The importance of experience was clearly demonstrated during the Jacobite Rebellion. Of the fifteen battalions at Culloden that destroyed the Jacobite army five battalions had been at Dettingen, another eight at Fontenoy and four had been at both. It was also experience that taught that it was better to brave the enemy fire and get close before firing and then closing with the bayonet than to give in to instinct and fire as soon as the enemy was in range. As La Fausille pointed out, it was the apparently more dangerous course of action that led to the fewer casualties.121
What is also clear from both the theory and the practice of British infantry combat doctrine during the War of the Austrian Succession is that it is still basically the same as that developed during the English Civil War. What was also demonstrated during the Jacobite Rebellion was that the infantry were capable of adapting the detailed execution of their doctrine to suit circumstances and the nature of a specific enemy, but that they did so without compromising the underlying principles of maximising short-range fire and following it with effective use of the bayonet. Nor should the importance of the bayonet be underestimated. Perhaps because of the small amount of attention paid to it in the drill books, modern writers appear to have missed the significance of its use and rather emphasised the infantry’s commitment to firepower. That it was an essential element of the way the infantry fought is clearly stated by Duroure in his comment on how it had been intended to fight at Dettingen and La Fausille in his remarks on Laffeldt. What British infantry generally did not do was get into long, sustained firefights where fire alone would decide the outcome, though when necessary they were more than capable of it, as at Laffeldt.
Chapter 7
The Seven Years War in Europe
The mid-eighteenth century saw a considerable amount of theoretical consideration of the conduct of war and tactical doctrine. Authors such as Saxe, Folard and Santa Cruz wrote extensively on their theories of the best way to conduct war. In Europe the military successes of Frederick the Great resulted in the widespread imitation of all things Prussian, particularly in the art of war. In the Seven Years War, 1756–63, it also saw what has been described as the first worldwide war.1 One consequence of this was that for the first time significant numbers of British soldiers found themselves fighting far from their habitual European campaigning grounds. Within Europe, however, the British Army was again pitted against the French. Amongst military historians, even British ones, the emphasis has been on studies of Frederick and his army. Studies of the British Army, in the European theatre, have been largely limited to biographies and narrative histories. In what little analysis there is of combat modern historians, such as McLynn and Black writing about Minden, have again credited its victories to the firepower of the infantry.2
In mid-eighteenth-century Europe the military debate on doctrine was between the advocates of l’ordre profonde, or columnar tactics, and those of l’ordre mince, or linear tactics. Supporters of the column believed in cold steel and shock tactics and included such writers and military theorists as the Spanish Marquis de Santa-Cruz and the French Chevalier de Folard.3 Another influential figure was the very successful French general, Field Marshal Maurice, Comte de Saxe. His Reveries was published in English in 1757, following his death in 1750, although it had been written in 1732 under unusual circumstances.4 Saxe had been extremely ill and suffering from a fever when he put pen to paper to counter the boredom of his illness. Saxe maintained, from personal experience, that infantry fire was largely ineffective, although he shared the belief that fire should be reserved until the enemy had fired first. His preference was for the combination of shock tactics and cold steel, with firepower in a supporting role rather being relied upon to provide victory.5 Ironically he was subsequently an eyewitness to the terrible effectiveness of British infantry firepower at Fontenoy.
Following the War of the Spanish Succession there had been little development in France in infantry tactics and the method for delivering firepower remained unchanged. A form of platoon firing had been introduced in 1707, similar to the alternate form of platoon firing, but it was only used in defensive positions.6 Much of the responsibility for this stagnation lay with the officer class.7 Nosworthy has written that there was an ‘attitude among the nobility making up the officer class. This was the belief that what was most important in an officer was valor and honor; if the troops were brave enough and led by a daring fellow, any situation could be won.’8
The French experience of British firepower in the War of the Austrian Succession, however, made a considerable impression. After Dettingen Marshal Noailes wrote to Louis XV: ‘Their infantry was closed and held themselves brazenly, they conducted a fire so lively and so sustained that the old officers never had seen anything like it, and so superior to ours one could not make any comparison, this resulting from our troops being neither exercised nor disciplined as to be suitable.’9
While the French continued to believe cold steel was their métier they did take steps to improve the infantry’s firepower. They began ‘locking up’ and levelling their muskets according to the range, and in 1750 three methods of delivering fire became regulation: fire by ranks, platoon fire and billebaude, or voluntary fire, where each soldier fired individually in his own time. Fire by ranks was finally abolished in 1753. During the Seven Years War, however, French infantry only occasionally managed to employ platoon fire, usually resorting to voluntary fire.10
Perhaps the most influential figure in the development of warfare in the mid-eighteenth century was Frederick the Great. Initially Fredrick was an exponent of shock action and cold steel, preferring his infantry to attack with the bayonet and without firing. However, during the course of the Seven Years War it was the Prussian infantry’s ability to generate a considerable volume of fire that gained the attention and admiration of British officers. A Dutch officer wrote that the ‘Prussians have certainly brought quick-firing to a greater degree of perfection than the troops of any other nation’, but added that they did not rely on it and preferred the bayonet.11
Among the British admirers of the Prussian army’s firepower was James Wolfe, who, at the beginning of the Seven Years War was the lieutenant colonel of the 20th Foot and effectively in command of it. An order of his from 1753 shows how British officers were determined to do what they could to improve the effectiveness of their battalions’ firepower. At a review of the 20th and the 13th regiments the Duke of Cumberland had expressed the opinion that the 13th fired faster than the 20th. The colonel of the 20th, Lord Bury: ‘Commanded that we practise the same platoon exercise that they do; for to the differences between their platoon exercise and ours, his lordship ascribes their superiority in this point . . . he desires we may begin to practise this platoon exercise as early as possible.’12
By the phrase platoon exercise Wolfe was referring to the process of loading a musket, rather than the manner of delivering fire. Regrettably his order did not explain what it was the 13th were doing that made them faster. It is possible that, as regulations often codified what had already been developed, this was a forerunner of the changes that would be brought in officially with the 1756 platoon exercise.
With the threat of a French invasion of Britain in January 1755 Wolfe wrote a set of instructions for the battalion on how it was to fight if the French landed. These included a clear allusion to the Prussian methods of firing; ‘As the alternate fire by platoons or divisions, or by companies, is the most simple, plain and easy, and used by the best disciplined troops in Europe, we are at all times to imitate them in that respect.’13 It is usually assumed that this is Wolfe the innovator at work, giving him the credit for the introduction of more effective Prussian ideas of delivering fire.14 However, one of the captains of the 20th was the young Duke of Richmond. Richmond had travelled abroad before joining the army and had met Frederick the Great. Although Wolfe’s military junior he was a person of considerable influence, being acquainted with the Duke of Cumberland, with Henry Fox as his brother-in-l
aw and later serving as aide-de-camp to Prince Frederick of Brunswick.15 A clue that Richmond rather than Wolfe may have been behind the innovations introduced to the 20th is found in a letter from Wolfe to Richmond after the latter had become lieutenant colonel of the 33rd: ‘I have great hope of your success in bringing about such reformations, as you think wanting in your Corps . . . & as your Grace has seen & brought away many excellent things from the Armies upon the Continent, they may, by your help, become general among our Troops, & improve them.’16
Alternate fire, as has been shown, was used in the War of the Spanish Succession until superseded by the organisation of platoons into three firings. Cumberland had made use of alternate fire against the Highland charge at Culloden, but thereafter was insistent on the forms of firing laid down in 1748. Of these, firing by subdivisions came closest to alternate fire. However, instead of each subdivision firing in turn from the flanks to the centre, alternating between the left and right halves of a battalion, first the right-hand subdivision of each grand division fired from the flanks to the centre, alternating between the halves of the battalion, and then the left-hand subdivisions did the same.17 There is no known explanation of exactly why Cumberland objected to alternate fire, but that he did was made clear in a letter he wrote when he heard that it was being practised by troops in 1757:
I must desire that you will acquaint Sir John Ligonier, for the Army in general; & to all General officers commanding Corps, Sir John Mordaunt not excepted, that I am surprised to hear that my orders as to the Fireing and Posting of the officers, approved & confirmed by His Majesty, are changed according to the Whim & Supposed Improvements of every fertile Genius; and that therefore, it is my positive order, that . . . they conform exactly to those Standing orders.18
In this letter Cumberland is making reference to the new platoon exercise of 1756 which perpetuated Cumberland’s 1748 firings.19 It is notable that with the Duke of Richmond leaving the 20th in 1756 Wolfe was quick to comply with the new regulations for all that he might complain about them. In his orders for an exercise issued in 1756 he instructed that: ‘The two regiments shall conform to the practice of the army in their firings, and in their telling off the battalion.’ He further added that: ‘The firing of the infantry shall begin by platoons followed by that of subdivisions, then by grand-divisions, as they approach nearer and nearer the enemy, so that this last firing may cease when they are within a few paces of his line.’20
Leaving aside for the moment the arguments concerning alternate fire, Wolfe’s orders of December 1755 also contain a wealth of information on the steps that could be taken to improve a battalion’s general combat readiness and firepower, regardless of how it was finally delivered. There were clear instructions that stressed the importance of both marksmanship and the use of the bayonet: ‘they are to be taught to fire at marks at different distances, and in different situations, to be fully instructed in the use of their bayonet’ and ‘to fire, kneeling and standing, to the front, to the rear, and obliquely, and from one rank to six deep’.21 Quite how firing was to be carried out in six ranks is not explained, but it could simply be a reference to a unit parading six deep before forming into three ranks to fire. An explanation of oblique fire, however, is to be found in The Complete Militia-Man of 1760.22 Firing at an angle to either side of a battalion presented no difficulty for the front- or centre-rank man. In oblique firing, however, the rear-rank man, instead of presenting his musket to the right of the man in front of him, presented his musket to either the right or left of the men standing on either side of the man in front of him. The platoon exercise was to be practised under different circumstances as was the use of the bayonet in attack and defence, suggesting that there was a lot more unofficial drill for the use of the bayonet than that contained in the regulations.23 The use of the bayonet was reiterated when Wolfe ordered: ‘If the firing is ordered to begin by platoons, either from the wings or from the center, it is to proceed in a regular manner, till the enemy is defeated, or till the signal is given for attacking them with the bayonets.’24
The regularity of the firing was also something Wolfe emphasised: ‘There is no necessity for firing very fast; a cool well levelled fire, with the pieces carefully loaded, is much more destructive and formidable than the quickest fire in confusion.’25 Although the Prussian method of delivering fire was admired and imitated it would appear that British officers did not share the Prussian view that speed was everything.
Wolfe also had instructions for dealing with any attack by a column of infantry. He instructed that his soldiers were to carry ‘a couple of spare balls’ and if attacked by a column, and time allowed, that part of the battalion facing the head of the column was to load the extra balls and then when ‘the column is within about twenty yards they must fire with a good aim, which will necessarily stop them a little’.26
One section of Wolfe’s orders that began, ‘There are particulars in relation to fire arms that the soldiers should know’ is of particular interest because of the light it sheds on some of the minutiae of firing a musket. It pointed out that the power and accuracy of a musket did not improve the more powder was used, but that the best size of charge was discovered through experience, something very necessary when soldiers were issued with powder, ball and cartridge paper to make their own ammunition. In relation to this the size of cartridges was also an important matter. Muskets became fouled with powder residue after repeated firing and if a cartridge was too big it could be difficult to ram home the ball. Too large a gap between powder and ball could result in a barrel bursting. Conversely, if a ball was rammed home too hard it could inhibit the powder from burning completely, thus reducing the power of the shot.27
In April 1756 new regulations were issued, first just dealing with the platoon exercise, but subsequently expanded in the 1757 regulations to cover all aspects of drill.28 Under these regulations battalions continued to be organised for firing as had been laid down by the Duke of Cumberland in 1748. There were, however, some significant changes in the way the soldiers loaded their muskets. Previously, after firing, each soldier brought his musket up to the recover position, with the musket held vertically in front of him, the lock at about neck height. The front rank rose from their kneeling position and the middle and rear ranks stepped back to a distance of six feet between each rank before reloading.29 According to the New Exercise the ranks were to be at one pace or two feet distance both to fire and reload. This saved the few seconds of time taken up opening and closing the ranks to load and to fire. Furthermore, instead of first coming to the recover with the musket it was instead to be brought from the present position for firing straight to the position for priming, again saving a few seconds.30
Another difference, albeit an apparently slight one, concerned the use of the rammer. Prior to the issue of the New Exercise of 1756 the 1728 regulations still applied to the loading of a musket, which were themselves unchanged where the rammer was concerned from the 1708 regulations. It took two motions to pull the rammer from the stock of the musket, then after turning it round and shortening it so that the rammer head was at the muzzle, it took three motions to use it to thrust the cartridge down the barrel. This was followed by withdrawing it to an arm’s length and then ramming ‘down the charge with ordinary force’. It took a further three motions to pull the rammer out of the barrel – unless it was a steel one rather than a wooden one, in which case it took only two motions.31 The additional weight of a steel rammer and its greater strength meant that it could be treated with more vigour as it was less likely to break.
The change from wooden to steel rammer was not without its opponents. General Hawley was blunt in his opinion in his article Chaos, which he appears to have written in 1726 when he was Colonel of the 33rd Foot: ‘The iron rammers the Foot are coming into are very ridiculous . . . if they have not some alloy of steel they stand bent and cannot be returned. If they have the least too much steel then they snap like glass; in wet weather or in a fog they
rust and won’t come out.’32
Despite these objections the changeover continued, but was slow as can be seen from an order of 22 April 1748, ‘Lord Harry Beauclerk’s Regt. [31st] to send to the Train [of Artillery] tomorrow to compleat their iron Rammers’; they were to be followed by the Guards and all the line regiments according to seniority.33
The instructions in the 1757 regulations were that the rammer was to be drawn from the musket stock in two motions and then to ‘Ram down the Cartridge quick, and with good force; at the rebound of the rammer catch it close at the muzzle.’ One further motion was sufficient to get it out of the barrel. A footnote in the regulations states: ‘The Firing quick depends chiefly upon the quick Loading, and that chiefly upon the dexterity of drawing the Rammer, the ramming down and returning the Rammer. This Part of the Exercise therefore requires great practice and Attention.’34 This increased vigour and speed in the use of the rammer was only possible because of the introduction of the more robust steel rammer.
A battalion was arranged for firing as had been laid down by Cumberland in 1748, with two platoons of grenadiers on the flanks and the hat companies divided into sixteen platoons, eight subdivisions and four grand divisions. The only difference from the 1748 arrangement was that the grand divisions were now fire units as well as units for manoeuvring. While this New Exercise improved on the platoon exercise it did nothing to address two significant problems that had caused difficulties with the various firings from the 1730s onwards.
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 15