Chapter 8
The French and Indian War
Whilst a part of the British Army was campaigning in Europe a significant part was experiencing the less familiar expanses of North America. The nature of the environment required the army to adapt to campaigning over huge distances through wilderness landscapes and presented many new challenges to an army more accustomed to campaigning in Europe.1 It was also faced with fighting against not only French regulars, but a very different enemy in the form of Native Americans (known as Indians at that time) and French-Canadian irregulars. However, despite the very different nature of such warfare, the bulk of the recent scholarly history written about this war is concerned with the narrative of events rather than any analysis of those differences and their consequences. An example of this is Anderson’s Crucible of War.2
Historians of the Seven Years War in North America – or the French and Indian War, as it usually referred to in North America – have tended to look most frequently at the campaign in 1759 under Major General James Wolfe. This is not surprising as it was the decisive campaign that led to not only the defeat of the French and the capture of Quebec, but to the expulsion of France from Canada and the establishment of British control there. In addition to Wolfe’s strategic achievements Stuart Reid has also sought to analyse his wider contribution to the British Army and concludes: ‘In the longer term it was Wolfe’s volley and bayonet tactics, first described in December 1755, which formed the cornerstone of British infantry tactics in the Peninsular War and at Waterloo . . . his influence on the development of the British Army, and in particular on its infantry tactics, was perhaps his real legacy.’3
This assessment of Wolfe has been reiterated most recently by Saul David: ‘He left, moreover, an important legacy: the simple but effective battle tactic – a close quarter volley, followed by a bayonet charge – that British infantrymen would use to sweep all (or almost all) before them for much of the next hundred years.’4
Both writers are referring to Wolfe’s influence on conventional warfare as represented by the battle of Quebec, where, according to Fortescue, the British infantry delivered ‘the most perfect volley ever fired on a battlefield’.5 Wolfe’s part in the development of tactics in the European theatre has already been discussed, but the Quebec campaign was his first independent command where he could influence tactics free of outside interference or objection.
By comparison scant attention has been paid to the demands and challenges of the irregular warfare that had to be faced. The campaigns in North America saw the establishment, albeit temporarily, of the first light infantry units in the British Army. These were raised specifically to counter the threat posed by the Indian allies of the French and their own French-Canadian irregulars. Perhaps because their contribution is not seen as decisive, or perhaps because their existence was temporary, their tactics and methods have been little studied. Fuller’s British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century is dated and demonstrates a limited availability of material.6 Gates’s The British Light Infantry Arm touches on the subject in his first chapter, but the French and Indian War is outside the main scope of his work.7 More recently there has been a useful publication by Osprey, but the limited size of this publication means that it can only serve as an introduction to the subject.8
The most comprehensive recent treatment of the development of light infantry and Indian fighting is in Brumwell’s Redcoats. He deals with all aspects of the war in North America and addresses the nature of irregular warfare and the tactical evolution of the redcoats.9 His account of the development of British light infantry and its experiences is thorough, but in keeping with most military historians he neglects the procedures by which this form of warfare was conducted, making it difficult to identify any underlying tactical doctrine. He writes: ‘The mixture of regular and irregular warfare which characterised these campaigns demanded diverse combat skills; the resulting fusion of Old and New World techniques created troops capable of fighting in both the conventional fashion of Flanders and in a more flexible manner that owed little to the traditions of Dettingen and Fontenoy.’10
What he does not do is give any description of those combat skills and techniques or the doctrine underpinning them, although he does claim that the ‘“American Army” acquired an ethos and tactical doctrine that set it apart from other British and European armies’.11
It was clearly understood that the nature of warfare against Indians was different from anything experienced in Europe or even the Highlands of Scotland. What would seem not to have been appreciated was just how different it was. Writing after the war, Colonel (later Brigadier) Henry Bouquet summarised the tactics of the Indians:
The first, that their general maxim is to surround their enemy.
The second, that they fight scattered, and never in a compact body.
The third, that they never stand their ground when attacked, but
immediately give way, to return to the charge.12
This type of warfare was far removed from Europe where solid lines of infantry three deep and manoeuvring in an open landscape could fire shattering volleys at ranges of thirty yards.
Just how different this was became apparent when Major General Braddock’s expedition against Fort DuQuesne was thoroughly defeated on 9 July 1755 at the battle of Monongahela. Braddock was aware that the army’s usual tactics would need to change in order to combat the Indian threat and he took steps to do that. In March he had issued instructions on how the battalions were to conduct their firing.
One company was nominated as a second grenadier company and was to be posted on the left of the battalion while the grenadier company took the right. The eight remaining companies were retained intact and either formed single fire units or were divided into two platoons. When firing, the right hand of the eight companies fired first, followed by the left-hand company, and so on, alternating right and left towards the centre. The two grenadier companies fired last, but not until the first companies to fire were loaded again. The firing was to be ‘as fast as possible’. Orders were to be given by the officer commanding a company.13 This method of delivering fire was nothing more or less than the alternate-fire system that had been introduced by Wolfe to his regiment just two months earlier and is here in use some three years before Mordaunt introduced it to his command on the Isle of Wight.
On the march and in order to secure the numerous wagons from attack by Indians the main body of the infantry marched on each side of the wagons, company by company and in two files. In case of attack the infantry were to simply face outwards forming a two-deep line on each side of the road. An advance guard preceded the main body. A few miles short of Fort DuQuesne the advance guard was engaged by a force of Indians and French infantry. ‘The French . . . threw themselves behind trees as soon as they saw the English & began to fire their muskets. The Indians . . . took up their positions at the base of each tree with their customary shrieks.’14
After giving an initial platoon volley the officer commanding the advance guard,
observing their Confusion and being apprehensive of a second Attack of the same kind, immediately ordered the Men to draw back, and posted them singly behind Trees, in the Indian Manner; where probably they would not only have maintained themselves, but might have done execution against the Enemy, had not the General, who came up from the Rear upon the first Fire, upbraided them for Cowards, and with his Sword drawn forced them in a Manner to return to their Ranks.15
The consequence of this was that rather than holding their ground until the main body could be organised to meet the attack, the advance guard and their supports were driven back onto the main body, causing considerable confusion. The Indians then encircled the whole British column and continuously fired from cover at the British infantry standing in the open in rank and file.
They having always a large marke to shoute at and we having only to shoute at them behind trees or laid on their Bellies. We was drawn up in large Bodies together,
a ready mark. They need not have taken sight at us for they Always had a large Mark, but if we saw of them five or six at one time [it] was a great sight and they Either on their Bellies or Behind trees or Running from one tree to another almost by the ground.16
Some attempts were made to close with the Indians with the bayonet, but these came to nothing as the Indians shot down the officers and avoided any close contact. Some of the American provincial troops took cover behind trees to return the Indian’s fire, but many of these were shot from behind by the wild volleys that came from the British infantry whenever they caught a glimpse of a target.17 One British soldier claimed that it was these Americans who caused what casualties were inflicted on the enemy.18
Remarkably the British infantry held their ground for about three hours, only finally breaking when they ran out of ammunition.19 According to a contemporary newspaper report the soldiers told their officers that it was pointless shooting at trees and bushes, but that they would fight their enemy if they could see him.20 The French and Indians had also made a point of picking off the officers, which contributed to the lack of fire control and the general state of confusion and, ultimately, panic.21 As the French themselves reported: ‘The Indian mode of fighting is entirely different from that of us Europeans, which is good for nothing in this country. The enemy formed themselves into battle array, presented a front to men concealed behind trees, who at each shot brought down one or two, and thus defeated almost the whole of the English.’22
In the aftermath of this defeat one British officer complained that Braddock had given orders to fire by platoon, which was inappropriate for the situation they had found themselves in.23 Braddock was mortally wounded in the battle and unable to defend himself. However, this lack of control of the infantry’s fire, along with an ignorance of the nature of the enemy, was also identified by the French as contributing to the result. ‘If on terrain without real problems, such a disaster could happen to brave and well-disciplined troops, through an inability to direct fire & ignorance of the nature of the enemy they were engaging, then this provides a good lesson that these two aspects of warfare should receive close attention.’24
At the time much of the blame for the defeat was laid on the behaviour of the rank and file.25 Wolfe, still in Britain, wrote that ‘the cowardice and ill-behaviour of the men far exceeded the ignorance of the chief.’26 Stanley Pargellis has argued more recently that the blame lay with Braddock’s failure to apply basic military precautions when on the march through enclosed country, be it in Europe or North America. This allowed the column, in the first instance, to be surprised and then to be unable to react correctly to the attack.27 However, even if the British had not been surprised and had been able to form an ordered two-deep line against the attack, it is unlikely that they would have defeated the French and Indians. As the two French reports quoted above make clear, European-style combat procedures were rendered impotent in the face of the irregular procedures. It was impossible for the British infantry to apply their traditional combat doctrine of first disrupting the enemy with effective musketry and then dispersing him by means of the bayonet. Monongahela was a victory of individual aimed fire from cover over massed volleys delivered from in the open.
The effectiveness of irregular warfare was also demonstrated a few months later on 8 September 1755 in an engagement between British provincial forces and a French force of regulars, Indians and Canadians. The French were making a pre-emptive strike against a force advancing to attempt the capture of Fort St Frederic. The ensuing fight was a long, confused affair that ended in victory for the provincial forces and the establishment of Fort William Henry while Fort St Frederic remained in French hands. During the battle the irregulars on both sides made full use of the available cover, even the French regulars: after firing, a few platoons ‘went into the Indian way of Fighting, squatting below the Shrubs, or placing themselves behind the Trees’.28
The British Army’s response to the difficulties of this sort of warfare was twofold. One measure was to endeavour to train the regular battalions in the rudiments of irregular warfare or bush fighting. The second measure was the introduction of their own light troops to take on the French irregulars on their own terms. One of the first and perhaps the most famous of these were Rogers’ Rangers. This was not a regular British Army unit, but formed of Anglo-Americans. It was one of several ranger units, most of which proved themselves unreliable and ill-disciplined. Consequently British commanders determined to form their own light infantry subject to regular army discipline. However, many of the officers of the regular light infantry served with Rogers and learnt their bushcraft from him. Rogers subsequently wrote down his rules for irregular warfare and these can be said to have formed the basis for the operational methods of British light infantry.
He first required that rangers carried sixty rounds of powder and ball. This was necessary because they spent considerable periods away from bases where they might resupply. He wrote extensively about the tactics of warfare in the woods, including a number of points that dealt specifically with combat methods. If the enemy was firing, he advised: ‘fall or squat down, till it is over, then rise and discharge at them.’ When advancing against an enemy his instructions were for the rangers to keep well apart from each other and move from tree to tree in two lines, the first some ten or twelve yards ahead of the other. After the first line fired the second was to pass through and fire in turn while the first line reloaded. By this means the two lines could advance whilst keeping up a constant fire on the enemy. If receiving an attack his instructions were: ‘In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire until they approach very near, which will then put them into the greatest surprise and consternation, and give you an opportunity of rushing upon them with your hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.’29 There are two features of these instructions that stand out. One was the requirement for keeping up a constant fire; the other was the use of firepower backed up by close-quarter combat.
Captain Knox added further details about the ammunition of the rangers. He described them as carrying a bag which ‘contains bullets, and a smaller shot, of the size of full-grown peas: six or seven of which, with a ball, they generally load’. This was also a practice of the French irregulars who are described as always loading with six or seven ‘buck shot’ as well as a normal ball.30
Bouquet also had his views on training light infantry: ‘They will be taught to handle their arms with dexterity; and without losing time upon trifles, to load and fire very quick, standing, kneeling or lying on the ground. They are to fire at a mark without a rest, and not suffered to be too long in taking aim.’31 The emphasis had shifted to the effectiveness of the fire of the individual rather than a battalion, company or platoon. This new emphasis was also seen in other proposals concerning the development of light infantry.
One of the first proposals for forming light infantry from amongst the regular infantry came from Major George Scott in early 1758. He wrote to Lord Loudon, who had arrived in North America in July 1756, replacing Braddock as commander-in-chief, with proposals on how they should be equipped. He recommended a firelock that was shorter and lighter than the standard Long Land Pattern musket with its forty-six-inch-long barrel. Apart from being less of a burden a shorter, lighter musket was also quicker to bring to the aim and easier to keep on target, thus improving accuracy, particularly against briefly seen or moving targets. Furthermore the barrel was to be blackened, which served two purposes. It prevented the position of the firer being given away by sunlight reflecting off it and it also prevented reflected sunlight dazzling the firer. The musket was still to be provided with a bayonet, but it was to be short and light and in the form of a knife, making it a dual-purpose item. Scott maintained that in the absence of cavalry in North America it did not need to be as long as the usual seventeen inches. The advantage of the lighter bayonet was the reduction in weight of the musket at the muzzle end, thus improving aiming.
&nb
sp; Ammunition, in the form of cartridges, was to be carried in a tin cartridge box that would protect the ammunition from the damp. In a significant change Scott proposed a return to using priming horns, abandoned in the 1740s, instead of priming from the cartridge. These were to be filled with finer pistol powder, His argument was that the finer powder was easier to ignite than the slightly coarser powder used in muskets and that priming from a horn would avoid any loss of powder from the cartridge, ensuring the musket got a full load. He claimed that as much as half the powder in a cartridge was sometimes lost in priming, with the consequence that the resultant shot had neither its intended force nor range.32 The return to the use of priming flasks could be seen as a retrograde step, their abandonment had speeded up the loading process. However, since, according to Bouquet, light infantry were to load without ‘losing time upon trifles’ and were not handicapped by standing in closely packed ranks and files it is possible that there was no real loss of speed in reloading.
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 18