Complete Works of Frontinus

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by Frontinus


  [14] Lucullus adversus Mithridatem et Tigranem in Armenia Maiore apud Tigranocertam, cum ipse non amplius quindecim milia armatorum haberet, hostis autem innumerabilem multitudinem eoque ipso inhabilem, usus hoc eius incommodo nondum ordinatam hostium aciem invasit atque ita protinus dissipavit, ut ipsi quoque reges abiectis insignibus fugerent.

  [14] At Tigranocerta in Greater Armenia, Lucullus, in the campaign against Mithridates and Tigranes, did not have above 15,000 armed men, while the enemy had an innumerable host, which for this very reason was unwieldy. Taking advantage, accordingly, of this handicap of the foe, Lucullus attacked their line before it was in order, and straightway routed it so completely that even the kings themselves discarded their trappings and fled.

  [15] Ti. Nero adversus Pannonios, cum barbari feroces in aciem oriente statim die processissent, continuit suos passusque est hostem nebula et imbribus, qui forte illo die crebri erant, verberari. Ac deinde, ubi fessum stando et pluvia non solum sed et lassitudine deficere animadvertit, signo dato adortus superavit.

  [15] In the campaign against the Pannonians, when the barbarians in warlike mood had formed for battle at the very break of day, Tiberius Nero held back hand his own troops, and allowed the enemy to be hampered by the fog and be drenched with the showers, which happened to be frequent that day. Then, when he noticed that they were weary with standing, and faint not only from exposure but also from exhaustion, he gave the signal, attacked and defeated them.

  [16] C. Caesar in Gallia, quia compererat Ariovisto Germanorum regi institutum et quasi legem esse non pugnandi decrescente luna, tum potissimum acie commissa impeditos religione hostes vicit.

  [16] Gaius Caesar, when in Gaul, learned that it was a principle and almost a law with Ariovistus, king of the Germans, not to fight when the moon was waning. Caesar therefore chose that time above all others for engaging in battle, when the enemy were embarrassed by their superstition, and so conquered them.

  [17] Divus Augustus Vespasianus Iudaeos Saturni die, quo eis nefas est quicquam seriae rei agere, adortus superavit.

  [17] The deified Vespasian Augustus attacked Jews on their sabbath, a day on which it is sinful for them to do any business, and so defeated them.

  [18] Lysander Lacedaemonius adversus Athenienses apud Aegospotamos instituit certo tempore infestare naves Atheniensium, dein revocare classem. Ea re in consuetudinem perducta, cum Athenienses post digressum eius ad contrahendas copias dispergerentur, extendit ex consuetudine classem et recepit. Tum hostium maxima parte ex more dilapsa, reliquos adortus occidit et universas naves cepit.

  [18] When Lysander, the Spartan, was fighting against the Athenians at Aegospotami, he began by attacking the vessels of the Athenians at a regular hour and then calling off his fleet. After this had become an established procedure, as the Athenians on one occasion, after his withdrawal, were dispersing to collect their troops, he deployed his fleet as usual and withdrew it. Then, when most of the enemy had scattered according to their wont, he attacked and slew the rest, and captured all their vessels.

  II. De Loco ad Pugnam Eligendo

  II. On Choosing the Place for Battle

  [1] M’. Curius, quia phalangi regis Pyrrhi explicitae resisti non posse animadvertebat, dedit operam, ut in angustiis confligeret, ubi conferta sibi ipsa esset impedimento.

  [1] Manius Curius, observing that the phalanx of King Pyrrhus could not be resisted when in extended order, took pains to fight in confined quarters, where the phalanx, being massed together, would embarrass itself.

  [2] Cn. Pompeius in Cappadocia elegit castris locum editum. Unde adiuvante proclivi impetum militum facile ipso decursu Mithridatem superavit.

  [2] In Cappadocia Gnaeus Pompey chose a lofty site for his camp. As a result the elevation so assisted the onset of his troops that he easily overcame Mithridates by the sheer weight of his assault.

  [3] C. Caesar adversus Pharnacem Mithridatis filium dimicaturus in colle instruxit aciem; quae res expeditam ei victoriam fecit, nam pila ex edito in subeuntis barbaros emissa protinus eos averterunt.

  [3] When Gaius Caesar was about to contend with Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, he drew up his line of battle on a hill. This move made victory easy for him, since the darts, hurled from higher ground against the barbarians charging from below, straightway put them to flight.

  [4] Lucullus adversus Mithridatem et Tigranem in Armenia Maiore apud Tigranocertam dimicaturus, collis proximi planum verticem raptim cum parte copiarum adeptus, in subiectos hostes decucurrit et equitatum eorum a latere invasit; aversumque et eorundem protinus pedites proturbantem insecutus clarissimam victoriam rettulit.

  [4] When Lucullus was planning to fight Mithridates and Tigranes at Tigranocerta in Greater Armenia, he himself swiftly gained the level top of the nearest hill with a part of his troops, and then rushed down upon the enemy posted below, at the same time attacking their cavalry on the flank. When the cavalry broke and straightway threw the infantry into confusion, Lucullus followed after them and gained a most notable victory.

  [5] Ventidius adversus Parthos non ante militem eduxit, quam illi quingentis non amplius passibus abessent, atque ita procursione subita adeo se admovit, ut sagittas, quibus ex longinquo usus est, comminus applicitus eluderet. Quo consilio, quia quandam etiam fiduciae speciem ostentaverat, celeriter barbaros debellavit.

  [5] Ventidius, when fighting against the Parthians, would not lead out his soldiers until the Parthians were within five hundred paces. Thus by a rapid advance he came so near them that, meeting them at close quarters, he escaped their arrows, which they shoot from a distance. By this scheme, since he exhibited a certain show of confidence, he quickly subdued the barbarians.

  [6] Hannibal apud Numistronem contra Marcellum pugnaturus cavas et praeruptas vias obiecit a latere, ipsaque loci natura pro munimentis usus clarissimum ducem vicit.

  [6] At Numistro, when Hannibal was expecting a battle with Marcellus, he secured a position where his flank was protected by hollows and precipitous roads. By thus making the ground serve as a defence, he won a victory over a most renowned commander.

  [7] Idem apud Cannas, cum comperisset Volturnum amnem ultra reliquorum naturam fluminum ingentis auras mane proflare, quae arenarum et pulveris vertices agerent, sic direxit aciem, ut tota vis a tergo suis, Romanis in ora et oculos incideret. Quibus incommodis mire hosti adversantibus illam memorabilem adeptus est victoriam.

  [7] Again at Cannae, when Hannibal learned that the Volturnus River, at variance with the nature of other streams, sent out high winds in the morning, which carried swirling sand and dust, he so marshalled his line of battle that the entire fury of the elements fell on the rear of his own troops, but struck the Romans in the face and eyes. Since this difficulty was a serious obstacle to the enemy, he won that memorable victory.

  [8] Marius adversus Cimbros ac Teutonos constituta die pugnaturus firmatum cibo militem ante castra conlocavit, ut per aliquantum spatii, quo adversarii dirimebantur, exercitus hostium potiusº labore itineris profligaretur. Fatigationi deinde eorum incommodum aliud obiecit, ita ordinata suorum acie, ut adverso sole et vento et pulvere barbarorum occuparetur exercitus.

  [8] After Marius had settled on a day for fighting the Cimbrians and Teutons, he fortified his soldiers with food and stationed them in front of his camp, in order that the army of the enemy might be exhausted by marching over the interval between the opposing armies. Then, when the enemy were thus used up, he confronted them with another embarrassment by so arranging his own line of battle that the barbarians were caught with the sun and wind and dust in their faces.

  [9] Cleomenes Lacedaemonius adversus Hippiam Atheniensem, qui equitatu praevalebat, planitiem, in qua dimicaturus erat, arboribus prostratis impediit et inviam fecit equiti.

  [9] When Cleomenes, the Spartan, in his battle against Hippias, the Athenian, found that the latter’s main strength lay in his cavalry, he thereupon felled trees and cluttered the battlefield with them, thus making it impassable for cavalry.

  [10
] Hiberi in Africa ingenti hostium multitudine excepti timentesque, ne circumirentur, applicuerunt se flumini, quod altis in ea regione ripis praefluebat. Ita a tergo amne defensi et subinde, cum virtute praestarent, incursando in proximos omnem hostium exercitum straverunt.

  [10] The Iberians in Africa, upon encountering a great multitude of foes and fearing that they would be surrounded, drew near a river which at that point flowed along between deep banks. Thus, defended by the river in the rear and enabled by their superior prowess to make frequent onsets upon those nearest them, they routed the entire host of their adversaries.

  [11] Xanthippus Lacedaemonius sola loci commutatione fortunam Punici belli convertit. Nam cum a desperantibus iam Carthaginiensibus mercede sollicitatus animadvertisset Afros quidem, qui equitatu et elephantis praestabant, colles sectari, a Romanis autem, quorum robur in pedite erat, campestria teneri, Poenos in plana deduxit; ubi per elephantos dissipatis ordinibus Romanorum sparsos milites per Numidas persecutus eorum exercitum fudit, in illam diem terra marique victorem.

  [11] Xanthippus, the Spartan, by merely changing the locality of operations, completely altered the fortunes of the Punic War; for when, summoned as a mercenary by the despairing Carthaginians, he had noticed that the Africans, who were superior in cavalry and elephants, kept to the hills, while the Romans, whose strength was in their infantry, held to the plains, he brought the Carthaginians down to level ground, where he broke the ranks of the Romans with the elephants. Then pursuing their scattered troops with Numidians, he routed their army, which till that day had been victorious on land and sea.

  [12] Epaminondas dux Thebanorum adversus Lacedaemonios directurus aciem, pro fronte eius decurrere equitibus iussis, cum ingentem pulverem hostium oculis obiecisset exspectationemque equestris certaminis praetendisset, circumducto pedite ab ea parte, ex qua decursus in aversam hostium aciem ferebat, inopinantium terga adortus cecidit.

  [12] Epaminondas, leader of the Thebans, when about to marshal his troops in battle array against the Spartans, ordered his cavalry to engage in manoeuvres along the front. Then, when he had filled the eyes of the enemy with clouds of dust and had caused them to expect an encounter with cavalry, he led his infantry around to one side, where it was possible to attack the enemy’s rear from higher ground, and thus, by a surprise attack, cut them to pieces.

  [13] Lacedaemonii CCC contra innumerabilem multitudinem Persarum Thermopylas occupaverunt, quarum angustiae non amplius quam parem numerum comminus pugnaturum poterant admittere. Eaque ratione, quantum ad congressus facultatem, aequati numero barbarorum, virtute autem praestantes, magnam eorum partem ceciderunt nec superati forent, nisi per proditorem Ephialten Trachinium circumductus hostis a tergo eos oppressisset.

  [13] Against a countless horde of Persians, three hundred Spartans seized and held the pass of Thermopylae which was capable of admitting only a like number of hand-to-hand opponents. In consequence, the Spartans became numerically equal to the barbarians, so far as opportunity for fighting was concerned, and being superior to them in valour, slew large numbers of them. Nor would they have been overcome, had not the enemy been led around to the rear by the traitor Ephialtes, the Trachinian, and thus been enabled to overwhelm them.

  [14] Themistocles dux Atheniensium, cum videret utilissimum Graeciae adversus multitudinem Xerxis navium in angustiis Salaminis decernere idque persuadere civibus non posset, sollertia effecit, ut a barbaris ad utilitates suas Graeci compellerentur. Simulata namque proditione misit ad Xerxen, qui indicaret populares suos de fuga cogitare difficilioremque ei rem futuram, si singulas civitates obsidione adgrederetur. Qua ratione effecit, ut exercitus barbarorum primum inquietaretur, dum tota nocte in statione custodiae est; deinde, ut sui mane integris viribus cum barbaris vigilia marcentibus confligerent, loco ut voluerat arto, in quo Xerxes multitudine qua praestabat uti non posset.

  [14] Themistocles, leader of the Athenians, saw that it was most advantageous for Greece to fight in the Straits of Salamis against the vast numbers of Xerxes’s vessels, but he was unable to persuade his fellow Athenians of this. He therefore employed a stratagem to make the barbarians force the Greeks to do what was advantageous for the latter; for under pretence of turning traitor, he sent a messenger to Xerxes to inform him that the Greeks were planning flight, and that the situation would be more difficult for the King if he should besiege each city separately. By this policy, in the first place he caused the host of the barbarians to be kept on the alert doing guard-duty all night; in the second place, he made it possible for his own followers, the next morning, with strength unimpaired, to encounter the barbarians all exhausted with watching, and (precisely as he had wished) in a confined place, where Xerxes could not utilise his superiority in numbers.

  III. De Acie Ordinanda

  III. On the Disposition of Troops for Battle

  [1] Cn. Scipio in Hispania adversus Hannonem ad oppidum Indibile, cum animadvertisset Punicam aciem ita directam, ut in dextro cornu Hispani constituerentur, robustus quidem miles, sed qui alienum negotium ageret, in sinistro autem Afri, minus viribus firmi, sed animi constantiores, reducto sinistro latere suorum, dextro cornu, quod validissimis militibus exstruxerat, obliqua acie cum hoste conflixit. Deinde fusis fugatisque Afris Hispanos, qui in recessu spectantium more steterant, facile in deditionem compulit.

  [1] Gnaeus Scipio, when campaigning in Spain against Hanno, near the town of Indibile, noted that the Carthaginian line of battle was drawn up with the Spaniards posted on the right wing — sturdy soldiers, to be sure, but fighting for others — while on the left were the less powerful, but more resolute, Africans. He accordingly drew back his own left wing, and keeping his battle-line at an angle with the enemy, engaged the enemy with his right wing, which he had formed of his sturdiest soldiers. Then routing the Africans and putting them to flight, he easily forced the surrender of the Spaniards, who had stood apart after the manner of spectators.

  [2] Philippus Macedonum rex adversus Hyllios gerens bellum, ut animadvertit frontem hostium stipatam electis de toto exercitu viris, latera autem infirmiora, fortissimis suorum in dextro cornu conlocatis, sinistrum latus hostium invasit turbataque tota acie victoriam profligavit.

  [2] When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hyllians, he noticed that the front of the enemy consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. Accordingly he placed the stoutest of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy’s left, and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a complete victory.

  [3] Pammenes Thebanus, conspecta Persarum acie, quae robustissimas copias in dextro cornu conlocatas habebat, simili ratione et ipse suos ordinavit omnemque equitatum et fortissimum quemque peditum in dextro cornu, infirmissimos autem contra fortissimos hostium posuit praecepitque, ut ad primum impetum eorum fuga sibi consulerent et in silvestria confragosaque loca se reciperent. Ita frustrato robore exercitus, ipse optuma parte virium suarum dextro cornu totam circumiit aciem hostium et avertit.

  [3] Pammenes, the Theban, having observed the battle-line of the Persians, where the most powerful troops were posted on the right wing, drew up his own men also on the same plan, putting all his cavalry and the bravest of his infantry on the right wing, but stationing opposite the bravest of the enemy his own weakest troops, whom he directed to flee at the first onset of the foe and to retreat to rough, wooded places. When in this way he had made the enemy’s strength of no effect, he himself with the best part of his own forces enveloped the whole array of the enemy with his right wing and put them to rout.

  [4] P. Cornelius Scipio, cui postea Africano cognomen fuit, adversus Hasdrubalem Poenorum ducem in Hispania gerens bellum ita per continuos dies ordinatum produxit exercitum, ut media acies fortissimis fundaretur. Sed cum hostes quoque eadem ratione adsidue ordinati procederent, Scipio eo die, quo statuerat decernere, commutavit instructionis ordinem et firmissimosº in cornibus conlocavit ac levem armaturam in media acie, sed retractam. Ita cornibus, quibus ipse praevalebat, infi
rmissimas hostium partes lunata acie adgressus facile fudit.

  [4] Publius Cornelius Scipio, who subsequently received the name Africanus, on one occasion, when waging war in Spain against Hasdrubal, leader of the Carthaginians, led out his troops day after day in such formation that the centre of his battle-line was composed of his best fighting men. But when the enemy also regularly came out marshalled on the same plan, Scipio, on the day when he had determined to fight, altered the scheme of his arrangement and stationed his strongest troops on the wings, having his light-armed troops in the centre, but slightly behind the line. Thus, by attacking the enemy’s weakest point in crescent formation from the flank, where he himself was strongest, he easily routed them.

  [5] Metellus in Hispania, eo proelio quo Hirtuleium devicit, cum comperisset cohortes eius, quae validissimae vocabantur, in media acie locatas, ipse mediam suorum aciem reduxit, ne ea parte ante cum hoste confligeret, quam cornibus complicatis medios undique circumvenisset.

  [5] Metellus, in the battle in which he vanquished Hirtuleius in Spain, had discovered that the battalions of Hirtuleius which were deemed strongest were posted in the centre. Accordingly he drew back the centre of his own troops, to avoid encountering the enemy at that part of the line, until by an enveloping movement of his wings he could surround their centre from all sides.

 

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