by Frontinus
[2] C. Caesar, cum forte conscendens navem lapsus esset, “teneo te, terra mater”, inquit. Qua interpretatione effecit, ut repetiturus illas a quibus proficiscebatur terras videretur.
[2] Gaius Caesar, having slipped as he was about to embark on ship, exclaimed: “I hold thee fast, Mother Earth.” By this interpretation of the incident he made it seem that he was destined to come back to the lands from which he was setting out.
[3] T. Sempronius Gracchus consul, acie adversus Picentes directa, cum subitus terrae motus utrasque partis confudisset, exhortatione confirmavit suos et impulit, consternatum superstitione invaderent hostem, adortusque devicit.
[3] When the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was engaged in battle with the Picentines, a sudden earthquake threw both sides into panic. Thereupon Gracchus put new strength and courage into his men by urging them to attack the enemy while the latter were overwhelmed with superstitious awe. Thus he fell upon them and defeated them.
[4] Sertorius, cum equitum scuta extrinsecus equorumque pecora cruenta subito prodigio apparuissent, victoriam portendi interpretatus est, quoniam illae partes solerent hostili cruore respergi.
[4] Sertorius, when by a sudden prodigy the outsides of the shields of his cavalrymen and the breasts of their horses showed marks of blood, interpreted this as a mark of victory, since those were the parts which were wont to be spattered with the blood of the enemy.
[5] Epaminondas Thebanus contristatis militibus, quod ex hasta eius ornamentum infulae more dependens ventus ablatum in sepulchrum Lacedaemonii cuiusdam depulerat, “nolite”, inquit, “milites, trepidare; Lacedaemoniis significatur interitus; sepulchra enim funeribus ornantur.”
[5] Epaminondas, the Theban, when his soldiers were depressed because the decoration hanging from his spear like a fillet had been torn away by the wind and carried to the tomb of a certain Spartan, said: “Do not be concerned, comrades! Destruction is foretold for the Spartans. Tombs are not decorated except for funerals.”
[5] Idem, cum fax de caelo nocte delapsa eos qui animadverterunt terruisset, “lumen”, inquit, “hoc numina ostendunt.”
[5] The same Epaminondas, when a meteor fell from the sky by night and struck terror to the hearts of those who noticed it, exclaimed: “It is a light sent us from the powers above.”
[7] Idem, instante adversus Lacedaemonios pugna, cum sedile in quo resederat succubuisset et id vulgo pro tristi [exciperetur] significatione confusi milites interpretarentur, “immo”, inquit, “vetamur sedere.”
[7] When the same Epaminondas was about to open battle against the Spartans, the chair on which he had sat down gave way beneath him, whereat all the soldiers, greatly troubled, interpreted this as an unlucky omen. But Epaminondas exclaimed: “Not at all; we are simply forbidden to sit.”
[8] C. Sulpicius Gallus defectum lunae imminentem, ne pro ostento exciperent milites, praedixit futurum, additis rationibus causisque defectionis.
[8] Gaius Sulpicius Gallus not only announced an approaching eclipse of the moon, in order to prevent the soldiers from taking it as a prodigy, but also gave the reasons and causes of the eclipse.
[9] Agathocles Syracusanus adversus Poenos, simili eiusdem sideris deminutione quia sub diem pugnae ut prodigio milites sui consternati erant, ratione qua id accideret exposita docuit, quidquid illud foret, ad rerum naturam, non ad ipsorum propositum pertinere.
[9] When Agathocles, the Syracusan, was fighting against the Carthaginians, and his soldiers on the eve of battle were thrown into panic by a similar eclipse of the moon, which they interpreted as a prodigy, he explained the reason why this happened, and showed them that, whatever it was, it had to do with nature, and not with their own purposes.
[10] Pericles, cum in castra eius fulmen decidisset terruissetque milites, advocata contione lapidibus in conspectu omnium collisis ignem excussit sedavitque conturbationem, cum docuisset similiter nubium attritu excuti fulmen.
[10] Pericles, when a thunderbolt struck his camp and terrified his soldiers, calling an assembly, struck fire by knocking two stones together in the sight of all his men. He thus allayed their panic by explaining that the thunderbolt was similarly produced by the contact of the clouds.
[11] Timotheus Atheniensis adversus Corcyraeos navali proelio decertaturus gubernatori suo, qui proficiscenti iam classi signum receptui coeperat dare, quia ex remigibus quendam sternutantem audierat, “miraris”, inquit, “ex tot milibus unum perfrixisse?”
[11] When Timotheus, the Athenian, was about to contend against the Corcyreans in a naval battle, his pilot, hearing one of the rowers sneeze, started to give the signal for retreat, just as the fleet was setting out; whereupon Timotheus exclaimed: “Do you think it strange if one out of so many thousands has had a chill?”
[12] Chabris Atheniensis classe dimicaturus, excusso ante navem ipsius fulmine, exterritis per tale prodigium militibus, “nunc”, inquit, “potissimum ineunda pugna est, cum deorum maximus Iuppiter adesse numen suum classi nostrae ostendit.”
[12] As Chabrias, the Athenian, was about to fight a naval battle, a thunderbolt fell directly across the path of his ship. When the soldiers were filled with dismay at such a portent, he said: “Now is the very time to begin battle, when Jupiter, mightiest of the gods, reveals that his power is present with our fleet.”
LIBER SECUNDUS — BOOK II
Dispositis primo libro exemplis instructuris, ut mea fert opinio, ducem in his, quae ante commissum proelium agenda sunt, deinceps reddemus pertinentia ad ea, quae in ipso proelio agi solent, et deinde ea, quae post proelium.
Eorum, quae ad proelium pertinent, species sunt:
Having in Book I given classes of examples which, as I believe, will suffice to instruct a general in those matters which are to be attended to before beginning battle, I will next in order present examples which bear on those things that are usually done in the battle itself, and then those that come subsequent to the engagement.
I.
De tempore ad pugnam eligendo.
II.
De loco ad pugnam eligendo.
III.
De acie ordinanda.
IV.
De acie hostium turbanda.
V.
De insidiis.
VI.
De emittendo hoste, ne clausus proelium ex desperatione redintegret.
VII.
De dissimulandis adversis.
VIII.
De restituenda per constantiam acie.
Eorum deinde, quae post proelium agenda sunt, has esse species existimaverim:
IX.
Si res prospere cesserit, de consummandis reliquiis belli.
X.
Si res durius cesserit, de adversis emendandis.
XI.
De dubiorum animis in fide retinendis.
XII.
Quae facienda sint pro castris, si satis fiduciae in praesentibus copiis non habemus.
XIII.
De effugiendo.
Of those which concern the battle itself, there are the following classes:
I. On choosing the time for battle.
II. On choosing the place for battle.
III. On the disposition of troops for battle.
IV. On creating panic in the enemy’s ranks.
V. On ambushes.
VI. On letting the enemy escape, lest, brought to bay, he renew the battle in desperation.
VII. On concealing reverses.
VIII. On restoring morale by firmness.
Of the matters which deserve attention after battle, I consider that there are the following classes:
IX. On bringing the war to a close after a successful engagement.
X. On repairing one’s losses after a reverse.
XI. On ensuring the loyalty of those whom one mistrusts.
XII. What to do for the defence of the camp, in case a commander lacks confidence in his present forces.
XIII. On retreating.
I. De Tempore ad Pugnam Eligendo
I. On choosing the
time for battle
[1] P. Scipio in Hispania, cum comperisset Hasdrubalem Poenorum ducem ieiuno exercitu mane processisse in aciem, continuit in horam septimam suos, quibus praeceperat, ut quiescerent et cibum caperent; cumque hostes inedia, siti, mora sub armis fatigati repetere castra coepissent, subito copias eduxit et commisso proelio vicit.
[1] When Publius Scipio was in Spain and had learned that Hasdrubal, leader of the Carthaginians, had marched out and drawn up his troops in battle array early in the morning before they had had breakfast, he kept back his own men till one o’clock, having ordered them to rest and eat. When the enemy, exhausted with hunger, thirst, and waiting under arms, had begun to return to camp, Scipio suddenly led forth his troops, opened battle, and won the day.
[2] Metellus Pius in Hispania adversus Hirtuleium, cum ille oriente protinus die instructam aciem vallo eius admovisset, fervidissimo tunc tempore anni intra castra continuit suos in horam diei sextam. Atque ita fatigatos aestu facile integris et recentibus suorum viribus vicit.
[2] When Metellus Pius was waging war against Hirtuleius in Spain, and the latter had drawn up his troops immediately after daybreak and marched them against Metellus’ entrenchments, Metellus held his own forces in camp till noon, as the weather at that time of year was extremely hot. Then, when the enemy were overcome by the heat, he easily defeated them, since his own men were fresh and their strength unimpaired.
[3] Idem, iunctis cum Pompeio castris adversus Sertorium in Hispania, cum saepe instruxisset aciem, hoste qui imparem se duobus credebat, pugnam detrectante, quodam deinde tempore Sertorianos milites animadvertisset magno impetu instinctos, deposcentes pugnam umerosque exserentes et lanceas vibrantes, existimavit ardori cedendum in tempore recepitque exercitum et Pompeio idem faciendi auctor fuit.
[3] When the same Metellus had joined forces with Pompey against Sertorius in Spain, and had repeatedly offered battle, the enemy declined combat, deeming himself unequal to two. Later on, however, Metellus, noticing that the soldiers of the enemy, fired with great enthusiasm, were calling for battle, baring their arms, and brandishing their spears, thought it best to retreat betimes before their ardour. Accordingly he withdrew and caused Pompey to do the same.
[4] Postumius consul in Sicilia, cum castra eius a Punicis trium milium passuum spatio distarent et dictatores Carthaginiensium cotidie ante ipsa munimenta Romanorum dirigerent aciem, exigua manu levibus adsidue proeliis pro vallo resistebat. Quam consuetudinem contemnente iam Poeno, reliquis omnibus per quietem intra vallum praeparatis, ex more pristino cum paucis sustentavit incursum adversariorum ac solito diutius detinuit. Quibus fatigatis post sextam horam et iam se recipientibus, cum inedia quoque laborarent, per recentes suos hostem, quem praedicta profligaverant incommoda, fugavit.
[4] When Postumius was in Sicily in his consulate, his camp was •three miles distant from the Carthaginians. Every day the Punic chieftains drew up their line of battle directly in front of the fortifications of the Romans, while Postumius offered resistance by way of constant skirmishes, conducted by a small band before his entrenchments. As soon as the Carthaginian commander came to regard this as a matter of course, Postumius quietly made ready all the rest of his troops within the ramparts, meeting the assault of the force with a few, according to his former practice, but keeping them engaged longer than usual. When, after noon was past, they were retreating, weary and suffering from hunger, Postumius, with fresh troops, put them to rout, exhausted as they were by the aforementioned embarrassments.
[5] Iphicrates Atheniensis, quia exploraverat eodem adsidue tempore hostes cibum capere, maturius vesci suos iussit et eduxit in aciem egressumque hostem ita detinuit, ut ei neque confligendi neque abeundi daret facultatem. Inclinato deinde iam die reduxit suos et nihilominus in armis retinuit. Fatigati hostes non statione magis quam inedia statim ad curam corporis et cibum capiendum festinaverunt. Iphicrates rursus eduxit et incompositi hostis adgressus est castra.
[5] Iphicrates, the Athenian, having discovered that the enemy regularly ate at the same hour, commanded his own troops to eat at an earlier hour, and then led them out to battle. When the enemy came forth, he so detained them as to afford them no opportunity either of fighting or of withdrawing. Then, as the day drew to a close, he led his troops back, but nevertheless held them under arms. The enemy, exhausted both by standing in the line and by hunger, straightway hurried off to rest and eat, whereupon Iphicrates again led forth his troops, and finding the enemy disorganized, attacked their camp.
[6] Idem, cum adversus Lacedaemonios pluribus diebus castra comminus haberet et utraque pars certis temporibus adsidue pabulatum lignatumque procederet, quodam die militum habitu servos lixasque dimisit ad munera, milites retinuit; et cum hostes dispersi essent ad similia munera, expugnavit castra eorum inermesque cum fasciculis passim ad tumultum recurrentes facile aut occidit aut cepit.
[6] When the same Iphicrates had his camp for several days near the Lacedaemonians, and each side was in the habit of going forth at a regular hour for forage and wood, he one day sent out slaves and camp-followers in the dress of soldiers for this service, holding back his fighting men; and as soon as the enemy had dispersed on similar errands, he captured their camp. Then as they came running back from all quarters to the mêlée, unarmed and carrying their bundles, he easily slew or captured them.
[7] Verginius consul in Volscis, cum procurrere hostes effuse ex longinquo vidisset, quiescere suos ac defixa tenere pila iussit. Tum anhelantes integris viribus exercitus sui adgressus avertit.
[7] When the consul Verginius, in the war with the Volscians, saw the enemy run forward at full stretch from a distance, he commanded his own men to keep steady and hold their javelins at rest. Then, when the enemy were out of breath, while his own army was still strong and fresh, he attacked and routed them.
[8] Fabius Maximus non ignarus, Gallos et Samnites primo impetu praevalere, suorum autem infatigabiles spiritus inter moras decertandi etiam incalescere, imperavit militibus, contenti primo congressu sustinere hostem mora fatigarent. Quod ubi successit, admoto etiam subsidio suis in prima acie, universis viribus oppressum fudit hostem.
[8] Since Fabius Maximus was well aware that the Gauls and Samnites were strong in the initial attack, while the tireless spirits of his own men actually waxed hotter as the struggle continued, he commanded his soldiers to rest content with holding the foe at the first encounter and to wear them out by delay. When this succeeded, bringing up reinforcements to his men in the van, and attacking with his full strength, he crushed and routed the enemy.
[9] Philippus ad Chaeroneam memor, sibi esse militem longo usu duratum, Atheniensibus acrem quidem, sed inexercitatum et in impetu tantum violentum, ex industria proelium traxit, moxque languentibus iam Atheniensibus concitatius intulit signa et ipsos cecidit.
[9] At Chaeronea, Philip purposely prolonged the engagement, mindful that his own soldiers were seasoned by long experience, while the Athenians were ardent but untrained, and impetuous only in the charge. Then, as the Athenians began to grow weary, Philip attacked more furiously and cut them down.
[10] Lacedaemonii certiores ab exploratoribus facti, Messenios in eam exarsisse rabiem, ut in proelium cum coniugibus ac liberis descenderent, pugnam distulerunt.
[10] When the Spartans learned from scouts that the Messenians had broken out into such fury that they had come down to battle attended by their wives and children, they postponed the engagement.
[11] C. Caesar bello civili, cum exercitum Afranii et Petrei circumvallatum siti angeret isque ob hoc exasperatus interfectis omnibus impedimentis ad pugnam descendisset, continuit suos, arbitratus alienum dimicationi tempus, quod adversarios ira et desperatio incenderet.
[11] In the Civil War, when Gaius Caesar held the army of Afranius and Petreius besieged and suffering from thirst, and when their troops, infuriated because of this, had slain all their beasts of burden and come out for battle, Caesar held back his own soldiers, deeming the occasion ill-suited for an engagement, since his opponen
ts were so inflamed with wrath and desperation.
[12] Cn. Pompeius, fugientem Mithridatem cupiens ad proelium compellere, elegit tempus dimicationi nocturnum, ut abeunti se opponeret. Atque ita praeparatus subitam hostibus necessitatem decernendi iniecit. Praeterea sic constituit aciem, ut Ponticorum quidem oculos adversa luna praestringeret, suis autem inlustrem et conspicuum praeberet hostem.
[12] Gnaeus Pompey, desiring to check the flight of Mithridates and force him to battle, chose night as the time for the encounter, arranging to block his march as he withdrew. Having made his preparations accordingly, he suddenly forced his enemy to fight. In addition to this, he so drew up his force that the moonlight falling in the faces of the Pontic soldiers blinded their eyes, while it gave his own troops a distinct and clear view of the enemy.
[13] Iugurtham constat, memorem virtutis Romanorum, semper inclinato die committere proelia solitum, ut, si fugarentur sui, opportunam noctem haberent ad delitiscendum.
[13] It is well known that Jugurtha, aware of the courage of the Romans, was always wont to engage in battle as the day was drawing to a close, so that, in case his men were routed, they might have the advantage of night for getting away.