Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

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Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 22

by George F Nafziger


  To the south of Markoff, General Lambert deployed his forces— the Kourin Infantry Regiment, 14th Jagers, Alexandria Hussar Regiment, and six guns. Markoff formed his forces into two lines with the Tartar Uhlan Regiment forming the link with Lambert. The cossacks and kal-mucks were posted further to Lambert's left as was the Pavlovgrad Hussar Regiment.

  While the Russians and Saxons raced to extend their flanks towards Zavnice, a heavy battle began at the critical junction of Sahr's brigade and the Austrians on the far side of the river. For an hour the Austrians and Saxons were subjected to heavy Russian artillery fire. The Alvinzi Infantry Regiment lost ninety men to this fire. Sahr's forces were repeatedly charged by the Russian dragoons, but the support of the Austrian artillery on the far bank forced them back. The 2nd Light Infantry formed a line with the von Speigel and von Anger Grenadier battalions in square on either flank. Part of the 2nd Light Infantry was formed in skirmish order before them.

  The 6th company of the 2nd Light Infantry was charged by the dragoons and formed klumpen (small knots of men sometimes known as “hasty squares”) and bravely fought off the Russian dragoons with the support of the 2nd company. The 2nd Light Infantry lost 7 officers and 260 men during these attacks.

  The Russian cavalry near Zavnice continually charged the Saxons, especially Le Coq's 21st Division, on whose right was all the Saxon cavalry. The first major Russian cavalry attack consisted principally of ten squadrons of cossacks and two dragoon regiments. They struck Zech-meister's brigade. Zechmeister faced them frontally with the Polenz Che-vauléger Regiment and a few squadrons of the hussars, while he sent the Hohenzollern Chevauxléger Regiment into their flank, taking 150 prisoners.

  Reynier ordered the Austrian chevauxlégers and Polenz Chevauxlé-gers to move against the Cherechev-Kobrin road and gain the Russian left flank. This maneuver was countered by the Pavlograd and Alexandria Hussar Regiments, who drove them back.

  During the evening, as the battle slackened, Sahr's brigade renewed its attack on the Russian right, supported by the Alvinzi Infantry Regiment, the skirmishers of Le Coq's 21st Division, and 1/Collerado Mansfield Regiment. This Austrian battalion was positioned on the far side of the river. It crossed through the swamp and pushed forward against the Russian flank with bayonets, driving back the Russian infantry. Its advance was stopped by the threat of attack by the Russian cavalry. It was forced back to the edge of the swamp where it was supported by 2/Collerado Mansfield Regiment, which had also crossed the river. The Miller Infantry Regiment moved up too, but did not cross the swamp. It had support from the Austrian artillery on the far bank.

  Because of the threatening cavalry, the Alvinzi Infantry Regiment, also advancing to support the 1/Collerado Mansfield Regiment, formed bataillonmasse and continued to advance. General Frelich moved to support them with the Blankenstein and Kaiser Hussar Regiments. Further support came from the half-battery of Lieutenant Aust, which fired on the Russian left flank. Despite the ardor of the Russian attack, they were driven back after failing to dislodge the Austrians. Night began to fall, and the battle died out.

  Before Gorodetschna, at about 5:00 P.M., General Frimont, who commanded the force watching the original Russian positions across the river from Gorodetschna, resolved to attack the Russians before him. To do this he established a 6pdr battery which directed its fire on them. He had noticed the slow drawing off of forces facing him across the river. When they did not respond to his artillery fire he advanced a Grenz infantry battalion, a battalion of the Beaulieu Infantry, and three divisions of cavalry into Gorodetschna, to support the 6pdr battery.

  This alarmed the Russians, who responded by placing four battalions and eight guns by the Gorodetschna post office, three divisions of cavalry and eight more guns on the right, and, near the swamp, a further three divisions of cavalry. Behind them Frimont saw masses of infantry on the sandy hills and decided that the position was too strong to attack. About the time he withdrew, night was falling and the battle died down.

  Tormassov was reinforced by the 13,000 men he had been expecting, but he had not engaged more than eighteen battalions and forty-eight squadrons of his total force of thirty-nine battalions and sixty-six squadrons. He decided that his position was too dangerous to continue to hold. Once night fell, he began to withdraw. He had lost about 4,000 men hors de combat and 500 prisoners. The Austrians had lost 2,000 men hors de combat and the Saxons lost 3 officers and 166 men dead, 16 officers and 644 men wounded, and 1 officer and 5 men missing. In addition the Saxons lost five guns, three of them from the von Roth horse battery, which were destroyed in the artillery duels during the day.

  Russian Withdrawal

  On 13 August Reynier advanced to renew his effort on the Russian left only to find their rear guard under General Count Lambert. The Russians fell back behind Mouk Navelsa and the allies occupied Kobrin without resistance.

  On 15 August the Austro-Saxons attacked the Russian rear guard without serious effect near Novo Selki and again the next day at Divin. By the 17th the Russians reached Samary without opposition.

  Tormassov reached Ratno on the 17th with detachments of Prince Khowanshoi's and Generalmajor Tschlapitz' forces. On the same day he learned of Admiral Tchichagov's approach after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. He determined to retrace his steps and moved back to establish his army on the Styr River. Schwarzenberg also heard of Admiral Tchichagov's approach and stopped his pursuit at the Styr.

  The effect of this action, though technically a Russian failure, was to draw Schwarzenberg away from the main army and its ordered junction with Davout. It also prevented many of the Polish troops in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw from being sent to the rear areas of the main French army to support its operations. Instead they were tied to garrison duties in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

  Northern Operations

  To the extreme north of Oudinot and St. Cyr, Marshal Macdonald marched on Riga with his X Corps. When Barclay evacuated the Russian camp at Drissa, Wittgenstein was left in Pokemtsy with about 25,000 men, exclusive of the Riga garrison. He was charged with defending Riga and Pskof. While Wittgenstein maneuvered with his forces against Oudinot, Macdonald moved on Riga. Macdonald left Rossieny on 4 July and occupied the cities of Mitau, Bransk, and Jacobstadt with his Prussian forces.

  The governor of Riga, General Essen, had long been preparing his city for siege. He had torn down the suburbs of the city to give the fortress a clear field of fire as well as to prevent the French from approaching the fortress unseen. In addition, every possible reinforcement had been added to the garrison. To strengthen his position, Essen dispatched General Lewis with several infantry battalions, a large artillery force, an uhlan regiment, some cossacks, and a large force of dragoons to occupy Eckau and the neighborhood of Bouske.

  The Prussians of General Grawart were positioned between Mitau and Riga. Macdonald had his headquarters in Jacobstadt, and the Russian forces moving on Eckau threatened to cut the communications between Grawart and Macdonald. To prevent this possibility, Grawart moved to attack them with five battalions before they could accumulate sufficient forces to actually cut his communications. Grawart hoped to push the Russians back to Riga.

  The Battle of Eckau

  On the morning of 18 July, several small detachments of Prussian hussars were observed by the Russians as they reconnoitered the Russian positions. The Russian uhlan regiment posted there drove them off and captured a few prisoners. The appearance of the Prussian forces alarmed the Russians, and they leapt to arms. They prepared to receive the pending Prussian attack. One Prussian column moved from the vicinity of Ranken and, covered by the forces of General Kleist (three battalions and six squadrons), moved on to the left. Kleist seemed determined to take possession of the ground occupied by the Russians. A second Prussian column positioned itself on the main road leading to Eckau and moved towards the Prussian right and center.

  The Prussian advance did not shake the Russians, who coolly awaited its arrival. As the Prussians
closed, their left column was swept with heavy artillery fire from a strong battery on the heights that covered the Russian right flank. At the same moment the Prussian cavalry moved forward to charge the Russian uhlans, who were stationed near the entrance of a narrow defile. They moved to prevent the Russians from striking the Prussian infantry.

  The cannonade caused heavy casualties on the advancing Prussian infantry. Kleist thought it necessary to respond to this by falling on the Russian left, but his initial assault failed. Kleist rallied his forces and sent them back repeatedly.

  General Lewis found his right heavily pressed by the Prussians, who had just reinforced their attack. He was obliged to withdraw towards Riga and assume a new defensive position. The losses from this battle were not particularly high. The Russians lost about 600 men hors de combat, and the Prussians lost about the same number of men.

  Northern Stalemate

  After this clash, the forces of both sides settled down for nearly a month without any action. The French forces near Schlock received reinforcements and reports that the siege train of heavy artillery from Danzig for the siege operations against Riga had reached Marshal Mac-donald. Essen learned that another French corps was advancing from Germany to assist Macdonald in his siege of Riga. Essen felt that if this force should arrive before the Prussians were defeated, he would be obliged to fight with terribly disadvantageous numbers. He resolved to lessen this by attempting to drive the Prussians back to Mittau and the opposite bank of the Aa River.

  The Prussians were strongly placed. Their right was a short distance from the village of Eckau and ran across the main road near Draken, which was also occupied by the Prussians. The Prussians had further strengthened their position by digging earthworks that were well posted with artillery. The Prussian center was flanked on the left by the Mouss, a branch of the Aa. There was a large force placed between these positions and the Babite Lake.

  General Essen decided that the Prussian right was the most vulnerable point in the Prussian line and directed his efforts against it. He ordered a brigade under General Viliamov to make a false attack on the Prussian center in an effort to draw off their reserves. Meanwhile he directed six British gunboats, ten Russian gunboats, and three bombards filled with troops from Dinamunde, under Admiral von Moller, to descend on Schlock. They were to land on the Prussian flank and rear.

  Battle of Dahlenkirchen

  On 22 August the Russians launched their attack. A furious assault began. The Russians landed their troops and sent Viliamov's brigade forward against their center. The Prussian left was swept from their entrenchments at bayonet point. The Russians lost control in the excitement of dislodging the Prussians and pursued them headlong towards the Prussian rear only to find a large body of Prussian cavalry awaiting them. The Prussian cavalry charged them before they were able to reform, and the Russians suffered severe casualties. Despite the heavy losses and the impact of the charge, the Russians succeeded in holding the Prussian earthworks.

  While the Russians held off the Prussian cavalry, the Prussian infantry rallied. On the Prussian right, which had held, an eight-gun horse battery moved forward at General Grawart's order and unlimbered to pour heavy fire into the Russians. Despite this, the Prussian position was not strong enough, and they were forced to withdraw. The withdrawal of the Prussian right was followed shortly by the now unsupported Prussian center. The center had never been seriously engaged by Viliamov, and its withdrawal was not difficult.

  At the moment of his success General Essen learned that only six of the gunboats under Razvozov had been able to move past Schlock and make the landing. This failure to pass Schlock prevented Essen's designs on the Prussian right. Though he did not destroy the Prussians, Essen had dislodged them from their positions and inflicted a serious loss on them. The Prussians withdrew to Mittau.

  The Prussians had had about 1,500 men and a single battery under Oberst von Horn, while the Russians had attacked with twelve battalions and six squadrons, about 6,000 men total. The Russians inflicted about 800 casualties and suffered about 600 casualties.

  The most unusual aspect of this battle was the combined army and naval operations. Though there was no official treaty ending hostilities between the Russians and English, there had been several instances of similar cooperation between Russian and British forces since 20 July. Admiral von Moller reported to General Essen that “there were six English vessels, under the command of Captain Stuart, detached up the River Aa, while ten of our (Russian) gunboats landed a thousand troops to attack the enemy, who occupied the town of Schlock and its environs. '”

  Stalemate Resumes

  After 23 August General Essen's forces became stationary, not engaging in any enterprise of note. His positions did not change significantly from those they assumed after their victory at Schlock. There was uninterrupted communication between Essen and Wittgenstein during this period.

  Essen was informed that considerable portions of the division facing him had fallen back from Mittau, leaving only a very small garrison in the city. He lost no time in making preparations to seize the city, which he knew to be an intermediate depot for the Prussians. In addition, their artillery park and engineering park were in Ruenthal and Bórsmunde, situated near the Aa River, about a mile apart and three short days' march from Riga.

  Though the engineering park was of little value, the siege train contained the 130 guns necessary for the assault on Riga. The season was too advanced to undertake the siege, so the forces had been held back rather than be exposed to unnecessary risk. The train had come under Macdonald's command on 9 July and moved from Koenigsberg on the 12th, It had moved forward only slowly, passing Tilsit on 30 July and finally reaching Ruenthal on 30 August.

  On 26 September Steingell and his Finnish corps joined General Lewis and advanced on Eckau with about 16,000 men. Eckau was only lightly held. Yorck was informed of Steingell5s move and positioned Kleist before Mittau. He ordered Hunerbein to join him and to assume a position near Eckau with the bulk of his forces.

  On the following day, before Hunerbein arrived, Yorck decided to fix his left so as to cover the park and establish himself behind the Aa on the heights of Ruenthal. He was unable to cover both the park and Mittau, so he ordered Kleist to join him as quickly as possible.

  Steingell occupied Bausk with a small detachment (two infantry regiments) and took up a position opposite Yorck on the Aa. His force consisted of the Nizov Infantry Regiment and a battery of twelve guns. These positions remained unchanged until Kleist joined Yorck.

  That junction occurred on 29 September, and Hunerbein was only a few miles from Bausk. Yorck decided to assume the offensive and had a bridge constructed over the Aa at Mesoten. Yorck began to move his infantry across at 1:00 P.M. His cavalry and artillery moved across at a ford a short distance away. Yorck's advanced guard quickly pushed back the Russian advanced parties, but stopped when they encountered Steingell's main body, which advanced against them. Steingell crossed below Mesoten, by Zemal, and moved on Grafenthal. Kleist was posted there and pushed the Russians back to the Aa.

  While this was going on, General Essen moved on Mittau down the river in his gunboats and, with the support of 3,000 men sent by Steingell, seized Mittau on the 29th with little opposition. Here he captured 50 effective soldiers, 150 invalids, four brass guns, and a vast collection of provisions, including furs that had been requisitioned from Courland. These furs were a significant capture in this area, which was inclined to very harsh winters.

  On 30 September Yorck learned that Hunerbein had retaken Bausk. He continued his offensive movements and attacked the Russians on both banks of the Aa. The Russians on the left bank of the Aa retired on Mittau and those on the right fell back to Olai. Yorck did not pursue them into the cities, but on 1 October, Steingell and Essen resumed their withdrawal and moved into Riga. This latest series of engagements had cost the Russians about 1,500 dead and wounded and about 2,500 prisoners. The Prussians lost about 900 dead and wounded a
nd 350 prisoners.

  Macdonald had left a feeble detachment in Dinaburg and moved the bulk of his forces on 30 September to join Yorck. By the time he arrived, the situation had once again returned to a state of lethargic inactivity.

  Steingell decided that he did not wish to be closed into Riga and moved south to join Wittgenstein near Drissa on 10 October.

  Macdonald established his headquarters near Stalgen, on the left bank of the Aa, between Bausk and Mittau. Immediately after his arrival he pulled Grandjean's division back to Illuks, a day's march from Dinaburg. He retained Hunerbein's brigade, with eight battalions, in its last position. Yorck remained near the Baltic and Eckau with a Polish brigade, a Prussian brigade, and six squadrons of Prussian cavalry. His right extended to Frederickstadt, and his reserves were in Mittau, Stalgen, and Anenburg. Jacobstadt also received a small garrison.

  The Russians occupied Olai, Baldon, and Niegut. Macdonald decided not to surrender his advantages to the Riga garrison. The countryside had been heavily foraged and he could not afford to move his forces about the countryside to forage further. As a result he chose to hold his positions strongly.

  During the month of October Macdonald ordered the siege train returned to Germany, but his forces remained in their siege positions around Riga for the entire month.

  On 16 July Murat reported Russian movements that appeared to be the attack for which Napoleon was longing. Napoleon responded by recalling the Guard and VI Corps, which he had sent to Bloubokie in the hopes of striking any Russian advance out of Drissa, to his south.

  On the 19th, when the hoped-for Russian attack did not materialize and Murat reported that the Russians were evacuating Drissa and destroying the material that they could not take with them, Napoleon reacted swiftly. He thought that the Russians would move on Polotsk and effect a junction with Bagration. Instead, he discovered they were moving on Vitebsk. Napoleon responded by redirecting his troops to move from Kamen to Biechenkovski on the 21st. They arrived there on the 24th. Davout's battle at Saltanovka, near Mohilev, had denied Bagration the use of that road and redirected his movement. On the 24th, near Biechenkovski, a number of Russian stragglers were captured. These men informed Napoleon that Barclay was definitely in Vitebsk, on the left bank of the Dvina.

 

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