When the form of the firings and the division of a battalion into fourteen platoons had been fixed under Marlborough in 1711, a battalion had consisted of one grenadier company and twelve hat companies. With the division of the grenadier company into two platoons, one on each flank, the hat companies were left to form one platoon each.35 In 1717 the number of hat companies had been reduced to eleven, as was still the case in 1727 when Bland’s Military Discipline was published and the following year when the 1728 regulations were issued. Although Bland contained details for a variety of numbers of platoons the 1728 regulations still specified fourteen.36 In the 1730s, however, the number of hat companies was further reduced to nine, but without any compensatory alteration in the number of platoons. In fact, as has been seen, under the Duke of Cumberland the number of platoons increased so that the nine hat companies had to form sixteen platoons.
The inevitable confusion caused by breaking up the companies into a different number of platoons was further exacerbated by the way the officers of a battalion were distributed around the battalion for command and control purposes. This was done entirely according to seniority and with no regard for the position of the men in an officer’s company. As was spelt out at length in the New Exercise and reinforced with the authority of both Cumberland and the king: ‘By the above scheme the Colonel and Lieutenant colonel are in the Front, and the eldest Captain in the Center of the Rear; a Captain commands each Grand Division, the Senior Lieutenants command every other Subdivision, and the remaining eight platoons are commanded by Lieutenants and Ensigns.’37 The effect of this was that soldiers were frequently formed with men from other companies and more often than not were under the command of officers they did not know and who did not know them.
For some years officers had questioned the existence of two separate sets of arms drill, the manual exercise, which included all the drill involving the musket, and the platoon exercise, which was for use in the platoons, in action, on the battlefield.38 The question asked was why was there a need for two drills? This had the potential to confuse a soldier in battle, particularly as the manual required the soldier to cast about the musket to his left side, whilst the platoon required him to load with the musket to his right. With the issue of the 1756 regulations the manual exercise was restricted to those parts of the musket drill that were not part of the loading and firing drill. Loading and firing were now carried out solely according to the platoon exercise.
The new platoon exercise was not, however, without fault and one change was made between the exercise as first issued in April 1756 and as issued in 1758 in a second, ‘entirely corrected and enlarged’ edition. Initially the position for priming the musket required it to be held at chest height, the muzzle a little higher than the butt and resting in the crook of the left elbow and between the thumb and forefinger of the left hand, the forefinger resting of the feather spring of the lock.39 This had two obvious drawbacks: it was uncomfortable, with the elbow raised unnaturally high and supporting the weight of the musket, and the muskets of each rank were liable to get in the way of the rank in front. In the revised version the musket was held in the left hand at the point of balance with the muzzle raised above the head of the man in front.40
With the ranks standing two feet apart for loading, there was no longer any need for the second and rear rank to close forward in order to lock up for firing. Instead the front-rank man knelt, pushing his right foot backwards three feet. The second-rank man stepped back a foot with his right foot, placing it just behind the right foot of the front-rank man. This allowed him to fire over the head of the front-rank man. The rear-rank man stepped to the right with his right foot so that it was behind the left heel of his right-hand man. This allowed him to aim his musket between the second-rank man to his front and the one to his right.41 The main consequence of these changes was that it became possible to form the men with the elbows just touching, reckoned as twenty-one inches to each file.42 Prior to this the files had been half an arm’s length apart, which is approximately a nine-inch gap.43 The effect of this was to increase the density of the distribution of muskets in a battalion. The effect of the fire of a platoon of thirty-six men was concentrated in seven yards rather than ten as previously. While this would not have resulted in more casualties amongst the enemy it would have concentrated them in a smaller area.
John Houlding states that the 1756 regulations reduced the platoon exercise from sixty-three to twenty-four motions, making it easier to learn and increasing the rate of fire by at least one round every two minutes.44 Houlding does not say what the rate of fire was, and the effect of reducing the number of motions on the loading time was minimal. The loading time of a musket was certainly decreased by the elimination of the ranks opening and closing and the new priming position. But the number of motions that the loading process was divided into made no difference to the requirements of the process itself. This was something that Douglass commented on in the 1740s in relation to a new platoon exercise developed by Colonel Blakeney. He wrote: ‘Lastly the author pretends shortening ye exercise by leaving out ye words of command . . . although ye words are left out yet ye number of motions are not decres’d.’45 In other words, it does not matter how the process of loading a musket is divided up, it is only by such things as priming from the cartridge instead of a flask, going straight to the priming position from the present and by adopting the more robust steel ramrod or by tap-loading that the process can be speeded up.
Despite these regulations reiterating the 1748 firings, there continued to be moves to change to alternate firing, in the face of considerable high-ranking opposition in the shape of the Duke of Cumberland. As has already been discussed in connection with its use at Culloden, alternate fire could deliver the fire of a battalion very quickly.46 An article apparently written in 1757, although not published until 1759, offers a possible explanation for the objections to alternate fire. ‘We have imbibed a notion that our safety depends upon reserving the greatest part of our fire, and therefore we use our men to fire by single platoons.’47 Another officer gave a similar explanation: ‘The square toes of the army tells us that half the regiment ought to be constantly shoulder’d. I have often heard this maxim, but never heard a reason for it.’48 In a reiteration of this the ‘foot exercise’ of 1757 as found in A System of Camp Discipline includes, ‘In the firings by grand Divisions the Officers must give a little more Time betwixt each Fire, that one half of the Battalion may always be loaded.’49 This would seem to chime with the arguments against alternate fire offered by Bland who thought its use left a battalion too open to attack.50
But just as much as alternate fire was objected to, so too were there complaints about the authorised methods of delivering fire. One officer wrote in the London Magazine: ‘But at present five or six different methods of firing in a battalion are constantly taught and practised. But, pray, why so many? Since they cannot all be good.’51 Firing platoon by platoon was objected to on the grounds that it took far too long and left the men standing with muskets loaded waiting their turn. The same officer recorded how high he could count between a platoon finishing loading and its turn to fire coming round. Unfortunately he did not say how fast he counted other than to say it was ‘with moderate quickness’. He claimed he had counted from up to 180 to 260, which, assuming two counts to the second, gives a time delay of from 90 to 130 seconds; even at three counts a second this gives a time delay of at least 60 seconds. He went on to say: ‘The reason generally given for firing by these platoons is that a constant fire should always be kept up.’52
If firing by individual platoons was too slow then firing by firings or subdivisions was also criticised. Here the objections were based upon the difficulty of coordinating the fire of units that were separated from each other, some by the whole width of a battalion. This was thought to be particularly difficult when more than one battalion was firing at a time and even more difficult in battle: ‘In regard to firing by firings, I should think that
it must also be impossible for the scattered divisions, in action, to hear their signals, whether they be given by drums, or voices; and, as the battalion is divided into three fires only, perhaps the fire could not be perpetual.’53
This was something that Wolfe had stated when introducing alternate fire to the 20th:
As the alternate fire by platoons or divisions, or by companies, is the most simple, plain and easy, and used by the best disciplined troops in Europe, we are at all times to imitate them in that respect, making every platoon receive the word of command, to make ready and fire from the officer who commands it; because in battle the fire of the artillery and infantry may render it difficult to use any general signals by beat of drum.54
The officer who questioned firing by platoons in the London Magazine also argued that perpetual fire was possible with subdivisions and even grand divisions, which was eight or four fire units, and which raised the question: why fire by individual platoons? To demonstrate that perpetual firing with four fire units was possible he gave the example of the 2nd Troop of Horse Grenadiers who had done just that.55 This was a particularly interesting example to use as this was a cavalry unit. At that time all cavalry units were required to be able to fight on foot if necessary.56 He also informed his readers that Marshal Saxe said a good soldier could fire four times a minute, or every fifteen seconds, and that the Prussians had eight platoons in a battalion. These, he informs us, were ‘only one word of command behind that which it follows’.57 By this he means that if, as with British infantry, the words of command to fire a volley were ‘make ready, present, fire’ then the officer commanding the second platoon to fire would order ‘make ready’ as the first ordered ‘present’. This would have resulted in something like a two-second delay between platoons firing, meaning that each platoon fired every sixteen seconds.
This officer made the case for a battalion’s fire to be delivered in four firings. Another did the same, but adding that in a firing it was not absolutely necessary for the platoons to fire perfectly together.58 The view that a constant fire could be kept up using four fire units was challenged in an article commenting upon the ‘Observations on the present methods of firing’ article: ‘He imagines, that four platoons are able to keep up a constant succession of firing; whereas he will find, upon experiment, that just double that number will come nearest the mark he aims at, viz. to keep up an uninterrupted succession of fire, and thus to discharge the greatest quantity of ball in the least time possible.’ The author of this article went on the recommend to his readers The Complete Militia-Man, ‘where he will find the best system of firing we remember to have seen’.59
The Complete Militia-Man was an extremely useful publication because it was written for civilians taking commissions in the militia and thus contained explanations that would not have been necessary for regular officers. The criticism of the authorised firings was repeated: ‘In my chapter of the firings, I have differed entirely from the practice of the army, because I was willing to recommend nothing to the Militia, but was essential and practicable upon real service.’60 The anonymous army officer who wrote this was in agreement with the other two equally anonymous officers in stating that fire should be reserved to close range, ‘Experience informs us that the fire of musketry at a distance does very little execution’, but that once firing had started it could not be delivered too quickly. However, he maintained that it was necessary to have eight fire units.
It is scarce possible to reserve your fire too long, before you begin; but I am certain, that after you do begin, it is impossible to make your succession of fire too quick. Let me therefore advise the gentlemen of the Militia, if they ever engage an enemy, not to fire by platoons, but by subdivisions, or companies, provided they have eight companies in their battalion.61
What is noticeable about this discussion in the pages of various English publications is that it is entirely concerned with the best way to deliver a battalion’s fire. There is no discussion anywhere of the relative benefits of firepower as against cold steel, or column versus line. The debates that took place in Europe appear to have completely passed by the British officer corps. Although it is not explicitly stated anywhere, it is tempting to consider that they were perfectly content with their tactical doctrine and it was only improving the execution of that which was of interest to them.
Some officers were so convinced of the difficulties of the official firings and of the superiority of alternate fire that they introduced it to the troops under their command. This is what occurred in 1757 on the Isle of Wight where General Mordaunt was preparing a force for an amphibious assault on France. Two of the battalions under his command were the 20th, under Wolfe, and the 33rd, under the Duke of Richmond. Perhaps under the influence of those two officers, Mordaunt effectively tore up the regulations, as the Duke of Richmond wrote in a letter to his brother:
General Mordaunt has done a thing in his army, which if it is followed by the rest the whole nation will be obliged to him for it. He has dared to follow common sense and to put into execution what every body has long since thought right. He has broke through all the absurd regulations that General Napier has been puzzling the army with since he has been Adjutant General. He has abolished the manual exercise both old and new, and draws up all the regiments as Kingsley’s [20th] used to do, by companies with their own officers.
This is truly great and you have no idea how much it has already improved the other regiments. This is against all order, and some persons are amazed that Sir John Mordaunt will undertake it.62
In doing this Mordaunt was risking the wrath of the Duke of Cumberland, who was campaigning in Germany, albeit with an army that contained no British troops. Not surprisingly Cumberland heard about Mordaunt’s actions and wrote to the Secretary at War in no uncertain terms, insisting that the regulations should be adhered to.63
However, Cumberland had just been badly beaten by the French at the battle of Hastenbeck and at the convention of Kloster Zeven was forced to accept humiliating terms by which his army was disbanded.64 As a result Cumberland resigned all his positions, leaving the way clear for the proponents of alternate fire.
Using Wolfe’s Instructions, Richmond’s letter to his brother, which states categorically that they were drawing up ‘all the regiments as Kingsley’s [20th] used to do’, and The Complete Militia-Man, it is possible to examine precisely how alternate fire was organised and executed and to analyse its effectiveness. In keeping with the Prussian practice the core of alternate fire was eight fire units. In order to simplify the organisation of a battalion these were to be eight of a battalion’s ten companies. Of the other two companies one was the grenadier company. Previously this had been divided into two platoons, one on each flank of the battalion. With the company now the basic fire unit it was no longer possible to divide the grenadiers in that manner. Instead they were posted as a complete company on the right of the battalion whilst the other, tenth company was posted on the left and referred to as a piquet. This term applied to any detachment of soldiers, as Richmond explained in his letter: ‘The whole comp[any] of Grenadiers on the right and a detached company or picquet on the left.’ In addition to a company acting as a single fire unit it was also divided into two platoons that could also be used as fire units if necessary. One further detail, found in both Wolfe’s Instructions and Richmond’s letter, is that each company retained its own officers with it instead of them being distributed around the battalion according to seniority.65
Figure 7.1: The order of firing of eight companies using alternate fire
According to The Complete Militia-Man the first and second companies to fire, being at opposite ends of a battalion, were to ‘make ready’ when the battalion commander instructed the battalion to ‘take care to fire by subdivision’. When the order was given to commence firing the officer commanding the first company, on the right of the battalion, then gave the orders ‘present’, followed by ‘fire’. The next company to the left was to fire thi
rd, after the second company to fire, which was on the other flank. The commander of this third company gave the order ‘make ready’ as soon as the first company fired. On hearing that first company fire the commander of the second company to fire also gave the orders ‘present’ and ‘fire’, at which point the company to its right, which was to be the fourth to fire, would ‘make ready’. Meanwhile, back on the other flank of the battalion, the officer commanding the third company to fire, hearing the second fire, gave the orders ‘present’ and ‘fire’, which was followed by the fourth company firing.66 As the commander of the third company to fire took his timing for the order ‘make ready’ from the first, which was next to him, and had only to listen for the second company firing, this largely dealt with the difficulty of the separation of the successive companies firing.
Rather than having the grenadier company on one flank and a piquet company on the other, as practised in the regular army, The Complete Militia-Man had the grenadier company divided into two platoons, one on each flank. Of these, the right-hand platoon was to ‘make ready’ after the fourth company fired and to fire after the fifth, followed by the grenadier platoon on the left flank. The remaining four companies followed in a like manner.67 It would seem likely, however, that the firing sequence used by the regular battalions did not include the grenadier and piquet companies. According to Richmond the battalions formed with ‘The whole comp[any] of Grenadiers on the right and a detached company or picquet on the left. The remaining eight companies form the battalions and have all their own officers with them, and practise no other firing but by companies from right and left.’68 Wolfe’s Instructions also suggest that the grenadier and piquet companies operated semi-independently of the main body of the battalion, covering and protecting the flanks or pursuing a beaten enemy.69
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 16