Complete Works of Frontinus

by Frontinus

  [5] Flavius Fimbria in Asia apud Rhyndacum adversum filium Mithridatis, brachiis ab latere ductis, deinde fossa in fronte percussa, quietum in vallo militem tenuit, donec hostilis equitatus intraret angustias munimentorum; tunc eruptione facta sex milia eorum cecidit.

  [5] Flavius Fimbria, when fighting in Asia near the river Rhyndacus against the son of Mithridates, constructed two lines of works on his flanks and a ditch in front, and kept his soldiers quietly within their entrenchments, until the cavalry of the enemy passed within the confined portions of his fortifications. Then, making a sortie, he slew six thousand of them.

  [6] C. Caesar in Gallia, deletis ab Ambiorige Titurii Sabini et Cottae legatorum copiis, cum a Q. Cicerone, qui et ipse oppugnabatur, certior factus cum duabus legionibus adventaret, conversis hostibus metum simulavit militesque in castris, quae artiora solito industria fecerat, tenuit. Galli praesumpta iam victoria velut ad praedam castrorum tendentes fossas implere et vallum detrahere coeperunt; qua re proelio non aptatos Caesar emisso repente undique milite trucidavit.

  [6] When the forces of Titurius Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar’s lieutenants in Gaul, had been wiped out by Ambiorix, Caesar was urged by Quintus Cicero, who was himself also under siege, to come with two legions to his relief. The enemy then turned upon Caesar, who feigned fear and kept his troops within his camp, which he had purposely constructed on a smaller scale than usual. The Gauls, already counting on victory, and pressing forward as though to plunder the camp, began to fill up the ditches and to tear down the ramparts. Caesar, therefore, as the Gauls were not equipped for battle, suddenly sent forth his own troops from all quarters and cut the enemy to pieces.

  [7] Titurius Sabinus adversus Gallorum amplum exercitum continendo militem intra munimenta praestitit eis suspicionem metuentis. Cuius augendae causa perfugam misit, qui affirmaret exercitum Romanum in desperatione esse ac de fuga cogitare. Barbari oblata victoriae spe concitati lignis sarmentisque se oneraverunt, quibus fossas complerent, ingentique cursu castra nostra in colle posita petiverunt. Unde in eos Titurius universas immisit copias multisque Gallorum caesis plurimos in deditionem accepit.

  [7] When Titurius Sabinus was fighting against a large force of Gauls, he kept his troops within their fortifications, and thus produced upon the Gauls the impression that he was afraid. To further this impression, he sent a deserter to state that the Roman army was in despair and was planning to flee. Spurred on by the hope of victory thus offered, the Gauls loaded themselves with wood and brush with which to fill the trenches, and at top speed started for our camp, which was pitched on the top of an elevation. From there Titurius launched all his forces against them, killing many of the Gauls and receiving large numbers in surrender.

  [8] Asculani, oppugnaturo oppidum Pompeio cum paucos senes et aegros in muris ostendissent, ob id securos Romanos eruptione facta fugaverunt.

  [8] As Pompey was about to assault the town of Asculum the inhabitants exhibited on the ramparts a few aged and feeble men. Having thus thrown the Romans off their guard, they made a sortie and put them to flight.

  [9] Numantini obsessi ne pro vallo quidem instruxerunt aciem adeoque se continuerunt, ut Popilio Laenati fiducia fieret scalis oppidum adgrediendi; quo deinde suspicante insidias, quia ne tunc quidem obsistebatur, ac suos revocante, eruptione facta aversos et descendentis adorti sunt.

  [9] When the Numantines were blockaded, they did not even draw up a line of battle in front of the entrenchments, but kept so closely within the town that Popilius Laenas was emboldened to attack it with scaling-ladders. But, suspecting a ruse, since not even then was resistance offered, he recalled his men; whereupon the Numantines made a sortie and attacked the Romans in the rear as they were climbing down.

  XVIII. De Constantia Obsessorum

  XVIII. Concerning Steadfastness on the Part of the Besieged

  [1] Romani, assidente moenibus Hannibale, ostentandae fiduciae gratia supplementum exercitibus, quos in Hispania habebant, diversa porta miserunt.

  [1] The Romans, when Hannibal was encamped near their walls, in order to exhibit their confidence, sent troops out by a different gate to reinforce the armies which they had in Spain.

  [2] Idem agrum, in quo castra Hannibal habebat, defuncto forte domino venalem ad id pretium licendo perduxerunt, quo is ager ante bellum venierat.

  [2] The land on which Hannibal had his camp having come into the market owing to the death of the owner, the Romans bid the price up to the figure at which the property had sold before the war.•b

  [3] Idem, cum ab Hannibale obsiderentur et ipsi obsiderent Capuam, decreverunt, ne nisi capta ea revocaretur inde exercitus.

  [3] When the Romans were besieged by Hannibal and were themselves besieging Capua, they passed a decree not to recall their army from the latter place until it was captured.

  LIBER QUARTUS — BOOK IV

  Multa lectione conquisitis strategematibus et non exiguo scrupulo digestis, ut promissum trium librorum implerem, si modo implevi, hoc exhibebo ea, quae parum apte discriptioni priorum ad speciem alligatae subici videbantur et erant exempla potius strategicon quam strategemata; quae idcirco separavi, quia quamvis clara diversae tamen erant substantiae, ne, si qui forte in aliqua ex his incidissent, similitudine inducti praetermissa opinarentur. Et sane velut res residua expedienda fuit, in qua et ipsa ordinem per species servare conabor:

  Having, by extensive reading, collected examples of stratagems, and having arranged these at no small pains, in order to fulfil the promise of my three books (if only I have fulfilled it), in the present book I shall set forth those instances which seemed to fall less naturally under the former classification (which was limited to special types), and which are illustrations rather of military science in general than of stratagems. Inasmuch as these incidents, though famous, belong to a different subject, I have given them separate treatment, for fear that if any persons should happen in reading to run across some of them, they might be led by the resemblance to imagine that these examples had been overlooked by me. As supplementary material, of course, these topics called for treatment. In presenting them, I shall endeavour to observe the following categories:

  I.

  De disciplina.

  II.

  De effectu disciplinae.

  III.

  De continentia.

  IV.

  De iustitia.

  V.

  De constantia.

  VI.

  De affectu et moderatione.

  VII.

  De variis consiliis.

  I. On discipline.

  II. On the effect of discipline.

  III. On restraint and disinterestedness.

  IV. On justice.

  V. On determination (“the will to victory”).

  VI. On good will and moderation.

  VII. On sundry maxims and devices.

  I. De Disciplina

  I. On Discipline

  [1] P. Scipio ad Numantiam corruptum superiorum ducum socordia exercitum correxit dimisso ingenti lixarum numero, redactis ad munus cotidiana exercitatione militibus. Quibus cum frequens iniungeret iter, portare complurium dierum cibaria imperabat, ita ut frigora et imbres pati, vada fluminum pedibus traicere assuesceret miles, exprobrante subinde imperatore timiditatem et ignaviam, frangente delicatioris usus ac parum necessaria expeditioni vasa. Quod maxime notabiliter accidit C. Memmio tribuno, cui dixisse traditur Scipio: “mihi paulisper, tibi et rei publicae semper nequam eris.”

  [1] When the Roman army before Numantia had become demoralized by the slackness of previous commanders, Publius Scipio reformed it by dismissing an enormous number of camp-followers and by bringing the soldiers to a sense of responsibility through regular daily routine. On the occasion of the frequent marches which he enjoined upon them, he commanded them to carry several days’ rations, under such conditions that they became accustomed to enduring cold and rain, and to the fording of streams. Often the general reproached them with timidity and indolence; often he broke utensils which served only the
purpose of self-indulgence and were quite unnecessary for campaigning. A notable instance of this severity occurred in the case of the tribune Gaius Memmius, to whom Scipio is said to have exclaimed: “To me you will be worthless merely for a certain period; to yourself and the state for ever!”

  [2] Q. Metellus bello Iugurthino similiter lapsam militum disciplinam pari severitate restituit, cum insuper prohibuisset alia carne quam assa elixave milites uti.

  [2] Quintus Metellus, in the Jugurthine War, when discipline had similarly lapsed, restored it by a like severity, while in addition he had forbidden the soldiers to use meat, except when baked or boiled.

  [3] Pyrrhus dilectatori suo fertur dixisse: “tu grandes elige, ego, eos fortes reddam.”

  [3] Pyrrhus is said to have remarked to his recruiting officer: “You pick out the big men! I’ll make them brave.”

  [4] L. Paulo et C. Varrone consulibus milites primo iure iurando adacti sunt; antea enim sacramento tantummodo a tribunis rogabantur, ceterum ipsi inter se coniurabant se fugae atque formidinis causa non abituros neque ex ordine recessuros nisi teli petendi feriendive hostis aut civis servandi causa.

  [4] In the consulship of Lucius Paulus and Gaius Varro, soldiers were for the first time compelled to take the ius iurandum. Up to that time the sacramentum was the oath of allegiance administered to them by the tribunes, but they used to pledge each other not to quit the force by flight, or in consequence of fear, and not to leave the ranks except to seek a weapon, strike a foe, or save a comrade.

  [5] Scipio Africanus, cum ornatum scutum elegantius cuiusdam vidisset, dixit non mirari se, quod tanta cura ornasset, in quo plus praesidii quam in gladio haberet.

  [5] Scipio Africanus, noticing the shield of a certain soldier rather elaborately decorated, said he didn’t wonder the man had adopted it with such care, seeing that he put more trust in it than in his sword.

  [6] Philippus, cum primum exercitum constitueret, vehiculorum usum omnibus interdixit, equitibus non amplius quam singulos calones habere permisit, peditibus autem denis singulos, qui molas et funes ferrent; in aestiva exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo portari imperavit.

  [6] When Philip was organizing his first army, he forbade anyone to use a carriage. The cavalrymen he permitted to have but one attendant apiece. In the infantry he allowed for every ten men only one servant, who was detailed to carry the mills and ropes. When the troops marched out to summer quarters, he commanded each man to carry on his shoulders flour for thirty days.

  [7] C. Marius recidendorum impedimentorum gratia, quibus maxime exercitus agmen oneratur, vasa et cibaria militis in fasciculos aptata furcis imposuit, sub quibus et habile onus et facilis requies esset; unde et proverbium tractum est “muli Mariani”.

  [7] For the purpose of limiting the number of pack animals, by which the march of the army was especially hampered, Gaius Marius had his soldiers fasten their utensils and food up in bundles and hang these on forked poles, to make the burden easy and to facilitate rest; whence the expression “Marius’s mules.”

  [8] Theagenes Atheniensis, cum exercitum Megaram duceret, petentibus ordines respondit ibi se daturum. Deinde clam equites praemisit eosque hostium specie impetum in suos retorquere iussit. Quo facto cum quos secum habebat tamquam ad hostium occursum praepararentur, permisit ita ordinari aciem, ut quo quis voluisset loco consisteret; cum inertissimus quisque retro se dedisset, strenui autem in frontem prosiluissent, ut quemque invenerat stantem, ita ad ordines militiae provexit.

  [8] When Theagenes, the Athenian, was leading his troops towards Megara and his men inquired as to their place in the ranks, he told them he would assign them their places when they arrived at their destination. Then he secretly sent the cavalry ahead and commanded them, in the guise of enemies, to turn back and attack their comrades. When this plan was carried out and the men whom he had with him made preparations for an encounter with the foe, he permitted the battle-line to be drawn up in such a way that a man took his place where he wished, the most cowardly retiring to the rear, the bravest rushing to the front. He thereupon assigned to each man, for the campaign, the same position in which he had found him.

  [9] Lysander Lacedaemonius egressum via quendam castigabat. Cui dicenti ad nullius rei rapinam se ab agmine recessisse respondit: “ne speciem quidem rapturi praebeas volo.”

  [9] Lysander, the Spartan, once flogged a soldier who had left the ranks while on the march. When the man said that he had not left the line for the purpose of pillage, Lysander retorted, “I won’t have you look as if you were going to pillage.”

  [10] Antigonus, cum filium suum audisset devertisse in eius domum, cui tres filiae insignes specie essent, “audio”, inquit, “fili, anguste habitare te pluribus dominis domum possidentibus: hospitium laxius accipe”; iussoque commigrare edixit, ne quis minor quinquaginta annos natus hospitio matris familias uteretur.

  [10] Antigonus, hearing that his son had taken lodgings at the house of a woman who had three handsome daughters, said: “I hear, son, that your lodgings are cramped, owing to the number of mistresses in charge of your house. Get roomier quarters.” Having commanded his son to move, he issued an edict that no one under fifty years of age should take lodgings with the mother of a family.

  [11] Q. Metellus consul, quamvis nulla lege impediretur, quin filium contubernalem perpetuum haberet, maluit tamen eum in ordine merere.

  [11] The consul Quintus Metellus, although not prevented by law from having his son with him as a regular tent-mate, yet preferred to have him serve in the ranks.

  [12] P. Rutilius consul, cum secundum leges in contubernio suo habere posset filium, in legione militem fecit.

  [12] The consul Publius Rutilius, though he might by law have kept his son in his own tent, made him a soldier in the legion.

  [13] M. Scaurus filium, quod in saltu Tridentino loco hostibus cesserat, in conspectum suum venire vetuit. Adulescens verecundia ignominiae pressus mortem sibi conscivit.

  [13] Marcus Scaurus forbade his son to come into his presence, since he had retreated before the enemy in the Tridentine Pass. Overwhelmed by the shame of this disgrace, the young man committed suicide.

  [14] Castra antiquitus Romani ceteraeque gentes passim per corpora cohortium velut mapalia constituere soliti erant, cum solos urbium muros nosset antiquitas. Pyrrhus Epirotarum rex primus totum exercitum sub eodem vallo continere instituit. Romani deinde, victo eo in campis Arusinis circa urbem Malventum, castris eius potiti et ordinatione notata paulatim ad hanc usque metationem, quae nunc effecta est, pervenerunt.

  [14] In ancient times the Romans and other peoples used to make their camps like groups of Punic huts, distributing the troops here and there by cohorts, since the men of old were not acquainted with walls except in the case of cities. Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, was the first to inaugurate the custom of concentrating an entire army within the precincts of the same entrenchments. Later the Romans, after defeating Pyrrhus on the Arusian Plains near the city of Maleventum, captured his camp, and, noting its plan, gradually came to the arrangement which is in vogue to-day.

  [15] P. Nasica in hibernis, quamvis classis usus non esset necessarius, ne tamen desidia miles corrumperetur aut per otii licentiam sociis iniuriam inferret, navis aedificare instituit.

  [15] At one time, when Publius Nasica was in winter-quarters, although he had no need of ships, yet he determined to construct them, in order that his troops might not become demoralized by idleness, or inflict harm on their allies in consequence of the licence resulting from leisure.

  [16] M. Cato memoriae tradidit in furto comprehensis inter commilitones dextras esse praecisas aut, si lenius animadvertere voluissent, in principiis sanguinem missum.

  [16] Marcus Cato has handed down the story that, when soldiers were caught in theft, their right hands used to be cut off in the presence of their comrades; or if the authorities wished to impose a lighter sentence, the offender was bled at headquarters.

  [17] Clearchus, dux Lacedaemoniorum, exercitui dicebat imperatorem
potius quam hostem metui debere, significans eos, qui in proelio dubiam mortem timuissent, certum, si deseruissent, manere supplicium.

  [17] The Spartan general Clearchus used to tell his troops that their commander ought to be feared more than the enemy, meaning that the death they feared in battle was doubtful, but that execution for desertion was certain.

  [18] Appii Claudii sententia senatus eos, qui a Pyrrho, rege Epirotarum, capti et postea remissi erant, equites ad pedites redegit, pedites ad levem armaturam, omnibus extra vallum iussis tendere, donec bina hostium spolia singuli referrent.

  [18] On motion of Appius Claudius the Senate degraded to the status of foot-soldiers those knights who had been captured and afterwards sent back by Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, while the foot-soldiers were degraded to the status of light-armed troops, all being commanded to tent outside the fortifications of the camp until each man should bring in the spoils of two foemen.

  [19] Otacilius Crassus consul eos, qui ab Hannibale sub iugum missi redierant, tendere extra vallum iussit, ut immuniti assuescerent periculis et adversus hostem audentiores fierent.