The Battle of Ostrovno
On 25 July Murat proceeded towards Ostrovno with his cavalry. At approximately 6:00 A.M., about three miles from Ostrovno, the French 8th Hussar Regiment encountered two squadrons of the Russian Guard Hussar Regiment and eight 6pdr guns of Horse Battery #7. This was Ostermann's advanced guard. The Russian cavalry, supported by the artillery, drove the 8th Hussar Regiment back on the rest of Pire's 4th Light Cavalry Brigade. The 8th Hussars joined the 16th Chasseur à Cheval Regiment. They counterattacked, capturing the eight guns and 150 prisoners.
Ostermann fell back to await the arrival of the Russian infantry that was following him and directed the Soum Hussar Regiment to attack Pire. They quickly found themselves facing Murat's advanced guard, the I Reserve Cavalry Corps under General Nansouty. General St. Germain and two battalions of infantry advanced against the Russians, while all of the corps horse artillery was formed into a single battery to play on the Russians. When they arrived, Ostermann deployed Tchoglokov's 11th Division on both sides of the main road, and Bakhmetieffs 23rd Division formed itself in battalion columns as a second line behind him. Murat estimated the total force to be seven or eight battalions.
Murat advanced St. Germain's division, which was formed by brigades and supported by Bruyère's division. A heavy cannonade developed and the Ingremannland Dragoon Regiment moved to take the French in the right flank.
The French countered this by moving the 15th Light Brigade to face them. This brigade consisted of two Polish uhlan regiments and the combined Prussian Hussar Regiment. The brigade charged and drove the Russians back, taking 200 prisoners. At the same time Ornano1 s 12th and 13th Light Brigades charged along the main road, only to be thrown back by the Russian infantry's defensive fire.
Murat sent two battalions of the 8th Légère Regiment into the woods on his left to support the 1st Cuirassier Brigade. The Russians responded by sending three battalions to attack them. The Russian advance was stopped by the 9th Polish Uhlans and the Prussian Combined Hussar Regiment.
Ostennann attempted to force the French to retreat by threatening their right, but the battalion he sent was struck by the 9th Polish Uhlan Regiment supported by two squadrons of the Prussian Hussars and a brigade of cuirassiers. A further 200 prisoners were captured, and the Russians withdrew.
At the same time, two other Russian battalions moved against the French right and were attacked by the 6th and 8th Polish Uhlans of the 15th Light Brigade, leaving 200 Russian dead and 150 wounded behind them.
Murat's continued attacks forced Ostermann's infantry back into the woods. Murat soon realized that it was fruitless to attempt to attack them and backed off his cavalry. He had possession of the ground where the initial attack on the 8th Hussar Regiment had occurred. He positioned Bruyère's 1st Light Division and St. Germain's 1st Cuirassier Division where they could hold that position and watch the Russians.
As the French rallied and prepared their next attack they were reinforced by the arrival of Delzon's 13th Infantry Division, from Eugene's IV Corps. This division took position on the heights in time to stop an advance by the Russians. Two battalions of the 8th Légère Regiment stopped repeated attacks by the Russians.
Faced with this overpowering force, Ostermann had no alternative but to withdraw. This he did in good order, and the engagement broke off. He withdrew to favorable positions before Ostrovno.
As a serious battle seemed to be developing, the divisions of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, part of I Corps, III Corps, Sebastiani's division (then posted on the right bank of the Dvina), the 2nd and 4th Cuirassier Divisions from the II Reserve Cavalry Corps, as well as General Montbrun with the three regiments of Bavarian cavalry received orders from Napoleon to congregate on the scene.
Ostermann's new position was well chosen and commanded the ground in front of it. It overlooked all the roads that approached Ostrovno. The city stood astride the main road and was flanked by the Dvina River on the right, a ravine on its front, and a thick woods on the left. Ostermann was positioned so that he had communication with the magazines that supplied him as well as with Vitebsk, the regional capital. Ostermann intended to defend this city.
That evening Murat was joined by the remainder of Eugene's IV Corps. Ostermann was also reinforced by the 3rd Cavalry Corps and by Konovnitzin's 3rd Division. At 10:00 A.M. Murat sent Delzon's division forward against Konovnitzin's division, which was in a strong position behind the ravine. Konovnitzin's left wing was fixed in a forest that bordered the left of the battlefield.
Murat sent a strong reconnaissance against them, consisting of the French advanced guard and two battalions of the 8th Légère Regiment. The Russian infantry fire drove back the French cavalry, but the Russian advance was stopped by the French infantry supporting them.
Delzon sent the 84th Line Regiment in column by divisions under General Huard against the Russian right, while the 92nd Line and the 1st Provisional Croatian Infantry Regiment were directed to enter the heavy woods on the Russian left. The French artillery of Danthouard formed on their center, while the 106th Line Infantry Regiment and Nansouty's cavalry and artillery remained as a general reserve behind the ravine. The difficulties in pushing the Russians out of the woods slowed Huard's advance. He attempted twice to push Konovnitzin's division back, but the Russian reserve deployed to counter his thrust.
The Russians struck back. The 8th Légère and 84th Line Regiments vainly tried to hold them back. Their line gradually diminished, littering the ground in front of their position with their dead and the plain behind them with their retiring wounded. The stream of wounded was joined by others who abandoned their ranks. This trickle of deserters grew into a stream and eventually developed into a rout. The French artillery, perceiving itself abandoned, also began to retire, resulting in a general rout.
Reportedly, Murat saw this and darted forward, placing himself in front of the 8th Polish Uhlan Regiment. He excited them with his words and actions, though they were already enraged by the sight of the advancing Russians. Murat then ordered them forward. He had, apparently, only wished to stimulate them and send them against the Russians. He had no intention of throwing himself with them into the midst of a melee, from which he could neither see nor command, but the Poles were already crouched and condensed behind him. The charging cavalry covered the width of the field completely and pushed Murat before them. He could neither detach himself from them nor stop. He had no recourse but to charge in front of the regiment, where he had stationed himself to harangue them. Now, trapped, he submitted himself with some grace to what was, at best, an uncomfortable position.
At the same time, General Danthouard ran to his artillery men while General Girardin ran to his reserve, two battalions of the 106th Line Regiment. These generals rallied their forces and directed them against the Russian position. The 84th Line and Croatians, supported by the two battalions of the 106th, struck the Russians, reestablished their original positions, and captured two guns. This movement was seconded by General Roussel leading the 92nd Line Regiment in column from the forest.
On the Russian left, General Pire led the 4th Light Cavalry Brigade around the Russian flank. The Russians continued to hold the thick forest which broke the battlefield in two. The 92nd Line Infantry, intimidated by the heavy fire issuing from the forest, froze in its position, unable to advance or withdraw. Generals Belliard and Roussel moved to them and led them forward. They advanced into and seized the forest.
This success turned the strong Russian column that had advanced against the French right. Murat, perceiving this and having survived his charge with the Polish uhlans, drew his sword and exclaimed, “Let the bravest follow me!” The Russians saw the danger in their exposed situation and began to withdraw. They quickly plunged into the forest and intervening ravines which slowed Murat's cavalry sufficiently to permit their escape.
After their furious battle and their previous experience with Russians in the woods, Eugene and Murat were hesitant to commit themselves on
ce again to a battle in the forests. Napoleon arrived at this time and took over tactical command of the battle. He quickly gave orders, and the woods that had stopped Eugene and Murat were swept end to end. That evening the residents of Vitebsk could see the French light troops emerging from the forests around the city.
The retreating Russians were reinforced by Tuchkov's remaining division, the grenadier division under Strogonoff which arrived at Do-brieka at about 5:00 P.M.
The battle had been exhausting and the movement through the woods had badly disordered the French. As night fell they stopped to reorganize and prepare for the night. Opposite the French lines, the skies were lit with the multitude of bivouac fires that marked the Russian positions. They had lost 2,500 men hors de combat during the battle, while the French lost 3,000 and about 300 prisoners.
On the dawn of 27 July, Napoleon appeared at the French advanced posts. In the growing light he saw the Russian army encamped on the elevated plain that commanded the approach to Vitebsk. The Lucizza River formed a deep channel that divided the French and Russian positions. Pahlen's 3rd Cavalry Corps, eight battalions of infantry, and two pulks of cossacks had replaced Ostermann and Konovnitzin in front of Vitebsk. The infantry was centered on the main road, while the cavalry was stationed on the right in a double line supported by the Dvina.
The Russian position was not squarely opposite the French position, but to their left. This was because they had changed their facing to conform to the course of the river.
General Pire's brigade was directed to the right to reconnoiter the terrain. To defend the passage of the French, a twelve-gun battery was established to the left of the road on a ridge overlooking the plain.
The French forces crossed a narrow bridge over a ravine and were obliged to deploy by a change of front to the left, with their right wing foremost, in order to preserve the support of the river on that side. General Broussier's division led the advance formed in square because of the threatening Russian cavalry. Delzon's division followed behind to form the second line. On the banks of this ravine, near the bridge and to the left of the main road, was a small hillock which had already attracted Napoleon's notice. From this vantage point Napoleon could observe both armies, yet not be in the middle of the battle.
The 14th Division, part of Eugene's IV Corps, under General Brous-sier, sent forward the 200 Parisian voltigeurs forming the three companies of voltigeurs of the 9th Line and the 18th Légère Regiment commanded by General de brigade Sivary. They pushed forward on the left, passing in front of the entire Russian cavalry force. They pushed the Russians out of a small village and took up a position where their flank was secured on the Dvina. The 16th Chasseur à Cheval Regiment followed them with a battery of horse artillery. The Russians coolly allowed the French to advance and permitted them to prepare to attack.
As the 16th Chasseurs prepared themselves and reorganized after traversing the broken terrain, they were attacked by the cossacks opposite them. They stood fast and unsuccessfully attempted to break the Russians' charge with carbine fire. They held their fire until the Russians were thirty paces from them and then fired a volley. Despite the effect of the French fire, the Russians closed with them and drove them back in disorder,
In their haste to escape, the 16th Chasseurs became trapped in the ravine. Murat reacted by drawing his saber and leading the sixty officers of his suite into the melee. During the course of this melee, one officer barely deflected a blow aimed by a cossack at Murat. The remains of the 16th Chasseurs rallied behind the 53rd Line Regiment, part of General Broussier's division, which had hastily formed squares in echelon. The fire of the 53rd drove the Russian cossacks back, saving the French artillery that was about to fall into the Russians' hands. The Russian cavalry charged the squares repeatedly, but were eventually driven back.
The charge of the Russian cossacks carried them to the foot of Napoleon's observation post on the hill. Some of the Chasseurs à Cheval de la Garde, posted to protect Napoleon, drove off a few aggressive cossacks with a few well-aimed shots. The Russian cossacks withdrew and passed directly over the voltigeurs of the 18th Légère Regiment. These men had escaped attention during the cavalry battle, but now became the center of attention. All eyes were locked on them as they disappeared in the midst of the cossacks. Only the voltigeurs knew that they were not lost. Their captains had fought their way across the ground, heavily cut by ravines and thickets bordering the Dvina. There the voltigeurs reunited, urged on by their officers and the danger that stalked them. In this emergency each looked to his neighbor for support, knowing that if one failed, all would be lost. They skillfully turned the ground to their benefit. The Russians became entangled in the brush and other obstructions as the voltigeurs calmly shot them down. As each fell, his body and that of his horse further encumbered the ground, making the Russian approach increasingly difficult. They soon lost heart and withdrew, to the delight of the French army.
Meanwhile, the rest of IV Corps and Murat's cavalry, followed by the three divisions of I Corps under the command of Count Lobau, attacked the main road and the woods on the right of the Russian line. Delzon's division was ordered to march parallel along the heights and to its right, to move rapidly on the Lucizza River and turn the enemy's rear in an effort to bar their escape towards Vitebsk. In this effort he was supported by a brigade of light cavalry and a cuirassier division. Once in place, their advance begun, Broussier's division attacked a small village defended by four battalions and ten guns. The village was taken and the defending Russians driven back.
This retreat was the signal for the Russian cavalry to begin withdrawing. The Russian vanguard retreated suddenly behind the ravine of the Lucizza River to avoid being pinned against it by the French advance. The result was that the entire Russian army was collected on the far bank of the Lucizza River and presented a united body of twenty-two battalions and sixty-four squadrons, about 20,000 men, to the attacking French.
The determined Russians had assumed a strong position in front of Vitebsk, the regional capital. The probability of a determined defense was high as a result. Napoleon assumed that they would feel their position was strong enough and their duty clear enough to warrant a serious defense. At 11:00 A.M. Napoleon ordered the French attack to cease in order to permit them to reorganize and prepare for the decisive battle expected on the next day. Napoleon spent the rest of the day studying the battlefield and awaiting the arrival of further reinforcements.
Generallieutenant Konovnitzin believed Bagration to be near Orsha and had resolved to fight until he was joined by Bagration. When he had learned that Bagration had retreated via Novoi-Bickov towards Smolensk, he quickly changed his mind, and on the morning of 28 July, the French awoke to find that the Russians had disappeared. The maneuver of Vitebsk ended in failure for the French when the Russians effected their second escape from Napoleon's traps. They left 2,700 dead and wounded and 1,100 prisoners behind them, but Barclay's forces had not been brought to battle.
The Advance Resumes
The French resumed their advance on the 29th. As they arrived in Sourai, Eugene was informed that a Russian convoy was passing nearby. He sent Colonel Banco, commander of the 2nd Italian Chasseur à Cheval Regiment, with 200 men to pursue this convoy. After marching twenty miles, Banco arrived at Veliz at the same moment the convoy departed from the far side of the village. Banco's forces charged as soon as they were within range, charging five times, but being repulsed by a force of infantry and cavalry that was their superior. Despite their initial failures, the Italians eventually prevailed. They took 500 prisoners and the abandoned Russian baggage. The Italian casualties were light in view of the fury of their attacks.
The French probed the roads tentatively, but for eight days Napoleon remained camped before Vitebsk to reorganize his army and allow the stragglers to catch up. During this reorganization, Junot assumed command of the Westphalian VIII corps, formally replacing Jerome.
Before this second halt, Junot, Eugene, and
Davout rejoined the main body with their forces. Davout rejoined on the 21st near Dubrovna, and Eugene joined it on the 24th near Briszikova. The VIII Corps joined on 4 August near Orsha.
Poniatowski and the Polish V Corps remained in Mohilev until 8 August, when he detached Latour-Maubourg with the IV Cavalry Corps and Dombrowski's division to move against General Hertel in Bobruisk. Latour-Maubourg eventually returned to the main body, but Dombrowski remained behind to cover Minsk.
The French had suffered considerably from their marches, the weather, and the occasional combat. Their numbers had also been reduced by the detachments of troops to form garrisons in the various strategic cities that the French had taken as they advanced. The size superiority Napoleon had enjoyed over Barclay was considerably diminished, and by 3 August his main army consisted of 185,000 men.
Of the original 375,000 men in the main army, 90,000 had been detached under St. Cyr, Oudinot, Latour-Maubourg, and Reynier. This should have left about 285,000 in the central army, but there was a deficit of 100,000 men which was a clear loss. The 185,000 remaining men were distributed between Murat and Ney, who were in Rudnia, Count Lobau's three divisions in Babinovicki, the Guard in Vitebsk, Eugene in Surasch and Welisch, and Davout and Junot on the left bank of the Dnieper.
Bagration arrived in Smolensk on 4 August. He immediately began to poison the political waters with lies about Barclay's true loyalties. Barclay was also being pressured by Alexander to assume the offensive and decided on 6 August to attack Napoleon. Though resolved to attack, Barclay was ignorant of the positions of Napoleon's forces. He intended to have the combined Russian armies advance on Rudnia, turn Eugene's flank and destroy his corps, then engage the rest of the French as they came to Eugene's aid.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 23