Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756

by David Blackmore

  From the information that can be gleaned from the myriad accounts of battles and skirmishes and from the few drill manuals some conclusions may be drawn about the application of firepower during the English Civil Wars and how it changed during that period. After Edgehill there was a rapid move away from relatively slow and low-intensity fire sustained over long periods of time to delivering fire in sharp, close-range bursts followed by an immediate assault. Not only was this more decisive, frequently in favour of the aggressor, but it also conserved ammunition while maximising effectiveness. At the same time the ability to maintain low-intensity, sustained fire was retained. Although not a battle winner it still had a role to play. That there were measures employed to resupply musketeers during a battle is evidenced by comments concerning the use of reserve musketeers to bring up ammunition and the numerous occasions when careless musketeers blew themselves up when replenishing their powder.

  The test of these developments came during the 1650s and 1660s when English infantry were pitted against foreign infantry who had the benefit of experience gained during the European-wide Thirty Years War. At the battle of the Dunes in 1658 they found themselves allied to the French and fighting the Spanish. The English were posted on the left flank of the French Army and were opposite a large force of Spanish infantry posted on the top of a large sandhill. Lieutenant Colonel Hughes described how the English infantry ‘on hands and knees crept up the hill, and gave the enimies foote two good volleys, and with our pikes forced them to retreat’.64 Morgan, commanding the infantry, described the result of the attack: ‘Immediately the enemy were clear shocked off their ground, and the English colours flying over their heads, the strongest officers and soldiers clubbing them down.’65 The battle was a complete victory for the Anglo-French army. From Hughes’s account it would appear that the infantry fired two three-rank volleys, just as described by Elton.

  Another view of the hand-to-hand combat at the Dunes comes from the future James II, who was commanding an exiled English Royalist army fighting for the Spanish. He led a frontal cavalry charge against Lockhart’s regiment, but was repulsed with considerable losses.66 Shortly after this he led another desperate cavalry charge against Lockhart’s. This time he attacked them in the flank and broke into the regiment.

  Tis very observable that when wee had broken into this Battalion, and were got amongst them, not so much as one single man of them ask’d quarter, or threw down his armes; but every one defended himself to the last: so that wee ran as great danger by the butt end of their muskets, as by the volley which they had given us. And one of them had infallibly knock’d me off from my horse, if I had not prevented him when he was just ready to have discharg’d his blow, by a stroke I gave him with my sword over the face, which layd him along upon the ground.67

  James’s attacks against Lockhart’s were ultimately futile, and did nothing to prevent a French victory, but they did demonstrate the ability of English infantry to defend themselves in line against cavalry attacking them frontally. An attack from the flank, however, was something that would continue to be a threat to infantry in line.

  Following the restoration of the monarchy Charles II sent a small force, many of whom were New Model Army veterans, to Portugal to help in the struggle for independence from Spain.68 Colonel James Apsley gave an account of the actions of the English infantry at the battle of Ameixial in 1663.

  The English marched on shouting as if victorious, but discharged no shot till they came within push of pike of the enemy, and then they poured in their shot so thick upon them that made them quit their ground and fly towards the left wing, leaving their cannon behind them, which were afterwards turned upon them, much to their prejudice. Notwithstanding the rich baggages and coaches and wealthy plunder which were on top of the hill – the English seeing the field not cleared – there was not one man of them stirred out of his rank, but kept close serried together to prevent any second onset, which immediately followed, for they were assaulted front, flank and rear by divers of the enemy’s troops of horse, but having their fire ready at all hands, they quickly quitted themselves of those troops.69

  This account offers nothing new in terms of combat doctrine for English infantry: the infantry fire is delivered at a typically close range and a counter-attack by cavalry is driven off in typical fashion. The interest lies in the reaction of other Europeans to this action. The King of Portugal

  acknowledged that in this year’s great defeat 1663 he gave Don John of Austria neer Ebora, that Brigade of English who servd there, though not much considerable in number, did perform the toughest part of the service, and first shewd them the way of using the Rests of the Musquet to knock down the Enemy; which made the French-men cry out, Faisont comme les anglois, Let’s do as the English.70

  The King’s generals ‘having not been accustomed to see so close an approach before firing, did give up the English for lost and did believe they all had intended to joined with the Castillians, but when they saw their thick firing and the good success the English obtained thereupon, they called us comrades and good Christians’.71

  The implication of these comments, particularly from Portugal, was that the English were doing something new that European enemies could not cope with and which very quickly gained them a considerable reputation. That was, firstly, their particularly effective and aggressive use of firepower that required the soldiers to ignore enemy fire and hold their own fire until they had closed to a range of five to ten yards when they would deliver one or two devastating volleys, depending on whether they were in three ranks or six. The effect on the enemy of the realisation that they had fired but that the English had not and were still advancing must have been considerable. Conversely, the English infantry were encouraged if the enemy fired too soon or inaccurately, as with Birch’s men at Arundel. At the battle of Preston John Hodgson recorded how ‘the enemy let fly at us (a company of Langdale’s men that was newly raised). They shot at the skies, which did so encourage our men, that they were willing to venture upon any attempt.’72

  Secondly, this aggressive firepower was combined with a willingness, if not eagerness, to close to hand-to-hand combat immediately after firing and to club down their opponents with their muskets. This eagerness was evident at the battle of the Dunes when the English infantry cheered at the sight of the enemy and the prospect of the fight, something that seems to have surprised Marshal Turenne, the French commander.73 However, that did not mean that they were incapable of less intense, sustained firing when necessary. Again at the Dunes, when the English infantry first advanced they halted within musket range of the Spanish, who fired two volleys at them that caused a few casualties. Instead of allowing themselves to be drawn into a long-range firefight they prepared for the assault, covered by commanded, or detached, musketeers who kept up a continual fire on the Spanish. Once the main body of infantry was ready to attack, the commanded musketeers opened to let it through.74 Again the attacking infantry ignored the enemy fire in order to get close to deliver their own fire.

  By contrast, there is nothing to suggest that the infantry of other European nations were doing anything other than continuing to use methods of firing similar to those developed at the start of the century and described by Barriffe. The two nations most closely connected to Britain as, variously, friend and foe, were the Netherlands and France. The French continued firing by ranks rotating to the front until they devised a new form of firing by ranks in the 1670s.75 The Dutch also continued with the drill first devised by Maurice of Nassau until the 1670s.76 The Swedes, so influential on tactics in the 1630s, also seem not to have changed until the end of the century when they devised a technique for the offensive known as ‘ga-pa’. This required the infantry, in four ranks, to ignore enemy fire and close rapidly, pausing for the two rear ranks to fire at about fifty paces and the two front ranks firing immediately before contact.77 This could be said to have similarities with the British method of firing three ranks at a time at very close range be
fore closing to hand-to-hand combat, but by the time it was in use British infantry fire techniques had developed further.

  Another feature of what English infantry was doing was their ability to defend themselves against cavalry in line, without the musketeers having to fall back on the pikemen. Although this was done by the Royalist musketeers at Edgehill and the Scots at Marston Moor these are rare occurrences and the preferred response to cavalry of short-range fire and then using clubbed muskets showed a high degree of confidence in firepower.

  Despite the numerous manuals available, such as Barriffe and Elton, it was only in 1676 that the first official drill book for the English army was published. It was titled An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline and was published ‘By His Majesties permission’.78 A later edition, diplomatically titled An Abridgement of the Military Discipline, was published in Edinburgh in 1680 for the use of the Scots army.79 The drill for the musket was still for the matchlock and was unchanged from Elton except for the order it was given in and some of the phrasing. The result was a simpler and briefer set of instructions.

  In describing the various ways of delivering fire the first given was firing by two ranks advancing. This was just the same as described by Barriffe forty-one years earlier, down to the marching to the rear around the outside of the unit, except it did allow for the two advanced ranks to fire together. The manual went on to describe firing to the flanks and rear, which were variations of firing advancing. These were followed by a description of street firing. In this the pikes blocked the street, or any narrow passage, while the musketeers loaded behind them and then, rank by rank, filed up one side of the pikes, formed a rank in front of them, fired and then filed to the rear down the other side of the pikes. This was followed by a method called the ‘Swedes Way’, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter.80 This is similar to the three ranks firing described by Elton and used by the English troops in Holland and Portugal. For the first time there were instructions on how to form a square, in this edition both a hollow and a solid square. In this formation the square of pikemen was surrounded by the musketeers three deep. When attacked by cavalry all three ranks fired together, the front rank of musketeers kneeling, the second stooping and the third standing upright. A section of the manual headed ‘Orders for Battel’ included the direction: ‘As soon as the Battalion comes to thirty Paces distance from the Enemy, let the Musqueteers Fire, the manner of which Firing shall be ordered them before.’81 There were also sections dealing with cavalry drill and camps.

  There were a further seven editions of the Abridgement, the first five with mostly minor alterations and additions.82 In the 1685 editions published in Dublin and London there were major changes, which also appeared in the next and last edition of 1686. Many sections were enlarged with more detailed instructions. Drill for the firelock musket made its first appearance and there were also separate sections for battalions with firelocks and with matchlocks and others dealing with horse grenadiers, garrisons and mounting guards. The most significant changes, however, were in the methods of firing. When firing in square the front rank was to kneel while the other two fired and then stand and fire in its turn.83 Firing by two ranks and the ‘Swedes Way’ disappeared. Instead, when firing to the front, the first five ranks of musketeers were to kneel while the sixth, rear rank fired over their heads. The fifth rank was then to stand and fire, followed by the fourth and so on. After firing, each rank was to reload, the obvious problem being that the sixth rank would be reloaded and ready to fire before the first rank was reloaded. The 1685 Abridgement also claimed that this method of firing could be carried out by two ranks or even three ranks at a time, one kneeling, one stooping and one standing, or the first two stooping, presumably if there were other ranks kneeling in front of them.84 Clearly this method of firing was only possible if the battalion was stationary. When advancing, a battalion was to halt briefly to allow the front rank to fire. After firing, this rank was to file to the rear and the battalion was to march on until its commander halted it again for firing.85 However, the ‘Orders for Battel’ no longer specified any range for opening fire. Another, quite separate, section gave an alternative way of firing. This required the musketeers to be reduced from six ranks to three, but not to fire in three ranks. Instead the first rank was to kneel while the other two ranks fired and then to stand and fire in its turn. After firing, the musketeers were to club muskets and fall on.86 This method retained something of the doctrine of delivering maximum fire, albeit by two ranks rather than three, immediately followed by closing to hand-to-hand combat. Generally, however, these changes appear to have reduced the firepower of the infantry.

  This change in approach to the delivery of fire seems to be down to the adoption of French ideas. A British brigade served in the French army from 1672 to 1678 and a copy of the French drill manual Le Major Parfait was inscribed ‘this book did belong to King James’ and dated 1686.87 Writing in 1670–1 Sir James Turner referred to the French General Martinet describing a way of firing in six ranks: ‘Of six ranks of Musqueteers he would have the first five to kneel; the sixth to stand and fire first, then the fifth to rise and fire next, and consecutively the rest, till the first rank have fired, after which he will have the foremost five ranks to kneel again, till the sixth discharge, if the service last so long.’ Turner expressed severe reservations about firing in this manner, suggesting that it put the men in the front ranks in danger from their own side.88 However, the French writer Demoriet wrote in 1686:

  The best way of firing is by ranks when it is desired to fire in line, parallel to the foe. To do this, and to fire without embarrassment, it is best to fire at the halt without making any move except that needed to make the first five ranks kneel on the ground; and the sixth is that which makes its first fire, the fifth than doing the same and the rest consecutively.89

  The introduction of drill for the firelock musket in the 1685 edition of the Abridgement reflected the increasing use of firelocks by the infantry. This was a process that had been under way from the time of the English Civil Wars. At Cropedy Bridge some of Waller’s Parliamentarian infantry had firelocks and during the night after the battle Richard Coe recorded that ‘our Fire-locks were placed under a hedge, and light matches hung alone on pallisadoes a Musket shot off.’90 At the battle of the Dunes, Morgan had four hundred men armed with firelocks.91 In January 1683 the Coldstream Guards were ordered to replace their matchlocks with firelocks, while in March it was ordered that two companies in each infantry regiment should be armed with firelocks.92 On 21 February 1687 a regulation was issued giving specifications for infantry firearms. The musketeers of the Guards regiments were to have snaphance muskets with a barrel length of forty-four inches, other musketeers were to have matchlock or snaphance muskets with forty-two-inch barrels.93 Fusiliers, a new type of infantry originally formed to guard the artillery, were to have snaphance muskets with forty-four-inch barrels while the grenadiers of infantry regiments were to have carbines with thirty-eight-inch barrels.94 The carbine was traditionally a cavalry weapon with a relatively short barrel. The description of the grenadiers’ muskets as carbines was a reference to the bore size, a carbine having a smaller bore than a musket. Undoubtedly the reduction in barrel length and weight from the musket of the 1640s and 1650s made these muskets easier to handle and thus quicker to load. However, only the fusiliers and grenadiers were to use cartridges, the rest continued using bandoleers.

  The adoption of the firelock, or flintlock, musket and the cartridge by some units in the army would make a difference to the speed of loading of individual soldiers in those units, but in the 1680s the majority of the infantry was still using the matchlock. What was as important as the weapons in use was how the infantry was organised to produce its firepower. In this regard the adoption of French firing methods and the apparent abandonment of the aggressive tactics developed in the 1640s and 1650s would appear to be retrograde changes, but these changes were not to be tested in battle.


  An account of the siege of Tangiers contains some interesting information concerning the supply of ammunition on the battlefield. From 1661 to 1684 England was in possession of Tangiers, part of the dowry of Charles II’s Portuguese bride, Catherine of Braganza.95 During this occupation the garrison was in frequent conflict with the Moors and was besieged in 1680. John Ross described how on one occasion the fighting continued ‘for the space of Seven or Eight hours desperately, and continually firing on both sides from right to left, that it was nothing for a Musketeer to empty three or four Bandeleers notwithstanding of their reliefs every two hours.’96 This represents the expenditure of between thirty-six and forty-eight rounds a man, a considerable amount of ammunition. However, Ross also gave some clues as to how this was managed. On another occasion he recorded that: