The rate of fire or of reloading is difficult to determine; there is no record of any officer making use of a watch to time the firings. However, taking the various comments suggesting that four rounds a minute was possible, that eight fire units could keep up a continual fire and considering the description of the giving of orders for alternate fire in The Complete Militia-Man, some estimation is possible.70 Four rounds a minute suggests a reloading time of fifteen seconds, but a unit had to be reloaded before an officer could give the first order of ‘make ready’, followed by ‘present’ and ‘fire’. Allowing time for the front rank to kneel, this sequence could take approximately five seconds, reducing the loading time to ten seconds, which would seem extremely difficult to achieve.
If the firing sequence in eight fire units is considered, the first company to fire was expected to make ready again after the seventh company had fired so that it could fire again after the eighth. This gave it the six intervals between it firing and the subsequent six companies firing in which to reload. Each interval was long enough for a company commander to give the orders ‘present’ and ‘fire’ and for his company to do just that. It was also long enough for a company to make ready, with the front rank kneeling, the second and rear ranks taking their proper position and the muskets being cocked. If this interval was three seconds, that gave each company eighteen seconds from firing before it had to be reloaded again and perpared to ‘make ready’.
These figures are, of course, approximations, but they do suggest strongly that a battalion was quite capable of delivering all of its fire approximately every twenty seconds. Allowing for a battalion on campaign being a little under its official establishment of seventy men to a company, perhaps sixty men, then eight companies would discharge 480 rounds. Standing in three ranks with a frontage of twenty-one inches a man and with a three-foot interval between companies, they had a total frontage of approximately one hundred yards. If the rate of hits already seen at Culloden and Fontenoy is allowed, then a battalion of British infantry employing eight companies firing alternately, could, at the preferred range of thirty yards, inflict between 100 to 120 casualties on an enemy every twenty seconds. That is one casualty for every yard of frontage every twenty seconds.
Arguing against the possibility of this sort of effectiveness a Dutch officer wrote:
It is observed that, at the battle of Fontenoy, the French had about six thousand killed and wounded. Now, on the side of the allies . . . there were but twenty thousand combatants. It is known, these fired away all their cartridges, to the number, perhaps, of thirty-six each man: but we will suppose each man fired no more than twenty: here were four hundred thousand shot discharged. And if, at the same time, we suppose, that only five hundred men suffered from the artillery, it is plain, here were seventy-three shot to one person killed or wounded. If we consider, besides, how many might suffer from the bayonet, the disproportion will also be considerably increased.71
This argument, however, was effectively dealt with by the author of The Complete Militia-Man.
First, let me assure you that the fire of a regiment, unless it be very near, is far from being so terrible as those who are not experienced are apt to imagine. One would think that almost every ball must do execution; but this is so far from being the case, that, in a general engagement, not one ball in a hundred does any mischief, till the armies come within twenty or thirty paces of each other. For this reason, if you have any desire to triumph over your enemies, or the least regard for your own safety, you will be very cautious not to throw away your fire.72
The inaccuracy of musket fire at any sort of distance was well known and was highlighted by La Fausille as contributing to the defeat of the French during the War of the Austrian Succession.73 The British infantry was clearly still adhering to the doctrine of close-range fire delivered with efficiency and accuracy. Whilst other nations might have been debating the competing merits of firepower and cold steel, British infantry was still balancing firepower with the use of the bayonet. Wolfe’s comments have already been noted above.74 The Complete Militia-Man contained directions to march up close to the enemy – in this case specifically naming the French – fire and then ‘charge your bayonets, march briskly up, and rush, like lions, into the broken ranks of the enemy.’75
In connection with the bayonet it has been suggested that Wolfe was responsible for the introduction to the British Army of a new form of bayonet drill.76 Rather than being held breast high as the pike had been, this new method saw the bayonet held much more comfortably at waist height. Unlike alternate fire there was no mention of this in direct connection with Wolfe, or Richmond, in any contemporary writing. However, it did make an appearance in several of the manuals that were written specifically for militia units. One of these was written for the Norfolk Militia and in his introduction its author acknowledged the assistance received from officers of Wolfe’s and Richmond’s regiments.77 It was not until the 1764 regulations were issued that this bayonet drill became authorised for use by the regular battalion, although it would seem unlikely that something like this was in use by the militia, but not the regulars.
On the question of dealing with cavalry the Duke of Richmond’s letter tells us that amongst other things General Mordaunt abandoned ‘such absurdities as squares etc.’78 Wolfe’s Instructions are silent on the matter. The Complete Militia-Man repeats advice that had been given since Mackay’s Rules.79
If ever you are attack’d by cavalry, your safety, as in the former case, depends entirely on reserving your fire; for if you should foolishly throw it away whilst they are at a distance, they will instantly put spurs to horses, and drive in among you: but if, on the contrary, you do not fire at all, you may be certain they will never come within fifty yards of you with their whole body.80
In 1755, at the same time as the British Army had been striving to improve its platoon exercise, the French Army also further developed its own version of platoon firing. A French battalion was to form in three ranks rather than four and its twelve companies were divided into six platoons that fired alternately from the centre to the flanks. There was to be a two-second interval between each platoon firing. The French, however, saw platoon firing as an essentially defensive tactic, continuing to prefer to rely on shock and cold steel in the offensive.81 Consequently they did not develop the aggressive combination of firepower and the bayonet in the attack used by British infantry. There was also an apparent problem with the quality of French musketry. A British paymaster, George Durant, wrote that the French were bad marksmen because they believed a musket ball in flight falls. As a consequence they had a tendency to aim high. Whilst this is true with regard to the laws of gravity, it was in fact necessary to aim low with a musket – and the closer the target, the lower the aim. This was because a musket kicked up as it was fired, throwing the shot high.82 Durant went on to write that consequently few British soldiers were hit below the chest while muskets being carried at the shoulder were hit above soldiers’ heads.83 In Germany in August 1761 Corporal Todd of the 30th described an attack against French infantry who ‘fired a whole Volley upon us . . . but scarce Kill’d a man, their shott flying over us’. He continued to describe how, in their normal manner, the British battalion continued to advance until within pistol shot before firing, which caused the immediate retreat of the French.84
In Germany in 1759 British infantry was ordered by Lord George Sackville to form according to the 1749 firings, in sixteen platoons, exclusive of grenadiers. At first sight this appeared to be a retrograde step, but the orders added further details. Each company was to be a subdivision, or two platoons, with two companies to a grand division. This organisation is not possible with an establishment of nine hat companies, unless the extra company was deployed as a piquet. That these orders established, as at least local regulations, the organisation and firings practised under General Mordaunt is clear from the part dealing with firing: ‘It is recommended to the commanding officers to practice chiefly t
he alternate firing, firing from right and left by grand divisions, subdivisions and platoons. His Lordship expects that the regiments will strictly conform to this order and he shall not see for the future one regiment practising differently from another, and of course producing confusion in the service.’85 It was with this organisation that British infantry entered the Seven Years War in Europe.
Leaving aside the various British amphibious raids on the French coast, there was, initially, limited participation in the Seven Years War in Europe by British infantry. Their first engagement was at Minden where the six British battalions that won the day were the only British infantry present. At Corbach just four battalions were engaged, whilst at Warburg it was primarily the British cavalry that was engaged. At Klosterkamp there were eight battalions with two grenadier battalions formed by combining the grenadier companies of those battalions. At both Vellinghausen and Wilhelmsthal there were seventeen British battalions, but some sixty or more other allied battalions. Despite this numerical inferiority it is arguable that in all their engagements British infantry punched above their weight.
At the Battle of Minden on 1 August 1759 the six British battalions present performed in such a manner that their feats that day are still annually celebrated by their descendant units. An allied Army under Prince Frederick of Brunswick had lured a French army into battle on unfavourable ground. Whilst the battle was still in its early stages the British infantry, in the centre of Frederick’s army, misunderstood their orders and immediately set off, supported by three Hanoverian battalions, marching directly towards the centre of the French army. The 12th, 37th and 23rd regiments formed the first line, followed by the 25th, 51st and 20th with the Hanoverians on their left flank. In an unusual deployment they were faced by sixty-three squadrons of cavalry formed in three lines in the centre of the French army.86 A detailed account of what followed was given by a British officer in the 12th, which, as the front right battalion, saw the hardest of the fighting: ‘When we got within about 100 yards of the Enemy a large Body of French Cavalry galloped boldly down upon us; these our Men by reserving their fire until they came within 30 yards immediately ruined.’87
Yet again the infantry held their fire until the enemy were within the preferred range of thirty yards. It would be reasonable to assume that under such circumstances the battalions fired all their companies together, something that appears to have been practised even if it does not appear in the regulations. Corporal Todd reported practising all the usual forms of firing and ‘vollies’.88 If not a reference to whole battalion firings it is difficult to know what else this might refer to.
The British battalions were then charged by fresh cavalry, the Gens d’Armes, who ‘we almost immediately dispersed without receiving hardly any mischief from the harmless Creatures’. The next French attack was made by seventeen infantry battalions, which the 12th and 37th wheeled to face. There followed a sustained firefight for about ten minutes before the French were driven off.89 It is highly improbable that the British infantry fired without a break for ten minutes. At three or four rounds a minute that would have used up most, if not all, the ammunition carried by the infantry, usually twenty-four rounds a man. It is more likely that they fought a quick succession of firefights as enemy battalions were beaten and replaced by others. The next French attack was carried out by battalions of grenadiers and the description sheds light on the French infantry’s apprehension about getting into a firefight with British infantry.
The next who made their appearance were some Regts of the Grenadiers of France, as fine and terrible looking Fellows as I ever saw. They stood us a tug; not with standing we beat them off to a distance, where they galded us much they having rifled barrels, and our Musquets would not reach them. To remedy this we advanced, they took the hint, and ran away.90
A final attack– the officer of the 12th said by infantry, others cavalry, and perhaps some confusion is understandable in the light of what had passed – partially broke the front three battalions, but was beaten by the three battalions in the second line. By the end of the battle the 12th had suffered 302 rank and file killed and wounded out of 480 and eighteen officers killed and wounded out of twenty-seven. ‘With this remnant we returned again the charge, but to our unspeakable joy no opponents could be found.’91
There is insufficient information to analyse this action in terms of rounds fired, rates of fire and casualties caused. There is no doubt, however, that it represented an unheard-of achievement by infantry. The French general, Contades, summarised what had had happened and its implications for the French Army:
As to the cannon, those of our enemy fired quicker, and did more execution than ours. Our musquetry, indeed, fired faster and oftener, being discharged sooner, and at a greater distance; but the enemy reserved their fire till they discharged it in our teeth; by which means they did thrice the execution; and then rushing in with their bayonets, prevented our troops from giving any more; and I cannot help mentioning, what if I had not seen it, I should have thought incredible, that one single column of infantry penetrated and broke through three lines of cavalry. This column consisted principally of the English regiments, whose intrepid behaviour in this battle, it will be prudent to conceal from the troops designed to invade Great Britain from France, less they should be intimidated by it.92
This is a clear recognition of the battlefield doctrine of British infantry, an admission of its capabilities and a confession that the French could not match it.
The battles of Corbach, Emsdorf and Warburg in 1760 are best known for the successful exploits of the British cavalry, which more than made up for Minden, where they had sat inactive while the French army fled the field. Their commander, Lord Sackville, was subsequently court-martialled and cashiered. Later that year, on 16 October 1760, at Klosterkamp an attempt to launch a surprise attack on the French ultimately failed, but only after the allied infantry involved had expended all their ammunition. In this engagement the fire of the British infantry was said to have been ‘so rapid and deadly that three French brigades were almost wiped out of existence’.93 The engagement lasted from before dawn until noon. One small hint as to how the British infantry at least might have been able to sustain a fight for so long when the standard issue of ammunition was twenty-four rounds comes from the diary of Corporal Todd. Prior to taking the field in 1761 he recorded how, on 1 June, after going through all the ‘firing Motions’ and having all the arms and ammunition checked it was ordered that more cartridges should be made up so that every man would have sixty rounds.94 On 9 June it was further ordered that the battalions should have ‘plenty of Ammunition ready made up in the Tummerils [tumbrils]’.95 These were in addition to the sixty carried by each man, as in August Todd recorded thirty being taken from each man, ‘they having carried with them 60 as before Order’d’.96 Whether carrying sixty rounds had been the case at Klosterkamp or was a consequence of it is unclear.
On the evening of 15 July 1761 Corporal Todd and his battalion were engaged in the opening round of the battle of Vellinghausen. The French attacked the Marquis of Granby’s British corps and Todd described how the eight British battalions ‘performed wonders & Maintain’d their ground against four times their Number’.97 No doubt their sixty rounds a man helped. The French attack on the allied army under Ferdinand the following day has been described as ‘one of the feeblest ever fought by the French army’.98 Todd, however, has left some interesting detail about the fight seen from his level. After the first evening’s fighting he recorded that they were ordered to check their muskets and to ensure every man had a good flint and was properly loaded. Much of the fighting the following day was in woods and amongst thick bushes where they had frequent recourse to their bayonets.99
The Seven Years War came to an end in 1763 and in 1764 a new set of regulations were issued for the British Army. There were some minor changes to the loading and individual firing in the platoon exercise. The use of the rammer was further quickened as it was drawn
from the stock in two motions, turned and put into the barrel without first being shortened against the body. After ramming it was similarly just turned and replaced in the stock without shortening.100 It would appear that having the men in each rank standing so close that they touched the men beside them left too little room for ease of loading. The files were now to be four inches apart while the distance between the ranks for firing remained at two feet.101 On the order ‘make ready’ the second-rank men stepped slightly to their right, only moving their right foot. After firing they brought the left foot towards the right for reloading. The rear rank took a larger step to the right and followed it with the left foot. They also stayed stepped to the right to reload, but after reloading both ranks stepped back to the left behind the front-rank men.102 While this meant that each file had a frontage of twenty-five inches instead of twenty-one it probably made loading easier and thus slightly quicker. This was still closer together than had been the case during the War of the Austrian Succession.
With regard to the instructions for delivering the fire of a battalion, the use of firing by individual platoons and by firings had disappeared. Firing was now limited to alternate fire by subdivisions – exactly as described by Wolfe, Richmond and in The Complete Militia-Man – or firing by grand divisions. The only difference was that the number of hat companies was reduced to eight after the war and the grenadier company was once again divided into two platoons, one on each flank.103
During the Seven Years War in Europe the infantry of the British Army had continued to demonstrate their effectiveness and to seek to improve their performance. This was not done, however, as a result of any great debate about how battles should be fought, whether cold steel was superior to firepower, or column to line – the doctrinal debates in Europe seem to have passed by almost unremarked. Instead there was a continuing adherence to the doctrine of close-range fire followed by the prompt and effective use of the bayonet. In doing so they changed the method of delivery back to something like it had been at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, which was alternate fire by companies. Bland’s objection to this had been that it left parts of a battalion unloaded and thus too exposed to attack.104 The introduction of firings had meant that a part of a battalion’s fire was always available along the whole front. Changes in drill and the adoption of other measures, such as the steel rammer, had the effect of reducing the loading time to the point where the dangers highlighted by Bland were neutralised. This allowed a return to the much simpler alternate fire method, which was far easier to control and less likely to break down in confusion. This in turn increased the effectiveness of that fire.
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 17