolinizi with two battalions of converged grenadiers from the 5th Division, three squadrons of the Riga Dragoons, and six guns from Horse Battery #3. This small force was to screen the main body as it moved along the left bank of the Dvina and to scout any movements by Oudinot.
On 27 July General Kulnieff crossed the Drissa with the cavalry of General Balk and advanced to reconnoiter the proposed advance. Infantry detachments were placed in Siabki and Tobolki, later to be reinforced by General Helfreich's forces.
At 4:00 P.M. the French advanced against this force, and a skirmish began around Philipova, not far from Kliastitzy, between the Russian advanced guard, consisting of Grodno Hussars, a squadron of the Guard Hussars, and the Platov #4 Cossack Regiment, and the leading French elements, consisting of the 7th and 20th French Chasseur à Cheval Regiments and the 6th Polish Uhlan Regiment. A heavy cavalry battle ensued and only stopped with nightfall. Though relatively inconclusive, the Poles lost 167 men.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 17