by Frontinus
[6] Artaxerxes adversus Graecos, qui Persida intraverant, cum multitudine superaret, latius quam hostes acie instructa in fronte peditem, equitem levemque armaturam in cornibus conlocavit. Atque ita ex industria lentius procedente media acie copias hostium cinxit ceciditque.
[6] Artaxerxes, having superior numbers in his campaign against the Greeks, who had invaded Persia, drew up his line of battle with a wider front than the enemy, placing infantry, cavalry, and light-armed troops on the wings. Then by purposely causing the centre to advance more slowly he enveloped the enemy troops and cut them to pieces.
[7] Contra Hannibal ad Cannas reductis cornibus productaque media acie nostros primo impetu protrusit. Idem conserto proelio, paulatim invicem sinuantibus procedentibusque ad praeceptum cornibus, avide insequentem hostem in mediam aciem suam recepit et ex utraque parte compressum cecidit. Veterano et diu edocto usus exercitu, hoc enim genus ordinationis exsequi nisi peritus et ad omne momentum respondens miles vix potest.º
[7] On the other hand, at Cannae Hannibal, having drawn back his flanks and advanced his centre, drove back our troops at the first assault. Then, when the fighting began, and the flanks gradually worked towards each other moving forward according to instructions, Hannibal enveloped within his own lines the impetuously attacking enemy, forced them towards the centre from both sides, and cut them to pieces, using veteran troops of long training; for hardly anything but a trained army, responsive to every direction, can carry out this sort of tactics.
[8] Livius Salinator et Claudius Nero, cum Hasdrubal bello Punico secundo decernendi necessitatem evitans in colle confragoso post vineas aciem direxisset, ipsi diductis in latera viribus vacua fronte ex utraque parte circumvenerunt eum atque ita adgressi superarunt.
[8] In the Second Punic War, when Hasdrubal was seeking to avoid the necessity of an engagement, and had drawn up his line on a rough hillside behind protective works, Livius Salinator and Claudius Nero diverted their own forces to the flanks, leaving their centre vacant. Having in this way enveloped Hasdrubal, they attacked and defeated him.
[9] Hannibal, cum frequentibus proeliis a Claudio Marcello superaretur, novissime sic castra metabatur, ut aut montibus aut paludibus aut simili locorum aliqua opportunitate adiutus aciem eo modo conlocaret, ut vincentibus quidem Romanis paene indemnem recipere posset intra munimenta exercitum, cedentibus autem instandi liberum haberet arbitrium.
[9] After Hannibal had been defeated in frequent battles by Claudius Marcellus, he finally laid out his camp on this plan: Protected by mountains, marshes, or similar advantages of terrain, he so posted his troops as to be able to withdraw his army, practically without loss, within his fortifications, in case the Romans won, but so as to have free option of pursuit, in case they gave way.
[10] Xanthippus Lacedaemonius in Africa adversus M. Atilium Regulum levem armaturam in prima acie conlocavit, in subsidio autem robur exercitus praecepitque auxiliaribus, ut emissis telis cederent hosti et, cum se intra suorum ordines recepissent, confestim in latera discurrerent et a cornibus rursus erumperent; exceptumque iam hostem a robustioribus et ipsi circumierunt.
[10] Xanthippus, the Spartan, in the campaign conducted in Africa against Marcus Atilius Regulus, placed his light-armed troops in the front line, holding the flower of his army in reserve. Then he directed the auxiliary troops, after hurling their javelins, to give way before the enemy, withdraw within the ranks of their fellow-soldiers, hurry to the flanks, and from there again rush forward to attack. Thus when the enemy had been met by the stronger troops, they were enveloped also by these light-armed forces.
[11] Sertorius idem in Hispania adversus Pompeium fecit.
[11] Sertorius employed the same tactics in Spain in the campaign against Pompey.
[12] Cleandridas Lacedaemonius adversus Lucanos densam instruxit aciem, ut longe minoris exercitus speciem praeberet. Securis deinde hostibus in ipso certamine diduxit ordines et a lateribus circumventos eos fudit.
[12] Cleandridas, the Spartan, when fighting against the Lucanians, drew up his troops in close array, so as to present the appearance of a much smaller army. Then, when the enemy had thus been put off their guard, at the moment the engagement began he opened up his ranks, enveloped the enemy on the flank, and put them to rout.
[13] Gastron Lacedaemonius, cum auxilio Aegyptiis adversus Persas venisset et sciret, firmiorem esse Graecum militem magisque a Persis timeri, commutatis armis Graecos in prima posuit acie et, cum illi aequo Marte pugnarent, submisit Aegyptiorum manum. Persae cum Graecis, quos Aegyptios opinabantur, restitissent, superveniente multitudine, quam ut Graecorum expaverant, cesserunt.
[13] Gastron, the Spartan, having come to assist the Egyptians against the Persians, and realizing that the Greek soldiers were more powerful and more dreaded by the Persians, interchanged the arms of the two contingents, placing the Greeks in the front line. When these merely held their own in the encounter, he sent in the Egyptians as reinforcements. Although the Persians had proved equal to the Greeks (deeming them Egyptians), they gave way, so soon as they were set upon by a multitude, of whom (as supposedly consisting of Greeks) they had stood in terror.
[14] Cn. Pompeius in Albania, quia hostes et numero et equitatu praevalebant, iuxta collem in angustiis protegere galeas, ne fulgore earum conspicui fierent, iussit pedites, equites deinde in aequum procedere ac velut praetendere peditibus, praecepitque eis, ut ad primum impetum hostium refugerent et, simul ad pedites ventum esset, in latera discederent. Quod ubi explicitum est, patefacto loco subita peditum consurrexit acies invectosque temere hostes inopinato interfusa proelio cecidit.
[14] When Gnaeus Pompey was fighting in Albania, and the enemy were superior in numbers and in cavalry, he directed his infantry to cover their helmets, in order to avoid being visible in consequence of the reflection, and to take their place in a defile by a hill. Then he commanded his cavalry to advance on the plain and to act as a screen to the infantry, but to withdraw at the first onset of the enemy, and, as soon as they had reached the infantry, to disperse to the flanks. When this manoeuvre had been executed, suddenly the force of infantry rose up, revealing its position, and pouring with unexpected attack upon the enemy who were heedlessly bent on pursuit, thus cut them to pieces.
[15] M. Antonius adversus Parthos, qui infinita multitudine sagittarum exercitum eius obruebant, subsidere suos et testudinem facere iussit, supra quam transmissis sagittis sine militum noxa exhaustus est hostis.
[15] When Mark Antony was engaged in battle with the Parthians and these were showering his army with innumerable arrows, he ordered his men to stop and form a testudo. The arrows passed over this without harm to the soldiers, and the enemy’s supply was soon exhausted.
[16] Hannibal adversus Scipionem in Africa, cum haberet exercitum ex Poenis et auxiliaribus, quorum pars non solum ex diversis gentibus, sed etiam ex Italicis constabat, post elephantos LXXX, qui in prima fronte positi hostium turbarent aciem, auxiliares Gallos et Ligures et Baliares Maurosque posuit, ut neque fugere possent Poenis a tergo stantibus et hostem oppositi, si non infestarent, at certe fatigarent. Tum suis et Macedonibus, qui iam fessos Romanos integri exciperent, in secunda acie conlocatis, novissimos Italicos constituit, quorum et timebat fidem et segnitiam verebatur, quoniam plerosque eorum ab Italia invitos extraxerat.
Scipio adversus hanc formam robur legionis triplici acie in fronte ordinatum per hastatos et principes et triarios opposuit; nec continuas construxit cohortes, sed manipulis inter se distantibus spatium dedit, per quod elephanti ab hostibus acti facile transmitti sine perturbatione ordinum possent. Ea ipsa intervalla expeditis velitibus implevit, ne interluceret acies, dato his praecepto, ut ad impetum elephantorum vel retro vel in latera concederent. Equitatum deinde in cornua divisit et dextro Romanis equitibus Laelium, sinistro Numidis Masinissam praeposuit. Quae tam prudens ordinatio non dubie causa victoriae fuit.
[16] When Hannibal was contending against Scipio in Africa, having an army of Carthaginians and auxiliaries, part of whom were not only
of different nationalities, but actually consisted of Italians, he placed eighty elephants in the forefront, to throw the enemy into confusion. Behind these he stationed auxiliary Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians, and Moors, that these might be unable to run away, since the Carthaginians were standing behind them, and in order that, being placed in front, they might at least harass the enemy, if not do him damage. In the second line he placed his own countrymen and the Macedonians, to be fresh to meet the exhausted Romans; and in the rear the Italians, whose loyalty he distrusted and whose indifference he feared, inasmuch as he had dragged most of them from Italy against their will.
Against this formation Scipio drew up the flower of his legions in three successive front lines, arranged according to hastati, principes, and triarii, not making the cohorts touch, but leaving a space between the detached companies through which the elephants driven by the enemy might easily be allowed to pass without throwing the ranks into confusion. These intervals he filled with light-armed skirmishers, that the line might show no gaps, giving them instructions to withdraw to the rear or the flanks at the first onset of the elephants. The cavalry he distributed on the flanks, placing Laelius in charge of the Roman horsemen on the right, and Masinissa in charge of the Numidians on the left. This shrewd scheme of arrangement was undoubtedly the cause of his victory.
[17] Archelaus adversus L. Sullam in fronte ad perturbandum hostem falcatas quadrigas locavit, in secunda acie phalangem Macedonicam, in tertia Romanorum more armatos auxiliares, mixtis fugitivis Italicae gentis, quorum pervicaciae fidebat; levem armaturam in ultimo statuit; in utroque deinde latere equitatum, cuius amplum numerum habebat, circumeundi hostis causa posuit.
Contra haec Sulla fossas amplae latitudinis utroque latere duxit et capitibus earum castella communiit. Qua ratione, ne circumiretur ab hoste et peditum numero et maxime equitatu superante, consecutus est. Triplicem deinde peditum aciem ordinavit relictis intervallis, per quae levem armaturam et equitem, quem in novissimo conlocaverat, cum res exegisset, emitteret. Tum postsignanis qui in secunda acie erant imperavit, ut densos numerososque palos firme in terram defigerent, intraque eos appropinquantibus quadrigis antesignanorum aciem recepit. Tum demum sublato universorum clamore velites et levem armaturam ingerere tela iussit. Quibus factis quadrigae hostium aut implicitae palis aut exterritae clamore telisque in suos conversae sunt turbaveruntque Macedonum structuram. Qua cedente, cum Sulla instaret et Archelaus equitem opposuisset, Romani equites subito emissi averterunt eos consummaveruntque victoriam.
[17] In the battle against Lucius Sulla, Archelaus placed his scythe-bearing chariots in front, for the purpose of throwing the enemy into confusion; in the second line he posted the Macedonian phalanx, and in the third line auxiliaries armed after the Roman way, with a sprinkling of Italian runaway slaves, in whose doggedness he had the greatest confidence. In the last line he stationed the light-armed troops, while on the two flanks, for the purpose of enveloping the enemy, he placed the cavalry, of whom he had a great number.
To meet these dispositions, Sulla constructed trenches of great breadth on each flank, and at their ends built strong redoubts. By this device he avoided the danger of being enveloped by the enemy, who outnumbered him in infantry and especially in cavalry. Next he arranged a triple line of infantry, leaving intervals through which to send, according to need, the light-armed troops and the cavalry, which he placed in the rear. He then commanded the postsignani, who were in the second line, to drive firmly into the ground large numbers stakes set close together, and as the chariots drew near, he withdrew the line of antesignani within these stakes. Then at length he ordered the skirmishers and light-armed troops to raise a general battle-cry and discharge their spears. By these tactics either the chariots of the enemy were caught among the stakes, or their drivers became panic-stricken at the din and were driven by the javelins back upon their own men, throwing the formation of the Macedonians into confusion. As these gave way, Sulla pressed forward, and Archelaus met him with cavalry, whereupon the Roman horsemen suddenly darted forth, drove back the enemy, and achieved victory.
[18] C. Caesar Gallorum falcatas quadrigas eadem ratione palis defixis excepit inhibuitque.
[18] In the same way Gaius Caesar met the scythe-bearing chariots of the Gauls with stakes driven in the ground, and kept them in check.
[19] Alexander ad Arbela, cum hostium multitudinem vereretur, virtuti autem suorum fideret, aciem in omnem partem spectantem ordinavit, ut circumventi undique pugnare possent.
[19] At Arbela, Alexander, fearing the numbers of the enemy, yet confident in the valour of his own troops, drew up a line of battle facing in all directions, in order that his men, if surrounded, might be able to fight from all sides.
[20] Paulus adversus Persen Macedonum regem, cum is phalangem suorum duplicem mediam in partem direxisset eamque levi armatura cinxisset et equitem utroque cornu conlocasset, triplicem aciem cuneis instruxit, inter quos velites subinde emisit. Quo genere cum profligari nihil videret, cedere instituit, ut hac simulatione perduceret hostes in confragosa loca, quae ex industria captaverat. Cum sic quoque, suspecta calliditate recedentium, ordinata sequeretur phalanx, equites a sinistro cornu praeter oram phalangis iussit transcurrere citatis equis, tectos, ut obiectisº armis ipso impetu praefringerent hostium spicula. Quo genere telorum exarmati Macedones solverunt aciem et terga verterunt.
[20] When Perseus, king of the Macedonians, had drawn up a double phalanx of his own troops and had placed them in the centre of his forces, with light-armed troops on each side and cavalry on both flanks, Paulus in the battle against him drew up a triple array in wedge formation, sending out skirmishers every now and then between the wedges. Seeing nothing accomplished by these tactics, he determined to retreat, in order by this feint to lure the enemy after him on to rough ground, which he had selected with this in view. When even then the enemy, suspecting his ruse in retiring, followed in good order, he commanded the cavalry on the left wing to ride at full speed past the front of the phalanx, covering themselves with their shields, in order that the points of the enemy’s spears might be broken by the shock of their encounter with the shields. When the Macedonians were deprived of their spears, they broke and fled.
[21] Pyrrhus pro Tarentinis apud Asculum, secundum Homericum versum quo pessimi in medium recipiuntur, dextro cornu Samnites Epirotasque, sinistro Bruttios atque Lucanos cum Sallentinis, in media acie Tarentinos conlocavit, equitatum et elephantos in subsidiis esse iussit.
Contra consules, aptissime divisis in cornua equitibus, legiones in prima acie et in subsidiis conlocaverunt et his immiscuerunt auxilia. XL milia utrimque fuisse constat. Pyrrhi dimidia pars exercitus amissa, apud Romanos V milia desiderata sunt.
[21] Pyrrhus, when fighting in defence of the Tarentines near Asculum, following the Homeric verse, according to which the poorest troops are placed in the centre, stationed Samnites and Epirotes on the right flank, Bruttians, Lucanians, and Sallentines on the left, with the Tarentines in the centre, ordering the cavalry and elephants to be held as reserves.
The consuls, on the other hand, very judiciously distributed their cavalry on the wings, posting legionary soldiers in the first line and in reserve, with auxiliary troops scattered among them. We are informed that there were forty thousand men on each side. Half of Pyrrhus’s army was lost; on the Roman side only five thousand.
[22] Cn. Pompeius adversus C. Caesarem Palaepharsali triplicem instruxit aciem, quarum singulae denos ordines in latitudinem habuerunt. Legiones secundum virtutem cuiusque firmissimas in cornibus et in medio conlocavit, spatia his interposita tironibus supplevit. Dextro latere DC equites propter flumen Enipea, qui et alveo suo et alluvie regionem impedierat, reliquum equitatum in sinistro cornu cum auxiliis omnibus locavit, ut inde Iulianum exercitum circumiret.
Adversus hanc ordinationem C. Caesar et ipse triplici acie dispositis in fronte legionibus sinistrum latus, ne circumiri posset, admovit paludibus. In dextro cornu equitem posuit, cui velocissimos miscuit peditum, ad morem eq
uestris pugnae exercitatos. Sex deinde cohortes in subsidio retinuit ad res subitas et dextro latere conversas in obliquum, unde equitatum hostium exspectabat, conlocavit. Nec ulla res eo die plus ad victoriam Caesari contulit; effusum namque Pompei equitatum inopinato excursu averterunt caedendumque tradiderunt.
[22] In the battle against Caesar at Old Pharsalus, Gnaeus Pompey drew up three lines of battle, each one ten men deep, stationing on the wings and in the centre the legions upon whose prowess he could most safely rely, and filling the spaces between these with raw recruits. On the right flank he placed six hundred horsemen, along the Enipeus River, which with its channel and deposits had made the locality impassable; the rest of the cavalry he stationed on the left, together with the auxiliary troops, that from this quarter he might envelop the troops of Caesar.
Against these dispositions, Gaius Caesar also drew up a triple line, placing his legions in front and resting his left flank on marshes in order to avoid envelopment. On the right he placed his cavalry, among whom he distributed the fleetest of his foot-soldiers, men trained in cavalry fighting. Then he held in reserve six cohorts for emergencies, placing them obliquely on the right, from which quarter he was expecting an attack of the enemy’s cavalry. No circumstance contributed more than this to Caesar’s victory on that day; for as soon as Pompey’s cavalry poured forth, these cohorts routed it by an unexpected onset, and delivered it up to the rest of the troops for slaughter.