Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  On 16 November the Saxons attempted to assault the city, but the effort proved fruitless. As the assault fell back, the air was filled with three distinct salvos, the signals that the Austrians were fast approaching. With that reassuring signal, the Saxon artillery began a heavy barrage on the city, and twelve companies of the 32nd Division surged forward in an assault.

  Sacken's forces were strongly positioned, but he lost his nerve. The Russians had heard the signal too and quickly abandoned their positions. They began maneuvering on Sqislocz. Schwarzenberg's lead elements began appearing on the battlefield. Schwarzenberg had with him the two infantry divisions of Trautenberg and Bianchi and the cavalry of Frolich and Wrede. The remainder of the Austrian Hilfkorps had remained in Slonim to watch Admiral Tchichagov's forces.

  New Russian Maneuvers

  On 24 November Sacken moved to Brest-Litovsk and Kobrin, but he continued to move eastward towards Lubolm and Kovel. Reynier followed him, occupying Brest-Litovsk, and Schwarzenberg reoccupied Kobrin. This was, however, as far as they were to advance, because Schwarzenberg had received orders to fall back on Warsaw. Reynier formed the rear guard, and on 1 November their withdrawal began.

  Sacken's maneuvers had cost him 7,000 men and several guns, but he had seriously impacted Napoleon's plans and hurt the outcome of the campaign. He had diverted Schwarzenberg from his pursuit of Admiral Tchichagov, though if Schwarzenberg was to resume the pursuit by 14 November, he still could have caught him.

  On the night of 20 November the 3rd Ukrainian Cossacks were surprised by the Austrians, and three squadrons were captured at Pruhany. At the same time 8,000 Poles under General Kossenki were turned back in their attempt to penetrate Volhynia via Oustilony by General Moussin Pouchkin as he advanced on Vladimir.

  The French at Borisov

  The French governor of Minsk had retreated on Borisov, where he gathered together a small garrison of 3,000 men. Dombrowski, who heard of the capture of Minsk while in Semlo, moved to Berezino, seeking a safe route to Borisov. His force had shrunk to 5,000 men. A Lithuanian regiment commanded by General Kossenki and a Wurttemberg battalion were detached and lost at Koidanov. Another regiment had been detached on the Bobruisk road to act as a rear guard. The column had a total of twenty guns with it.

  Hagendorp, the former governor of Minsk, had established himself in Borisov and occupied a weak bridgehead with a single battalion of the 95th Line Regiment. He was blissfully ignorant of the danger that threatened him, and instead of urging Victor to advance quickly to support him, he persuaded Victor and Pampeluna that there was no danger of attack.

  Tchichagov Closes In

  Admiral Tchichagov sent Lambert to Jouknovo on 19 November while Tschlapitz covered his left, and Colonel Loukoffkin was detached with a cossack regiment to watch the road to Igumen. The cossacks encountered six Russian infantry battalions, four squadrons, and another cossack regiment detached by General Ertel moving from Oozyr to reinforce Tchichagov. Ertel had been ordered to join Tchichagov with his entire force, but chose to send only part of it. Tchichagov was so enraged by this disobedience that Ertel was relieved and command passed to Tuchkov.

  Colonel Loukoffkin 's detachment of cossacks contacted Dombrowski 's rear guard near Igumen and pursued it. On 20 November Lambert reached Jodin and pushed on towards Ouperecoiczi. His move was supported by Lambert, also in Jodin, and Tschlapitz in Zembin.

  Dombrowski moved as quickly as he could towards the French bridgehead at Borisov by advancing along the Berezina. He arrived there at midnight on 20 November. He was not met by any knowledgeable individual, and, as a result, he was forced to encamp his forces as best he could in the dark. He set his right on the works on the road to Zembin. His left had nothing to secure itself against and hung in the open.

  The Battle of Borisov

  The works around the bridgehead were far from finished. Many of them were little more than tracings on the ground where bridgeheads were to be built. At dawn on 21 November, Lambert appeared before Dombrowski's positions. The 14th Jager Regiment attacked Dombrowski's right, the 38th Jager Regiment hit his left, and the 7th Jager Regiment were to hit his center. The two flanks were to be taken before the 7th Jagers hit the center.

  The Russian 11th and 12th Horse Batteries advanced, one on each flank, while Lambert's other two infantry regiments and the advanced guard's cavalry formed a reserve on the road to Jodin.

  The battalion of the French 95th Line Regiment, stationed near the bridgehead, was surprised and driven back across the bridge. The 14th Jager Regiment seized the redoubt on the right, but the 38th Jagers were unable to hold their ground against the Wurttemberg battalion advancing from Borisov.

  The Russian General Engelhardt, who advanced at the head of his 7th Jager Regiment, turned his regiment to support the 38th Jager Regiment, but was killed. Despite the loss of its general, the regiment continued its movement and recaptured the redoubt on the left.

  Dombrowski was alerted to the action and realized the danger to his forces if the Russians seized the bridgehead. He moved to join the Wurttemberg battalion in the central works that covered the bridge.

  By noon Dombrowski had established his brigade so that it straddled the main road to Minsk. He proceeded to move his baggage and artillery park over the bridge. He established six guns in a battery on the far side of the river to cover his retreat.

  Lambert positioned his artillery so that it might sweep the bridge as Dombrowski's Poles retreated over it. An artillery duel began, and a heavy cannonade lasted until 5:00 P.M. Lambert was wounded while rallying the 7th Jager Regiment, which had fallen back from its unsuccessful attack on the central works. Colonel Krussovski succeeded Lambert. Krussovski drew up his forces under the cover of a twelve-gun battery placed to the left of the redoubt. His forces then advanced and carried the whole line of entrenchments, the village, and the bridge.

  Dombrowski led his troops across the bridge and attempted to rally them for the defense of a mill on the Orsha road. However, the Russians had too much momentum for him to stop them, and he was pushed back towards Lochnitza. Dombrowski left 1,500 dead, 2,500 wounded, two standards, and eight guns on the battlefield. The Russians suffered about 2,000 casualties out of the 3,500 engaged.

  Langeron heard the cannonade and was marching to the sounds of the guns. However, he was unable to join the advanced guard until nightfall and did not participate in the battle. Admiral Tchichagov followed close behind and established his headquarters in Borisov that night.

  Tchichagov Moves on the Berezina

  During the same day as the battle at Borisov, Colonel Loukoffkin and his cossacks had overtaken the single regiment forming Dombrowski's rear guard near Oucha. They drove it over the Berezina River at Usza and took two to three hundred prisoners.

  On 22 November Voinov's corps and the reserve under Savaneieff passed over the Berezina and took up a position astride the road to Bobr. Tschlapitz withdrew from Zembin and advanced to the new Russian headquarters at Borisov.

  General Pampeluna and his brigade, detached from the 6th Division, part of Oudinot's II Corps, had been posted in Vesselovo and received the first news of the fall of Borisov. The news was duly passed on to Oudinot, who responded by moving his corps to Nemonitza, where he met Dombrowski's shattered forces. On 23 November Admiral Tchichagov directed Generalmajor Pahlen, who had replaced Lambert as the commander of the advanced guard, to advance with his forces down the road to Bobr. As he reached the heights of Nemonitza, he was shocked to find that he had encountered Oudinot's advanced guard marching on Borisov under the command of Dombrowski.

  A quick action resulted, and Pahlen found himself unable to deploy. Pahlen found himself quickly bundled up and hustled in great disorder down the road. He fled back over the bridge at Borisov with a loss of 1,500 prisoners, the headquarters baggage, and the advanced guard baggage. Castex's brigade, the 23rd and 24th Chasseur à Cheval Regiments, pursued him. Dombrowski was leading 2,500 infantry, 1,100 cavalry, and 12 guns. The r
esults were not a surprise when one considers that the Russians had only 2,800 infantry.

  Oudinot's seizure of Borisov and the bridge had trapped three Russian jager regiments and 3,000 cavalry on the east bank of the Berezina. They escaped his wrath only because a peasant showed them a ford near Brill.

  Tchichagov had been dining in Borisov as Oudinot's II Corps arrived. He escaped, but lost all his correspondence and baggage. He did succeed in cutting the bridge and establishing batteries along the river to prevent Oudinot from repairing it.

  On 29 November Napoleon ordered Schwarzenberg to move against Admiral Tchichagov, but too great a distance separated them, and there was little point in the pursuit. Schwarzenberg had carried their pursuit of Sacken too far for him to be able to intervene.

  Napoleon and the Main Army

  The actions by the II, VI, and IX Corps to the north and that of the VII and Austrian Hilfkorps to the south were little more than a sideshow for the withdrawal of the main army from the battlefield at Malo-Jaroslavets.

  Napoleon spent the day after the battle of Malo-Jaroslavets in deep contemplation. He pondered the options open to him. Murat, as usual, urged a resumption of the attack across the Lutza River. Davout urged a withdrawal through Medyn and Elnya. However, the other marshals consulted urged a quick withdrawal through Mozhaizk. Napoleon accepted the decision of the majority, and even though he later learned that Kutusov was in full retreat himself, he continued the French withdrawal through Mozhaizk.

  The French army began to retrace its steps of the last five months along the roads from Borodino to Smolensk. As it crawled along the poor roads, it was burdened by heavy wagons overloaded with loot and hundreds of sick and wounded that were accumulated in the various hospitals along the way rather than left to the mercies of the cossacks. The Grande Armée filed past the battlefield at Borodino which was still littered with the putrefying corpses of the dead and broken implements of war. It proved a haunting spectacle for all that passed. As the army passed over this thoroughly ravaged land, it was unable to provision itself. Discipline began to break down as the soldiers began to forage more savagely than they had in the past.

  Soldiers were competing for an ever-diminishing supply of food. Officers became bored with the pace of the war. The senior officers left every decision to Napoleon, and the younger officers lacked the experience and knowledge to sustain themselves and their troops. Regiments began to dissolve into disorder, and swarms of stragglers dogged the flanks and rear of the army in ever-growing numbers. Davout's I Corps was the rear guard. It was swamped with stragglers and the mass of lagging baggage and artillery. This mass was more than even the many-talented Davout could handle, and he received much unjust criticism from Napoleon. He was accused of delaying the retreat by his inability to manage this horde. The situation for Davout's forces was even worse than for the rest. This was because he had to pass over terrain that had been ravaged during the advance to Moscow and again by the rest of the army as it preceded him across it in retreat. The countryside had been picked clean of everything, including forage. The horses were weakened by the lack of forage and died by the thousands. This further slowed the advance of Davout's charges. Eugene advanced just ahead of Davout. He advanced as slowly as possible, to spare the wear and tear on his corps.

  Kutusov had lost contact with the French during his retreat from Malo-Jaroslavets. He lost further time by looking for the French down the road to Medyn, but on 27 October he learned of their line of retreat and set off in pursuit. He began to position himself such that he always remained a threat to Napoleon's withdrawal but remained relatively secure from attack himself. Napoleon's forces were preceded by Ozharovski, who raided ahead of Napoleon in an attempt to destroy all of the supplies possible, while Miloradovitch's and Platov's cossacks hounded his flanks and rear.

  Napoleon had reason to fear such an effort from Kutusov, and, suspecting that he might be cut off from his base in Smolensk, he marched ahead of the main body with his guard, reaching Viazma on 31 October. When he arrived in Viazma, his army was stretched over sixty miles of road, and he did nothing to close it up other than to scold Davout for not moving fast enough.

  In Viazma Napoleon found dispatches from Paris, Warsaw, St. Cyr, and Victor. These documents confirmed his fears of a Russian offensive. He learned of Schwarzenberg's and Reynier's movement northward and of Wittgenstein's pursuit of Victor. He urged Victor to turn on Wittgenstein and push him back across the Dvina. Napoleon recalled d'Hillers and ordered him to join the main line of withdrawal. He ordered Ney to take a position in Viazma until Davout could pass through it. Ney was then to assume the position of rear guard.

  On 31 October Platov's cossacks made contact with the rear of the French army and began to dog its heels. They continued their harassing pursuit. On 3 November Miloradovitch and his two divisions appeared before Viazma, attempting to interpose themselves between Eugene and Davout and cut off the French rear guard.

  As the Russians arrived, Eugene's scouts and baggage were only a mile from the city. Nothing was visible to indicate the presence of the Russians to Eugene. The French were badly drawn out along the road,and Eugene stopped the lead elements to allow the straggling column to catch up. Shortly after the halt, Chef d'escadron Labedoyere arrived in Viazma with word of the Russian presence.

  The Battle of Viazma

  General Nagel's brigade of the 13th Division formed Eugene's rear guard. He was attacked in the left flank about two miles from Viazma by several squadrons of Russian cavalry. This cavalry moved into the gap separating the I and IV Corps. Eugene saw the danger and began to redeploy his forces to the right of the road near Foederovskoe. He placed his Polish forces a bit forward of the rest of his forces. The divisions of I Corps closed up quickly to support those of the IV Corps,

  The Russian cavalry was supported by an infantry division of 12,000 men. Eugene's forces were able to check their advance, except on the right, near Viazma, where the Italians were dislodged. The Russians held the Italian position until a regiment from Ney's III Corps moved out of Viazma to attack them.

  At the same time Compans' 5th Division, part of I Corps, joined the rear guard. They cleared the way to Viazma and engaged the Russians while the rest of I Corps passed along the left side of the road. Compans remained to support Eugene's rear guard.

  When Davout completed this maneuver, he assumed a position on the right of Eugene's forces, linking them to Viazma. Eugene allowed the 13th Division, the old rear guard, to pass behind the 14th Division. The 14th Division assumed the duties of the rear guard, and Compans' division preceded it.

  The 15th Division followed the 13th Division and remained with the Italian Royal Guard near Viazma, where they formed a reserve. When this maneuver was complete, the Russian infantry once again advanced, and a violent action began. The Russians had a massive artillery superiority and had been encouraged by the confusion generated by the French maneuvers. They took it for a rout and maneuvered their artillery at a gallop to take advantage of that confusion.

  The Russian artillery moved obliquely to the flank of the French lines, which it began to cut down. The French guns in Viazma were ordered to return and provide support for the infantry. However, they could only maneuver with difficulty. Davout's forces advanced and forced the Russians to withdraw their artillery, lest it all be overrun. Three guns were captured. The audacity of this action astonished both the Russians and the French.

  Miloradovitch realized that the French were escaping him and sent the British military observer General Wilson to Kutusov to request assistance. Wilson found Kutusov within earshot of the battle, unconcernedly resting his army and himself. Wilson became furious and called him a traitor, declaring that he would dispatch one of his escorts to St. Petersburg to denounce his actions to the czar.

  This had no effect whatsoever on Kutusov. He seemed to be of the opinion that the Russian winter alone would bring about Napoleon's demise. He felt that nature had not sufficiently weakened
the French for him to fully commit himself to a battle with them, to quote Wilson. However, it is more likely that Kutusov realized that the French before Miloradovitch were the battle-hardened core of the French army. It was the best of the French army, and his army was newly flushed out with new conscripts and would be no match for the French. It is reasonable to consider that an ill-advised attack at this point would have been an open invitation to disaster, throwing away all the Russian gains to date.

  Kutusov, no doubt, did feel that it was wiser to permit the winter to work on the French a little longer before he committed himself. Wilson's perspective was seriously tainted by a great hatred of the French and a strong desire to see them punished at any opportunity. In this case, Kutusov's military judgment was far superior to his.

  Miloradovitch, left to his own devices, tried to break the French lines. However, the French were still strong enough to resist him and prevented his penetrating their lines. Despite their strength, the men of the I and IV Corps were weakening. They became worried as they heard another action beginning to their rear. They imagined that the rest of the Russian army was approaching Viazma via the Yuknov road, the passage Ney was defending.

  It was only a small Russian advanced guard, but it alarmed Eugene by threatening to cut off his escape route. The action was broken off as soon as all the French baggage had made its escape. The French retrograde movement encouraged the Russians, who renewed their efforts. Only the efforts of the 25th, 57th, and 85th Regiments, part of I Corps, along a ravine, prevented the Russians from breaking the I Corps, turning its right flank, and destroying it.

  Eugene was not heavily engaged and was able to move more rapidly through Viazma. The Russians pursued him closely and penetrated into the city limits. The Russians then blocked Davout's passage as he attempted to pass through the city. He was being pursued by 20,000 Russians and under the fire of eighty cannons. Morand's 1st Division entered first and was unaware of the Russian presence. They struck him and drove him back. Morand rallied his division, restored the situation, and fought his way through the city.