Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  Geography of a Battlefield

  Before him, Murat saw a rolling, open plain speckled with occasional clumps of pine and birch. Along the north of the plain ran the new road from Smolensk to Moscow. To the south of the field ran the old Smolensk road. These two roads united at Mozhaizk, behind the plain. From there a single road continued through the forest. The Kolocha stream ran along the north of the plain, swinging north to eventually join the Moscow River. It and its tributaries had deeply scored the ground and were marked with steep banks that would prove to be serious military obstacles.

  Though they were invisible to Murat, the plain had been fortified with a number of entrenchments by the tiny Russian engineering establishment. Twenty-six guns were positioned behind the Kolocha in what was to be known as the “Great” or “Raevsky Redoubt.” Two further batteries with a total of twelve guns (nine in the forward battery and three in the rear battery) were placed “en echelon” near Gorki.

  To the south, near the right flank, were a number of small streams running approximately north-south. They were the Voinak, Semenovka, Kamenka, and the Stonets, all of which flowed into the Kolocha. Kutusov chose to make his stand on the east bank so he could take advantage of a low ridge, which gave his gunners the fullest advantage of their fire, and of the gullies of these streams, which would provide some handicap to the attacking French.

  The Raevsky Redoubt was constructed in the shape of a “V” with two short epaulments (shoulders) at the tops of the 6tV.” The work was originally open at the back, but a wooden palisade was raised to close it off. Modest Bogdanovich made some unusual comments regarding the strength of this work and states that

  it was desired to construct a strong work in the fashion of a bastion, with half-tenailles at the sides. However, both the means and the time were lacking for this, so that this position, contrary to the claims of foreign histories, was only weakly fortified. The guns placed in this redoubt were unable to sweep the surrounding terrain properly. The entrenchment of earth was on the downslope, and in consequence of this, had a counterscarp noticeably lower than its scarp, while the entrenchment itself was not very deep to begin with. The construction of the entrenchment had only begun on 6 September (Gregorian Calendar), and therefore only on the evening before (the first day of the battle). This was because the personnel of the Moscow Government's militia, to whom the work had been assigned, had not been provided with pickaxes and shovels, and did not have the slightest concept of how to manufacture gabions or fascines.

  At daybreak on the 7th, the embrasures for only nine guns had been completed, and the redoubt was still not generally ready. The digging was generally extraordinarily difficult, on account of the rounded stones with which the heights of the Borodino battlefield were covered. For this reason, the cross section of the work could not be given the requisite bulk, and because of the shortage of fascines, the slopes could not be faced. There was nothing to speak of in the way of palisades or other hindrances to the approach. (M. Bogdanovitch, Geschichte des Feldjagers im Jahre 1812.)

  The Russian Positions

  Despite his demotion, Barclay still commanded the 1st Army of the West and was charged with holding the Russian right flank. He placed a mobile reserve on the right flank consisting of Platov's cossack and the 1st Cavalry Corps. Kutusov had positioned Baggovout and his 2nd Infantry Corps with the 4th Infantry Corps of Ostermann-Tolstoy behind the Kolocha in an unassailable position. Docturov's 6th Infantry Corps stretched from these forces to the Raevsky Redoubt. The redoubt was manned by Paskevitch and men of his 26th Division, part of the 7th Infantry Corps.

  Korff and Kreutz, commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps, were positioned behind the redoubt to support it. In the village of Borodino, some distance in front of the redoubt, the Guard Jager Regiment was posted in a most vulnerable and isolated position. These dispositions clearly indicated that Kutusov anticipated the main French advance along the new Smolensk road.

  To the south Kutusov's position was not so impregnable. There was an open stretch of 2,500 yards devoid of any terrain protection other than the banks of the Semenovka stream. The village of Semenov-skaya dominated this position, but it was a military liability because of its totally wooden construction. As a result it was totally dismantled and burned to provide a clear field of fire.

  On the left of this position were three more field fortifications. These three “V” flèches were “en echelon” and known as the “Bagration fléches.” About a mile in front of these flèches was the Shevardino Redoubt, another “V, “which was erected to warn of any French advance in that direction.

  Kutusov positioned General Raevsky's corps, one division of which occupied the redoubt, south towards the village of Semenovskaya. He had the 4th Cavalry Corps positioned to support Raevsky. Still further south was Voronzov's 2nd Converged Grenadier Division, which occupied the Bagration flèches. Neverovski's 27th Division was behind the flèches. All of this infantry, part of the 8th Infantry Corps of Generallieu-tenant Borosdin, were formed in battalion columns.

  A general Russian reserve was formed with the 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions. The Guard Infantry and Tuchkov's 3rd Infantry Corps and twenty-six batteries, 300 guns total, were part of this reserve.

  Kutusov's tactical dispositions reflected his inability to grasp the possibility of a French advance from the south. As a result, initially, he made little effort to defend his southern flank. When he did react to the appearance of the French, he only sent 8,000 men from Tuchkov's 3rd Corps, 1,500 cossacks, and 7,000 opolochenie. This force took up positions around the Utitza mound. No fortifications were raised, even though this mound offered a strong position that would have been invulnerable if fortified. His only action was to place Tuchkov's forces in the woods so they could spring an ambush on the French should they advance rashly. He hoped that once the French had committed their last reserves against Bagration's flank, these forces could swing out and strike their flank and rear.

  To the north of this ambush, Kutusov strung out the 11th, 20th, 21st, and 41st Jager Regiments in an extended skirmish line that spread over a mile of open terrain. They formed the link between the ambush and Bagration's southern flank.

  General Bennigsen passed through this area on the 6th and was buried with complaints about these dispositions by the commanding officers of these jager regiments. He overrode Kutusov's orders and directed Tuchkov to abandon the ambush and take up a position on the open plain to calm the jagers' fears.

  Kutusov was not informed of this change and it was presumed that the changes in the positions had been made by Tuchkov, who died on the 7th. When Bennigsen”s actions were discovered, he incurred Kutusov 's wrath.

  Kutusov “s star had fallen after the disastrous battle of Austerlitz in 1805. In the time since his retirement, many tactical and operational changes had occurred in the Russian army. Kutusov was totally unfamiliar with them and made little effort to rectify this lack of knowledge. This lack of familiarity was probably the source of his irrational distribution of commands. Docturov commanded the center, which consisted of the 6th Infantry Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Prince Constantine commanded the Reserves. The right was commanded by Miloradovitch and consisted of the 2nd and 4th Infantry Corps as well as the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps. Prince Gorchakov commanded the left, which was formed with practically the entire 2nd Army of the West.

  Kutusov's positioning of forces was not unusual for the Russians, but were in striking contrast to those used by Wellington. Kutusov had placed his troops in dense columns on the forward slopes of the position, in full view of the French and their artillery. Wellington's practice was to place as much of his forces as possible on the reverse slopes, where they were hidden from view and fire.

  The French were well aware of the disadvantages of this type of position, and Davout's instructions to his artillery were very explicit when he stated that these vulnerable columns were to be their principal target. The Russian plan and the French doctrine doomed th
ousands of Russians to die. The Preobragenski and Semenovski Guard Infantry Regiments, who did not fire a shot in anger, were to suffer 273 casualties from the French artillery.

  Kutusov 's dispositions dismayed his generals. Clausewitz said,

  The best side of the position, however, the right wing, could be of no avail to redeem the defects of the left. The whole position too strongly indicated the left to the French as the object of operation, to admit of their forces being attracted to the right. It was, therefore, a useless squandering of troops to occupy this portion. It would have been far better to have let the right wing lean on the Kolocha itself in the neighborhood of Gorki, and merely to have observed the remaining ground as far as the Moskva, or have pretended to occupy it. (Clausewitz, Campaign of 1812 in Russia, p. 150)

  General Toll, the quartermaster general of the 1st Army of the West as well as quartermaster general of the entire Russian army under Kutusov, and Clausewitz both favored the deep formation that Kutusov had adopted. They considered such a position “to afford the best means in a defense of resuming the offensive, and of depriving the assailant of the advantage of the last disposition, and thus of surprise.” Some things would never change in Russian military thought, and this was one of them.

  Clausewitz indicates that it was most probably General Toll's influence that had resulted in the deep Russian formation. Clausewitz, though favoring deep formations, did not concur with Toll “as to the application of his principle in this instance/' Clausewitz felt that the Russians were too compact and that the reserves were positioned much too close to the front line. He said that

  the depth of the ground, was too much neglected. The cavalry stood from 300 to 400 paces behind the infantry, and from these to the great reserve was scarcely 1,000 paces. The consequence was that both the cavalry and the reserve suffered heavily from the enemy's fire without being engaged. If we recollect what masses of artillery were used in this battle by the Russians, that the Russian artillery, on account of the quantity of small ammunition carts it uses, takes up more room than any other, we may imagine how the space was filled and crammed up. The author retains to this moment the effect produced on his mind by the spectacle with which position presented in this particular. (Clausewitz, Campaign in Russia in 1812, p. 155)

  As the Russians stood awaiting the French offensive, Napoleon concentrated his efforts on bringing up his straggling columns. Seeing the strength on the Kolocha, he concentrated his army against the Russian left. Early on the afternoon of 5 September he rode forward to personally review the Russian position and the Shevardino Redoubt. Though of little military significance, it prevented Napoleon from making a close inspection of the Russian position and hindered the deployment of the French army with its twelve guns.

  After studying the Russian positions, Napoleon turned and rode back to his generals to make plans for the initial French attacks. He directed Poniatowski to move his V Corps to the south in an effort to flank the Russian left. He then directed Compans' 5th Division to assault the Shevardino Redoubt commanded by Generallieutenant Gorchakov II.

  Gorchakov had spread the 5th, 49th, and 50th Jager Regiments before the redoubt in a skirmish line extending from Alexinka to Fomkina along the Doronino ravine and in the brush extending towards Ielnia. The 27th Division was positioned behind the redoubt in dense columns, covered by the 12pdr guns in the redoubt. To the left and behind the infantry was the 2nd Cuirassier division, consisting of the Military Order, Little Russia, Gluchov, and Novgorod Cuirassier Regiments. It was posted in regimental columns. With it were eight horse guns, two squadrons of the Akhtyrsk Hussar Regiment, the New Russia, and the Kiev Dragoon Regiments detached from the 4th Cavalry Corps. To the right of the infantry were the Karkov and Tchernigov Dragoon Regiments, also from the 4th Cavalry Corps, and four horse guns. Generalmajor Karpov and six cossack regiments were posted on the Old Smolensk Road to observe the movements of Poniatowski.

  The Battle of Shevardino

  After throwing bridges over the stream that separated the two armies, Compans' 5th Division rolled forward, supported by the 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps under Nansouty and Montbrun. The Russian skirmish screen fired on the advancing French and quickly withdrew.

  The French advanced in dense columns preceded by a cloud of skirmishers and passed through Fomkino and Doronino, pushing back all Russian resistance. Compans established a strong battery near Va-loueava. This battery was on a low ridge. It fired in support of the French, limbered up, and advanced with the column, unlimbering to fire on the Russians time and again until it was within cannister range of the Russians. The gunners were supported by six or seven companies of voltigeurs that took up positions on a small mound near the gunners' final position.

  Compans' battery fired on the redoubt for nearly two hours and then moved against the village of Doronino and the adjacent woods. At the same time Poniatowski advanced against Ielnia, driving out the 5th Jager Regiment. The Kiev Dragoon Regiment charged, driving back the French skirmishers that had recklessly exposed themselves. A portion of the Akhtyrka Hussar Regiment, under Rittmeister Alexandravich, charged a column which marched against the Russian guns the hussars were to protect. The French were driven back.

  While the Russian skirmishers were retreating on the Russian right, the Novgorod Dragoon Regiment passed between the brush and the south side of the Doronino, disordering two French columns as well as throwing back a French cavalry probe. However, they too were obliged to withdraw as Poniatowski's Poles began to advance down the Old Smolensk Road and threatened their flank.

  Generalmajor Lowenstern misread the situation and returned to Bagration with a glowing report of the valiant defense of the redoubt. On his return he found the artillery and some of the defending infantry streaming back towards the main Russian lines. He reacted by sending forward another battery and committing a brigade of the 27th Division. These forces advanced and supported the redoubt with point-blank musketry aimed at the advancing French.

  Six companies of voltigeurs, supported by one battalion of the 61st Line Regiment, had occupied a mound 250 feet from the redoubt in support of Compans' battery. Compans sent the 57th and 61st Line Regiments, under General Duppelin, to attack the left wing of Never-ovski's 27th Division. The right wing of the French 5th Division, the 11 lth and 25th Line Regiments, were to turn the Russian right. Simultaneously Morand and Friant moved on the village of Shevardino. A violent fusillade began at a range of sixty feet and stopped the French advance. Compans brought up four guns behind the cover of the 57th Line Regiment to break the stalemate. They began to fire cannister into the dense green lines of Russians. The artillery fire shook the Russians, and they crumbled under a bayonet assault by the 57th and 61st Line Regiments. These two regiments swept into the redoubt and found that the skirmish fire had killed every living thing in it. Morand quickly followed this success up by occupying the redoubt with his division.

  Though it had begun as a small argument over maneuvering room,the battle around Shevardino was rapidly escalating into a general battle between the two armies' wings. Prince Gorchakov dispatched the 2nd Grenadier Division to relieve the battered 27th Division. The 2nd Grenadier Division and the rest of the 8th Corps were sent to take the redoubt, and they captured it after a bloody assault. The sole intention of Gorchakov was to hold the redoubt long enough to let night fall and end the battle.

  The French columns began to close in on the 2nd Grenadier Division from the left. Colonel Tolbouzin, commanding the Little Russia and Gluchov Cuirassier Regiments, charged the French columns, driving them back. They continued their charge into the French lines, where they took a battery on the heights near Doronino, dragging off three pieces. At the same time the Karkov and Tchemigov Dragoon Regiments dispatched two squadrons each in a charge on the 111th Line Regiment. In response the 111th formed square, but lost its two regimental guns in the battle. It was heavily pressed and only saved by the timely arrival of the Joseph Napoleon Regiment, a regiment of pressed
Spanish soldiers from Friant's 2nd Division.

  The fall of darkness did not end the battle. Poniatowski was turning the redoubt's southern flank. Generalmajor Karpov observed this calmly. The redoubt was half destroyed by the violence of the initial assaults. Around 11:00 P.M. Bagration received the order to withdraw his forces. The rear guard was made up of the 2nd Cuirassier Division and a battalion of the Odessa Infantry Regiment.

  As they withdrew, Murat's cavalry came forward once again. Never-ovski, in an effort to halt the French advance, ordered the Odessa Infantry Regiment to raise their voices and beat their drums as loudly as possible in an effort to exaggerate their numbers. The cuirassiers advanced to meet the French. The engagement was fought in total darkness, and in the confusion the Russians completed their withdrawal. The French brought 35,000 men to play against 18,000 Russians. Both sides seem to have lost about 8,000 men in the engagement.

  As the battle died down, both armies settled into their bivouacs. Russian fires lit the horizon to the east, but the French army sat sullen in the darkness. They had been unable to procure firewood or the other scarce comforts of field bivouacs.

  Preparations for the Next Day's Battle

  The night was marked with serious arguments in the Russian staff. General Yermolov contended that Shevardino was a superfluous position as a result of the Bagration flèches, and that it stood out of artillery range and consequently there was no point in defending and maintaining it. He was very outspoken in his opinion, stating that holding the position had allowed the French to strike an inferior, isolated portion of their army with little risk to themselves. Barclay agreed and urged that the redoubt be evacuated before a general assault was launched against it. Bagration's defense of this position was heated, probably because he had personally selected its site and his ego was involved. The result had been the sacrifice of 8,000 Russians. The decision to withdraw did come, but late in the evening.